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17

History of The Peninsular War.

BY

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OF THE CYMMBODORION, OF THE MASSACHUSETTS HISTORICAL
SOCIETY, &c.

IN THREE VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

LONDON:

JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE-STREET.

1823.

NEW YORK
PUBLIC
LIBRARY

LONDON:

PRINTED BY THOMAS DAVISON, WHITEFRIARS.

ROYAL
SOCIETY
OF
LONDON

TO

THE KING.

SIR,

It is with peculiar fitness, as well as pleasure, that I inscribe to your Majesty a History of the most glorious war recorded in the British annals.

When the Regency devolved into your hands, the fortunes of our allies were at the lowest ebb, and neither arts nor efforts were spared for making the spirit of this country sink with them. At that momentous crisis every thing depended, under Providence, upon your single determination; and to that determination Great Britain is beholden for its triumph, and Europe for its deliverance.

To your Majesty, therefore, this faithful History is offered, as a portion of the tribute due to a just, magnanimous, and splendid reign, and as a proof of individual respect and gratitude from

Your Majesty's
Most dutiful subject and servant,

ROBERT SOUTHEY.



ROY VAN
ZAND
VANDEN

PREFACE.

EIGHT years have now elapsed since the conclusion of that memorable war which began upon the coast of Portugal, and was brought to its triumphant close before the walls of Toulouse. From the commencement of that contest I entertained the hope and intention of recording its events, being fully persuaded that, if this country should perform its duty as well as the Spaniards and Portuguese would discharge theirs, the issue would be as glorious as the cause was good. Having therefore early begun the history, and sedulously pursued it, it would have been easy for me to have brought it forth while the public, in the exultation of success, were eager for its details. But I was not so unmindful of what was due to them and to the subject; and I waited patiently till, in addition to the means of information which were within my reach, more materials should be supplied by the publications of persons who had been engaged in the war, and till time enough had been allowed for farther consideration and fuller knowledge to correct or confirm the views and opinions which I had formed upon the events as they occurred.

I would have waited longer if there had been any reasonable prospect that the history undertaken by order of the Spanish Government would have been completed. The single volume

which has appeared is written with great ability ; and if it had proceeded farther, I might have derived more advantage from it than from any, or all other publications upon the subject. But its progress has been interrupted by the revolution in Spain ; and the aspects in that country are so dark, that there can be little hope of seeing it resumed.

A list of the printed documents which have been consulted in this work will be appended to the last volume. For the private sources of information which have been open to him, the author must content himself here with making a general acknowledgement. They are such as might entitle him to assert, that since the publication of Strada's *Decades*, no history composed by one who was not an actor in it, has appeared with higher claims to authority.

There is a danger in attempting stories of prime importance, lest they should excite expectations which it is fatal to disappoint, and yet impossible to fulfil. Great talents have sunk, and lofty reputations have been wrecked in such attempts. I might well be apprehensive for my own fortune in the present undertaking, were it not for a belief, that in the variety of details which this narration contains, in the importance of its events, in its splendid examples of heroism and virtue, and, above all, in the moral interest that pervades it, the reader will find attractions which may compensate for any defects in the execution of so arduous a work.

KESWICK, July 22, 1822.

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ERRATA.

Page 519, for *Loion* read *Loison*.

662, ... *eighty* ... *ffty*.

664, ... *Alsfeld* ... *Ahlefeldt*.

HISTORY

OF THE

PENINSULAR WAR.

THE late war in the Peninsula will be memorable above all of modern times. It stands alone for the perfidiousness with which the French commenced it, and the atrocious system upon which they carried it on. The circumstances of the resistance are not less extraordinary than those of the aggression, whether we consider the total disorganization to which the kingdom of Spain was reduced; the inveterate abuses which had been entailed upon it by the imbecility, misrule, and dotage, of its old despotism; the inexperience, the weakness, and the errors, of the successive governments which grew out of the necessities of the times; or the unexampled patriotism and endurance of the people, which bore them through these complicated disadvantages. There are few portions of history from which lessons of such political importance are to be deduced; none which can more powerfully and permanently excite the sympathy of mankind, because of the mighty interests at stake. For this was no common war, of which a breach of treaty, an extension of frontier, a distant colony, or a disputed succession, serves as the cause or pretext: it was as direct a contest between the principles of good and evil as the elder Persians, or the

Manicheans, imagined in their fables: it was for the life or death of national independence, national spirit, and of all those holy feelings which are comprehended in the love of our native land. Nor was it for the Peninsula alone that the war was waged: it was for England and for Europe; for literature and for liberty; for domestic morals and domestic happiness; for the vital welfare of the human race. Therefore I have thought that I could not better fulfil my duties to mankind, and especially to my own country, nor more fitly employ the leisure wherewith God has blessed me, nor endeavour in any worthier manner to transmit my name to future ages, than by composing, with all diligence, the faithful history of this momentous struggle. To this resolution I have been incited, as an Englishman, by the noble part which England has borne in these events; and as an individual, by the previous course of my studies, which, during the greater part of my life, have been so directed, that the annals and the literature of Spain and Portugal have become to me almost as familiar as our own. It is not strange, then, that having thus, as it were, intellectually naturalized myself in those countries, I should have watched them with the liveliest interest through their dreadful trial: and being thus prepared for the task, having some local knowledge of the scene of action, rich in accumulated materials, and possessing access to the best and highest sources of information, I undertake it cheerfully; fully assured that the principles herein to be inculcated and exemplified are established upon the best and surest foundation, and that nations can be secure and happy only in proportion as they adhere to them.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF THE STATE OF SPAIN AND PORTUGAL, FRANCE AND ENGLAND.

THE history of Spain and Portugal, from the foundation of their respective monarchies to the middle of the sixteenth century, when both countries attained their highest point of greatness, is eminently heroic, for the persevering spirit with which they warred against the Moors, never ceasing and scarcely breathing from the contest till they had finally exterminated them; and for the splendour, the extent, and the importance, of their foreign conquests. Both kingdoms had risen by the same virtues; the same vices brought on the decline of both; and the history of their decline is not less instructive than that of their rise. Their external relations have been widely different; but notwithstanding this difference, and notwithstanding a national enmity, kept alive rather by old remembrances and mutual pride than by the frequency of their wars with each other, the Spaniards and Portuguese have continued to be morally and intellectually one people. They spring from the same stock; the same intermixture of races has taken place among them; and their national character has been formed by similar circumstances of climate, language, manners, and institutions.

CHAP.
I.
Gradual degradation of Spain and Portugal.

The old governments are called free, like all those which the Teutonic tribes established; but this freedom was little better than a scheme of graduated tyranny, and the laws upon which it was founded were only so many privileges which the

CHAP. I. conquerors reserved or arrogated to themselves. When the commixture of languages and nations was complete, and commerce had raised up a class of men who had no existence under the feudal system, a struggle for political liberty ensued throughout all the European kingdoms. It was soon terminated in Spain: a good cause was ruined by the rashness and misconduct of its adherents; and the scale, after it had been borne down by the sword of the sovereign, never recovered its equipoise: for the Romish church leagued itself with the monarchical authority, against whose abuse it had formerly been the only bulwark; but changing its policy now according to the times, it consecrated the despotism whereby it was upheld in its own usurpations. The effects of this double tyranny were not immediately perceived; but in its inevitable consequences it corrupted and degraded every thing to which it could extend, . . . laws, morals, industry, literature, science, arts, and arms.

*Tyranny of
the church.*

In other countries where absolute monarchy has been established, and the Romish superstition has triumphed, both have been in some degree modified by the remains of old institutions, the vicinity of free states, and the influence of literature and manners. But in Spain and Portugal almost all traces of the ancient constitution had been effaced; and as there existed nothing to qualify the spirit of popery, a memorable example was given of its unmitigated effects. The experiment of intolerance was tried with as little compunction as in Japan, and upon a larger scale. Like the Japanese government, the Inquisition went through with what it began; and though it could not in like manner secure its victory, by closing the ports and barring the passes of the Peninsula, it cut off, as much as possible, all intellectual communication with the rest of the world.

The courts of Madrid and Lisbon were as despotic as those of Constantinople and Ispahan. They did not, indeed, manifest their power by acts of blood, because the reigning families were not cruel, and cruelty had ceased to be a characteristic of the times: but with that cold, callous insensibility to which men are liable, in proportion as they are removed from the common sympathies of humankind, they permitted their ministers to dispense at pleasure exile and hopeless imprisonment, to the rigour and inhumanity of which death itself would have been mercy. The laws afforded no protection, for the will of the minister was above the laws; and every man who possessed influence at court violated them with impunity, and procured impunity for all whom he chose to protect. Scarcely did there exist even an appearance of criminal justice. Quarrels among the populace were commonly decided by the knife: he who stabbed an antagonist or an enemy in the street wiped the instrument in his cloak, and passed on unmolested by the spectators, who never interfered farther than to call a priest to the dying man. When it happened that a criminal was thrown into prison, there he remained till it became necessary to make room for a new set of tenants: the former were then turned adrift; or, if their crimes had been notorious and frequent, they were shipped off to some foreign settlement.

After the triumph of the monarchical power, the Cortes had fallen first into insignificance, then into disuse*. There was no

CHAP.
I.

*Despotism
of the two
govern-
ments.*

*Mal-admi-
nistration of
the laws.*

*Disuse of
the Cortes.*

* A few years after the peace of Utrecht, the Abbé de Vayrac published a work in three volumes, entitled *Etat Present de l'Espagne, où l'on voit une Geographie Historique du Pays, l'Etablissement de la Monarchie, ses Revolutions, sa Decadence, son Rétablissement, et ses Accroissemens: les Prerogatives de la Couronne; le Rang des Princes et des Grands: l'Institution et les Fonctions des Officiers de la Maison du Roy, avec un Ceremonial du Palais: le Forme du Gouvernement Ecclesiastique,*

CHAP. legislative body; the principle of the government being, that all
 I. laws and public measures of every kind were to proceed from
 Condition of the nobles. the will and pleasure of the sovereign. Men of rank, therefore, if they were not in office, had no share in public business; and their deplorable education rendered them little fit either to improve or enjoy a life of perfect leisure. It is said also to have been the system of both governments, while they yet retained some remains of perverted policy, to keep the nobles in attendance about the court, where they might be led into habits of emulous extravagance, which would render them hungry for emoluments, and thereby dependent upon the crown. The long-continued moral deterioration of the privileged classes had produced in many instances a visible physical degeneracy; and this tendency was increased by those incestuous marriages, common in both countries, which pride and avarice had introduced, and for which the sanction of an immoral church was to be purchased.

Condition of the army.

The armies partook of the general degradation. The forms of military power existed like the forms of justice: but they resembled the trunk of a tree, of which the termites have eaten out the timber, and only the bark remains. There appeared in the yearly almanacks a respectable list of regiments, and a redundant establishment of officers: but, brave and capable of endurance as the Portuguese and Spaniards are, never were there such officers or such armies in any country which has ranked among civilized nations. Subalterns might be seen

Militaire, Civil et Politique; les Mœurs, les Coutumes, et les Usages des Espagnols: le tout extrait des Loix Fundamentales du Royaume, des Reglemens, des Pragmatiques les plus authentiques, et des meilleurs Auteurs. There is no mention whatever of the Cortes in this work!

waiting behind a chair in their uniforms, or asking alms in the streets; and the men were what soldiers necessarily become, when, without acquiring any one virtue of their profession, its sense of character and of honour, its regularity, or its habits of restraint, they possess all its license, and have free scope for the vices which spring up in idleness. Drawn by lot into a compulsory service, ill-disciplined, and ill-paid, they were burthensome to the people, without affording any security to the nation.

CHAP.
I.

The state of religion was something more hopeful, though it is scarcely possible to imagine any thing more gross than the idolatry, more impudent than the fables, more monstrous than the mythology of the Romish church, as it flourished in Spain and Portugal. Wherever this corrupt church is dominant, there is no medium between blind credulity and blank, hopeless, utter unbelief: and this miserable effect tends to the stability of the system which has produced it, because men who have no religion accommodate themselves to whatever it may be their interest to profess. The peasantry and the great mass of the people believed with implicit and intense faith whatever they were taught. The parochial clergy, differing little from the people in their manner of life, and having received an education so nearly worthless that it can scarcely be said to have raised them above the common level, were for the most part as superstitious and as ill-informed as their flock. The higher clergy, however, had undergone a gradual and important change, which had not been brought about by laws or literature, but by the silent and unperceived influence of the spirit of the times. While their principle of intolerance remained the same (being inherent in popery, and inseparable from it), the practice had been greatly abated; and the *autos-da-fe*, the high festival days of this merciless idolatry, were at an end: for it was felt and secretly

State of religion.

Improvement of the higher clergy.

CHAP. I. acknowledged, that these inhuman exhibitions were disgraceful in the eyes of Europe, and had brought a stain upon the character of the peninsular nations in other catholic countries, and even in Rome itself. The persecution of the Jews therefore (which the founder of the Braganzan line would never have permitted if he had been able to prevent it) ceased; and the distinction between Old and New Christians had nearly disappeared. At the same time, an increased intercourse with heretical states, the power and prosperity of Great Britain, and the estimation in which the British character is held wherever it is known, had insensibly diminished, if not the abhorrence in which heresy was held, certainly the hatred against heretics. Thus the habitual feelings of the clergy had been modified, and they were no longer made cruel by scenes of execrable barbarity, which in former times compelled them to harden their hearts. They became also ashamed of those impostures upon which so large a portion of their influence had been founded: though they did not purge their kalendar, they made no additions to it; miraculous images were no longer discovered: when a grave-digger, in the exercise of his office, happened to find a corpse in a state of preservation, no attempt was made to profit by the popular opinion of its sanctity: miracles became less frequent as they were more scrupulously examined; and impostures*, which, half a century ago, would have been encouraged and adopted, were detected, exposed, and punished. The higher clergy in both countries were decorous in their lives, and in some instances exemplary in the highest degree,

* The *Beatas* of Cuenca, Madrid, and Evora, may be cited as examples. Notices of the two former impostors may be seen in Llorente's *Histoire Critique de l'Inquisition*: a manuscript account of the latter is in my possession.

To the monastic orders the influence of the times had been less beneficial. There were ages during which those institutions produced the greatest blessings in Europe; when they kept alive the lamp of knowledge, mitigated barbarian manners, and carried the light of Christianity among a race of ferocious conquerors. These uses had long since gone by; and the dissolution of the Jesuits had extinguished the missionary spirit which that extraordinary society had provoked in its rivals, and by which it had itself almost atoned to humanity and to religion for its own manifold misdeeds. The wealthy orders still afforded a respectable provision for the younger sons of old or opulent families; the far more numerous establishments of the mendicants were more injuriously filled from the lower classes. The peasant who was ambitious of seeing a son elevated above the rank in which he was born, destined him for a friar; and he who was too idle to work, or who wished to escape from military service, took shelter in the habit. The mendicant orders were indeed a reproach to Catholicism, and a pest to the countries wherein they existed: they contributed not only to keep the people ignorant, but to render them profligate. Yet even among the Franciscans men were found, who, by their irreproachable conduct, their sincere though misdirected piety, and sometimes by their learning and industrious lives, preserved the order from the contempt into which it would otherwise have fallen even among the vulgar. The nunneries of every description produced nothing but evil, except in those cases where persons went into them by their own choice, who in Protestant countries would have been consigned to a Bedlam.

Literature had revived in both kingdoms, and was flourishing, notwithstanding the restraints which the government and the Inquisition continued to impose. Few similar institutions have equalled the Royal Academies of Madrid and Lisbon in

CHAP.
I.
*State of the
religious
orders.*

*Improving
literature.*

CHAP. the zeal and ability with which they have brought to light their
 I. ancient records, and elucidated the history and antiquities
 of their respective countries. There was one most important
 subject from which men of letters were compelled to refrain..
 the old free constitution : but it met them every where in their
 researches ; and its restoration was the object of their wishes, if
 not of their hopes.

*Morals of
 the lower
 classes.*

The lower classes, who in great cities are every where too generally depraved, were perhaps peculiarly so in Spain, from the effect of what may be called their vulgar, rather than their popular, literature. This had assumed a curious and most pernicious character, arising partly from the disregard in which ill-executed laws must always be held, and partly from the faith of the people in the efficacy of absolution. The ruffian and the bravo were the personages of those ballads which were strung for sale along dead walls in frequented streets, and vended by blind hawkers about the country. In these pieces, which, as they were written by men in low life for readers of their own level, represent accurately the state of vulgar feeling, the robberies and murders which the hero commits are described as so many brave exploits performed in his vocation ; and, at the conclusion, he is always delivered over safely to the priest, but seldom to the hangman. Fables of a like tendency were not unfrequently chosen by their dramatists for the sake of flattering some fashionable usage of superstition, such as the adoration of the cross and the use of the rosary ; and the villain who, in the course of the drama, has perpetrated every imaginable crime, is exhibited at the catastrophe* as a saint by virtue of one of

* What is most extraordinary is, that some German critics have discovered sublimity in these monstrous exhibitions, which are as offensive to common sense as they are to the moral feeling.

these redeeming practices. Such works were more widely injurious in their tendency than any of those which the Inquisition suppressed. They infected the minds of the people; and the surest course by which a coxcomb in low life could excite admiration and envy among his compeers was by appearing habitually to set justice at defiance. It became a fashion among some of the higher classes in Spain to imitate * these wretches; and, by a stranger and more deplorable perversion of nature, women were found among those of distinguished rank, who affected the dress and the manners of the vilest of their sex. No such depravity was known in Portugal: the court set an example of decorum and morality there; and as there were fewer large towns, in proportion to the size of the kingdom, there was consequently less corruption among the people.

Travellers, forming their hasty estimate from the inhabitants of sea-ports and great cities, have too generally agreed in reviling the Portuguese and Spaniards: but if they whose acquaintance with these nations was merely superficial have been disposed to depreciate and despise them, others who dwelt among them always became attached to the people, and bore willing and honourable testimony to the virtues of the national character. It was indeed remarkable how little this had partaken of the national decay. The meanest peasant knew that his country had once been prosperous and powerful; he was familiar with the names of its heroes; and he spoke of the days that were past with a feeling which was the best omen for those that were to come.

Such was the moral and intellectual state of the peninsular

* The Vermin and Four-in-hand clubs are sufficiently analogous to this Spanish fashion of the *Majos*, to render this at once intelligible and credible to the English reader.

CHAP. I. kingdoms toward the close of the eighteenth century. There was not the slightest appearance of improvement in the principles of the government or in the administration of justice ; but, if such a disposition had arisen, no nations could have been in a more favourable state for the views of a wise minister and an enlightened sovereign. For the whole people were proudly and devoutly attached to the institutions of their country ; there existed among them neither sects, nor factions, nor jarring interests ; they were one-hearted in all things which regarded their native land ; individuals felt for its honour as warmly as for their own ; and obedience to their sovereign was with them equally a habit and a principle. In spite of the blind and inveterate despotism of the government, the mal-administration of the laws, and the degeneracy of the higher classes, both countries were in a state of slow, but certain, advancement ; of which, increasing commerce, reviving literature, humaner manners, and mitigated bigotry were unequivocal indications. In this state they were found when France was visited by the most tremendous revolution that history has recorded, . . a revolution which was at once the consequence and the punishment of its perfidious policy, its licentiousness, and its irreligion.

*Both become
subservient
to France.*

It was soon seen that this revolution threatened to propagate itself throughout the whole civilised world. The European governments combined against it : their views were discordant, their policy was erroneous, their measures were executed as ill as they were planned : a master-mind was equally wanting in the cabinet and in the field. In the hour of trial the Spanish court perceived the inefficiency of its organized force ; and having neither wisdom to understand the strength of the nation, nor courage and virtue to rely upon it, it concluded a disastrous war by a dishonourable peace. From that time its councils were directed by France, and its treasures were at the disposal of the

same domineering ally. : A war against England, undertaken upon the most frivolous pretexts, and ruinous to its interests, was the direct consequence ; and when, after the experimental peace of Amiens, hostilities were renewed between France and England, Spain had again to experience the same fatal results of the dependence to which her cabinet had subjected her. Portugal had purchased peace with less apparent dishonour, because the terms of the bargain were not divulged ; but there also the government soon found that in such times to be weak is to be miserable : it was compelled to brook the ostentatious insolence of the French ambassadors, and to pay large sums for the continuance of a precarious neutrality whenever France thought proper to extort them ; for the system of Europe had now been overthrown, and the laws of nations were trampled under foot. A military power, more formidable than that of Rome in its height of empire, of Zingis, or of Timour, had been established in France upon the wreck of all her ancient institutions ; and this power was directed by the will of an individual the most ambitious of the human race, who was intoxicated with success, and whose heart and conscience were equally callous.

Many causes combined in producing the French revolution : the example of a licentious court had spread like a pestilence through the country ; impiety was in fashion among the educated classes ; and the most abominable publications were circulated among the ignorant with as much zeal as if a conspiracy had actually been formed for the subversion of social order, by removing from mankind all restraints of morality, of religion, and of decency. Things were in this condition when France took part in the American war ; a measure to which Louis XVI. reluctantly consented, because he felt in his heart its injustice, and had perhaps an ominous sentiment of its im-

CHAP.
I.

*Causes of
the French
revolution.*

CHAP. policy. The seeds of republicanism and revolution were thus

I. imported by the government itself, and they fell upon a soil which was prepared for them. Financial difficulties increased; state quacks were called in; a legislative assembly was convoked in a kingdom where none of the inhabitants had been trained to legislation; and the fatal error was committed of uniting the three estates in one chamber, whereby the whole power was transferred to the commons. There was a generous feeling at that time abroad, from which much good might have been educed, had there been ability to have directed it, and if the heart of the country had not been corrupted. Nothing was heard except the praises of freedom and liberality, and professions of the most enlarged and cosmopolitan philanthropy. The regenerated nation even renounced for the future all offensive war by a legislative act: they fancied that the age of political redemption was arrived, and they announced the Advent of Liberty, with peace on earth, good will towards men. They themselves seemed to believe that the Millennium of Philosophy was begun; and so in other countries the young and ardent, and the old who had learned no lessons from history, believed with them. But the consequences which Burke predicted from changes introduced with so much violence, and so little forethought, followed in natural and rapid succession.

*Progress of
the French
revolution.*

The constitutionalists, who had supposed that it is as easy to remodel the institutions of a great kingdom in practice as in theory, were driven from the stage by bolder innovators; and these in their turn yielded to adventurers more profligate and more daring than themselves. Nobility was abolished; monarchy was overthrown; the church was plundered; the clergy were proscribed; atheism was proclaimed; the king and queen were put to death, after a mockery of judicial forms; the dauphin slowly murdered by systematic ill-usage; a plaster

statue of Liberty was set up in Paris ; and in the course of two years more than fifteen hundred persons were beheaded at the feet of that statue, men and women indiscriminately. The frenzy spread throughout all France. In the wholesale butcheries which were reported to the National Convention, by its agents, as so many triumphs of equality and justice, not less than eighteen thousand lives were sacrificed by the executioner. It seemed as if God had abandoned the unhappy nation who had denied Him, and that they were delivered over, as the severest chastisement, to the devices of their own hearts. Before this madness was exhausted, the wretches who had thrust themselves into the government paid the earthly penalty of their guilty elevation. One faction did justice upon another : in the same place where dogs had licked the blood of Louis and his queen, there in succession did they lick the blood of Brissot, Danton, Hebert, Robespierre, and their respective associates. When the theorists, the fanatics, and the bolder villains, had perished, a set of intriguers, who had accommodated themselves in turn to all, came forward, and divided the spoil ; till the unhappy nation, disgusted with such intrigues, and weary of perpetual changes, acquiesced with joy in the usurpation of a military adventurer, which promised them stability, at least, if not repose.

The revolution had given the government absolute command over the whole physical force of France ; and this prodigious power was now at the disposal of an individual, unchecked by any restraint, and subject to no responsibility. Perhaps it would not have been possible to have selected among the whole human race any other man, to whom it would have been so dangerous to commit this awful charge. Napoleon Buonaparte possessed all the qualities which are required to form a perfect tyrant. His military genius was of the highest order ; his

CHAP.

I.

*Character of
Napoleon
Buonaparte.*

CHAP. talents were of the most imposing kind; his ambition insatiable;
 I. his heart impenetrable: he was without honour, without veracity, without conscience; looking for no world beyond the present, and determined to make this world his own, at whatever cost. The military executions committed in Italy by his orders had shown his contempt for the established usages of war, the law of nations, and the common feelings of humanity: the suppression of the Papal government, the usurpation of the Venetian states, and the seizure of Malta, had proved that neither submissiveness nor treaties afforded any protection against this fit agent of a rapacious and unprincipled democracy. But it was during the Egyptian expedition that the whole atrocity of his character was displayed. He landed in Egypt, proclaiming that he was the friend of the Grand Seignior, and that the French were true Mussulmen, who honoured Mahommed and the Koran. His first act was to storm a city belonging to the Grand Seignior, which he never summoned to surrender, and which was incapable of defence. The butchery was continued for some hours after the resistance had ceased. The very perpetrators of this carnage have related that they put to death old and young, men, women, and children, in the mosques, whither these unoffending and helpless wretches had fled to implore protection from God and from their prophet; and they have avowed that this was done deliberately, for the purpose of astonishing the people. Thus it was that Buonaparte commenced his career in Egypt. He left Alexandria, exclaiming, "The Virtues are on our side! Glory to Allah," he said; "there is no other God but God: Mahommed is his prophet, and I am his friend." He proclaimed to the Egyptians that Destiny directed all his operations, and had decreed from the beginning of the world, that after beating down the Cross, he should come into that country to fulfil the task assigned him;

*His crimes
in Egypt
and Syria.*

and he called upon them to enjoy the blessings of a system, in which the wisest and the most virtuous were to govern, and the people were to be happy. It is literally true, that the Egyptian mothers mutilated or killed their daughters, to save them from the brutality of his troops ; and that wherever the French moved, a flock of kites and vultures followed, sure of the repast which these purveyors every where provided for them. Their general entered Syria, took Jaffa by assault, and issued a proclamation upon its capture, professing that he would be "clement and merciful, after the example of God." Four days after the capture, and after that profession of clemency had been made, he drew out his prisoners, some three thousand in number, and had them deliberately slaughtered. A whole division of his army was employed in this massacre ; and when their cartridges were exhausted, they finished the work with the bayonet and the sword, dragging away those who had expired, in order to get at the living, who, in the hope of escaping death, had endeavoured to hide themselves under the bodies of the dead. To complete this monster's character, it was only needful that he should show himself as inhuman toward his own soldiers as his prisoners ; and that it might be complete in all parts, this proof of his disposition was not wanting. When Sir Sidney Smith and Captain Wright, then Sir Sidney's lieutenant, compelled him to raise the siege of Acre, the sick and wounded in his army were more than he had means of removing : any other general would have recommended them to the humanity of an English enemy ; but this would have been humiliating to Buonaparte, and therefore poison was administered to them by his orders.

Yet this man, like Augustus, had an opportunity of earthly redemption afforded him ; and, while he fabricated for himself a splendid fortune, might have deserved the gratitude of Europe,

*Opportunity
of redem-
ing his cha-
racter at the
peace of
Amiens.*

CHAP. not only in the existing generation, but through after ages.

I. When he had attained the supreme authority, he might have restored the Bourbons in France, and taken Italy for his own reward: an arrangement, for which no fresh act of injustice would have been required; which none whom it offended would have been able to oppose; and which, more than any other conceivable alteration in the state of Christendom, might have tended to the general good. Here was an object worthy of ambition, and a richer prize than military ambition had ever yet achieved: so great would have been the public benefit; so signal and durable the individual glory. Even if, incapable as he was of aiming at such true greatness, he could have contented himself with the situation in which he was recognized by the peace of Amiens, and have borne his faculties meekly in that unexampled elevation, the world is charitable to all extremes of fortune, and would have forgiven his former crimes; which, public and notorious as they were, were loudly denied by his advocates, and already disbelieved by his infatuated admirers. But the heart of Napoleon Buonaparte was evil; he regarded his fellow-creatures merely as instruments for gratifying his desire of empire, . . . pieces with which he played the game of war: in the presumptuousness of his power he set man at defiance, and in his philosophy God was left out of the account. Unhappily, the internal circumstances of France accorded but too well in all things with the disposition and the views of its autocrat.

*Military
power of
France.*

The revolutionary governments, through all their changes, had steadily pursued the favourite object of placing the military establishment of the country upon the most formidable footing, and thereby enabling France to give laws to the rest of Europe. During the first years, immense armies were filled with enthusiastic volunteers; and before that spirit exhausted itself,

provision was made for permanently supporting so disproportionate a force by means of the conscription. The conscription originated in Prussia, when Prussia was under a mere military despotism; it was now carried to its utmost extent in France. The law declared that every Frenchman was a soldier, and bound to defend his country: but the principle of general law which the latter clause of the sentence announces served to introduce a code, whereby the whole youth of France were placed at the disposal of the government, to be sent whithersoever its ambitious projects might extend, . . . to the sands of Egypt, or the snows of Moscovy. A view of this system will equally elucidate the strength, the resources, and the character, of the French government during these disastrous years.

Under the new arrangement of its territory, France was divided into departments, districts, cantons, and municipalities. The departments were governed by a prefect, and a council of prefecture; the districts by a sub-prefect and his council; the cantons and municipalities by a mayor and town-court: to which were added, on the part of the general government, a commissary of police, and his adjuncts. There was also a military division of the country into thirty districts, each under a general of division, with a long establishment of commissaries, inspectors, and military police-officers. On a certain day in every year, notice was given in every municipality that all men, between the ages of twenty and twenty-five, should within eight days appear at the town-house, and enrol their names: if any individual failed, not he alone, but his family also, were subject to a criminal prosecution. The names of the absent were to be enrolled by their nearest relations, and concealment was thus rendered impossible: the man who was not in his usual domicile being doubly registered; as an absentee in one place, and as a temporary sojourner in another. From these registers the

CHAP.

I

*System of
military
conscription.*

CHAP. returns for the conscription were prepared in five lists, according to age, and the names in each were carefully arranged according to seniority. The civil officers by whom these lists were formed were responsible for any omission; and, as a farther precaution, every village and every house was visited at stated and at unexpected times, publicly and secretly. After such preparations, the machine was easily put in motion. The war-minister gave notice what number of men were required; the senate voted them from the conscripts of that year which was next in course, and the prefects were ordered to provide their contingents: they called upon the sub-prefects; these again upon the municipalities; and within sixteen days from the date of the prefect's orders, the ballot took place. Tickets, numbered to the amount of all who were upon the list, were put into the urn, and the men were registered in the order of the numbers which they had drawn. The first numbers, up to the sum required, were for immediate service; the others were to be called upon in sequence, in case of necessity only: but, under Buonaparte, that necessity always existed. They were marched off under military escort, and distributed among the artillery, cuirassiers, dragoons, infantry, or sappers and miners, according to their stature and bodily strength.

Exemptions.

The infirmities which might be pleaded as exemptions were severely scrutinized, and were determined by the law with critical inhumanity: inveterate asthma, habitual spitting of blood, and incipient consumption only entitled the sufferer to a provisional dispensation. Men who were incapable of enduring the fatigues of war, or who might be more useful to the state in pursuing their own employments or their studies, were allowed to provide substitutes or purchase an exemption by the payment of three hundred francs; but this was an early law, and it is not likely that the pecuniary alternative was ever accepted when the waste

of men became excessive. The substitute was required to be a CHAP.
 Frenchman, between twenty-five and forty years of age (and I.
 therefore not liable to the conscription), not below five feet one, Substitutes.
 of a strong constitution, and in robust health. In addition to
 his own name, he was to take that of the person for whom he
 served, and by that name he was to be known in the army: the
 principal was still upon the list, and subject to be called upon
 if his representative deserted or withdrew; nor could he obtain
 a definitive exemption unless he produced proof that the sub-
 stitute had either been killed or disabled in service, or had
 served the full time which the laws required: during war the
 term was indefinite, in peace it was fixed at five years. During
 the latter years of Buonaparte's government men who could be
 admitted as substitutes were necessarily so rare, that their price
 rose from two hundred to a thousand Napoleons.

No constituted authority, no branch of the civil or military Punish-
ments for
evading the
conscrip-
tion.
 administration, might retain in its service a conscript who was
 called upon in his turn. No Frenchman, being, or having
 been, liable to the conscription, could hold any public office, or
 receive any public salary, or exercise public rights, or receive
 a legacy, or inherit property, unless he produced a certificate
 that he had conformed to the law, and either was actually in
 service, or had obtained his dismissal, or was legally exempted,
 or that his services had not been required. They who failed to
 join the army within the time prescribed were deprived of their
 civil rights, a circular description of their persons was sent to
 all the chiefs of the *gendarmerie* throughout the empire, and
 they were pursued as deserters. Eleven dépôts were appointed,
 where these refractory conscripts were disciplined in an uniform
 of disgrace, with the hair cut close: they were employed upon
 the fortifications, or in other hard labour, for which they
 received no additional pay or rations. This, however, was

CHAP. thought too lenient when the emperor's expenditure of men became more lavish, and it was then decreed that such offenders were to be punished as if they had actually deserted. A deserter was condemned to a fine of fifteen hundred francs, chargeable upon whatever property might fall to him at any future time, if he was not able to pay it immediately. In addition to this fine, the punishment for the simple offence of deserting into the interior was three years' labour upon the public works. The culprits wore a particular uniform, and were allowed shoes; their heads were shaved every eighth day, and they were not permitted either to shave their beards or to cut them. Their rations were the soldiers' bread, rice, or dry pulse; their pay half that of a common labourer; and of this a third was withheld till they should have served out their time, a third was deducted for their expenses, and the remainder was all which they had for purchasing better food than their miserable allowance. He who had deserted from the army, or a frontier place, or in a direction toward the enemy, or with a companion, or who had scaled ramparts in effecting his escape, was sentenced to public labour for ten years, with a bullet of eight pounds weight fastened to him by a chain eight feet long. He was to work eight hours a day during five months, ten during the better part of the year, and to be chained in prison all the rest of the time: he wore wooden shoes, and an uniform differing both in colour and fashion from that of the troops; his mustachios, as well as his head, were shaved every eight days; his beard was never shaved, nor shorn, nor shortened; his rations and pay were like those of the common deserters, because, indeed, life could not be supported upon less. The punishment of death, which was inflicted upon those who had deserted to the enemy, and in other aggravated cases, was mercy when compared to this.

I.

*Punish-
ments for
desertion.*

By the operation of this system the French were made a military nation, a change equally inconsistent with their own welfare and with the safety and independence of the surrounding states. Beginning at first with all men between the ages of twenty and twenty-five, enrolling the whole rising generation afterwards as they attained to manhood, and retaining all who were embodied as long as their services were required, in other words, as long as they were capable of serving, . . . the government had thus brought within its disposal every man who was capable of bearing arms ; and this was the tremendous power which Buonaparte found already organized to his heart's desire when he assumed the supreme authority. Such power might have kindled ambition in an ordinary mind ; no wonder then that the most ambitious of the human race, when he saw himself in possession of it, supposed universal empire to be within his reach. His supply of men might well appear inexhaustible ; there was neither difficulty nor expensé in raising them ; he had only to say what number he required, and the rest was mere matter of routine. After his armies had once passed the frontier, there was no cost in maintaining them ; war was made to support itself. This system also had been matured for him by his republican predecessors. The contributions which he levied upon conquered or dependent states discharged the soldiers' pay : in an ally's country their subsistence was expected as a proof of alliance ; in an enemy's it was taken as the right of war. And the perfection of the French commissariat was admired and extolled in England as a masterpiece of arrangement by the blind admirers of France, who either did not or would not perceive how easy the duties of that department were made, when every demand was enforced by military power, and nothing was paid for.

CHAP.

I.

*Effect of
this system.**War made
to support
itself.*

CHAP.

I.

*Former
constitution
of the
French
army.*

When Louis XVI. began his unhappy reign, the French army was still constituted upon a feudal principle which had been well adapted to the circumstances of later times. The corps were divided into proprietary companies, the captains of which, receiving pay proportionate to the required expenditure, provided every thing for the men, and raised them among their own vassals. The system was liable to abuse, but it had great advantages : for if the captain should act upon no worthier motive than mere selfishness, it was his interest to be careful of his men, lest he should incur the expense of recruiting them ; and it might reasonably be expected that he would treat them kindly to prevent desertion, and that he would spare no means for keeping them in health or restoring them in sickness. But there were better principles brought into action : the character both of the captain and of the men, in their native place, depended upon what each should report of the other ; the men also knew that their fidelity would not be forgotten when their services were over, and that, if they fell, their good conduct would be remembered to the benefit of their family. Both parties were always in the presence of that little world, to the opinion of which they were more immediately amenable, and from which applause or condemnation would most sensibly affect them ; and local and hereditary attachments, with all their strength and endurance, were thus brought into the service of the state. The system was abolished when M. de St. Germaine was minister at war, for the sake of some sordid speculations upon clothing and victualling the troops. Subalterns, who were learning their profession, and acquiring the love and confidence of the soldiers, were disbanded as a sacrifice to the prevailing fashion of economical reform : at the same time the penal discipline of the Germans was introduced, . . a poor substi-

*Change introduced by
M. de St.
Germaine.*

tution for the old bonds of feeling which had been thus rudely broken; and while all that was useful in the feudal constitution of the army was discarded, the worst part was retained by an order that no person should hold a commission unless he could prove the nobility of his family for four generations.

CHAP.

I.

The republicans naturally went into the other extreme; and Buonaparte retained in his army the levelling principle which the revolution had introduced, because it is as congenial to a despotism as to a democracy. No Frenchman could be made an officer (except in the artillery and engineers) till he had served three years as a private or sub-officer, unless he signalized himself in action. Perhaps the conscription, in its full extent, could never have been established without such a regulation. It rendered the military service less odious to the common people, who saw the children of the higher classes thus placed upon a level with themselves, and who were deceived into an opinion that merit was the only means of promotion: it brought also into the ranks a degree of intelligence and ambition not to be found there in armies which are differently composed; and those qualities were a security for discipline and perfect obedience under circumstances in which ordinary troops might have become impatient of continual privations. But it may well be doubted, on the other hand, whether the officers derived any important advantage from being trained in the ranks; and there can be no doubt that any such advantage would be dearly purchased by the degradation to which they were exposed; for, while the soldiery were materially improved by the mixture of well-born men who looked for promotion, these persons themselves were more materially injured by the inevitable effects of a system which levelled nothing so effectually as it did the manners, the moral feeling, and the sense of honour.

*Levelling
principle of
the revolu-
tionary ser-
vice.*

CHAP.

I.

*Honourable
character of
the old
French
army.*

The policy of the old French government had often been detestably perfidious, and yet French history abounds with examples of high chivalrous sentiment; and nowhere were men to be found more sensible of what was due to their king, their country, and themselves, more alive to the sense of national and individual honour, than in the old French army. A fatal change was produced by the revolution. At a time when all persons of high birth were objects of persecution or suspicion, men from the lowest occupations were hurried into the highest posts in the army. Many of them were possessed of great military talents, and there were some few who in every respect proved worthy of their fortune. But there were others who never cast the slough of their old habits: no service was too bloody or too base for such agents; and, without feeling shame for the employment, or compunction for the crime, they were ready to obey their remorseless master in whatever he might command, . . . the individual murders of Palm and the Duc d'Enghein, or the wholesale massacres of Jaffa and of Madrid, and those other atrocious actions in Portugal and Spain, of which this history records the progress and the punishment.

*Honour not
the principle
of despot-
ism.*

It was observed by Montesquieu, that honour, which is the moving and preserving principle of monarchy, is not, and cannot be, the principle of despotism. Little did he apprehend how soon the state of his own country would exemplify the maxim. Among military bodies, honour had hitherto supplied, however imperfectly, yet in some degree, the place of a higher and nobler principle: but under the tyranny of Buonaparte, while his measures tended directly, as if they had been so designed, to subvert this feeling (already weakened by the false philosophy of the age), there remained nothing in its stead except that natural goodness, and that innate sense of rectitude, which, in certain happy natures, can never be totally extin-

guished, but which, in the vast majority of mankind, are easily CHAP. I. deadened and destroyed. The humaner studies, whereby the manners and the minds of men are softened, and the sacred precepts whereby they are purified and exalted and enlightened, had been the one neglected, and the other proscribed, during the revolution; and a generation had grown up, without literature, without morals, and without religion.

Education had been chiefly in the hands of the Jesuits till the extinction of that famous company, the most active, the most intriguing, but in later times the most useful and the most calumniated of the monastic orders. After their dissolution, the system was continued upon the same plan, though perhaps with inferior ability, and the colleges were every where conducted by the clergy, either secular or regular. The massacre of St. Bartholomew's day, and the *dragonades* of Louis XIV, are crimes always to be remembered with unabating and unqualified detestation. Even at a later time it was evinced, in the shocking tragedies at Rouen and Thoulouse, that the same spirit existed in the French church, and was ready to blaze out. These execrable things were known over Europe; but it was not so generally known, that in the service of that same church which had dishonoured itself, and outraged human nature, by these actions, many thousand ministers were continually employed in training the young, visiting the sick, relieving the poor, consoling the penitent, and reclaiming the sinner; uninfluenced by love of gain, hope of applause or of advancement, or any worldly motive; but patiently and dutifully devoting themselves in obscurity to the service of their fellow-creatures and their God. The knowledge of their virtues was confined to the little sphere wherein their painful and meritorious lives were passed; and the world knew them not, till they were hunted out by the atheistical persecution, and

*Education
in the hands
of the clergy
before the
revolution.*

CHAP. were found to endure wrongs, insults, outrages, exile, and death,
 I. with the meekness of Christians, and the heroism of martyrs.

Generally
 diffused in
 France.

Under these teachers, the doctrines of Christianity, according to the Romish church, and the duties of Christianity, wherein all churches are agreed, were the first things inculcated, as being the first things needful. Errors of doctrine, though of tremendous importance when men are actuated by blind zeal, are, among the quiet and humble-minded part of mankind, latent principles which produce no evil, unless some unhappy circumstance calls them into action: but the moral influence of religion is felt in the whole tenour of public and of private life. There were endowed schools and colleges, before the revolution, in every part of France, chiefly under the direction of persons who acted from motives of duty and conscience, rather than of worldly interest. The French court, in the midst of its own licentiousness, understood the importance of training up the people in a faith which tended to make them good subjects, and therefore it had provided * for this great

* In this respect, more had been done in France nearly a century ago than has yet been attempted in England. It was not the fault of the government if any one of its subjects was ignorant of what it most concerns all men to know. The declaration of the king, of May 14, 1724, contains the following article: "*Voulons qu'il soit établi, autant qu'il sera possible, des maîtres et maîtresses d'école dans toutes les paroisses ou il n'y en a point, pour instruire tous les enfans de l'un et de l'autre sexe, des principaux mysteres et devoirs de la religion catholique, apostolique et Romaine; les conduire à la messe tous les jours ouvriers, autant qu'il sera possible; leur donner les instructions dont ils ont besoin sur ce sujet, et avoir soin qu'ils assistent au service divin les dimanches et fêtes; comme aussi pour y apprendre à lire, et même écrire à ceux qui pourront en avoir besoin, le tout ainsi qu'il sera ordonné par les archevêques et évêques en conformité de l'art. 25 de l'edit de 1695, concernant la juridiction ecclésiastique. Voulons à cet effet que, dans les lieux ou il n'y aura pas d'autres fonds, il puisse être imposé sur tous les habitans la somme qui manquera pour l'établissement des dits maîtres et maîtresses, jusqu'à celle de 150 fr. par an. pour les maîtresses.*"

object from a sense of policy, if from no better impulse. The reformers, in the natural course of political insanity, plundered the church before the revolutionists overthrew the throne. The Constituent Assembly followed up this act of iniquity by requiring from the clergy an oath, which they knew the greater part must conscientiously refuse to take. The whole system of education throughout France was thus subverted, before the work of proscription and massacre began; and, to complete the wreck, the National Convention, by one sweeping decree, suppressed all colleges and faculties of theology, medicine, arts, and jurisprudence, throughout the republic.

CHAP.
I.

The whole system of education destroyed by the revolution.

Public instruction, however, had been one of the first blessings which were promised under the new order of things; and accordingly plan after plan was pompously announced, as short-lived constitutions and short-sighted legislators succeeded one another. The Constituent Assembly promised an establishment of primary schools in the chief place of every canton; secondary ones in the capital of every district; department schools in the capitals of these larger divisions; and, finally, an Institute in the metropolis: the whole under a Commission of Public Instruction. Public tuition was not to begin before the age of six; till which time, it was said, mothers might be trusted to put in practice the immortal lessons of the author of *Emilius*: and girls were left wholly to their parents. Religion made no part of the scheme*; and instead of teaching children faith, hope, and charity, their duties toward God and man, the Declaration of Rights was to be cast into a catechism for their

Public instruction promised by the revolutionists.

Talleyrand's scheme.

Religion omitted.

* Except, indeed, that there were to be seminaries for the new national clergy, where they were to be taught...surveying, mensuration, the knowledge of simples, a little medicine, and a little law!

CHAP. I. use. This plan, which was the work of Talleyrand, was thrown aside when the Constituent Assembly, having completed, as they supposed, the work of demolition, made way for the Legislative Assembly, which was to erect a new edifice from the ruins. A second project was then presented by Condorcet. Revealed religion was, of course, proscribed from his scheme; and the miserable sophist said that this proscription ought to be extended to what is called natural religion also, because the theistic philosophers were no better agreed than the theologians in their notions of God, and of his moral relations to mankind. All prejudices, he said, ought now to disappear; and therefore it must now be affirmed, that the study of the ancient languages would be more injurious than useful. The physical sciences were the basis of his plan; and he advised that scientific lessons should be given in public weekly lectures, and that the miracles of Elijah and St. Januarius should be exhibited, in order to cure the people of superstition. A time, he said, undoubtedly would come, when all establishments for instruction would be useless: however, as they were necessary at present, girls as well as boys were to be received in the public schools. The orators of the National Convention went farther: they maintained, that domestic education was incompatible with liberty; that the holy doctrine of equality would have been proclaimed in vain if there were any difference of education between the rich and the poor; that, of all inequalities, the inequality of knowledge was the most fatal; and that every thing which elevated one man above another in the scale of intellect was studiously to be destroyed. All children, therefore, of both sexes, . . the boys from the age of five till that of twelve, the girls from five to eleven, . . ought to be educated in common at the expense of the republic; there was room enough for lodging them all in the palaces and castles of the emigrants; the boys

*Condorcet's
scheme.*

*Religion
proscribed.*

*Scheme of
the National
Convention.*

should be employed in tilling the earth, in manufactures, or in picking stones upon the highways; hospitals were to be annexed to the schools, where the children were in rotation to wait upon the sick and the aged; and they were never to hear of religion. One democratic legislator proposed, that those parents who chose to have their children educated at home should be vigilantly observed; and if it were discovered that they brought them up in principles contrary to liberty, that a process should be instituted, and the children taken from them, and sent to the houses of equality. This implied some choice on the part of the parents, though it would have made the choice a cruel mockery: but it was contended that liberty could not exist if domestic education were tolerated; and when the clause was proposed that parents *might* send their children to these schools, it was carried as an amendment that they *must* send them, because it was time to establish the great principle, that children belong to the republic more than to their parents. This, said one of their blasphemous declaimers, would complete the Gospel of Equality! It was even maintained, that education ought to commence before birth; and the philosophical statesmen of regenerated France were called upon to form rules for women during the time of gestation, and to enact laws for midwives and for nurses*!

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I.

Domestic
education
proscribed.

* “*L'ouvrage que l'on demande,*” said Gregoire, speaking in the name of the Committee of Public Instruction, “*doit donc tracer des regles de conduite pour le temps de la grossesse, des couches, de l'allaitement,*” &c. Petit went farther back: according to him, “*l'education en general doit aller chercher l'homme dans l'embryon de l'espece; les peres, les meres surtout, doivent d'abord fixer son attention.*”—

An able writer has performed the useful task of bringing together in one work the various schemes of education which were attempted in France during the democratic tyranny and the military tyranny which succeeded it. The title of his book is, *Le*

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I.

None of
these
schemes at-
tempted in
practice.

Follies and schemes like these were discussed by the National Convention in the intervals between their acts of confiscation and blood; and to this intolerable tyranny the fanatics of liberty and equality designed to subject the people in the dearest and holiest relations of domestic life! But proscriptions and executions succeeded so rapidly that the various projectors were swept off before their projects could be attempted in practice; till at length, when the remaining members of that

Genie de la Revolution consideré dans l'Education; ou Memoires pour servir a l'Histoire de l'Instruction Publique, depuis 1789 jusqu'à nos jours; ou l'on voit les Efforts reunis de la Legislation et de la Philosophie du Dix-huitieme Siecle pour aneantir le Christianisme. Paris, 3 T. 1817—1818. One legislator maintained that a nation which had recovered its freedom wanted none but stirring, vigorous, and robust men; it was such men that they should endeavour to form: and the revolution had already provided inexhaustible sources of instruction for them; for the best schools in which youth could receive a republican education were the public assemblies of the departments, districts, and municipalities, the tribunals, and, above all, the popular societies, .. meaning the jacobine clubs! Lequinio would have had a daily journal edited by a committee of philosophers, for the purpose of enlightening the simple country people, .. the people of Paris and the large towns being sufficiently enlightened. Lakanal required that there should be at least one theatre in every canton, where the women were to learn dancing, and the men to practise it. And Rabaut de St. Etienne, who had been a Protestant minister, proposed that the mayors of every canton should deliver moral lectures on Sundays in the national temple. These legislators confined their views to France; but Dupont, the atheist, hoped to see a school established at Paris for propagating atheism and anarchy throughout Europe. These are his words: “*Avec quel plaisir je me represente nos philosophes dont les noms sont connus dans toute l'Europe, Petion, Sieyes, Condorcet, et autres, entourés dans le Pantheon, comme les philosophes Grecs à Athenes, d'une foule de disciples venus des differentes parties de l'Europe, se promenant a la mode des Peripateticiens, et enseignant, celui-la le systeme du monde, celui-ci perfectionnant le systeme social, montrant dans l'arrêté du 17 Juin le germe de l'insurrection du 14 Juillet, du 10 Août, et de toutes les insurrections qui vont se faire avec rapidité dans toute l'Europe, de telle manière que ces jeunes etrangers de retour dans leur pays puissent y repandre les mêmes lumières, et opérer, pour le bonheur de l'humanité les mêmes revolutions.*”

nefarious assembly, after the death of Robespierre, had acquired some feeling of personal safety, the Normal Schools were established, in which the art of teaching was to be taught. And now, it was proclaimed, the regeneration of the human mind would be effected; now, for the first time upon earth, Nature, Truth, Reason, and Philosophy would have their seminary! The most eminent men in talents and science were to be professors in this institution: from all parts of the republic the most promising subjects were to be selected by the constituted authorities, and sent to the metropolis as pupils; and when they should have completed the course of human knowledge, the disciples of these great masters, thoroughly imbued with the lessons which they had received, were to return to their respective places of abode, and repeat them throughout the land, which would thus, in its remotest parts, receive light from Paris, as from the focus of intellectual illumination. Fourteen hundred young men were in fact brought from the country; and, that nothing might be lost to mankind, the conferences in which universal instruction was to be communicated were minuted in short-hand. So notable a plan excited great enthusiasm in Paris; it soon excited as much ridicule: in the course of three months both pupils and professors discovered in how absurd a situation they were placed; it was acknowledged in the National Convention that the scheme had altogether failed; and thus ended what was properly called the organized quackery of the Normal Schools*.

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I.

Normal
Schools.

* Every thing was to be done by . . analysis:—" *Cette analyse, qui compte tous les pas qu'elle fait, mais qui n'en fait jamais un ni en arrière, ni à côté, . . elle peut porter la même simplicité de langage, la même clarté dans tous les genres d'idées. . . Les sciences morales, si nécessaires aux peuples qui se gouvernent par leurs propres vertus, vont être*

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I.

Consequences of these visionary schemes.

Analyse des Procès Verbaux, quoted by Portalis. L. Goldsmith, Recueil, T. i. p. 282.

Attachment of the Jacobines to Buonaparte.

Meantime the irrecoverable years were passing on, and the rising generation was sacrificed to the crude theories and ridiculous experiments of sophists in power; men whose ignorance might deserve compassion, if their absurdity did not provoke indignation as well as contempt, and their presumptuous wickedness call for unmingled abhorrence. When the subject was renewed under the consular government, the frightful consequences had become too plain to be dissembled. A view of the moral and religious state of France was drawn up from official reports which were sent in from every department, and it was acknowledged that the children throughout the republic had been left to run wild in idleness during the whole preceding course of the revolution. "They are without the idea of a God," said the Report, "without a notion of right and wrong. The barbarous manners which have thus arisen have produced a ferocious people, and we cannot but groan over the evils which threaten the present generation and the future."

It suited the views of Buonaparte that his government should hold this language while he was negotiating the *Concordat*, for the sake of obtaining the papal sanction to his authority. Perhaps he was then hesitating whether to take the

soumises à des demonstrations aussi rigoureuses que les sciences exactes et physiques. . . Tandis que la liberté politique, et la liberté illimitée de l'industrie et du commerce détruiront les inégalités monstreuses des richesses, l'analyse, appliquée à tous les genres d'idées dans toutes les écoles, détruira l'inégalité des lumières, plus fatale encore et plus humiliante. . . L'analyse est donc essentiellement un instrument indispensable dans une grande démocratie; la lumière qu'elle repandra a tant de facilité à pénétrer partout, que comme tous les fluides, elle tend sans cesse à se mettre au niveau."

Rapport de Lakanal sur les Ecoles Normales, du 3 Brumaire, an. III. (24 Oct. 1794.)

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I.

right hand way or the left ; whether to build up again the ruined institutions of France, strengthen the throne on which he had resolved to take his seat by an alliance with the altar ; and in restoring to the kingdom all that it was possible to restore while he retained the sovereignty to himself, engraft upon the new dynasty those principles which had given to the old its surest strength when it was strongest, and a splendour, of which no change of fortune could deprive it. Two parties would be equally opposed to this, the Jacobines and the Royalists. The latter it was impossible to conciliate : they would have stood by the crown even if it were hanging upon a bush ; but their allegiance being founded upon principle and feeling, . . upon the sense of honour and of duty, . . would not follow the crown when it was transferred by violence and injustice from one head to another. He found the Jacobines more practicable. They indeed had many sympathies with Buonaparte : he favoured that irreligion to which they were fanatically attached, because it at once flattered their vanity and indulged their vices ; his schemes of conquest offered a wide field for their ambition and their avarice : and what fitter agents could he desire than men who were troubled with no scruples of conscience or of honour ; whom no turpitude could make ashamed ; who shrunk from no crimes, and were shocked by no atrocities ? Thus Buonaparte judged concerning them, and he reasoned rightly. The Jacobines both at home and abroad became his most devoted and obsequious adherents : they served him in England as partizans and advocates, denying or extenuating his crimes, justifying his measures, magnifying his power, and reviling his opponents ; on the Continent they co-operated with him by secret or open treason, as occasion offered ; in France they laid aside in his behalf that hatred to monarchy which they had not only pro-

CHAP. fessed but sworn, and swearing allegiance to a military despotism,
 I. gave that despotism their willing and zealous support.

A system of
 education
 necessary
 for his
 views.

Such persons were still a minority in France; but their activity, their arts, and their audacity supplied the want of numbers. It was essential to his views that a succession of such men should be provided, and that the French nation should by the sure process of education be moulded to his will, and made to receive the stamp of his iron institutions. Many of the clergy, when the proscription which had driven them from their country was removed, had opened schools on their return from exile, as the readiest means of obtaining a maintenance for themselves and of performing their Christian duties. Their success was incompatible with Buonaparte's policy: he wanted not a moral and a religious*, but a military people. After some preparatory attempts, all tending to the same object, the Imperial University was established; . . a name which, it was admitted, had altogether a different signification from what it bore under the old order of things. The legitimate principle was proclaimed, that the direction of public education belongs to the state; the intolerant one was deduced and put in practice, that therefore a monopoly of education should be vested in the new establishment.

Imperial
 University.

At the head of this University there was a Grand Master, for whom Buonaparte, indulging in such things his own taste as well as that of the French people, appointed a splendid

* He is reported to have said, *Les prêtres ne considèrent ce monde que comme une diligence pour conduire à l'autre. Je veux qu'on remplisse la diligence de bons soldats pour mes armées.* The speech seems to authenticate itself; but whether it be authentic or not, this was the spirit and the declared object of his institutions.

costume ; his civil-list was 150,000 francs, and he had the power of nominating to all the inferior appointments, . . an enormous influence, if it had been intended that he should be any thing more than the mere organ of the Emperor's will. There were under him a chancellor, a treasurer, with salaries of 15,000 francs each ; ten counsellors for life, twenty counsellors in ordinary, the former with salaries of 10, the latter of 6,000 francs ; and thirty inspectors general, whose salary was 6000 also, and whose travelling expenses were paid. Next in rank were the Rectors of Academies : this too was an old word with a new signification. There were to be as many Academies in the empire as there were courts of appeal. Each Rector had an establishment for his inferior jurisdiction analogous to that of the Grand Master ; his salary was 6000 francs, with 3000 for his official expenses, and the additional emolument which he derived as Dean of the Faculties. He ranked with the Bishop of the diocese ; and the rivalry which this pretension occasioned was in no degree mitigated by the spirit in which the Imperial University was founded and administered. The Faculties, or Schools of Theology, Jurisprudence, Medicine, Physical Sciences, and Literature, were under the Rector's authority, as were the Lyceums, Colleges, *Institutions*, *Pensions*, and even the Primary Schools, which were not considered as beneath the cognizance of the University, although the government had taken care that even these should not be under the direction of the clergy, having committed them to the superintendence of a certain number of inhabitants, among whom the parochial priest had only a single voice. All seminaries, therefore, of every kind belonged to the University, and contributed in no small degree to its revenues. For it was not only required that every person who opened a *Pension* or *Institution* must be a graduate, but also that he must take out a brevet from the

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CHAP. I. Grand Master, the price of which varied from 200 to 600 francs, and which was to be renewed at the same cost every ten years. Besides these decennial droits, a fourth part of the same sum was exacted annually; and a tax was levied upon the pupils of five per cent upon what they paid to the master. It was the purpose of the government to discourage these schools, which, as being mostly in the hands of the clergy, were nowise congenial with the principles and views of Buonaparte: therefore they were thus heavily taxed; and lest they should be supported in spite of all discouragement, a decree was issued, declaring that the Lyceums might at any time fill up their numbers by taking from the nearest *Pensions* or *Institutions* as many pupils above the age of nine as would complete their complement. The precise effect of this iniquitous decree was, that exactly in proportion as any particular Lyceum was known to be ill conducted, and as parents were unwilling to entrust their children there, it became impossible for any better seminary to exist in its neighbourhood.

Communal
Colleges.

There were two other kind of seminaries which it was in like manner the intention of the Imperial government to destroy by indirect means, . . the Communal Colleges and the Ecclesiastical Schools. More than four hundred of the former had been founded at the expense of their respective *communes*, as soon as any hope appeared that a settled order of things might be maintained in France. But because every thing far and near was regulated by the new despotism, the money which they levied upon themselves for this purpose went, like other imposts, to the capital: and was thrown into a common fund, from whence an allowance to each particular college was made, not according to its necessary expenditure, but according to the pleasure of the minister to whom the distribution was confided. Thus the design of starving the colleges, and rendering

the *communes* weary of a voluntary tax from which no benefit was derived, was in most cases easily effected; and where the inhabitants of a town, being more desirous of supporting such an establishment, supplied the deficiency of the fund by fresh subscriptions, the University interfered, to harass and disgust them by means contradictory in appearance, but tending to the same end. Being vested with authority over the Regents, it appointed and superseded them at pleasure, removing to the Lyceums those who had deserved the confidence of the neighbourhood, and supplying their place by incompetent and worthless adventurers; it forced upon the colleges professors of sciences which were not taught there, or it forbade them to pursue the same branches of education if they were teaching them with success. Very few of these establishments, and those only in the remotest provinces, escaped the effects of this insidious hostility. The Ecclesiastical Schools had been instituted as seminaries for the priesthood by the Bishops, and were founded and supported by contributions. Some were placed in cities where they were under the Bishop's immediate inspection, and became especial objects of his care: others were fixed in the country, that they might be removed from the corruption of great towns. The children of the poor who appeared by their talents and disposition to be fit subjects for the ministry, were educated there gratuitously; those of the wealthy for a moderate payment. The Romish clergy have always understood that where religious feeling exists, money is never wanting for religious purposes. Poor as Buonaparte had left the Gallican church, large buildings were now bought or erected for these seminaries, and furnished and supported with a liberality which manifested that in the provinces at least there was more religion than suited the wishes of the Imperial government.

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I.

Ecclesiastical Schools.

CHAP. I. Effectual means therefore were pursued for degrading and destroying them. It was decreed that not more than one should be allowed in a department, and that that one must be in a large town where there should be a Lyceum: all others were to be shut up within a fortnight after the promulgation of the law, and their property, moveable and immoveable, applied to the use of the University. The pupils were compelled to attend the Lyceums, and go through the same course of mathematical studies as if they had been designed for the army; they were not allowed to keep the church festivals as holidays, although they wore the habit of ecclesiastical students, and their masters were ranked below those of the meanest boarding-school. The object of the government in thus mortifying the teachers would be defeated by the wise policy of the Romish church, which has taught its ministers to regard every act of humiliation as adding to their stock of merits; the design of disgusting the students with their profession, by the contempt to which they were exposed in what were essentially military academies, and of unfitting them for their intended profession by an intercourse with military pupils, was likely to be more successful.

Lyceums.

It was through the Lyceums more than any other of his institutions that Buonaparte expected to perpetuate the new order of things: in these academies it was, that, by a system such as a Jesuit might have devised for the use of a Mamaluke Bey, he trained up the youth of France to become men after his own heart. It was laid down as a maxim by the government that all public education ought to be regulated upon the principles of military discipline, not on those of civil or ecclesiastical police. In the Lyceums, therefore, the pupils were distributed not in forms, or classes, but in companies, each

having its serjeant and its corporal; and an officer-instructor, as he was called, taught the use of arms to all above twelve years of age, and drilled them in military manœuvres. He was present to superintend all their movements, which were so many evolutions, or marches. The punishments in use were arrest and imprisonment; and for their meals, their studies, their lessons, their sports, prayers, mass, going to bed, and getting up, signal was given by beat of drum. The youth who were thus trained up in military habits had been taught, in their first catechism, that they owed to their Emperor Napoleon love, respect, obedience, fidelity, military services, and the contributions required for the preservation and defence of the empire, and of his throne: that God, who creates empires and disposes of them according to his will, had, by endowing Napoleon with a profusion of gifts as well in peace as in war, made him the minister of his power, and his image upon earth: to honour and serve the Emperor was therefore the same thing as to honour and serve God; and they who violated their duty towards him, would resist the order which God himself had established, and render themselves worthy of eternal damnation. The religious sanction which was thus given to his authority had its full effect in childhood, and when this feeling lost its influence, devotion to the Emperor had become a habit which every thing around them contributed to confirm and strengthen. There were 150 exhibitions, or burses, appointed for every Lyceum: twenty were of sufficient amount to cover the whole expense of the boys' education and maintenance; the others were called half or three-quarter burses, and the relatives of those who obtained them made up the sum which was deficient. The money for these foundations was of course drawn from the public taxes: a third part was even raised by an extra and

CHAP.
L

*First
catechism.*

CHAP. specific impost upon the respective *communes*. But in the eyes
 I. of the pupils every thing flowed from the Emperor himself: he
 was their immediate benefactor, as well as their future and sure
 patron; and they looked to him with gratitude and hope at
 an age when these generous feelings are the strongest. Two
 hundred and fifty chosen youths were transferred every year to
 the special military academies, where they were supported by
 the state; and from whence the army was supplied with a suc-
 cession of young men, thoroughly educated for their profession,
 and thoroughly attached to the Emperor Napoleon. Others
 were appointed to such civil offices as they seemed best qualified
 to fill, and they carried with them the same attachment to revo-
 lutionary principles, and to the person of Buonaparte. This
 was not all. Buonaparte, far-sighted when not blinded by
 vanity, or dazzled by ambition, made use of the Lyceums to
 assist in securing his conquests. Two thousand four hundred
 youths, chosen from the foreign territories which had been
 annexed to France, were educated in these academies at the
 public expense. This measure, said Fourcroy (by whom the
 scheme of the University was framed), was so congenial with
 the times, that its advantages would be perceived by all who
 were capable of understanding the existing circumstances. The
 inhabitants, he said, who spake a language of their own, and
 were accustomed to their own institutions, must relinquish their
 old usages, and adopt those of their new country: they had not
 the means at home of giving their children the education, the
 manners, and the character, which were to identify them with
 the French. What more advantageous destiny could be pre-
 pared for them than that which the new system offered? and
 what more efficacious resource could be given to the govern-
 ment, which had nothing more at heart than to bind these new

*Special
military
academies.*

*Youths
from the
conquered
countries.*

citizens to the French empire?... Bound to it, indeed, they would thus be; the youths by the effect of the education which they received; the parents because the children were hostages for their forced allegiance.

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I.

Thus was the scheme of the Lyceums well suited both to the foreign and domestic policy of Buonaparte. The tone of morals which prevailed in these academies is said to have been not less congenial to his purposes. If, indeed, in happier countries, and where the intention is that better principles should be carefully inculcated, schools still are places where good dispositions incur some danger of contamination, and where evil ones have their worst propensities nurtured, and forced as if in a hot-bed, what was to be expected from a system of education planned and directed by men who had grown up during the revolution, or who had taken part in it, and gone through the course of its crimes, . . its agents, or its creatures? A thorough corruption, under the appearance of that regularity which military order produced; a cold irreligion, with which the youths went through the external practices of devotion as they went through the drill; a calculating spirit of insubordination, never breaking out but in concerted movements; speculating selfishness, premature ambition, ferocious manners; . . these were to be expected, and by these, it is said, the Lyceums were characterised.

*Moral effect
of the Ly-
ceums.*

*Genie de la
Revolution.
T. 1. 392.*

The *Provisseurs* (or masters), the censors, and the teachers in the Lyceums and Colleges (which latter were regarded as secondary schools), were bound to celibacy: the professors might marry, but in that case they were not allowed to lodge within the precincts, nor might any woman enter there. Every academy had one or two inspectors, whose business it was from time to time to visit all the Lyceums and inferior schools within

*System of
inspection.*

CHAP. their respective districts, and see that the rules of the University were strictly observed; and lest this examination should be carelessly or unfaithfully performed, there were from twenty to thirty general inspectors. The members of the University were bound each to inform the grand master and his officers of any thing contrary to the rules, which might occur within their knowledge: they were bound to obey him in whatever he might command for the Emperor's service; and whosoever was expelled, or left the University without a letter of dimission, became thereby incapable of holding any civil employment. The pupils were not permitted to correspond with any persons except their parents, or persons acting for their parents; and all letters which they received or wrote passed through the hands of the censor.

*Uniformity
of educa-
tion.*

The University was one of Buonaparte's favourite plans: it well exemplifies his precipitate temper and his thorough despotism. In the edict which erected it, the Napoleonic dynasty was styled the conservator of the liberal ideas which the French constitutions had announced;... that very edict was an act for enforcing uniformity of education throughout the empire! All persons who were previously employed in tuition were by this act incorporated as members of the University, without their consent, and bound to all its regulations: they were compelled to change the course of instruction to which they had been accustomed, and to follow a prescribed form, whether they approved it or not: they were subjected to the inquisitorial visits of the inspectors, and to the arbitrary power of the Grand Master: they were heavily taxed for the support of this system, and ultimately were to be sacrificed to it; for it was the declared intention of government gradually to diminish the number of their schools till they should all be shut up, for

the purpose of multiplying the Lyceums. The insolent injustice of such a measure would produce disgust and consequent neglect in many instances, the suddenness of the change would occasion disorder and confusion in all; and the itinerant inspectors were less likely to amend what was amiss, than to act in a vexatious spirit of interference, or with corrupt connivance, according as the views and temper of the individual inclined him to the one abuse or to the other. Except the miserable schoolmasters who were pressed into the University, its other members were taken from such persons hanging loose upon society as had interest enough to obtain the better appointments, or were forlorn enough to accept the worst. Yet from some thousands of men, not prepared by previous habitudes and studies, not selected for the fitness of their acquirements, their talents, or their disposition to the course of life in which they were to be placed, but brought together by the drag-net of despotism, Buonaparte expected and demanded that singleness of purpose, that totality of interests, that subserviency of all the parts to the whole, that disciplined unanimity which had existed among the Jesuits, and was the perfection of their consummate system. But the great object of his policy was answered; the youth of France were brought up in military habits; they were taught from their earliest boyhood to look to him for patronage; and to consider their own advancement as connected with the prosperity and permanence of his empire: if the moral and religious part of their education was worse than neglected, it mattered not, or rather it accorded with his views and wishes; they were then fitter instruments for the work in which they were to be employed.

The revolution had seared the feelings and hardened the hearts of a light-minded people: this was the natural effect of

CHAP.
I.

*Effects of
the revo-
lution upon
morals.*

CHAP. I. its horrors and of the ruin which it had spread*. That immorality which a succession of vicious courts had encouraged by their example, was released by the revolution from all restraints of law and of external decorum. The religious sanction of marriage was destroyed, and the unbounded facility of divorce rendered the civil ceremony a mere form, which was no longer binding than till one of the parties might choose to throw off the engagement. The literature of France, always, to the disgrace of the nation, more licentious than that of any other country, became, under the perfect freedom of the press, obscene to a degree too loathsome for expression; the arts were prostituted to the same devilish purpose; and the line of distinction between vice and virtue, which can never be too strongly marked, was as completely effaced in general practice as in the theories of those sophists who have laboured to corrupt their fellow-creatures. Such things were beneath the consideration of a legislature which arrogated to itself the praise of philosophical liberality; or, rather, they accorded with the views of that foul philosophy, which, regarding man as a mere material machine, would degrade him to the condition of the beasts that perish. Gambling, also, which every government that regards the welfare of its subjects endeavours to check by salutary laws, was encouraged by authority in France. Every week two or three lotteries were drawn, in which the poorest of the poor were tempted to engage, there being shares as low as sixpence. Nor must it be supposed that this measure was defended upon

*Frequency
of divorces.*

*Obscene
publica-
tions.*

*Gaming-
houses esta-
blished by
government.*

* Of the persons who died in Paris in the year 1800, more than two-fifths expired in the hospitals:.. from this single fact some estimate may be formed of the numbers who were ruined by the revolution.

the specious ground that governments ought to regulate the vices which they cannot prevent, and therefore may allowably make them conducive to the advantage of the state. The French government legalized this vice in its fullest extent, took to itself a monopoly of the gaming houses, farmed them at one time, and afterwards administered them by agents of its own. This profligate measure originated with the Directory, and was continued by Buonaparte: whatever tended to make men prodigal and desperate accorded with the spirit of his system, and under that system every thing tended to that effect.

Of all the previous measures of the revolutionists there was none which more entirely suited his views than the abolition of the law of primogeniture; that law, which perhaps, next to the institution of marriage, has produced more good, moral and political, than any other act of human legislation. The revolutionists were not mistaken when they believed that that structure of social order which it was their determination to destroy rested upon this basis; and they were too short-sighted to perceive that in breaking it up they were acting as pioneers to prepare the way for despotism. Buonaparte was thus enabled to surround himself with an aristocracy of his own making, who possessed no natural influence in the country, who represented none of its interests, who had no inheritance of honour to maintain and to bequeath, but were his mere creatures and dependents. In this respect the government of France under the Emperor Napoleon was assimilated to the barbarous despotisms of Persia and Turkey: and this was the direct consequence of a measure, which was intended to secure and perpetuate the triumph of liberty and equality! But it was not the only consequence: the evil extended throughout the whole middle class of society. The best motive whereby men

CHAP.
I.

*Abolition
of primo-
geniture.*

CHAP. are induced to labour for the accumulation of wealth, the
 I. motive by which a propensity, mean in itself, is exalted and refined, was removed when the hope of building up a family was taken away. Mansions would not be erected, and domains ornamented and improved, when, upon the death of the proprietor, the estates were to be divided. There no longer existed the same means for that liberal expenditure which called forth ingenuity, encouraged the arts, and afforded employment to useful industry in all its branches. Properties were broken down, which in former times enabled the father to set his younger children fairly forward in the world, and the heads of families to assist their relatives, . . . from pride sometimes, if a kindlier principle were wanting. And as estates by this levelling act were divided into smaller and smaller portions at every descent, more adventurers were thrown upon the public with less parental aid. The political system of the revolutionists, like their godless philosophy, looked to the present alone, deriving no wisdom from the past, and having for the future neither care nor hope.

Barbarizing effects of this measure.

The growth of that middle order was thus prevented in which the strength of civil society mainly consists; which is the most favourable to the developement of our intellectual faculties, and to the improvement of our moral nature; to knowledge, and contentment, and virtue; to public freedom, individual happiness, and general prosperity. No measure could more certainly tend to perpetuate barbarous institutions than one by which property was thus divided in every generation: and the state of things among the Huns and Tartars of old scarcely operated more exclusively to form a military people than all the circumstances of France under its military Emperor. The conscription was as indiscriminate as the

plague, and less to be averted by any human means : it mattered not what might be the inclinations of the youth, nor what the wishes, principles, and feelings of the parents ; he must take the chance of the lot, and as Buonaparte became more eager in his ambition and more prodigal in his expenditure of life, there was scarcely a chance of escaping from it. The chief object of education was to train up the boys in military habits and propensities ; and the military was the only profession which offered any thing to their hopes. Commerce had been almost destroyed, less by the maritime war than by the tyranny of Buonaparte, who, in the vain desire of ruining Great Britain, cared not what injury he brought upon his own subjects and his dependent states. Few persons would engage in the study of the liberal professions, because it was not in their free choice to follow them. The official business of the state no longer offered, as in former times, a sure and honourable path to promotion and public esteem ; it was reduced to the wretched art of doing whatever the Emperor required, supplying immediate wants by temporary shifts, enforcing oppressive edicts, defending acts of perfidy, inhumanity, and flagrant wrong, and promoting a system of despotism and delusion by all the aids of systematic falsehood. And the Church was in a state of degradation as complete as that to which Julian would have reduced it ; it had been stripped of its respectability as well as of its wealth. Buonaparte had hardly condescended to treat its re-establishment as any thing more than a mere matter of expediency : and when the Pope was brought to Paris for the purpose of crowning a man who had publicly professed himself an enemy to the Cross, the ceremonies of his reception were performed in a spirit of mockery which it was scarcely attempted to conceal. The Bishops of the new establishment, indeed, were not wanting in endeavours to deserve the Emperor's favour ; they uttered their maledictions against England,

CHAP.
I.



Degradation of the church.

CHAP. I. as Balaam would fain have done against the Israelites ; and in strains of blasphemous adulation they addressed Buonaparte as one whom the Lord had brought out of the land of Egypt to be the man of his own right hand, the Cyrus whom God had chosen for the accomplishment of his inscrutable designs in regard to the nations of the earth, the Christ of providence, the lion of the tribe of Judah ! But if this impious flattery gratified the tyrant to whom it was addressed, it contributed still farther to degrade the clerical character in public estimation. The constitutional clergy were regarded as little better than schismatics by those persons who retained a rooted attachment to the religion of their fathers : hence, in the interior, the churches were deserted by the devout as well as by the infidel ; and they who were near enough the frontier went to partake of the ordinances and receive confirmation, from a foreign clergy, because they had no reverence for their own. Public opinion being so decidedly against the national priests, and their stipends precarious in all places, and at the best barely sufficient for a decent maintenance, it followed, as a natural consequence, that a supply of ministers for the service of the altar could not be found. Thus while the laws made every youth look to a military life as the probable allotment of destiny from which he could not escape, the circumstances of France were such as to take away all desire for any other profession.

*State of
Europe.*

At the head of a nation whose whole activity and talents were thus directed to war as the only pursuit, Buonaparte had realised those schemes of ambition which Louis XIV. had been prevented from accomplishing by Marlborough's consummate abilities as a statesman and a general. He had effected all, and more than all that Louis had designed. The Austrian Netherlands, and all the German states as far as the Rhine, were annexed to France, and the European powers who were

most injured and endangered by this usurpation acquiesced in it with hopeless submission. Beyond the Rhine the French were in possession of many strong places, which gave them access into the heart of Germany. Buonaparte was King of Italy, as well as Emperor of France. One of his brothers had been made King of Holland, a second King of Naples, and a third King of Westphalia, all in immediate dependence upon him as the head and founder of the Napoleonic dynasty. The Holy German Empire, . . the Empire, as by a prouder and exclusive title it claimed to be called, . . that venerable and mighty body of which the complicated confusion had hitherto, so it was boasted, been divinely preserved, was dissolved by the defection of its members, and the abdication of its chief. The secondary, and all the inferior powers of which it had been composed, had contracted under the name of the Confederation of the Rhine, federatively and individually an alliance with the Emperor Napoleon, offensive and defensive, whereby they were virtually rendered so many feuds of France: the force which they were to bring into the field was determined; and to enable them to raise their respective contingents, the conscription was introduced into these states, as the accompanying curse of French alliance. This Confederacy was extended from Bavaria and the frontiers of Switzerland, to the banks of the Elbe. Switzerland acknowledged Buonaparte as its protector, and continued in peace, with something of the appearance, but little of the reality of independence, till it should suit his purpose to assume the sovereignty without disguise. Prussia, beaten, humbled and dismembered, seemed to exist only by his sufferance. Austria, after three struggles against revolutionary France, each more lamentably misconducted and more disastrous than the last, divorced from the empire, despoiled of the Netherlands, the Brisgaw, the Frickthal, the Vorarlberg, the Tyrol, and all its

CHAP.
I.



CHAP. I. Italian territories, had no other consolation in the ignominious peace to which it had been forced than that of seeing the house of Brandenburg soon afterwards reduced to a state of greater humiliation. Denmark was in alliance with France, the government rather than the nation co-operating heartily with Buonaparte. Sweden, with an insane king, and a discontented people, maintained against him a war which was little more than nominal. Russia, the only country which seemed secure in its distance, its strength, and the unanimity of its inhabitants, . . the only continental state to which the rest of Europe might have looked as to a conservative power, . . Russia appeared to be dazzled by Buonaparte's glory, duped by his insidious talents, and blindly subservient to his ambition. Spain was entirely subject to his control, its troops and its treasures were more at the disposal of the French government than of its own. Portugal had hitherto been suffered to remain neutral, because Buonaparte from time to time extorted large sums from the Court as the price of its neutrality, and because the produce of the Spanish mines found their way safely through the British cruisers, under the Portuguese flag. England alone perseveringly opposed the projects of this ambitious conqueror, and prevented the possibility of his accomplishing that scheme of universal dominion, which had it not been for her interference he believed to be within his reach.

*State of
England.*

The situation of England in the year 1807 was more extraordinary than any that is exhibited in the history of former times. After a war, which with the short interval of the peace of Amiens had continued fifteen years, and at the commencement of which all Europe had been leagued with her against revolutionary France, her last reliance upon the continental governments had failed ; most of her former allies were leagued against her, and it was manifest that the few states which still

preserved a semblance of neutrality, would soon in like manner be compelled into a confederacy with France. The French army and the English navy, two more tremendous powers than old times had ever seen, were opposed to each other without the possibility of coming in conflict. Masters as the French were on the continent, all thoughts of attacking them by land were at an end, and neither they nor their allies dared show their flag upon the sea. England could not in any way lessen the power of France, neither could France subdue, nor in any way weaken England. The threat of invasion had been laid aside: it had been seriously intended by Buonaparte, but the spirit with which the English people flew to arms, intimidated him, and his gun-boats were left to rot in the harbours where with so much cost and care they had been collected. Secured against any such evil by our fleets, and still more by our internal strength, we were carrying on the war equally without fear and without hope.

The state of our home politics was not less remarkable. For the first time Great Britain was under an administration without a name; its ostensible head the Duke of Portland never appeared in parliament, and was neither spoken of, nor thought of by the public. He deserves, however, an honourable memorial in British history, for having accepted office in a time of peculiar and extreme difficulty, and thereby enabled the King to form a ministry whose opinions were in unison with his own principles and feelings, and with the wishes and true interests of his people. The other ministers held their places less by their own strength than by the weakness of their opponents, for of all administrations, that to which they had succeeded, had been the most unpopular. From their want of influence in the country, the powerful families being mostly with the opposition, it was thought that they depended too much upon the personal favour of the sovereign, and were more literally the King's servants

CHAP.

I.

*Duke of
Portland's
administra-
tion.*

CHAP. I. than is consistent with the spirit of the constitution. Their talents had not been put fairly to the proof, and the nation had not as yet learned to appreciate the cool clear judgement of Lord Hawkesbury, the finished oratory of Mr. Canning, and the activity and intrepidity of Mr. Perceval, always ready and always right-minded. While Pitt and Fox were living, every man believed either in one or in the other; one party was perfectly satisfied that all the measures of the minister were right, and the other as confidently expected that notwithstanding the evil consequences of his mispolicy and his misfortunes, the country was to be saved as soon as their political redeemer came into power. From this comfortable state, wherein faith supplied the place of reason, they were disturbed by the death of both these leaders, neither of whom left a successor, but both exaggerated reputations. It became the general complaint that there was no man or set of men in whom the nation had any confidence. Some persons apprehended from this a dangerous indifference in the public toward parliament itself. Others hoped that as the people were weary of factious debates, parliament would no longer be made a theatre of faction, but that measures would be discussed with a view to the common weal, and no longer solely with reference to the party by which they were brought forward.

The opposition consisted of the most heterogeneous and discordant materials. The Grenville party had a just view of the dangers of the country, and a right feeling for its honour. They were sincerely attached to the monarchy, to the Church of England, and to the existing constitution of the state: therefore they steadily and manfully resisted the measures of pretended reform which were brought forward sometimes by mistaken, sometimes by designing men, as leading with sure tendency to a mob-government and all its certain horrors. They knew also that hopeless as the war might seem, it was our safest position, and

that peace could not be made without disgrace and imminent danger, so long as the continent of Europe was under the control of France. But while they thus entirely agreed with the government in the fundamental principles of its policy foreign and domestic, they opposed it in all the details of administration with a factious animosity, which seemed to show how deeply they resented their dismissal from power: and thus they lost with the nation much of that weight which they must otherwise have possessed by reason of their acknowledged ability, their constitutional principles, and their high personal character. Still, however, they were regarded with a certain degree of respect, which was not the case with the remains of Mr. Fox's party. The Foxites, from the beginning of the war, through all its changes had uniformly taken part against their country; consistent in this and in nothing else, they had always sided with the enemy, pleading his cause, palliating his crimes, extolling his wisdom, magnifying his power, vilifying and accusing their own government, depreciating its resources, impeding its measures, insulting its allies, calling for disclosures which no government ought to make, and forcing them sometimes from the weakness and the mistaken liberality of their opponents. Buonaparte, as Washington had done before him, relied upon their zeal and virulence; and they by their speeches and writings served him more effectually upon the continent and in France itself, than all the manifestoes of his ministers, and the diatribes of his own press. In future ages it will be thought a strange and almost incredible anomaly in politics, that there should have existed in the legislature of any country a regular party, organised and acknowledged as such, whose business it was to obstruct the proceedings of government, and render it by every possible means contemptible and odious to the people; a party always in semi-alliance with the enemy, who in times of difficulty

CHAP.

L

The Foxites.

CHAP. and danger prophesied nothing but failure, disgrace, and ruin ;
 I. and whose systematic course of conduct, if it had been intended
 to bring about the fulfilment of their predictions, could not have
 been more exactly adapted to that object.

*Attempts to
 raise a cry
 for peace.*

The Foxites, before they were admitted into office, had pertinaciously insisted upon the practicability and ease of making peace ; this opinion could not be maintained while they were in power, and their dismissal was at this time so recent, that it could not as yet decently be resumed. Attempts, however, to raise a popular cry for peace were made by certain manufacturers whose trade was at a stand : they were assisted by many of those persons who in strict adherence to the phraseology as well as the principles of the puritans, call themselves religious professors, and by some other conscientious but inconsistent men, who while they admit that the necessity of war must be allowed in just cases, exclaim in all cases against the practice, setting their compassionate feelings in array against

*Superstition
 concerning
 Buonaparte.*

reason, and against the manlier virtues. A superstition concerning Buonaparte was mingled with this womanish sensibility. They who had not lost sight of his enormities doubted whether he were the Beast, whose number they contrived to discover in his name ; .. or Antichrist himself. Others whom he had in some degree conciliated by his various aggressions upon the papal power, forgave him his crimes because the Whore of Babylon happened to be among those whom he had plundered : they rather imagined him to be the Man upon the White Horse. In this, however, they were all agreed, that Providence had appointed him for some great* work : and it was an easy con-

* “ The most serious and thinking people among all denominations begin to see something more than an ordinary providence in the recent overthrow of state after

clusion for those whose weak heads and warm imaginations looked no further, that it must be unavailing, if not impious, to oppose him. CHAP. I.

This was a pitiable delusion: but more extraordinary was the weakness of those, who having been the friends of France at the commencement of the revolution, when they believed that the cause of liberty was implicated in her success, looked with complacency now upon the progress which oppression was making in the world, because France was the oppressor. They had turned their faces toward the east, in the morning, to worship the rising sun, and now when it was evening they were looking eastward still, obstinately affirming that still the sun was there. Time had passed on; circumstances were changed; nothing remained stationary except their understandings; and because they had been incapable of deriving wisdom from experience, they called themselves consistent; and because they were opposed in every thing to the views of their government, the hopes of their countrymen, and the honour and interest of their country, they arrogated to themselves the exclusive praise of patriotism! But the persons who from these various views and feelings united in calling for peace, were insignificant in number, and

*Admirers of
the French
revolution.*

state, and kingdom after kingdom, upon the continent of Europe. People without any pretensions to religion see a fatality attending almost every state that has hitherto exerted itself against the French empire." The Gospel Magazine then compares Buonaparte to Cyrus, because having destroyed the persecuting spirit of Romish Babylon, and restored the liberty of religious worship, he had so far laid the foundations of the New Jerusalem. "It is of no avail," says the writer, "to object to any such character that he is a man of blood, for such was David; and yet as his wars were necessary to bring in the peaceable reign of Solomon, so the present wars, and the manifest destruction of the enemies of truth, may introduce the reign of a greater than Solomon, who shall have dominion also from sea to sea, and from the river to the ends of the earth." This sample may suffice, one of many which might be adduced in proof of the text.

CHAP. government had never at any time more certainly acted with
 I. the full concurrence of the nation, than in carrying on the war
 against Buonaparte.

*Increased
 expenditure,
 activity and
 wealth.*

Heavy burthens had been incurred during this long and arduous contest. At the commencement of the year 1807, the annual expenditure was not less than seventy-two millions, and the national debt amounted to six hundred and twenty-seven. But hitherto the prosperity of the country had kept pace with its exertions. The wheels of the machine seemed rather to move more freely than to be impeded by the weight which was laid upon them ; and the war created means for supporting its enormous demands, by the enterprize which it called into action, and the money which it put in circulation. All the manufactures connected with the numerous branches of the naval and military service were in full activity. Agricultural industry also received an impulse such as had never before been experienced ; for the English being excluded from the Baltic, and holding relations of doubtful amity with the United States of America, were fain to depend upon themselves for produce, and the emergency produced commensurate exertions throughout the kingdom. The country banks supplied a currency without which these exertions could not have been made ; every where wastes were brought into cultivation ; and the agricultural labourers being every where employed at high wages, contributed by their increased expenditure to extend the prosperity of which they partook.

*Manufac-
 turing
 system.*

Other circumstances, connected with the progress of society, and leading beyond all doubt to the most perilous crisis which society has ever yet undergone, conduced at this time mainly to the service of the state, and enabled the government to raise a revenue and support fleets and armies upon a scale which even in the last generation could not have been contemplated as

possible. As the drunkard derives a pleasurable sensation, and an immediate excitement from strong liquors which by their sure effect are producing organic derangement, incurable disease, and death, so the manufacturing system contributed at this time to the national wealth and strength, while it was poisoning the vitals of the commonwealth. Carried as it now appeared to be by mechanical ingenuity and power to its utmost extent, it enabled our merchants to supply the world with manufactured goods, and at so low a price, that the most severe enactments, enforced by the most vigilant precautions, could not exclude them from the continental markets. In vain did Buonaparte shut the ports of Europe against the British flag, thinking that by destroying that part of our revenue which is derived from foreign trade, he should cut the sinews of our strength; in vain did the American government co-operate with him by its non-importation acts; British goods still found their way every where, and the books of the custom-house proved a continual increase in our exports; while the internal commerce of the country (nine-elevenths of the whole), and that with Ireland and our foreign possessions, (a large proportion of the remaining parts), flourished beyond all former example. The manufacturing system supplied the war with men as well as means; the necessity for hands in agriculture also being greatly diminished by improved modes of labour, and by the use of agricultural machines, we were enabled without violence or difficulty to maintain in arms a force scarcely inferior in numbers to that of the enemy with all their fivefold superiority of population. And thus the country was prevented from feeling the evil of that forced population which the manufacturing system and the poor laws had produced, and of the prevailing custom of educating youths of the middle rank for stations higher than that in which they were born, or had means to support.

CHAP.
I.



CHAPTER II.

SECRET TREATY OF FONTAINEBLEAU. INVASION OF PORTUGAL. REMOVAL OF THE ROYAL FAMILY TO BRAZIL. STATE OF PORTUGAL UNDER THE FRENCH USURPATION.

CHAP.
II.

1807.

*Conjectures
concerning
the projects
of Buona-
arte.*

ALL opposition to Napoleon Buonaparte being at an end upon the continent of Europe, men began to inquire what would be the next object of his restless ambition. Would he execute his long meditated designs against the Turkish empire, parcel out Greece in tributary dukedoms, principalities and kingdoms, and make his way again to Egypt, not risking himself and his army a second time upon the seas, but by a safer land journey, conquering as he went? The imbecile policy of the English in Egypt, the state of that country, and the importance of which it might become in the hand of an efficient government, seemed to invite the French emperor to direct his views thitherward, if he understood his real interests as a conqueror. The scene also which had recently been enacted at Paris by the Jews in Sanhedrim assembled, under his command, appeared to have more meaning than was avowed. It was little likely that he should have convened them to answer questions which there was no reason why he should ask; or to lend their sanction to the conscription, which requiring no other sanction than that of his inexorable tyranny, set all laws, principles, and feelings, at defiance. And though doubtless the deputies indulged gratuitously in impious adulation, yet it was apparent that in some of their blasphemies they echoed the pretensions of the adventurer whom

they addressed. When in their hall of meeting they placed the Imperial Eagle over the Ark of the Covenant, and blended the cyphers of Napoleon and Josephine with the unutterable name of God; impious as this was, it was only French flattery in Jewish costume. But when they applied to him the prophecies of Isaiah and Daniel, when they called him "the Lord's anointed Cyrus,"... "the living Image of the Divinity,"... "the only mortal according to God's own heart, to whom He had intrusted the fate of nations, because he alone could govern them with wisdom;"... these things resembled the abominable language of his Bishops and of his own proclamations, too much to escape notice. And when they reminded him that he had subdued the ancient land of the eternal pyramids, the land wherein their ancestors had been held in bondage, that he had appeared on the banks of the once-sacred Jordan, and fought in the valley of Sichem in the plains of * Palestine, such language seemed to indicate a project for resettling them in the Holy Land, as connected with his views concerning Egypt. Nay, as he had successively imitated Hannibal, and Alexander, and Charlemagne, just as the chance of circumstances reminded him of each, was it improbable that Mahommed might be the next object of his imitation? that he might breathe in incense till he fancied himself divine; that adulation, and success, and vanity, utterly unchecked as they were, having destroyed all moral feeling and all conscience, should affect his intellect next; and that, from being the Cyrus of the Lord, he would take the hint which his

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II.
1807.

* Transactions of the Parisian Sanhedrim, p. xiv. 11, 104, 168, 226. There are two Hebrew Odes upon the birth-day of Buonaparte in this volume. Macpherson imitated the scripture-poetry when he manufactured Ossian; and it is curious to observe, how much more these French Hebrew Odes resemble Macpherson, than either he or they resemble the Biblical poets.

CHAP. own clergy had given him, and proclaim himself the temporal
 II. Messiah? Nothing was too impious for this man, nothing too
 1807. frantic; . . and, alas! such was the degradation of Europe and
 of the world, England alone excepted, that scarcely any thing
 seemed to be impracticable for him.

Another speculation was, that, in co-operation with the Russians, he would march an army through Persia to the Indies, and give a mortal blow, in Hindostan, to the prosperity and strength of England; for it was one of the preposterous notions of our times, that the power of England depended upon these foreign possessions, . . the acquirements, as it were, of yesterday! An ominous present was said, by the French journalists, to have been sent him by the Persian sovereign, . . two scimitars, one of which had belonged to Timur, the other to Nadir Shah. The intrigues of his emissaries at the Persian court, and with the Mahrattas and Mahommedan powers in Hindostan, were supposed to render this project probable; and the various routes which his army might take, were anxiously traced upon the map, by those whose forethought had more of fear in it than of wisdom and of hope. But Buonaparte was now enacting the part of Charlemagne, and had not leisure, as yet, to resume that of Alexander. He had determined upon occupying the kingdoms of Spain and Portugal, believing that because of the helplessness of one country, and the state of the court in the other, he might obtain possession of both without resistance, and become master of Brazil and of the Spanish Indies.

*Rise of D.
 Manuel de
 Godoy.*

Don Manuel de Godoy, Duke of Alcudia and Prince of the *Peace, was at this time minister in Spain. He was an up-

* *Principe del Pax*, not Prince of Peace, as usually translated. The title of Prince of Peace used formerly to be given by the Emperors to the Abbots of Mount Cassino, or assumed by them.—Helyot, 5, 53.

start, who, because he had been the Queen's paramour, had attained the highest power in the state, and by whatever qualities he ingratiated himself with the King, possessed his confidence and even his friendship. There was no jealousy in the Queen's attachment to this minion; she gave him one of the royal family in marriage, but the private life of the favourite continued to be as infamous as the means whereby he had risen. It is said that there was no way so certain to obtain promotion, as by pandering to his vices; and that wives, sisters, and daughters, were offered him as the price of preferment in a manner more shameless than had ever before been witnessed in a christian country. Certain it is, that the morals of the Spanish court were to the last degree depraved, and that this depravity affected all within its sphere like a contagion. He was rapacious as well as sensual; but as his sensuality was amply fed by the creatures who surrounded him, so was his avarice gratified by the prodigal favour of the crown, and Godoy had nothing to desire beyond the continuance of the authority which he enjoyed. The cruel part of his conduct must be ascribed to that instinctive dread of wisdom and hatred of virtue which such men necessarily feel in their unnatural elevation.

Other ministers may have been as vicious: many have been more vindictive; and in ordinary times Godoy might have filled his station without more disgrace than certain of his predecessors, and even with some credit, for vanity led him to patronize arts and science in conformity with the fashion of the age. Pestalozzi's scheme of education was introduced under his favour into Spain; and vaccination was communicated to the Spanish dominions in America, and to the Philippines by an expedition sent for that sole purpose. But his lot had fallen in times which might have perplexed the ablest statesman; and in proportion as he was tried his incapacity became notorious to all men.

CHAP.

II.

Godoy created a prince for making peace with France.

CHAP.
II.

*The Prince
of Astu-
rias inimical
to Godoy.*

*Parties in
favour of
the French.*

While Charles and his favourite were vainly wishing to free themselves from the yoke of France, that very disposition on their part induced the Prince of Asturias to regard Buonaparte with complacency and hope. The father's favourite has seldom been the minister of the son. Those Spaniards who were excluded from any share in public affairs under the administration of Godoy, looked naturally to the Prince, and formed a party round him, in which men of the most opposite elements were combined. When the French revolution began, the young and the ardent in Spain, as in the rest of Europe, eagerly adopted principles which promised a new and happier order of things: they were comparatively far less numerous than in any other country, partly because of the state of the press, still more because of the feeling and devotion with which this nation is attached to its religion and all its forms. There were, however, many, and those of the best of the Spaniards, who hoped to obtain that reformation in their government by the assistance of France, which without such assistance they knew it would not only be hopeless, but fatal to attempt. The attachment which they had formed to the French republic, many of these men transferred to the French empire, with an inconsistency so gross and monstrous, that it might seem impossible, if we had not seen it exemplified among ourselves: having, because of their principles, at first acquired a party feeling, they deluded themselves by supposing that in serving their party they promoted their principles, till at last they had no other principle than the mere party interest itself. Another class of Spaniards had been hostile to the French revolution till its character was changed by Buonaparte: they felt no dislike to the system of his government, because they were accustomed to despotism, and the acts of personal atrocity which he had committed did not

sufficiently alarm them. The unhappy circumstance with which the English war had commenced, irritated them against Great Britain, and that sentiment of indignation naturally biassed them toward France. There were some of a third description, who had neither heart nor understanding to feel for the honour, or to wish for any improvement in the state of their native land, but who desired a change for the mere sake of acquiring authority : these men were enemies to the Prince of the Peace, not for his vices, his injustice, and his political misconduct ; they hated him because they envied him, and wished to exercise a like tyranny themselves.

CHAP.
II.

The people felt the degradation of Spain, and imputed to Godoy not only their present difficulties, but the whole train of inveterate evils under which the country was groaning. Never had any former favourite been so universally detested. His administration would have been instantly at an end, if the Prince's party could have appealed to public opinion ; but being precluded by the nature of a despotic government from any other means of attempting his overthrow than those of intrigue*, and

Unpopularity of Godoy.

* In the year 1796 Godoy was denounced to the Inquisition by three friars, as being suspected of atheism, he not having confessed or communicated in his proper church for eight years, as having two wives living, and leading a scandalous life with many other women. This was a court intrigue, planned by D. Antonio Despuig, Archbishop of Seville, and afterwards cardinal, and by D. Rafael de Murquez, queen's confessor, and titular archbishop of Seleucia. The inquisitor-general, Lorenzana (archbishop of Toledo), was afraid to interfere ; they assured him that the king would consent to the proceedings when it was shown him that Godoy was an atheist ; and Despuig applied to the pope through the nuncio, that Lorenzana might be reprovved for his timidity, and enjoined to act. The pope accordingly wrote to the inquisitor-general ; his courier was intercepted at Genoa by the French, and Buonaparte sent the letters to Godoy, as a means of consolidating the recent friendship between the Directory and the court of Spain. The two archbishops in consequence were sent out of the kingdom

CHAP.
II.

*The French
ambassador
advises the
prince to so-
licit an al-
liance with
Buona-
parte's
family.*

knowing that all intrigues against him at their own court would be dangerous, as well as ineffectual, they hoped to accomplish this object by help of a foreign power. The Prince being a widower, Beauharnois, the French ambassador at Madrid, seeing the disposition of the government to shake off its subjection to France, and that of Ferdinand and his friends to get the administration of affairs into their hands through the influence of France, hinted to him how advantageous it would be to connect himself by marriage with the new imperial family. Whether he was instructed to invite a proposal to this effect or not, it is believed that he acted with perfect good faith, and indeed he might well have imagined that in so doing he acted for the interest of both countries. It was at this time generally believed in Spain that Buonaparte, being justly offended with Godoy for the intention which he had manifested before the battle of Jena, would insist upon his dismissal from the government. The friends of Ferdinand therefore never doubted but that he would gladly contract the proposed alliance with the heir of the Spanish monarchy, a connection which would at once gratify his pride, strengthen his power, and secure a wavering ally. The better men of this party seem also to have been persuaded, that under the protection of Buonaparte they might relieve the country from some of its manifold grievances; nor would this persuasion have been unreasonable, if any ties could have restrained the merciless ambition of the man in whom they confided. For though it might be his policy now to keep Spain in her present weakness,

under a pretext of paying a visit of condolence to the pope. These facts are stated by Llorente in his History of the Inquisition (chap. 39). Llorente had been secretary to that abominable tribunal, and in writing its history, had none of those motives for perverting the truth which influenced him when writing under the name of M. Nellerto.

and consequent dependence, yet when his own blood acquired an interest in the prosperity of that kingdom, it might fairly be expected that those salutary changes which were essential to its welfare would be promoted by him, and peaceably effected under his auspices.

CHAP.
II.
1807.

11 Oct.

Influenced by such considerations, the Prince addressed a secret letter to Buonaparte. It had long, he said, been his most earnest desire to express, at least by writing, the sentiments of respect, of esteem, and of attachment which he had vowed to a hero who eclipsed all those that preceded him, and whom Providence had sent to preserve Europe from the total subversion with which it was threatened, to secure her shaken thrones, and to restore peace and happiness to the nations. He was unhappy enough to be compelled by circumstances to conceal so just and laudable an action as if it were a crime, . . . such were the fatal consequences of the excessive goodness of the best of kings. His father was endowed with the most upright and generous heart; but artful and wicked persons too often took advantage of such a disposition to disguise the truth from their sovereigns, and none but the Emperor Napoleon could detect the schemes of such perfidious counsellors, open the eyes of his dearly beloved parents, render them happy, and provide at the same time for his happiness, and for that of the Spaniards. "Therefore," said the Prince, "I implore with the utmost confidence your majesty's paternal protection, to the end that you will not only deign to accord me the honour of allying me with your family, but that you will smooth all the difficulties, and remove all the obstacles which might oppose this object of my wishes." When Buonaparte was thus entreated by the Prince to lend his influence for the removal of Godoy, he was carrying on secret negociations with that favourite. Long before he received this letter, he had determined upon seizing Spain; his measures for

*The prince
applies se-
cretly to
Buona-
parte.*

*Buonaparte
intends to
seize the
Peninsula.*

CHAP. II. 1807. subjecting it by force had been arranged. But it was necessary to begin by occupying Portugal, and to dupe the Spanish court into a co-operation against a friendly and unoffending power, a power too with which it was connected by the closest ties: thus would the purposes of France be every way served; for while she derived from Spain all the assistance that could be desired, the Spanish government would be preparing the way for its own destruction, and depriving itself at the same time of all claim to compassion when the hour arrived.

Spanish troops sent to the North of Europe, and to Tuscany.

The first step toward the accomplishment of his design, was to remove the best troops from Spain; and accordingly, at the requisition of the French government, in conformity to treaty, 16,000 men, the flower of the Spanish army, were marched into the North of Germany, under the Marquis de Romana, and another division into Tuscany, under D. Gonzalo O'Farrill. The next business was to introduce French troops into Spain, and for this the occupation of Portugal afforded a pretext. Buonaparte, who was regardless of all other engagements, however solemnly contracted, was always, as far as his power extended, faithful to his vows of vengeance. Exasperated by the service which the Portuguese ships had rendered in blockading Malta, he had said in one of his Egyptian proclamations, that there would come a time when the Portuguese should pay with tears of blood for the affront which they had offered to the French republic. Heavy payments of a different kind had already been exacted. During many years the Prince of Brazil had submitted to insults which he had no means of resenting, and from time to time had bought off at a heavy price the threat of invasion, in the hope of preserving his kingdom by these expedients till peace should be restored to Europe. So often had these threats been renewed, and these respites purchased, that Portugal incurred the burden and the shame of paying tribute, without obtaining the security

Condition of the Portuguese government.

of a tributary state. Upon this, however, that poor government relied. They thought themselves safe because France obtained greater sums from them in this manner than could be drawn from Portugal as a conquered country ; because much of the treasure from Spanish America, so large a portion of which found its way into France, reached Europe in safety by the assistance of the Portugueze ; and because they had every reason to suppose that if an attack upon them should at any time be seriously intended, the court of Madrid would use its utmost influence to avert their danger for its own sake. Could any reliance have been placed either upon the understanding or the honour of the Spanish king, upon royal and national faith, the plainest common interest, and the closest ties of alliance, the Portugueze government would have reasoned justly. But Charles IV. was one of the weakest of sovereigns ; his favourite had obtained the administration for his vices, not for his talents, which were of the meanest order ; and it was easy for Buonaparte to deal with such men, and make them at once the instruments and the victims of his ambition.

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A month after the peace of Tilsit had been concluded, the French and Spanish ambassadors jointly informed the court of Lisbon that it must shut its ports to England, arrest the English subjects, and confiscate the English property in Portugal, or expose itself to an immediate war with France and Spain ; if these propositions were not complied with, they were instructed to leave the country in three weeks. Without waiting for the reply, Buonaparte seized the Portugueze ships in his harbours. The crisis was now manifestly at hand ; there no longer remained a hope of purchasing farther respite, and in the state to which the army had been reduced by long misrule, resistance was not thought of. The court of Portugal was weak even to helplessness, but it had the advantage of perfectly understanding

*August.
Portugal re-
quired to act
against
England.*

CHAP. II. the character of the two powers between which it was compelled to choose; knowing that every forbearance might be expected on the part of England, and on the part of France every thing that was oppressive and iniquitous. In full reliance therefore upon the justice and long tried friendship of Great Britain, the Prince informed the French government that he would consent to shut his ports, but that neither his principles of morality nor of religion would permit him to seize the persons and property of the British subjects, in violation of treaties and of the law of nations. At the same time the English were apprized that they would do well to wind up their affairs as speedily as possible, and leave the kingdom. A Portuguese squadron happened to be cruising against the Algerines, and the necessity of keeping on good terms with England till this should have re-entered the Tagus, was urged as a reason for temporising awhile, to which Buonaparte, eager as he was for ships, was likely to listen more readily than to any other plea. It was held out to him also, that as hostilities must be expected from England in case the rigour of the terms upon which France insisted were enforced, it would be prudent to send out the young Prince of Beira to Brazil, while the seas were still open, that his presence might secure the fidelity of the colonies.

Middle course proposed by the Portuguese government.

Cham-pagny's report, in L. Goldsmith, v. iii. p. 253-255.

Preparation for occupying Portugal.

The Portuguese ministers at Paris and Madrid have been accused of having betrayed their country at this time; more probably they were deceived and perplexed, and knew not how to advise; and thus the Portuguese government was left to act without any other information of the proceedings of the two hostile courts, than what it obtained from common rumour, or through the circuitous channel of England. Buonaparte's intention was to secure the persons of the royal family if possible, but at all events to take possession of Portugal: this point was essential to his ulterior views. For this purpose a force had been collected under the

title of the Army of Observation of the Gironde, . . a title which CHAP.
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may have been intended to intimidate the government of Spain, for it was not even pretended that France could have any danger to apprehend in that quarter. Junot, who had been ambassador at Lisbon, was appointed to the command, and he was on the way to Bayonne before the term expired which had been allowed to Portugal to choose its part. The Prince was prepared to make every sacrifice of interest and of feeling, so he might thereby save the country from an attack : the misery which the expulsion of the English, and the consequent loss of a flourishing and extensive commerce, must bring upon Lisbon and upon the whole kingdom, was yet less dreadful than the horrors of invasion at a time when defence appeared impracticable. He determined therefore, at the last, to comply with the demands of the besotted court of Spain, and of the tyrant who directed its suicidal measures, but not till the last. The French and Spanish legations were suffered to retire, because nothing but the last extremity could induce him, even in appearance, to commit an act of cruelty toward the English. When these legations withdrew, the British residents were at the same time preparing with all speed for their compulsory departure : and so little did the Prince feel assured that he could preserve the country in peace by total submission to the iniquitous terms which were pressed upon it, that circular instructions were dispatched to the bishops and the heads of the religious orders, requiring them to register the plate of the churches, and send it to Lisbon or other places appointed for security.

*The French
and Spanish
ambassadors
leave
Lisbon.*

While the Prince and his ministers were in this state of lamentable suspense, a secret treaty between France and Spain for the partition of Portugal was signed at Fontainebleau. By this extraordinary treaty, the King of Etruria ceding his Italian possessions in full and entire sovereignty to Buonaparte,

*Secret treaty
of Fontaine-
bleau.*

CHAP. II. 1807. was to have the province of Entre Minho e Douro, with the city of Porto for its capital, erected into a kingdom for him, under the title of Northern Lusitania. Alentejo and Algarve were in like manner to be given to Godoy*, in entire property and sovereignty, with the title of Prince of the Algarves; the other Portuguese provinces were to be held in sequestration till a general peace, at which time, if they were restored to the house of Braganza, in exchange for Gibraltar, Trinidad, and other colonies which the English had conquered, the new sovereign was, like the King of Northern Lusitania and the Prince of the Algarves, to hold his dominions by investiture from the King of Spain, to acknowledge him as protector, and never to make peace or war without his consent. The two contracting powers were to agree upon an equal partition of the colonial possessions of Portugal; and Buonaparte engaged to recognize his Catholic Majesty as Emperor of the Two Americas, when every thing should be ready for his assuming that title, which might be either at a general peace, or at farthest within three years therefrom; and he guaranteed to him the possession of his dominions on the continent of Europe south of the Pyrenees.

A secret convention, which was concluded at the same time, agreed upon the means for carrying this nefarious treaty into effect. Twenty-five thousand French infantry and 3000 cavalry were to enter Spain, and march directly for Lisbon; they were to be joined by 8000 Spanish infantry and 3000 cavalry, with

* No additional infamy can possibly be heaped upon Don Manuel Godoy; it ought however to be mentioned, that the minion who thus planned the destruction of the kingdom of Portugal, in order to obtain a new principality for himself, was, at this very time, a noble of that kingdom, by the title of Conde de Evora-Monte, and enjoyed a pension from the crown. This was conferred upon him by an *Alvara* of Feb. 5th, 1797, in which the Queen calls him "My Cousin."

30 pieces of artillery. At the same time 10,000 Spanish troops were to take possession of the province between the Minho and Douro, and the city of Porto; and 6000 were to enter Alentejo and Algarve. The French troops were to be maintained by Spain upon their march. As soon as they had entered the country, (for no opposition was expected,) the government of each portion of the divided territory was to be vested in the Generals commanding, and the contributions imposed thereon accrue to their respective courts. The central body was to be under the orders of the French Commander-in-chief. Nevertheless, if either the King of Spain, or the Prince of the Peace, should think fit to join the Spanish troops attached to that army, the French, with the General commanding them, should be subject to his orders. Another body of 40,000 French troops was to be assembled at Bayonne, by the 20th of November at the latest, to be ready to proceed to Portugal, in case the English should send reinforcements there, or menace it with an attack. This army, however, was not to enter Spain, till the two contracting parties had come to an agreement upon that point.

This nefarious treaty, whereby the two contracting powers disposed of the dominions of two other sovereigns with whom the one was connected by the nearest and closest ties of relationship and alliance, and both were at peace, was carried on with a secrecy worthy of the transaction. D. Eugenio Izquierdo, an agent of Godoy's, was employed to negotiate it unknown to the Spanish ambassador in France, and the whole business is said to have been concealed from the ministers* in both countries.

* Azanza and O'Farrill declare that when they came into office as Ferdinand's ministers, they found no papers concerning it in their office. Cevallos says, that he was entirely ignorant of the transaction: Izquierdo indeed charges him with having

CHAP. II. would not permit him, rightly judging that as the disposition of the Russian government was now known to be unfriendly towards England, it was not proper that these Russian ships should be allowed to enter an enemy's port, and thus effect a junction with an enemy's fleet. Siniavin therefore proceeded to the Tagus; his unexpected arrival at such a juncture was naturally supposed to be part of the tyrant's gigantic plans, and it was not doubted now that Buonaparte meant to make Lisbon one of the ports from which the British dominions were to be invaded. The circumstance was in reality accidental, but at such a moment it appeared like design, and the blockade was therefore more rigorously enforced.

1807.
November.

*Buonaparte
endeavours
to seize the
royal fa-
mily.*

If Buonaparte's only object had been to force the Prince into hostilities with England, he would now have been satisfied. A courier had been immediately dispatched to inform him that all his demands were complied with, and the Marquis de Marialva speedily set out after the courier with the title of Ambassador Extraordinary; . . while he was on his way the French troops had entered Portugal. The tyrant thought to entrap the royal family; but disdaining in the wantonness of power to observe even the appearances of justice or common decorum toward a country which he so entirely despised, the success of his villainy was frustrated by his own precipitation. From the commencement of these discussions the Prince had declared that if a French army set foot within his territories he would remove the seat of government to Brazil. The French expected that the rupture with England would deter him from pursuing this resolution; should it prove otherwise they thought to prevent it by their intrigues and their celerity: and such was the treachery with which the Prince was surrounded, and the want of vigilance in every branch of his inert administration, that Junot was within an hundred miles of Lisbon before any official advices were re-

ceived that he had passed the frontiers! Even private letters which communicated intelligence of the enemy's movements and the rapidity and disorder of the march, were detained upon the road.

CHAP.
II.
1807.
November.

Junot had advanced from Salamanca by forced marches; he reached Alcantara in five days, the distance being forty leagues, by mountainous and unfrequented roads and in a bad season. No preparations had been made for the French on the way; even at Ciudad Rodrigo the governor had received no intimation of their coming. The Spanish forces, which according to the secret convention of Fontainebleau were to be under the French general's orders, had been instructed to join him at Valladolid and Salamanca; by his directions however they waited for him at Alcantara; scarce half a ration could be procured there for the half-starved and exhausted troops, and this the Spanish general Carraffa took up upon his own credit. From thence Junot issued a proclamation to the Portugueze people, in which among his other titles he enumerated that of Grand Cross of the Order of Christ, an order conferred upon him by that very Prince whom he was hastening to entrap and depose. "Inhabitants of the kingdom of Portugal," it said, "a French army is about to enter your country; it comes to emancipate you from English dominion, and makes forced marches that it may save your beautiful city of Lisbon from the fate of Copenhagen. But for this time the hopes of the perfidious English government will be deceived. Napoleon, who fixes his eyes upon the fate of the Continent, saw what the tyrant of the seas was devouring in his heart, and will not suffer that it should fall into his power. Your Prince declares war against England; we make therefore common cause. Peaceable inhabitants of the country, fear nothing! my army is as well disciplined as it is brave. I will answer on my honour for its good conduct. Let it find the

Noves,
1. 160.

Junot's pro-
clamation
from Al-
cantara.
Nov. 17.

CHAP. welcome which is due to the soldiers of the Great Napoleon ;
 II. let it find, as it has a right to expect, the provisions which are
 1807. needful." The proclamation proceeded to denounce summary
 November. justice against every French soldier who should be found plun-
 dering, but its severest threats were against the Portuguese
 themselves. Every Portuguese, not being a soldier of the line,
 who should be found making part of an armed assembly, was to
 be shot, as well as every individual exciting the people to take
 arms against the French ; wherever an individual belonging to the
 French army should be killed, the district was to be fined in not
 less than thrice the amount of its yearly rents, the four prin-
 cipal inhabitants being taken as hostages ; and the first city,
 town or village in which this might happen, should be burnt
 and rased to the ground. " But," said Junot, " I willingly per-
 suade myself that the Portuguese will understand their own
 true interest ; that aiding the pacific views of their Prince they
 will receive us as friends ; and especially that the beautiful city
 of Lisbon will with pleasure see me enter its walls at the head of
 an army which alone can preserve it from becoming a prey to
 the eternal enemies of the Continent."

*The French
 enter Por-
 tugal.*

The march from Salamanca had been so fatiguing that it
 was impossible for the troops to proceed without some rest.
 Junot had arrived there on the 17th of November. On the 18th
 he sent a reconnoitring party as far as Rosmaninhal, and they
 returned with intelligence that the country was neither prepared
 to resist them, nor aware of their approach. On the 19th, the van-
 guard passed the frontier, and Junot, with the remainder of the
 first division of his army, followed the ensuing day. This division
 consisted of 8,600 men, with 12 field pieces. The second division,
 moving likewise upon Castello-Branco, entered by Salvaterra
 and Idanha-a-nova: its cavalry and guns, with the third division
 and the baggage, were detained some days by the sudden rise of

the mountain streams. On the evening of the 20th there was a report in Castello-Branco that the French were at Zebreira ; and at six o'clock, when it was hardly known whether the rumour were true or false, a French officer arrived to inform the magistrates that quarters must be made ready for General Laborde and a corps of 3000 men, who would be there in the course of two hours. Junot took up his quarters the next day in the episcopal palace, and manifested sufficient ill-humour that no preparations had been made for entertaining him. The adjutants carried off some of the bishop's valuables, overhauled his library in the hope of finding money concealed there, and not finding what they were in search of, demanded money, and obtained it. One of them, after they had left the city, returned from Sarzedas to borrow a farther sum in Junot's name ; nor was it known whether this was a fraudulent extortion of his own, or a courteous mode of robbery on the part of the general. The night which the French passed in Castello-Branco is described by the inhabitants as an image of Hell. Junot had pledged his honour for their good conduct ; but men and officers were, like their commander, as rapacious and as unprincipled as the government which they served. They were passing through a country where they experienced no resistance, and which they protested they were coming to defend ; but they added wanton havoc to the inevitable devastation which is made by the passage of an army ; the men pillaged as they went, and the very officers robbed the houses in which they were quartered ; olive and other fruit trees were cut down for fuel or to form temporary barracks, houses and churches were plundered ; and as if they had been desirous of provoking the Portugueze to some act of violence which might serve as a pretext for carrying into effect the threats which Junot had denounced, they burnt or mutilated the images in the churches, and threw the wafer to be trodden under foot.

CHAP.
II.1807.
November.*Their rapacity upon the march.**Neves, i.
199.**Neves,
196-199.*

CHAP.

II.

1807.

November.

Conduct at
Abrantes.

The vanguard of the French reached Abrantes on the afternoon of the 23d, and Junot arrived the next morning. The generals entered that city with all the cattle which they had been able to collect on the way, like border-men returning from a foraging party, and the booty was sold for their emolument. A detachment was immediately sent to secure Punhete, a town situated on the left bank of the Zezere, where it falls into the Tagus. Means also were taken to supply some of the wants of the army, after the manner of the French in a country where they called themselves friends, protectors, and allies. The *Juiz de fora* was ordered to collect rations for 12,000 men, and 12,000 pair of shoes; a threat was added of imposing upon the town a contribution of 300,000 *cruzados novos*; and the manner in which these orders were intimated, seemed to imply such consequences to the magistrate in case of non-performance, that he thought it prudent to consult his own personal safety by flight. Junot then ordered the son of the person in whose house he had taken up his quarters to assume the vacant office, though the young man was not only not qualified for the office, because he had not taken the degrees which are required for it, but was positively disqualified, being a native of the place. The whole city was in consternation, apprehending the most dreadful results if the demands of the French were not complied with. Messengers were despatched to Thomar and through all the country round, to purchase all the shoes which could be found, and set all the craft to work: by these means, and by taking them from individuals, between 2 and 3000 pair were collected; with which Junot was fain to be satisfied, because he saw that no possible exertions could have procured more. These exactions were less intolerable to the Portuguese, than the insults and irreligion with which they were accompanied. A colonel who was quartered in a Capuchin convent made the Guardian pull off his boots, and after

robbing the convent of the few valuables which it contained, threatened to fusillade him if he did not bring him money ; the friar had no other resource but that of feigning to seek it, and taking flight. In the church of St. Antonio the altars were used as mangers for the horses.

Junot was at Abrantes, within ninety-two miles of Lisbon, before the Portuguese government received any certain intelligence that the French had passed the frontier. The first advices came from Lecor, orderly adjutant to the Marquez d'Alorna, and a truer Portuguese than his commander. At the same time a flag of truce from the British squadron entered the Tagus ; and the secret treaties of Fontainebleau were communicated to the Prince by Great Britain. D. Rodrigo de Sousa Coutinho urged him to execute his resolution of removing to his possessions in Brazil, the only course which he could pursue with honour or with safety. Lord Strangford came on shore, and assured him on the word of a British ambassador and a British admiral, that the measures which had been taken against Great Britain were considered as acts of compulsion on his part, in no ways abating the friendship of that old ally, if he would avail himself of her friendship. In Brazil he had an empire to the growing prosperity of which he might now add by his presence ; or he must inevitably be cut off from it by the nature of the maritime war, against which the combination of all the continental powers must be ineffectual.

The Prince's determination was anticipated at Abrantes before it was known, and perhaps before he himself had decided how to act. Rumours were current there that he had already embarked part of the royal family, that many fidalgos had gone on board to accompany the court in its removal, and that the army which had bombarded and taken Copenhagen was on board the British squadron. These reports made Junot fear that the

CHAP.
II.

1807.
November.

Noves,
900-2.

*Representa-
tion of the
British am-
bassador.*

*Observador
Portugues,*
p. 12.

*The Prince
determines
upon re-
moving to
Brazil.*

CHAP. II. prey would escape him ; and he was the more uneasy, because at a moment when every thing depended upon celerity, his march was impeded. There was the Zezere to cross, a river which in former wars had been considered as protecting Lisbon on this side, . . its depth and rapidity, and the height of its banks rendering it easy to defend the passage. A bridge of boats had been constructed at Punhete in the campaign of 1801, and afterwards broken up. Every exertion was now made to re-establish it; and in the meantime Junot sent off a courier with a confidential despatch to the minister of war and foreign affairs, Antonio de Araujo de Azevedo, framed for the purpose of being communicated to the Prince. Intrigue and protestations, however, would no longer avail ; the entrance of the French was an act of such unequivocal outrage, that its object could not be doubted, and the Prince prepared immediately for his removal. Europe had never yet beheld one of its princes compelled to seek an asylum in his colonies; such an intention had once been formed by the Dutch, but it was reserved for Portugal to set the first example in modern history.

He refuses to let the people and the English fleet defend the city.

Neves, i. 171.

Had there been a previous struggle, like that of the democratic cantons in Switzerland, or of the Tyrolese, such a termination would have been not less glorious than the most signal success. Preceded as it had been by long misgovernment, and all the concessions and vacillations of conscious imbecility, still it is among the most impressive as well as most memorable events in the annals of a kingdom fertile beyond all others in circumstances of splendid and of tragic story. The Prince had uniformly declared that to this measure he would resort, if the French entered Portugal; but he had not expected to be driven to it, and was not prepared for it. So completely indeed had he relied upon the assurance of the French legation, and of Dom Lourenço de Lima, that he had publicly assured the people all

had now been settled, and there no longer existed any cause of apprehension from France. The dismay and astonishment of the Lisbonians, therefore, may well be conceived, when a few days only after this declaration, they learnt that the French were at Abrantes, and saw the court making ready for immediate flight. The hurry and disorder of Junot's march was not unknown; his artillery had been damaged, having been dragged by oxen and peasantry over mountainous roads, a great number of his horses had died upon the way overworked, and the men themselves had been marched so rapidly and fed so ill, that a large proportion of them were more fit for the hospital than for active service. The greater part of the Portuguese army was near the capital, and wretched as the state was to which it had fallen, neither the will nor the courage of the men was doubted. The English in the fleet, with a right English feeling, were longing to be let loose against the enemy: Sir Sidney offered to bring his ships abreast of the city, and there, seconded by the indignant populace, dispute every inch of ground with the invader: "Surely," he said, "Lisbon was as defensible as Buenos Ayres!" Well might he thus feel and express himself who had defended Acre; and certain it is that Junot and all his foremost troops might have been put to the death which they had already merited at the hands of the Portuguese, if the Prince had given the word. But such an act of vengeance, just as it would have been, would have been advantageous to Buonaparte, by giving him a colourable pretext for treating Portugal as a conquered country: this the Prince knew; and it was in reliance upon his gentle and conscientious character, that Junot advanced in a manner which would else have appeared like the rashness of a madman.

The royal family had for some time past resided at Mafra; as soon as the emigration had been determined, they removed

CHAP.
II.

1807.

November.

*Manifesto
of the court
of Portugal.*

*Embarka-
tion of the
royal fa-
mily.*

CHAP. II. to Queluz, where they might be nearer the Tagus, and less exposed to any sudden attempt of the enemy. The Portuguese navy was ill equipped for sea ; no care had been taken to keep it victualled, and it was now found that many of the water casks were rotten, and new ones were to be made. The morning of the 27th had been fixed for the embarkation, and at an early hour numbers of both sexes and of all ages were assembled in the streets and upon the shore at Belem, where the wide space between the river and the fine Jeronymite convent was filled with carts and packages of every kind. From the restlessness and well-founded alarm of the people, it was feared that they would proceed to some excess of violence against those who were the objects of general suspicion. The crowd however was not yet very great when the Prince appeared, both because of the distance from Lisbon, and that the hour of the embarkation was not known. He came from the Ajuda, and the Spanish Infante D. Pedro in the carriage with him ; the troops who were to be on duty at the spot had not yet arrived, and when the Prince alighted upon the quay, there was a pressure round him, so that as he went down the steps to the water-edge, he was obliged to make way with his hand. He was pale and trembling, and his face was bathed in tears. The multitude forgot for a moment their own condition in commiseration for his ; they wept also, and followed him, as the boat pushed off, with their blessings. There may have been some among the spectators who remembered that from this very spot Vasco de Gama had embarked for that discovery which opened the way to all their conquests in the East ; and Cabral for that expedition which gave to Portugal an empire in the West, and prepared for her Prince an asylum now when the mother country itself was lost.

A spectacle not less impressive presented itself when the royal family arrived from Queluz. The insane Queen was in the

first carriage; for sixteen years she had never been seen in public. It is said that she had been made to understand the situation of affairs, so as to acquiesce in what was done; and that when she perceived the coachman was driving fast, she called out to him to go leisurely, for she was not taking flight. She had to wait some while upon the quay for the chair in which she was to be carried to the boat, and her countenance, in which the insensibility of madness was only disturbed by wonder, formed a striking contrast to the grief which appeared in every other face. The widow Princess, and the Infanta D. Maria, the Queen's sister, were in the next carriage, both in that state of affliction and dismay which such a moment might well occasion. The Princess of Brazil came next, in the octagon coach, with all her children, the nurse of the youngest babe, and the two *Camareiras mores*, or chief ladies of the bedchamber. She had been indefatigable in preparing for the voyage, and now she herself directed the embarkation of the children and domestics with a presence of mind which excited admiration. The royal family were distributed in different ships, not merely for the sake of being more easily accommodated, but that if shipwreck were to be added to their misfortunes, a part at least might probably be preserved.

The apprehension of this danger would occur more readily to the Portuguese than to any other people, because their maritime history is filled with the most dreadful and well-known examples; and the weather at the time of the embarkation gave a fearful specimen of what might be expected at that season. It blew a heavy gale, the bar was impassable, and continued so during the whole of the succeeding day. In the evening M. Herman, and a Portuguese, by name Jose de Oliveira Barreto, came with fresh despatches from Junot; he had sent them down the river in pursuance of that system of deception which was to

CHAP.
II.

1807.
November.

CHAP. be carried on to the last. Their arrival produced no effect upon
 II. the determination of the Prince; but every hour added to the
 1807. alarm and danger of his situation, and orders were given to dis-
 November. mantle the fortresses which commanded the river, and spike the
 guns in the batteries. During the night the storm abated, the
 weather was fair at daybreak on the 29th, a favourable wind
 sprung up, and the fleet crossed the bar when the enemy were
 just near enough to see their prey escape.

*Observador
 Port. 18.*

The fleet consisted of eight sail of the line, three frigates, and five smaller ships of war; besides these there were all the merchant-vessels that could be made ready, making in all a fleet of six-and-thirty sail. The nobles who accompanied the royal family, were the Duke of Cadaval, the Marquesses Angenja, Vago, filho, Lavradio, Alegrete, Torres Novas, Pombal, and Bellas; Counts Redondo, Caparica, Bel-monte, and Cavalleiro, Viscount Anadia; Araujo, whom the public voice loudly, but erringly accused of treason, embarked with the other ministers. All the ships were crowded with emigrants, . . for every one who had the means was eager to fly from the coming ruin. The confusion had been so great, that families were separated; wives got on board without their husbands, . . husbands without their wives; children and parents were divided; many were thus left behind, and many had the joy of meeting in Brazil when each believed that the other was in Portugal.

*Neves, i.
 180.*

*Regency
 appointed
 by the
 Prince.*

The Prince had appointed a regency the day before his embarkation, and the edict was made public on the next morning. Having endeavoured, he said, by all possible means to preserve the neutrality which his subjects had hitherto enjoyed, having exhausted his treasury, and after all other sacrifices, gone the length of shutting his ports against his old and faithful ally, the King of Great Britain, exposing thus the commerce of the country to total ruin, . . he saw that the troops of the Emperor

of the French, to whom he had united himself on the continent in the persuasion that he should be no farther disquieted, were marching towards his capital. To avoid, therefore, the effusion of blood, for these troops came with professions of not committing the slightest hostility, . . . knowing also that his royal person was their particular object, and that if he himself were absent, his subjects would be less disturbed, he had resolved for their sakes to remove, with the whole royal family, to his city of Rio de Janeiro, and there establish himself till a general peace. The persons whom he appointed to govern during his absence, were the Marquez de Abrantes, Francisco da Cunha de Menezes, lieutenant-general, the *Principal* Castro of the royal council, and *Regidor das Justiças*, Pedro de Mello Breyner, also of the council, and President of the treasury during the illness of Luiz de Vasconcellos e Souza, and Don Francisco de Noronha, Lieutenant-general, and President of the Board of Conscience. In failure of any of these, the Conde Monteiro Mor was appointed, who was also named for president of the *Senado da Camara*, with the Conde de Sampaio, or in his place Dom Miguel Pereira Forjaz, and the *Dezembargador do Paço* and *Procurador da Coroa*, Joam Antonio Salter de Mendonça, for the two secretaries. These governors were instructed to preserve, as far as possible, the kingdom in peace; to see that the French troops were well quartered and provided with every thing needful during their stay, to take care that no offence was offered them, or if offered, to punish it severely, and to preserve that harmony which ought to be kept with the armies of two powers to which Portugal was united on the continent.

Junot meantime had re-established the bridge over the Zézere, but not without difficulty. The river, at all times a strong and rapid stream, was swoln with rains; the work was more than once frustrated, and some of the workmen drowned. So

CHAP.
II.

1807.
November.

Junot advances rapidly.

CHAP. impatient was he to proceed, that he had begun to pass over his
 II. men in boats. Hastening on with his usual rapidity over the
 1807. marshes of Gollegam, he reached Santarem to dinner on the
November. 28th. Here he met the messenger on his return whom he had
 despatched from Abrantes, and the report of this person increased his anxiety. He ordered the Capitam Mor de Aviz, at whose house he was entertained, to provide him a horse: this gentleman happened to possess a very beautiful one, and Junot discovering that he had attempted to conceal the animal, was only dissuaded from putting him to death by the supplications of his wife; but he made him walk beside him, bare-headed, to the jail, and then dismissed him with every mark of ignominy. Time was when a Portuguese officer would have wiped out such an injury in the blood of him who inflicted it; it is fortunate that in this instance a forbearance suited to the times was shown. The French general reached Cartaxo that night; about an hour after midnight he was awakened with intelligence that the royal family had actually embarked, and it produced a fit of rage like madness.

*The French
 enter Lisbon.*

*Neves, i.
 184.
 18*

*Obs. Port.
 p. 19.*

The next day he was met by a deputation whom the governors sent to compliment him on his approach, a measure upon which the people commented with just severity. A few persons volunteered on the same obsequious service; men, probably, who having adopted the principles of the revolution in its better days, adhered to the French party under all its changes. In the course of the day the advanced guard arrived in the immediate vicinity of the city, and Junot himself saw the ships with that prey on board in the hope of which he had advanced with such rapidity, conveying the family of Braganza beyond his power, and beyond that of his mighty master. The troops arrived without baggage, having only their knapsacks, and a half gourd slung from the girdle as a drinking-cup; their muskets were

rusty, and many of them out of repair ; the soldiers themselves mostly barefoot, foundered with their march, and almost fainting with fatigue and hunger. The very women of Lisbon might have knocked them on the head. Junot reached Sacavem between nine and ten at night. The next morning the royal guard of police went on to meet him at an early hour. Without halting in Lisbon, he hurried on to Belem, and entering the battery of Bom-successo, satisfied himself by ocular demonstration that the Portugueze squadron was beyond his reach ; he fired, however, upon those merchant-ships, which not having been ready in time, were now endeavouring to escape. Very many were thus detained, for the Prince's orders to spike the guns had only been partially obeyed, having been countermanded by the governors ; and this was another of their acts for which the people could assign no adequate or excusable cause. Junot immediately sent a battalion to garrison Fort St. Juliens, and then returned to Lisbon, with hardly any other guard than some Portugueze troops whom he had met on the way and ordered to follow him ; thus accompanied, he paraded as in triumph through the principal streets. It was raining heavily, yet the streets were filled with a melancholy and wondering crowd. The shops were shut, the windows and varandas full of anxious spectators. The gestures of all those who saluted him as he passed, either for former acquaintance, or flattery, or fear, he returned with studied courtesy and stateliness. In this manner he proceeded to the house of Baraõ de Quintella, in the Rua d'Alegria, one of the most opulent of the Portugueze merchants. The palace of Bemposta had been prepared for him, and the *Senado da Camara* assigned for his household expenses a monthly contribution of 12,000 cruzados. He received the money, and compelled Quintella to be at the whole charge of his establishment.

CHAP.

II.

1807.

November.*Neves, i.*
215.*Neves, i.*
184.*Neves, i.*
216 7.

CHAP.

II.

1807.

November.

*Miserable
plight of
the French
who first
entered.*

During the night before his entrance the streets had been placarded with a proclamation in French and Portuguese, saying, "Inhabitants of Lisbon, my army is about to enter your city. I come to save your port and your Prince from the malignant influence of England. But that Prince, otherwise respectable for his virtues, has let himself be dragged away by the perfidious counsellors who surrounded him, to be by them delivered to his enemies: his subjects were regarded as nothing, and your interests were sacrificed to the cowardice of a few courtiers. People of Lisbon, remain quiet in your houses; fear nothing from my army, nor from me: it is only our enemies and the wicked who ought to fear us. The great Napoleon, my master, sends me for your protection; I will protect you." This proclamation was not without effect upon that numerous class of the community who think little and know nothing. Only those persons, indeed, who were in the confidence of government, knew what was the real state of things; and many persuaded themselves the sole object of the French was to occupy the ports, that British commerce might be effectually excluded. The state in which the French entered, very much contributed to this short delusion; for they came in not like an army in collected force, with artillery and stores, ready for attack or defence, but like stragglers seeking a place of security after some total rout. Not a regiment, not a battalion, not even a company arrived entire: many of them were beardless boys, and they came in so pitiable a condition, as literally to excite compassion and charity*; foot-sore, bemired and wet,

* A Portuguese, who saw their entrance, compares them to the hospital patients between Caldas and Lisbon in a wet day, and in the worst part of the road;—*humana enfiada de semimortos pobretoens, verdadeira imagem da conducta das Caldas em hum*

ragged and hungered and diseased. Some dropped in the streets, others leant against the walls, or lay down in the porches, till the Portuguese, with ill-requited humanity, gave them food, and conveyed them to those quarters, which they had not strength to find out for themselves. Junot, however, well knew that he risked nothing by this disorder; his first object was speed, his next security; and while he was pushing on with the van of his army, Laborde, who had accompanied him as far as Santarem, remained in that city to collect the following troops and provide the means of transport.

CHAP.
II.

1807.
December.

Neves, i.
213.

Neves, i.
213.

The next day, December 1, was the anniversary of the Acclamation, .. of that revolution which in 1640 had restored Portugal to the rank of an independent kingdom, and given its crown to the rightful heir. What a day for those inhabitants of Lisbon who loved their country, and were familiar with the history of its better ages! The second division was now come up, with the artillery and baggage; .. powder waggons creaked along the streets; thousands, and tens of thousands, whom the destruction of trade, and the dissolution of government had thrown out of employ, were wandering about the city, and the patrols and the whole force of the police was employed in calming and controlling the agitated multitude. The parish ministers went from house to house, informing the inhabitants that they must prepare to quarter the French officers, and collecting mattresses and blankets for the men. In the midst of all this so violent a storm of wind arose*, that it shook the houses

Arrival of
the second
division.

dia de chuva pelo enfadonho caminho de Espinhaço de Caõ. He himself picked up one who, fainting with exhaustion, had fallen upon one of the street-dunghills,—an act of compassion which he afterwards repented of as a crime.—Os Sebastianistas, P. I. p. 1, 2.

* The circumstance was noted in the Paris papers, and it was added, that no sooner had the French flag been hoisted, than the elements were calm, and the sun

CHAP. like an earthquake, and in the terror which it occasioned many
 II. families fled into the open country: windows were blown in,
 1807. and houses unroofed; the treasury and arsenal were damaged,
December. and the tide suddenly rose twelve feet. The troops entered
Obs. Port. Lisbon mostly by night, and without beat of drum. On the
 22. 3d, 11,000 men were posted in the city, from Belem to the
 Grilo, and from the castle to Arroios; and as the first fruits of
 that protection which the religion of the country was to ex-
 perience, all persons in the great convents of Jesus, the Paulistas,
 and St. Francisco da Cidade, who had any relations by whom
 they could be housed, were ordered to turn out, that the French
 soldiers might be accommodated in their apartments. This
 measure produced a great effect upon those who had for a
 moment been deluded by the professions of the enemy. The
 generals of division and brigade took possession of the houses
 of the principal merchants, and of those fidalgos who accom-
 panied the Prince.

*Forced loan
 required,
 Dec. 3.*

Every day, almost every hour, brought with it now some new
 mark of French protection. No sooner had troops enough been
 introduced into Lisbon to enforce the demand, than the merchants
 were called on for a compulsory loan of two million cruzados; and
 this at a time when their property, to an immense amount, had
 been seized in France, when a British squadron was blockading
 the Tagus, when the ships from Brazil were warned off by that
 squadron, and sent to England, foreign commerce utterly de-
 stroyed, and the internal trade in that state which necessarily
 ensued when the spring which gave motion to the whole was
 stopped. M. Herman, who had been sent to demand satisfaction

*A French-
 man added
 to the Re-
 gency.*

broke forth in all its splendour. This augury could not be current at Lisbon, because
 the French flag was not hoisted there till ten days after the storm.

from the court of Lisbon in 1804, for having suffered the ambassador, General Lasnes, to depart in disgust, was added to the regency by an act of Junot's pleasure, and made minister of finance and of the interior by an appointment of the Emperor; the date of which afforded decisive proof, if any proof had been wanting, that whatever the conduct of the Prince might be, Buonaparte had resolved to usurp the kingdom. Another Frenchman was nominated to the new office of Receiver-general of the contributions and revenues of Portugal. It was now plainly seen upon what tenure the people of Lisbon held their remaining property; and that they might fully understand upon what tenure they held their lives, the threatening proclamation which Junot had issued at Alcantara was now reprinted and circulated in the capital.

The next measure was an edict for confiscating English goods, ordering all persons who had any British property in their possession to deliver an account of it within three days, on pain of being fined in a sum ten times the amount of the property concealed, and of corporal punishment also, if it should be thought proper to inflict it. On the same day the use of fire-arms in sporting was prohibited throughout the whole kingdom: all persons detected in carrying fowling-pieces or pistols without a license from General Laborde, the French commandant of Lisbon, were to be considered as vagabonds and highway-murderers, carried before a military commission, and punished accordingly. The next day the use of all kind of arms was prohibited; and the wine sellers were ordered to turn out all Portuguese, French, or other soldiers, at seven in the evening, on pain of a heavy fine, and of death for the third offence. More troops came daily in; they were quartered in the convents, and their women with them, . . . a fresh outrage to the religious feelings of the people. Complaints were made that the officers required

CHAP.
II.

1807.
December.

Obs. Port.
p. 44.
Neves, ii.
225.

Dec. 5.
Edict for
confiscating
English
goods.

Use of
arms pro-
hibited.

CHAP. those persons upon whom they were billeted to keep a table for
 II. them: an order was issued, in which Junot expressed his dis-
 1807. pleasure at this, saying, that the French officers in Portugal
December. were to consider themselves as in garrison, and had no right to
 demand any thing more than their lodging, fire, and lights.
 He reminded them also that the Emperor had placed them on
 the same footing as the grand army, in consequence of which
 they would regularly receive extraordinary pay sufficient to
 defray all their expenses. This was intended for publication
 in foreign newspapers, as a proof of the good order which
 the French observed;...while the superior officers not merely
 compelled those upon whom they had quartered themselves to
 furnish a table, but every kind of provision also for the enter-
 tainments which they thought proper to give. Many persons
 abandoned their houses to these imperious guests, and retired
 into the country; still they were required to support the
 establishment, and answer all the demands which the intruders
 chose to make.

Dec. 8.
*Pastoral
 letter of the
 Cardinal
 Patriarch.*

There now appeared a pastoral letter from the Cardinal
 Patriarch of Lisbon, written in obedience to the desire of
 Junot, and according to his suggestions. The patriarch began
 by alluding to his age and infirmities; these, he said, prevented
 him from addressing his flock in person on the present occasion;
 but he could still, as their father and pastor, speak to them in
 this manner, so that in the day of judgement the Lord might not
 charge him with neglect of this important duty. "Beloved
 children," he continued, "you know the situation in which we
 find ourselves; but you are not ignorant how greatly the divine
 mercy favours us in the midst of so many tribulations. Blessed
 be the ways of the Most Highest! But it is especially necessary,
 beloved children, that we should be faithful to the immutable de-
 crees of his divine providence; and first we should thank him for

the good order and quietness with which the kingdom has received a great army coming to our succour, and giving us the best founded hopes of prosperity. This benefit we owe equally to the activity and prudence of the general in chief, whose virtues have long been known to us. Fear not then, beloved children ; live in security at home and abroad ; remember that this is the army of Napoleon the Great, whom God hath destined to support and defend religion, and to make the happiness of the people. You know him, and the whole world knows him ; confide implicitly in this wonderful man, whose like hath not been seen in any age ! He will shed upon us the blessings of peace, if you obey his determinations, and if ye love each other, natives and strangers, with brotherly charity. Religion, and the ministers of religion, will then be always respected ; the clausure of the spouses of the Lord will not be violated ; and the people, being worthy of such high protection, will be happy. Demean yourselves thus, my children, in obedience to the injunction of our Lord Jesus Christ. Live subject to those who govern, not only for the respect which is due to them, but because conscience requires you so to do." In conclusion, he entreated all his clergy, by the bowels of Christ Jesus, to concur with him in impressing upon the people the duty of resignation and submission. The Inquisitor general repeated the same strain of adulation and servility : some of the prelates followed the example, and the clergy were ordered in circular letters to enforce these principles from the pulpit and the confessional. Whatever may have been the secret wishes of these men, however their language may have belied their hearts, certain it is that they now betrayed their country, and as far as in them lay contributed to its degradation and destruction.

By such means and such agents Junot thought to prepare the minds of the Portuguese for fresh humiliation. On the day

CHAP.
II.
1807.
December.

*Contact of
the Inqui-
sitor Ge-
neral.*

*The French
flag hoisted.*

CHAP. after the publication of this pastoral, he went on board the
 II. Russian admiral, and when he embarked the French flag was

1807. hoisted on the arsenal. This was the first time that it had been
December. planted in Lisbon; all eyes were attracted to it by a salute

Dec. 13.

which was fired on the occasion, and the sight exasperated a people who perhaps more than any other European nation are remarkable for national pride. The general feeling was sufficiently apparent in the murmurs and agitation of the populace; but they had no leaders, and in murmurs it seemed to spend itself. Two days the French colours remained flying there. On the third a large body of troops was drawn up in the great square of the Rocio, and Junot with his staff, and a numerous train of officers, appeared in state. He thanked them in the Emperor's name for the constancy with which they had endured the hardships of their march. They had rescued, he said, this fine city from oppression, . . . they had saved it from disorder; and they had now the glory of seeing the French flag planted in Lisbon. He concluded with three cheers for Napoleon: the troops took up the cry; at the same moment the French colours were hoisted on the castle, and a salute of twenty-five guns was fired and repeated by all the forts upon the river. A deep and general murmur ran through the multitude of spectators: at this moment the Marquez d'Alorna entered the square; the people regarded him as one of the generals to whom they might look up in their hour of deliverance, and they repeatedly cheered him as he passed. A spark then would have produced an explosion, and Lisbon was never in such danger of a massacre: happily there was no man bolder than his comrade, to step forward and provoke it; the troops marched off, and the crowd dispersed. But the national spirit which had thus systematically been outraged was burning in every heart. It was Sunday, a day on which more people are always in the

streets than on any other, and now the confluence was increased by the perturbed state of the general feeling. Towards evening some French soldiers, riding their horses to water through the Terreiro do Paço, were hooted by some of the populace, and they on their part returned insult for insult. A quarrel ensued, a Portuguese of the police guard interfered, and the French, thinking that he interfered as a party and not as a mediator, seized him and delivered him to their principal *corps de garde* which was in the same great square. The populace attempted to rescue him: they attacked the guard with sticks and stones, . . . and were on the point of overpowering and disarming them, when some patrols of the police came up, and succeeded in appeasing the tumult.

CHAP.
II.
1807.
December.

Junot had given a grand dinner to celebrate the events of the day; the governors and the greater part of the nobles were present at this festival, for the degradation of their country. He was repeatedly called out, as messenger after messenger arrived with news of the tumult; the cause of these frequent interruptions was indicated by his thoughtful manner, and the guests were presently informed that the people had mutinied, and that they themselves were to be considered as hostages. It was believed that he had invited them for that purpose, and it seems as if he had determined to provoke a tumult, for the purpose of intimidating the Portuguese. The disturbance in the Terreiro do Paço had been put an end to, but the crowd had not dispersed, and the popular feelings were still in the highest excitement. Things were in this state when Junot adjourned with his guests to the opera; he had taken possession of the royal family's box in the centre of the theatre, and from thence he ordered the French flag to be displayed over the pit during this night's representation. The French who were present saluted it with shouts; many of the Portuguese left the theatre,

*Commotion
in Lisbon.*

CHAP. and the news of this fresh insult increased the indignation of the
II. people. The patroles could no longer restrain them; men,
1807, women, and boys ran through the streets, exclaiming "The five
December. wounds for ever, and down with France!" It was fortunate for
the Lisbonians that they had at this time a well disciplined
police guard, raised by the Comte de Novion, a French emigrant,
whom General Fraser, when he commanded the British forces
in Portugal, had first patronized and recommended to the Por-
tugueze government, and who having rendered essential service
to the city by the establishment of this body, was now become one
of the most active and efficient agents of the new tyranny. These
guards formed the principal part of the force which was called
out against the people, and they levelled their pieces so as to
spare their countrymen. The firing continued between three
and four hours; but for this cause, and because the mob, who
had neither arms, nor plan, nor leaders, were more loud than
dangerous, few lives were lost. The firing ceased about nine
o'clock: the remainder of the night was actively employed by the
French; when morning appeared, cannon were seen planted at
the door of the commander in chief, 1200 men were drawn up
in the square, with horses and artillery, and the streets were every
where filled with patroles of soldiers. In the course of the day
a few straggling Frenchmen were killed, and some seven or
eight of the people. The mob saw the danger of attacking so
overpowering a force, and did not venture to engage against
musketry and cannon with their knives. Had they been armed,
nothing could have preserved Lisbon from a massacre. The
few native corps which still remained in the city were confined
to their quarters during the tumult; they would else probably
have taken part with their countrymen. A corps at Almada,
hearing the stir and the discharge of musketry, endeavoured
to get boats to cross over for this purpose. The populace

were in a state of frantic agitation ; at noon-day groups were collected in the streets, looking at the sky, and affirming that they saw a blazing star which portended the vengeance of God against their abominable oppressors.

CHAP.

II.

1807.

*December.**Precautions of the French.*

These events convinced Junot at once of the disposition and the weakness of the people. He forbade immediately all assemblies of whatever kind, created a military tribunal, and decreed that every individual found with arms in an assembly should be carried before this tribunal, and sentenced to three months' imprisonment, or to death if he had used his arms against any person whatever. Death was in like manner denounced against the leaders of any assembly or tumult. These regulations, he said, were made for the security of the good and honourable inhabitants of Lisbon, whom he did not confound with a few wretches. Those wretches who had seduced the people he knew, and they should pay with their heads for the insult which they had offered to the French flag. These words stood as a text to the proclamation, "Rebellion is the greatest of crimes." Junot had neither principles nor feelings to deter him from committing any wickedness which might suit with his policy or his inclinations ; in the present instance nothing was to be gained by cruelty, and therefore no execution followed the insurrection, nor were the persons who had been taken at the time proceeded against. This forbearance the Portuguese imputed to fear ; for however he might despise their present means, their numbers and their temper made them formidable, and the sight of the English fleet continually excited their hopes and his uneasiness. He began immediately to take the most effectual measures for securing himself. New batteries were formed at the castle, and works thrown up there from which the city might at any time be laid in ruins : and the provincial troops whom the Prince had called to Lisbon to cover his embarkation were now ordered

CHAP. back to their respective provinces, as the first step toward that
 II. breaking up of the Portuguese army which was intended. On
 1807. the 17th, which was the queen's birthday, the guards and patrols
 December. were doubled, and Novion paraded the streets in person. The
 midnight ceremonies of the church at Christmas were forbidden ;
 the bells also were forbidden to be sounded on any pretext
 during the night ; and when the host went out, a hand-bell only
 was to be rung before it, and that but thrice ; once at its going
 out, once to call good Christians to the aid of the dying person,
 and again at its return.

*Regulations
 concerning
 English
 goods.*

*Obs. Port.
 p. 52.*

*Neves, i.
 288.*

*Dec. 19.
 Obs. Port.
 p. 50.*

The edict for the discovery and confiscation of English property and goods had produced little effect. The three days allowed for sending in the returns having elapsed, the term was prolonged for eight days more, with heavy denunciations against those who should attempt to evade it. That part of the edict which related to English property might easily be obeyed by those who chose to obey it ; but the confiscation of all English goods in a city where half the goods were English, was as impracticable as it was oppressive ; and the day after Junot had issued his second decree upon this subject, he found it necessary to publish a third, modifying the former two, and in fact confessing their absurdity. It appeared, he said, that under these decrees the merchants and shopkeepers could not dispose of many articles of British manufacture ; that the want of these articles kept out of the market a great number of things which were in daily use, and would raise the prices of those which were not prohibited : such articles, therefore, as were not actually the property of British subjects, might be sold, on condition that the owners gave in an account of the British goods in their possession, and obtained permission to sell them from the commissary at Lisbon, or some public functionary in the provinces ; that this permission should not be granted unless the

kind, quality, measure, quantity, and price of the articles for sale were specified; that the vendor should hold himself responsible for the amount of all which he disposed of, and should for that purpose enter in his books the quantity of the thing sold, the price, and the name of the purchaser; and give security for this if it were required.

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II.
1807.

The trade of Lisbon needed not these new shackles. The stagnation of commerce was indeed beheld by the French General with complacency, as tending to the accomplishment of Buonaparte's desires against England; but in its more immediate effects he felt the security of his army in some degree implicated. Lisbon is dependent for great part of its corn upon foreign supplies: the failure of this supply had been contemplated by the Prince's government as one of the consequences to be expected if he submitted to the demands of France; and when he gave orders to shut the ports against England, an edict was issued, prohibiting all kinds of cakes and biscuits, that flour might be reserved for bread alone. Grievously as a scarcity of corn is felt when it occurs in our own country, in Portugal it is more literally a necessary of life; for the Portuguese consume little animal food, and the potatoe is hardly known among them; nor, indeed, is its culture successful. When Junot took possession of Lisbon, it was apprehended that in the course of two or three months there would be an actual want of bread. The Russians consumed about 10,000 rations daily: a consumption which made the French, as well as the inhabitants, regard them with an evil eye. Junot disliked them on another account: he suspected that they favoured the escape of British subjects and Portuguese emigrants to the British squadron; and the Russian officers kept aloof from the French, as if they were shocked at the profligacy of their conduct. But before the close of the year intelligence arrived

*Scarcity of
corn apprehended.*

*Never, i.
263.*

CHAP. II. that Russia had declared war against Great Britain ; an event which excited as much exultation in the French and their few partizans, as grief in the great body of the people ; for notwithstanding the peace of Tilsit, many were they who still rested their hopes upon the strength of Russia, and the personal character of the Emperor Alexander.

*Measures
for pro-
viding the
army.*

*Feb. 16,
1808.*

*Observador
Port. 175.*

News, 264.

December.

*The Portu-
guese leave
their fields
unknown.*

Whatever jealousy had been felt upon this score was thus removed ; but the danger of scarcity still remained, and Junot's first care was to provide for the subsistence of the army, whatever might become of the inhabitants. Many of the provisional authorities, in their fear of famine, laid an embargo upon the corn within their respective jurisdictions : this the French General forbade by a timely edict. The Portugeze magistrates found themselves under a government which exercised an unremitting vigilance, and made itself felt every where ; and the orders of that government were obeyed with a promptitude and activity which had long been unknown in Portugal. Full use was thus made of the resources of the country. Some corn he procured from Spain : it would have been a heavy cost had it entered into his system to pay any part of the expenses ; Spain having little to export, the distance being great, and the roads and the means of carriage equally bad. All farmers and corn-dealers who might be indebted to the crown were ordered to pay half the amount in grain, and deliver it to the French commissariat at reduced prices. The march of the French through the country had been like that of an army of locusts, leaving famine wherever they passed ; the tenantry, some utterly ruined by the devastation, and all hopeless because of the state to which Portugal was reduced, abandoned themselves to the same kind of despair which in some parts of the New World contributed to exterminate the Indians, and at one time materially distressed and endangered the merciless conquerors.

They thought it useless to sow the seed, if the French were to enjoy the harvest; and so generally did this feeling operate, that the regency which acted under Junot found it necessary to issue orders, compelling them to go on with the usual business of agriculture. The encouragement of agriculture served also as a pretext for breaking up the Portuguese army. Every subaltern and soldier who had served eight years, or who had not served six months, was discharged, and ordered to return to his own province. A like order was issued by the Spanish general at Porto; and the Marques del Socorro, who commanded at Setubal as governor of the new kingdom in which the Prince of the Peace was to be invested, disbanded by one sweeping decree all the Portuguese militia, discharged all the married men from the regular army, and invited all the others to apply for leave of absence.

In the partition and invasion of Portugal, the court of Madrid was as guilty as that of the Thuilleries; but the conduct of the Spaniards during the invasion was far different from that of their treacherous allies. The division of General Carraffa, which entered with Junot, and was under his command, separated from him at Abrantes to secure Porto, in case the army which was destined for that purpose should be delayed. This general had acquired the favour of Junot by his exertions at Alcantara, and had so far profited by his lessons, as to imitate him at humble distance; raising a contribution of 4000 cruzados at Thomar, and seizing 10,000 from the depository at Coimbra: . . . but he was the only Spaniard who thus disgraced himself. The force with which he accompanied Junot was little more than 2000 men; it was doubled by the gradual arrival of reinforcements, and was then annexed to the division of D. Francisco Taranco, which, according to the convention of Fontainebleau, should have consisted of 10,000 men, but did

CHAP.
II.

1807.

Dec. 29.

Dec. 22.

*Spaniards
under Car-
raffa at
Porto.*

*Neves, i.
189.*

*Taranco
takes the
command
there.*

CHAP. not in reality exceed six, till its number was thus made up.
 II. Taranco's army was formed in Gallicia, of which kingdom he
 1807. was Captain-General: he entered on the side of the Minho,
 December. taking the Valença road; and having reached Porto, issued a
 proclamation, much in the style of that which Junot had sent
 before him, saying that he was come to deliver Portugal from
 the disgraceful yoke of England, and assist her in taking ven-
 geance upon the English for their ferocious treachery toward
 all the nations of Europe: fair promises followed of strict
 discipline and just dealing, and bloody denunciations of punish-
 ment if resistance were attempted. The Spanish general's con-
 duct was wiser than his language; his promises were strictly
 observed, and no crime was added to that of the iniquitous
 attack and intended usurpation. He was, indeed, left at full
 liberty to act as his own disposition and principles might
 incline; for these provinces were, according to the treaty of
 Fontainebleau, to be formed into a kingdom for the former
 Prince of Parma, as an indemnification for Etruria; and as his
 consent had not been thought necessary to the arrangement
 which was to deprive him of one kingdom, neither were his
 instructions for the government of another.

*Good con-
duct of his
troops.*

*Solano at
Sevul.
Neves, i.
307.*

The Spanish general who entered Alem-Tejo to take pos-
 session of Godoy's kingdom was less fortunate; for he was
 compelled to raise contributions from a ruined people, though
 in other respects considerable latitude seems to have been given
 him, in deference to his character and talents. This general
 was the Marques del Socorro, D. Francisco Maria Solano,
 destined to leave an unhappy name in the history of his country.
 During many years he had been governor of Cadiz, where he
 had employed an almost unlimited power in the most ho-
 nourable and beneficial manner. It was his delight to orna-
 ment the city, and to promote the convenience and comfort of

the inhabitants. One of the beneficial acts of his government was to abolish the practice of burying in the churches: this he accomplished, not without difficulty, during one of those contagious fevers which of late years have so frequently visited that part of Spain. He is also entitled to be remembered with respect for the manner in which he maintained the old humanities of war with the English squadron which so long blockaded Cadiz: this conduct was the more honourable, because Solano was decidedly a partizan of France, and had acquired a dangerous love of political experiments in the revolutionary school. He had now an opportunity of indulging this passion; and the measures which he attempted prove the goodness of his intentions, as well as the errors of his judgement. While Junot's edicts were in one uniform spirit of tyranny, Solano was offering rewards to those who should raise the greatest crops, or breed the most numerous flocks and herds. He addressed circular instructions to the judges, enjoining each of them, when he had notice of any civil suit, to call the parties before him, hear their respective statements, and advise them to settle the dispute by arbitration. If they persisted in their appeal to the laws, he was then to require from each, before the process went forward, a written statement of the case, and the documents which were to support it. If the thing contested did not exceed eighty mil-reis in value, he might pronounce summary justice without farther examination: the losing party, however, retaining a right of appeal to the superior courts. If the value exceeded that sum, the parties were again to be exhorted to come to some accord, or at least to agree upon shortening the process, and avoiding all unnecessary delay and expense; and the judges were empowered to do this, even without the consent of the parties, and come as summarily as possible to the merits of the case. Another

CHAP.

II.

1807.

*Jacob's
Travels.**His schemes
for the im-
provement
of society.*

CHAP. of his projects seems to have been borrowed from the policy of
 II. the Peruvian Incas, or the government of Japan. Every parish
 1807. was to be divided into districts, containing not less than one hun-
 December. dred houses, nor more than two. Each district was to choose one
 among its inhabitants, with the title of Commissioner, whose
 duty it should be to make out a list of all the members of his
 district, their ages and occupations; to interfere in all family
 disputes, for the purpose of accommodating them; and to keep
 all persons to their respective employments. If they were not
 obedient to his admonitions he was to denounce them to the
 magistrates, that due punishment might be inflicted. He was
 also to walk his rounds for at least an hour every night, accom-
 panied by four of the most respectable men of the district,
 to see that no prohibited games were played in the taverns,
 and that nothing was committed offensive to good morals.

*Observador
 Portuguez.
 144-150.*

*Emigration
 from Lisbon.*

Such were the projects with which Solano amused himself at Setubal! The conduct of his soldiers easily accommodated itself to the good disposition of their chief. Accustomed to the same habits of life, attached to the same forms of worship as the Portuguese, and speaking a language so little different that they mutually understood each other, the Spaniards lived among them like men of the same country; and, as long as the power remained in their hands, the people of Alem-Tejo and of the northern provinces experienced none of those insults and oppressions which the French inflicted wherever their authority extended. In Lisbon the burthen was at once heavier than in other places and more galling; and most persons who had the power of removing into the country retired from those daily and hourly vexations which aggravated their sufferings. The rapacity of the French leaders opened a surer asylum for others. Notice was given that all Brazilians who wished to return to their native land might obtain passports, and be permitted to

embark in neutral ships. All who could invent any pretext for availing themselves of this permission hastened to purchase it; and the money which the French thus exacted was cheerfully paid as the price of deliverance. The ships which carried Kniphausen colours took out many emigrants in the dress of sailors, who smeared their hands with pitch, the better to disguise themselves. The Nuncio*, who during these transactions demeaned himself with great propriety, and repeatedly solicited passports for Brazil, that he might follow the court to which he was appointed, succeeded at last in getting on board a licensed vessel, unknown to Junot, and reaching England in safety, went from thence to Rio de Janeiro. Meantime the most rigorous measures were devised to prevent any person from escaping to the English squadron. All the fishing boats were arranged in divisions, which were denoted by letters, and the boats then numbered; and each had its letter and number painted on the bow and quarter in white characters a foot long. The master of every boat was bound to carry a list, specifying the letter of its division, the number of his boat, his name, his dwelling-place, and the number and names of the men on board. This paper was to be his passport at the different batteries, and his protection from the watch-boats which patrolled the river, and were charged to apprehend every person whose name was not inscribed in the list, and to seize every vessel by which any part of the edict was infringed, as a prize.

CHAP.
II.
1807.

1808.
Jan. 5.

* The letter which the Nuncio left for the French General may be seen in Neves, t. ii. c. 40. "Who would have thought," says the historian, "that England was to give an asylum to the delegate of the Holy Father? But this ought not to be wondered at, when we know that the successor of Henry VIII. has offered one to the Pope himself against the persecution of him who occupies the throne of St. Louis."—P. 223.

CHAP. II.
 1808. The magistrate of every district was to deliver in a list of all the owners of fishing boats in the corresponding division, in order that their property might be answerable for any infraction of these rules: a counter list was to be kept on board the floating battery. All the owners of all the divisions were to appear every Saturday at this floating battery, there to have their papers verified. Every boat which had any communication with the English squadron was to be confiscated; and all were bound to be within the bar at sunset on pain of being fined one piece for the first offence, three for the second, and of confiscation and corporal punishment for the third.

*Falsehoods
 respecting
 England.
 Observador
 Port. 181.*

*Neves, i.
 261.*

*Neves, i.
 245.*

The sight of the British squadron off the mouth of the Tagus continually kept alive the hopes of the Portuguese. Crowds of artizans who had been thrown out of employment used to assemble upon the heights of Santa Catharina, of the Chagas, Buenos Ayres, and the other eminences, fixing their longing eyes upon the English fleet, counting its number, and oftentimes deluding themselves with a belief that it was entering the river to deliver Lisbon. It was thought necessary to forbid these assemblages. Junot affected to ridicule this popular hope, and said, in scorn of the Marqueza de Angeja, who was known frequently to gaze toward the same object, that she would make an excellent wife for King Sebastian. But his own secret feelings were discovered by the falsehoods which were sedulously circulated respecting England. A pamphlet was published which pretended to describe the actual state of that country; and which, the better to deceive the people, was made by the manner of its license to appear as if it had been printed under the Prince's government. It represented our population at less than eleven millions, our army as short of 100,000 men, our fleet in great part laid up for want of naval stores; our debt insupportable, our paper-money at a discount, our custom-

houses almost shut up for want of any thing to do ; more than a million of manufacturers ruined, and publicly crying out for peace, agriculture decaying for want of hands and of commerce, and the people in despair, unable longer to support the burthen and endure the misfortunes of a destructive war. To excite the hatred of the Portuguese, it was affirmed by Junot that the Prince had not been conveyed to Brazil by the English, but that they had conducted him and his fleet, with all the treasures on board, to England.

CHAP.
II.
1808.

*Notes, ii.
8.*

Junot, it is said, was not without some apprehensions of the displeasure of Buonaparte for having suffered this prize to escape him. When that tyrant was exasperated by the failure of his commanders, he seldom condescended to ask whether success had been possible : in the present instance he either was or affected to be satisfied ; and the principles upon which he had thus far proceeded were now made known to the world in a report of M. Champagny, his minister for foreign affairs : it bore date a few days before the secret treaty of Fontainebleau. After the peace of Tilsit, this minister said, France and Russia had combined to restore peace to the world, the sole object of all the Emperor Napoleon's labours, of all his triumphs, of all his innumerable sacrifices. He had a right to call upon the continental powers to maintain their neutrality against England ; he had a right to demand that all Europe should concur in re-establishing the peace of the seas, and those maritime rights which England had haughtily declared she would respect no longer. All governments ought to make war against the English ; they owed this to their own dignity, they owed it to the honour of their people, they owed it to the mutual obligations by which the sovereigns of Europe are connected. There was not any sovereign who would not acknowledge, that, if his territory should be violated to the injury of the Emperor of

*Report of
the French
minister,
M. Cham-
pagny, con-
cerning
Portugal.*

*Oct. 21,
1807.*

CHAP. the French, he would be responsible. For instance, if a French
II. vessel were seized by the English in the ports of Trieste or
1808. Lisbon, the sovereigns to whom those ports belong are bound
January. to make the English respect their territory by force; otherwise
they would make themselves the accomplices of England, and
place themselves in a state of war with the Emperor of France.
When, therefore, the Portuguese government suffered its vessels
to be searched by English ships, its independence was violated,
with its own consent, by the outrage done to its flag, just as it
would have been if England had violated its territory or its ports.
For the ships of a power are as portions of its territory which
float upon the seas, and which, being covered by its flag, ought
to enjoy the same independence, and to be defended against
the same attacks. The conduct of Portugal, therefore, gave
the Emperor Napoleon a right of proposing to it the alternative
of making common cause with him in maintaining the rights of
its flag and declaring war against England, or of being con-
sidered as an accomplice in the evil which might result to his
Imperial Majesty from that violation... Such was the law of
nations as laid down by Buonaparte's minister M. Champagny,
and such the logic by which Portugal was proved to have
placed itself in a state of war with France!—M. Champagny
proceeded to affirm that Portugal had pronounced her own
fate. She had broken off her last communications with the
continent in imposing upon the French and Spanish legations
the necessity of quitting Lisbon. Her hostile intentions, which
the language of perfidy and duplicity had ill concealed, were
then unveiled. Not only were the English and their property
placed in safety, but her military preparations were directed
against France; and she waited only for the arrival of the
English fleet and army which had plundered Denmark to avow
herself. This curious paper concluded in a manner worthy of

its reasoning and its veracity. If, it said, this war was to make Portugal undergo the fate of so many states which had fallen victims of the friendship of England, the Emperor Napoleon, who sought not for such successes, would without doubt regret that the interest of the continent should have rendered it necessary. His views, which had constantly been raised with his power, showed him in war rather a scourge for humanity than a new prospect of glory; and all his wishes were that he might devote himself wholly to the prosperity of his people.

CHAP.
II.
1808.
January.

A second report of the same minister was published at the same time. The house of Braganza, it said, had delivered itself up to the English with all that it could carry away, and Brazil from henceforward would be only an English colony. But Portugal was at length delivered from the yoke of England. Her coasts had been left without defence; and England was at this time threatening them, blockading her ports, and wishing to ravage her shores. Spain, also, had had fears for Cadiz, and now was fearing for Ceuta. Toward that part of the world the English appeared to be directing their secret expeditions: they had landed troops at Gibraltar; they had assembled there those who had been driven from the Levant, and part of those whom they had collected in Sicily. Their cruisers upon the coast of Spain were become more vigilant; they seemed to wish to revenge themselves upon that kingdom for the disgrace which they had suffered in its colonies. The whole of the peninsula ought particularly to fix the attention of his Imperial Majesty, whose wisdom would dictate to him such measures as the state of things required. This paper was followed by a report from General Clarke, the minister of war, who announced that the corps of observation of the Gironde under General Junot had conquered Portugal; and advised that the conscription for the year 1809 should be called out, because of the necessity of

Second report, indicating measures against Spain.
Jan. 2.

Jan. 6.
The conscription for 1809 required.

CHAP. II. shutting the ports of the continent against their enemy, and of having considerable forces at every point of attack, in order to profit by the fortunate circumstances which might arise for carrying the war into the heart of England, of Ireland, and of the Indies. “Although,” said the General, “the indignation of all Europe is roused against England, although France has at no time possessed such armies, this is not yet enough; English influence must be attacked wherever it exists, till the moment when the sight of so many dangers shall induce England to remove from her councils the oligarchs who direct them, and entrust the administration to wise men, capable of reconciling the love and the interest of their country with the interest and the love of the human race. A vulgar policy,” he pursued, “would have induced your Majesty to disarm, but that policy would be a scourge for France; it would render imperfect the great results which you have prepared. Yes, Sire, far from diminishing your armies, your Majesty ought to increase them, till England shall have acknowledged the independence of all powers, and restored to the seas that tranquillity which your Majesty has secured to the continent. . . Doubtless your Majesty must suffer in requiring new sacrifices and imposing new burthens upon your people; but you ought to yield to the cry of all the French, . . no repose till the seas are set free, and till an equitable peace has re-established France in the most just, the most useful, and the most necessary of her rights.” Accordingly, 80,000 conscripts, of the conscription of 1809, were, by a decree of the senate, placed at the disposal of government: they were to be taken from the youths born in the year 1789; according to the conscription laws, twenty was the age at which they were ripe for slaughter, but the practice of dispensing with a year had already been begun. The minister of state, M. Regnaud de St. Jean d’Angely, pronounced an harangue upon this

1808.
January.

Jan. 21.

*Threats
against
England.*

occasion. "A holy and powerful league," said he, "has been formed, to punish the English oligarchy, to defend the right of nations, to revenge humanity. From the Baltic to the Mediterranean, from the Nile to the Neva, there hardly remain for the ships of Great Britain any shores where they may land, any points where they are not forbidden to touch. But it is not enough, by a just reciprocity, to have pronounced against England this tremendous sentence of outlawry among nations; no rest must be given her in the seat of her iniquitous dominion, nor upon any of her coasts; nor in any of her colonies, nor in any of those parts of the globe where she is not yet interdicted. Repulsed from one part of the world, and menaced in all the other, England must not be suffered to know where to direct the little military force which she can command; and our armies, more formidable than ever, must be ready to carry our victorious and avenging eagles into her possessions. The pillage of the arsenal and port of Copenhagen, the emigration of the Portuguese fleet, have not left the continent without ships: our legions may yet reach the English militia; Ireland may still look for succours against oppression; India may still expect her deliverers."

Well might the French nation have shuddered at the prospect of interminable war which was thus held out by the ministers of a tyrant, whose ambition increased with his power. He found, however, implicit and servile obedience in the nation. Their crime brought with it its curse, new successes only served as pretexts for demanding more sacrifices; and at a moment when France had not an enemy upon the whole continent of Europe, and a larger military force than had ever before existed, more conscripts were thus called for in advance! But though Buonaparte at this time despised the military force of Great Britain as heartily as he hated its naval power, neither

CHAP.
II.

1808.
January.

*The royal
arms of
Portugal
defaced.*

CHAP. London, nor Ireland, nor India, were as yet his objects. His
 II projects for seizing the whole Spanish peninsula were now ma-
 1808. ture, and these projects were probably communicated to Junot
January. by dispatches which arrived from Milan the second week in
 January. A few days afterward that General went with more
 than his usual pomp to the Foundry, destroyed the portraits of
 the Braganzan kings, and gave orders that the Portuguese arms
 should no longer be placed on the cannon. He gave orders
 also to deface the royal arms which were carved in stone over
 the entrance, but no Portuguese could be tempted to commit
 this act of treason ; and when some French soldiers broke the
 crown and defaced the shield, no sooner had they left the place
 than the women gathered up the fragments to preserve them as
 relics. The final act of usurpation was not long delayed. Early
 February. on the morning of the first of February the movements of the
 troops indicated that some great measure was about to be
 announced, for which the public mind was to be prepared by
 intimidation. Cannon were planted in the Rocio; the streets
 from thence to head-quarters were lined with soldiers ; and
 Junot, with all the parade of military pomp and power, pro-
 ceeded to the palace of the Inquisition, where the Regents held
 their sittings. Troops followed him, filling the lobbies of that
 execrable edifice, and extending even to the table where these
 poor puppets of authority were seated : amid this scene of noise
 and tumult and indecorum he read a paper, of which nothing
 more could be collected than that it pronounced the extinction of
 the Portuguese government, and the consequent dismissal of the
 Regents from office. Rockets gave the signal when the General
 came out, and salutes of artillery from the castle and all the forts
 and batteries insulted the afflicted and groaning people. The
 city was soon placarded with a proclamation in French and Por-
 tuguese, saying that all uncertainty was now at an end, the fate

*Junot de-
 clares that
 the Portu-
 guese go-
 vernment is
 dissolved.*

of Portugal was decided, and her felicity secured, because Napoleon the Great had taken her under his omnipotent protection. The Prince of Brazil, in abandoning Portugal, had renounced all right to the sovereignty of that kingdom. The House of Braganza had ceased to reign, and it was the will of the Emperor Napoleon that the whole of that fine country should be administered and governed in his name, and by the General in chief of his army. "The duties," said Junot, "which this mark of benignity and confidence on the part of my master imposes upon me, are difficult to fulfil, but I hope worthily to discharge them. I will open roads and canals, that agriculture and national industry may once more flourish. The Portuguese troops will soon form one family with the soldiers of Marengo, of Austerlitz, of Jena, and of Friedland; and there will be no other rivalry between them than that of valour and discipline. The good administration of the public revenues will secure to every one the reward of his labours. Public instruction, that parent of national civilization, shall be extended over the provinces, and Algarve and Beira shall each have one day its Camoens. The religion of your fathers, the same which we all profess, shall be protected and succoured by that same will which restored it in the vast empire of France, but freed from the superstitions which dishonour it. Justice shall be equally administered, and disembarassed of the delays and arbitrary will which paralysed it: the public tranquillity shall no more be disturbed by robbers, and deformed mendicity no longer drag its filth and its rags through this superb capital. Inhabitants of Portugal, be secure and tranquil! Resist the instigations of those who would excite you to rebellion, and who care not what blood is shed so it be the blood of the continent. Betake yourselves with confidence to your labours; you shall enjoy the fruits. If it be necessary that in these first moments

CHAP.
II.

1808.

February.*Junot appointed governor for the Emperor Napoleon.*

CHAP. II. you should make some sacrifices, it is that the government may be enabled to ameliorate your condition. They are also indispensable for the subsistence of a great army, which is required for the vast projects of the Great Napoleon. His vigilant eyes are fixed upon you, and your future happiness is secure. He will love you as he loves his French vassals: study, therefore, to deserve his goodness by your obedience to his will."

1808.
February.

*Council of
government
formed.*

A second decree, bearing date on the same day, was promulgated the next. It explained the form in which Portugal was from that time forward to be governed, in the name of the Emperor of the French, by the General in chief of the French army in that country. There was to be a council of government, composed of the General as president, a secretary of state for the administration of the interior and of the finances, with two counsellors of government, one for each department; a secretary of state for the departments of war and the marine, with a counsellor of government for the same departments; and a counsellor of government for the superintendence of justice and public worship, with the title of Regedor. The secretary-general of the council was to be keeper of its archives. M. Herman and M. Lhuitte were the two secretaries of state: the former had D. Pedro de Mello and the Senhor d'Azevedo for his secretaries; the latter had the Conde de S. Payo. The principal Castro was named for Regedor, and M. Vianez Vaublanc secretary-general. There was to be in every province an administrator-general, with the title of Corregedor Mor, to direct all the branches of administration, to watch over the interests of the province, and to point out to the government the improvements which ought to be made in it: on which subjects he was to communicate with the home secretary and the Regedor. The province of Estremadura was to have two of

these Corregedores: one residing at Lisbon, whose jurisdiction was confined to that capital and its term; the other for the rest of the province, and residing out of it, at Coimbra. There was also to be in each province a general officer, to maintain order and tranquillity: his functions were purely military, but in all public ceremonies he was to take the right hand of the Corregedor Mor. This precedence was not required to prove to the people that they were under a mere military government.

CHAP.

II.

1808.

February.

The device of Buonaparte, an eagle upon an anchor, was now placed over the arsenal; the official seals were ordered to bear the same impress as those of the French empire, with this inscription, "Government of Portugal:" and on the same day that possession was thus taken, and protection promised, an edict was made public, dated from Milan Dec. 23, imposing a war contribution-extraordinary of an hundred million of francs upon the kingdom of Portugal, as a ransom for individual property of every kind. A second article of this memorable decree directed the French general to take the necessary means for promptly collecting this contribution; and a third declared that the property of the Queen, the Prince Regent, and all the royal family, should be sequestered, and that of all the fidalgos who accompanied him also, unless they should return by the 15th of February. The decree originally fixed the first, but as it was not published till the second, Junot ventured to extend the term: even then, however, it served only to show how little the framer of such decrees considered what was possible; how impudently he set even the forms of equity at defiance. It was now explained what those sacrifices were which the people had been told on the preceding day were necessary to enable the government to ameliorate their condition. The sum to be levied amounted in Portuguese money to forty million cruzados.

*War contri-
bution im-
posed.*

CHAP. Junot decreed that the two millions already paid, which he
 II. raised as a loan, and now called a contribution, should be
 1808. accounted as part of the sum, and allowed for in the final pay-
February. ment. Six millions were to be paid by the commercial part of
 the nation at three instalments; on the first of March, the
 first of May, and the first of August. All goods of English
 manufacture being, on account of their origin, liable to con-
 fiscation, were to be ransomed by the merchants and tradesmen
 who possessed them, at a third of their value. All the gold
 and silver of all the churches, chapels, and fraternities in
 Lisbon and its district was to be carried to the mint within
 fifteen days; no other plate being excepted than what was
 indispensable for the decency of public worship. In the pro-
 vinces the collectors of the tenths were to receive the church
 plate and transmit it to the mint, and the amount was to be
 carried to the contribution. Archbishops, bishops, religious
 orders and superiors of either sex, who possessed any revenue
 from land, or capital of any kind, were to contribute two-thirds
 of their whole yearly income, if that income did not exceed
 sixteen thousand cruzados, and three-fourths if it did;...in
 consideration of which they were to be excused from paying
 the regular tenths for the current year. Every person en-
 joying a benefice which produced from six to nine hundred
 mil-reis, should contribute two-thirds of his income; three-
 fourths, if it exceeded the latter sum. All *Commendadors* of
 the military orders or of Malta should also pay two-thirds of
 their revenue. The donatories of crown property were to pay
 double their usual tax; owners of houses, half the rent for
 which they were let, or a proportionate sum if they inhabited
 them themselves; land-holders, two-tenths, in addition to the
 former imposts. The tax upon horses, mules, and servants,
 was doubled. The *Juiz do Povo*, under orders of the *Senado*,

was to rate all trading bodies and booth and stall-keepers, and compel them to pay their assessments by distress; and shops which were not under the jurisdiction of the *Senado* were to be rated in like manner by the *Mesa do Bem Commun*, . . the Board of General Good, . . under the inspection of the Royal Junta of Commerce.

CHAP.
II.

1808.

February.

The few persons who had thus long obstinately persisted in believing or pretending to believe that France wished and intended to improve the state of Portugal could no longer deceive themselves, and dared not attempt to deceive others. The contribution thus imposed amounted to four millions and a half sterling; the population of Portugal was less than three millions: the sum demanded, therefore, was equivalent to a poll-tax at a guinea and half per head. Yet even this statement inadequately represents its enormity: from at least three-fourths of the people nothing could be collected; and the mercantile part of the community, who had been the most opulent, were already reduced to ruin. The sum required exceeded the whole circulating medium of the country; and the reason why it was permitted to be paid by instalments, and not insisted upon at once, was, that the money received at the first instalment might in the course of circulation find its way to serve for the second! It was levied with the utmost rigour. The lowest hucksters, stall-keepers, and labourers, were summoned before the *Juiz do Povo*, to be assessed in their portion; and the merchants were ordered to appear in tallies before the Junta of Commerce, and there reciprocally discuss their affairs, and tax each other! The expulsion of the English, the emigration, and the general distress, had left a very large proportion of the best houses vacant, and rents in consequence had fallen nearly to half their former value; but every house was rated at what it had brought in before these events, and

*Observador
Portuguez.
203.*

CHAP. the owners of those which were untenanted were compelled to
 II. pay three-tenths of what they would have received upon that
 1808. valuation; and the property of those who had neither money
February. nor commodities to satisfy the demand was seized without
 mercy. Articles which were needful for the army were re-
 ceived in part of payment in kind. The French officers turned
 speculators: they purchased colonial goods, which they sent
 to France by land; and thus the money which they had ex-
 torted was re-issued, to answer fresh exactions, or serve as
 booty again. They carried on also a gainful trade in money;
 importing French coin, which they forced into circulation,
 and exchanged for Spanish dollars, or for the fine gold of
 Portugal, at an enormous profit; or they purchased with it
 paper-money, which usually fluctuated between 28 and 30 per
 cent. discount, . . . sometimes was as low as 35, and sometimes
 could find no purchasers. With this paper, according to law,
 they made half their payments at par: and when all their
 French money was expended in this manner, Junot issued an
 edict, by which he fixed a price at which it was to be received
 for the contribution, lower than that at which he had suffered
 it to be introduced.

*Godoy re-
 calls the
 Spanish
 troops from
 Portugal.*

The decree which appointed Junot governor of Portugal, and extended his authority over the whole kingdom, at once abrogated the secret treaty of Fontainebleau. That treaty had served Buonaparte's purpose, and the Spanish cabinet was at this time too much agitated by home disquietudes to resent this breach of faith, or take warning by it. Godoy, fallen from his dreams of royalty, and trembling for his life, was ready to make any sacrifice which might procure him the protection of France. He had written to Junot, requesting that Carraffa's division might return to Spain; alleging, that the English threatened a descent upon the coasts of Andalusia: . . . but the

*Neves, i.
 313.*

*Part only
 obey his
 orders.*

French were not duped by a pretext which they themselves had invented for a different purpose; and Junot, in conformity to his master's projects, detained the troops. Godoy probably wanted them to protect the removal of the King and Queen to the coast, but he was in no condition to insist upon any thing; and the abortive principality of the Algarves, and the kingdom of Septentrional Lusitania, came to an end before their intended lords had taken possession, and before their denominations had been made public. The Spanish troops from Algarve and Alentejo were recalled, and obeyed the order; those at Porto, and Carraffa's division, were more under Junot's power; they were detained, and Carraffa, upon the death of Taranco, by the French general's order took command of both.

CHAP.
II.
1808.
February.

Thus had Junot, in pursuance of his instructions, extended his authority over the whole of Portugal. He was, however, far from feeling secure in his usurpation. The temper of the people had shown itself; and if the English had landed a force to attack him, his men were but in ill condition to take the field; for they were sickly during the whole of the winter months. For this reason he had disbanded the militia, and broken up so large a part of the native army; . . . but the flower of that army was to be selected and sent into France, that they might be made agents in inflicting the same miseries upon other countries which their own endured. A great number of the soldiers who had been picked for this service deserted; and in consequence, the French code of martial law was declared to be applicable to the Portuguese army, and death became thereby the punishment for desertion. Six thousand infantry, and four regiments of cavalry, were marched off, under the Marquez d'Alorna. Gomes Freire d'Andrada, who had the highest military reputation of any officer in the army, was

*The whole
of Portugal
under com-
mand of
the French.*

*Jornal de
Coimbra, 2.
74.*

*The flower
of the Por-
tuguese
army
marched in-
to France.*

CHAP. second in command. The Marquez de Valença, the Marquez
 II. de Ponte de Lima, the Counts Ega and Sabugal, and many
 1808. other officers of rank and family, went in this ill-fated army;
February. some by compulsion, others by choice, the leaders being devoted to Buonaparte.

*Discontent
 of the
 people.*

Though the French despised the Portuguese troops as heartily as they did the people, it was observed that they became more insufferable in their personal conduct after the army was disbanded. As a body they might safely despise them; but every individual was in some measure restrained by the apprehension of individual vengeance, and the certainty that if in any tumult the military, as was natural, should take part with the people, the contest, though the event was not doubtful, must be far more severe. When this restraint was removed, they gave way to that insolence which adds a sting to oppression, and rouses even those who have submitted to heavier wrongs. A peasant at Mafra, Jacinto Correia was his name, killed two of these robbers with a reaping-hook; and when he was put to death for it by military process, he gloried to his last breath in what he had done, and repeated that if all his countrymen were like him, there should not a single Frenchman remain alive among them. The punishment was carefully made known in a proclamation, but the nature of the crime was as carefully suppressed, lest it should find imitation. It had, however, been determined to strike terror into the people by an execution, which should furnish in its example nothing but what was intimidating. Insignificant as the cause was, the circumstances of this insulated tragedy deserve to be stated, as a specimen of the spirit in which the military government of Portugal was conducted. A number of French soldiers had been sent to the hospital at the Caldas, a munificent establishment of royal charity, to be cured of the itch

*Observador
 Portuguez.
 166.*

*Executions
 at Caldas.*

by the baths at that place. They complained to General Thomiers, who commanded at Peniche, that the peasantry insulted them; and Thomiers sent a few stout grenadiers to take the first opportunity of resenting any mockery which might be offered to their comrades. These men paraded the streets, and drank at the wine-houses till they began to invite a quarrel. A countryman, heated like them with liquor, said to his companion as they were passing, I have killed seven of these fellows myself. The vaunt, which was probably as false as it was foolish, might have cost him his life in a regular way; but one of the French, who heard him, immediately attempted to cut him down: . . . he ran to his mother's house, which was close at hand, and calling out to his sister to help him, she stood in the door-way, let him enter, and instantly locking the door on the outside, put the key in her bosom. The French endeavoured to force the key from her; the woman was strong and determined: her cries were heard at a billiard table near, where a cadet of the regiment of Pato, which was quartered in the town, seeing a woman struggling upon the dunghill with three or four French soldiers, jumped out of the window, and ran to her assistance; the surgeon and a few others of the same regiment followed. A French captain also came up: by this time a considerable crowd had collected; the sword was knocked out of his hand by a stone, and he would have been in some danger, if a Portuguese sergeant had not called out to the mob to forbear, for he was a French officer. The soldiers now came up, and the tumult ended with no other immediate evil than that one or two of the first aggressors were slightly wounded: . . . the woman was the greatest sufferer; for one of them, with the pummel of his sword, had beaten her cruelly upon the bosom. When the circumstances were made known to Thomiers, his first intention was to pass it over lightly: as

CHAP.

II.

1808.

February.

CHAP. II. the *Juiz de Fora* of the town happened to be with him at the time, he desired him immediately to send him any four fellows of bad character, to whom a little punishment would do no harm, and who might represent the town on this occasion. Such an arrangement, curious as it is, would have been an improvement upon the ordinary course of Portuguese justice. Four men, accordingly, against whom complaints had been recently preferred by their wives, but who were entirely innocent of the matter in question, were arrested, and put in confinement. Nine days afterward, Loison, who commanded in the district, appeared at the head of three or four thousand men, bringing Thomiers with him. The woman was called upon to declare which of the soldiers had beaten her: she pointed out the man, and there ended this part of the inquiry: but, on the other part, fifteen Portuguese were condemned to death; among them the *Escrivam da Camara*, and one of the most respectable inhabitants of the place, who happened to be in the room with her when the tumult took place. They had been seen from an opposite house each to take a musket and load it: . . . this they acknowledged that they had done; but they had taken no part in the disturbance, nor even gone into the street. It was argued that they could not have loaded those guns with any other intention than that of discharging them against the French troops, and therefore they had incurred the penalty of death. That sentence was passed against them; and the uncle of the *Escrivam*, being one of the magistrates of the town, was ordered and compelled by Loison to be present at the execution! Five of the condemned persons took the alarm in time, and escaped. The surgeon leaped from a window, and broke his leg: he was carried to the place of butchery upon a hand-barrow, covered with a piece of sacking. While the execution was going on, the Prince of Salm Kirburg, a

young officer in the French service, lifted up the cloth to see what was under it: the sight shocked him, and he said to the French general it was monstrous to bring a man in such a condition to suffer death, . . let them heal him first, and then do with him what they would. This intercession availed: the surgeon was remanded to the hospital, and Loison was content with having seen nine men put to death for an affray in which not a single life had been lost.

The place where this tragedy was perpetrated is a little town, containing not more than three hundred inhabitants; for its baths and for the beauty of the surrounding country it was frequented by strangers and invalids, and more wealth and more comforts were to be found there than in any other of the provincial towns. In such a place, where every one of the victims was known to the whole neighbourhood, and all had their nearest relations and connections upon the spot, it may well be conceived what horror and what deep and inextinguishable hatred this bloody execution would excite. The hatred Junot despised; . . Buonaparte prided himself upon setting the feelings of mankind at defiance, and systematically outraging them, for the purpose of displaying his power; and in this, as in every thing else, his generals were his faithful agents. The murders at Caldas were committed upon this system, merely to strike terror through the country. . . Junot had refrained from making such an exhibition at Lisbon after the riot which the first act of open usurpation provoked, because there were native troops in the city; the population of a great capital would become formidable if it were made desperate; and, moreover, there was the English squadron in sight. But an opportunity had been watched for when it might be done safely and with more effect; and an affair which the nearest general passed over at the time as unworthy of serious notice was made the pretext.

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II.

1808.
February.

Noves,
Ch. 30.

CHAP.

II.

1808.

*February.**Conduct of
the French
Generals.*

The immediate superintendence of these murders had been entrusted to Loison. This general, whose military talents were considerable, had lost an arm in action with the Portuguese in Rousillon; for which reason the people now called him the *Maneta*, a name which will long be held in abhorrence: not that he was more rapacious, or more merciless, than his comrades; but, from the rank he held, he had better opportunities for pillage; and it was his fortune to preside at almost all the butcheries which were committed during the first invasion. Of all the French generals in this army, it is said that there were only two who preserved a fair character. These were, Travot, who commanded at Cascaes, and Charlot at Torres Vedras. They mitigated, as far as in them lay, the evils of which they were the instruments; but they could do little toward repressing the cruelty, the excesses, and the abandoned licentiousness of their officers and men. The language which the French openly held was, that Portugal was a conquered country, and therefore they, as conquerors, had a right to take what they chose and do what they pleased there; and they acted in full conformity to this principle*.

*Neves, ii.
132.*

They had entered Portugal with so little baggage, that even the generals borrowed, or rather demanded, linen from those upon whom they were quartered. Soon, however, without having received any supplies from home, they were not only

* One of their officers, a man of the old school, who had not forgotten the manners and the feelings of better days, did not scruple to declare in the house where he was quartered that the army was ruined. He had seen robbery enough in his time, he said, but never to an excess like the present; and, where this was suffered, an army must inevitably be destroyed: and he ran through the names of the generals, calling each a robber as he named him, and venting the bitterness of his heart in thus giving each the appellation which was so richly merited by all.

splendidly furnished with ornamental apparel, but sent to France large remittances in bills, money, and effects, especially in cotton, which the chief officers bought up so greedily that the price was trebled by their competition. The emigration had been determined on so late that many rich prizes fell into their hands. Fourteen cart-loads of plate from the patriarchal church reached the quay at Belem too late to be received on board. This treasure was conveyed back to the church, but the packing-cases bore witness of its intent to emigrate; and when the French seized it they added to their booty a splendid service for the altar of the sacrament, which had been wrought by the most celebrated artist in France. Junot fitted himself out with the spoils of Queluz, and Loison had shirts made of the cambric sheets belonging to the royal family which were found at Mafra. These palaces afforded precious plunder, which there had been no time to secure. The plate was soon melted into ingots, the gold and jewels divided among the generals, and the rich cloths of gold burnt for the metal, which constituted the smallest part of their value. The soldiers had not the same opportunities of pillage and peculation, but they suffered no opportunity to escape: those who were quartered in the great convent of St. Domingos pulled down the doors and window-frames, and put up the wood and iron work to auction. Yet their insolence was more intolerable than their rapacity, and their licentious habits worse than both. The Revolution had found the French a vicious people, and it had completed their corruption. It had removed all restraints of religion, all sense of honour, all regard for family or individual character; the sole object of their government was to make them soldiers, and for the purposes of such a government the wickedest men were the best. Junot himself set an example of profligacy: he introduced the fashion of lascivious dances,

CHAP.
II.

1808.

March.*Notes, i.*
247.*Notes, i.*
229.*Notes, i.*
240-1.

CHAP. imported perhaps from Egypt.. one of them bears his name ;
 II. and the Portugueze say that no man who regards the honour of
 1808. his female relatives would suffer them to practise it. The Moors
March. have left in the peninsula relics of this kind which are sufficiently
 objectionable : that, therefore, which could call forth this reprehension must be bad indeed. The decency of private families was insulted : the officers scrupled not to introduce prostitutes, without any attempt at disguising them, into the houses where they were quartered ; and happy were the husbands and the parents who could preserve their wives and daughters from the attempts of these polluted guests.

*State of
Lisbon.*

The situation of Lisbon, at this time, is one to which history affords no parallel : it suffered neither war, nor pestilence, nor famine, yet these visitations could scarcely have produced a greater degree of misery ; and the calamity did not admit of hope, for whither at this time could Portugal look for deliverance ? As the government was now effectually converted into a military usurpation, it became easy to simplify its operations ; and most of the persons formerly employed in civil departments were dismissed from office. Some were at once turned off ; others had documents given them, entitling them to be reinstated upon vacancies ; a few had some trifling pension promised. All who had depended for employment and subsistence upon foreign trade were now destitute. Whole families were thus suddenly reduced to poverty and actual want. Their trinkets went first ; whatever was saleable followed : things offered for sale at such a time were sold at half their value, while the price of food was daily augmenting. It was a dismal thing to see the Mint beset with persons who carried thither the few articles of plate with which they had formerly set forth a comfortable board, and the ornaments which they had worn in happier days. It was a dismal thing to see men pale with

anxiety pressing through crowds who were on the same miserable errand, and women weeping as they offered their little treasure to the scales. Persons who had lived in plenty and respectability were seen publicly asking alms . . for thousands were at once reduced to the alternative of begging or stealing; and women, of unblemished virtue till this fatal season, walked the streets, offering themselves to prostitution, that the mother might obtain bread for her hungry children, . . the daughter for her starving parents. Such was the state to which one of the most flourishing cities in Europe was reduced!

CHAP.
II.
1808.
March.

As the general distress increased, tyranny became more rigorous, and rapine more impatient. Many of the convents could not pay the sum at which they had been assessed, their resources having suffered in the common calamity; their rents were consequently sequestered, and the intrusive government began to take measures for selling off their lands to discharge the contribution. The rents of inhabited houses were sequestered, to answer for the assessment upon untenanted ones belonging to the same owner. At the beginning of April a prorogation of two months, for the payment of the last third of the impost, was promised to those who should have paid the first by the end of the month; on the 28th eight days grace was proclaimed for the payment of the first third; after which rigorous distress was to be levied upon the defaulters, not for the first payment alone, but for the whole contribution; and this threat was enforced. Suicide, which had scarcely ever been heard of in Portugal, became now almost a daily act. There is no inhumanity like that of avarice. The Royal Hospital at Lisbon was one of the noblest institutions in the world. Under the house of Braganza it was the admiration of all who knew how munificently it was supported, and how admirably conducted: under the usurpation of the French

April.

*Observador
Portugues.
p. 123.*

Ibid. p. 174.

CHAP. more than a third part of the patients who died there perished
 II. for want of food. Meantime the French government, affecting
 1808. to compassionate the misery which it had created, made an
April. ostentatious display of relieving the poor, and issued billets of
Observador two francs each, in Portugueze money 320 *reis*; four hundred
Portuguez, of which were distributed weekly among forty parishes, and
p. 200. five more added afterwards for a parish which had been overlooked. This measure was none of that charity which vaunteth not itself. The billets were given only at one place; crowds flocked thither in expectation; and the amount of this eleemosynary expense was loudly boasted and exaggerated by the French and their partizans, . . the whole sum thus expended scarcely exceeding 40*l.* per week. After a few weeks the billets were not regularly paid, and at length they became worthless: and this was the extent of the liberality of this execrable government in a city where they reckoned their plunder by millions! To complete the miseries of this devoted country anarchy alone was wanting; and it soon necessarily resulted from the barbarous system of the French wherever the immediate pressure of their authority was not felt. After the disbandment of the Portugueze army, troops of banditti were formed, who robbed in companies with perfect impunity. The edict which prohibited all persons from carrying arms left the traveller entirely at their mercy; and not content with being masters of the roads, they levied contributions upon the smaller towns and villages.

Neves, ii.
157.

*Esora no
seu Abati-
mento glo-
riosamente
Esaltada,*
p. 5.

*Increase of
the Sebas-
tianists.*

The French, in the pride of their strength, and their ignorance of the national character, despised this poor oppressed people too much to be in any fear of what despair might impel them to; and one remarkable effect of the general misery tended at once to increase their contempt and their security. There exists in Portugal a strange superstition concerning King

Sebastian, whose re-appearance is as confidently expected by many of the Portuguese as the coming of the Messiah by the Jews. The rise and progress of this belief forms a curious part of their history: it began in hope, when the return of that unhappy prince was not only possible, but might have been considered likely; it was fostered by the policy of the Braganzan party after all reasonable hope had ceased; and length of time served only to ripen it into a confirmed and rooted superstition, which even the intolerance of the Inquisition spared, for the sake of the loyal and patriotic feelings in which it had its birth. The Holy Office never interfered farther with the sect than to prohibit the publication of its numerous prophecies, which were suffered to circulate in private. For many years the persons who held this strange opinion had been content to enjoy their dream in private, shrinking from observation and from ridicule; but, as the belief had begun in a time of deep calamity, so now, when a heavier evil had overwhelmed the kingdom, it spread beyond all former example. Their prophecies were triumphantly brought to light, for only in the promises which were there held out could the Portuguese find consolation; and proselytes increased so rapidly that half Lisbon became Sebastianists. The delusion was not confined to the lower orders... it reached the educated classes; and men who had graduated in theology became professors of a faith which announced that Portugal was soon to be the head of the Fifth and Universal Monarchy. Sebastian was speedily to come from the Secret Island; the Queen would resign the sceptre into his hands; he would give Buonaparte battle near Evora on the field of Sertorius, slay the tyrant, and become monarch of the world. These events had long been predicted; and it had long since been shown that the very year in which they must occur was mystically prefigured in the arms of Portugal. Those

CHAP.
II.1808.
April.

CHAP. arms had been miraculously given to the founder of the Portu-
 II. gueze monarchy; and the five wounds were represented in the
 1808. shield by as many round marks or ciphers, two on each side,
April. and one in the middle. Bandarra the shoemaker, who was
 one of the greatest of their old prophets, had taught them the
 mystery therein. Place two O's one upon the other, said he,
 place another on the right hand, then make a second figure
 like the first, and you have the date* given. The year being
 thus clearly designated, the time of his appearance was fixed
 for the holy week: on Holy Thursday they affirmed the storm
 would gather, and from that time till the Sunday there would
 be the most tremendous din of battle that had ever been
 heard in the world, . . for this April was the month of Lightning
 which Bandarra had foretold. In pledge of all this, some of
 the bolder believers declared that there would be a full moon

* *Põe dois ós hum sobre outro,
 E põe lhe outro á direita,
 Põe outro como o primeiro,
 Ahi tens a conta feita.*

A Sebastianist was explaining this to P. Jose Agostinho de Macedo, who asked him, now he had made out the 808, where the thousand was? The believer pointed to the flag-staff from which the Portuguese colours were flying on the Mint. . . There it is, straight and upright, behind the five wounds, which the voice of the Prophet has converted into ciphers. . . *Oh loucos e duros de coração em vos render a evidencia! Abri os olhos, miseraveis, que eu vos desengano, quereis esse sinal numerico, esse hum, que designe os mil? Nam vêdes alli o pão da bandeira, tam direito, tam posto a pino, tam empertigado por detras das cinco chagas convertidas em cifras pela voz dos profetas; ahi estam, incredulos, ahi estam 1808.*—Os Sebastianistas, p. 1, 98.

Another prophecy gave the date by thirty pair of scissars, the bows standing for ciphers; and the scissars, when opened, each represented a Roman X. I am not sufficiently versed in the arithmetic of the prophets to discover how this is summed up into 1808.

on the 19th of March, . . . when she was in the wane! It was a prevalent opinion that the *Encoberto*, or the Hidden One, as they called Sebastian, was actually on board the Russian squadron!

CHAP.
II.
1808.
April.

Those parts of the old prophecies which clearly pointed to the year 1640, when the event for which they were intended was accomplished, were omitted in the copies which were now circulated and sought with equal avidity. Other parts were easily fitted to the present circumstances. A rhyme, importing that he of Braganza would go out and he of France would come in, which was written concerning the war of the Succession, was now interpreted to point to the Prince of Brazil and Buonaparte; and the imperial eagle which was preserved in the Spanish banners after Charles the Fifth, and against which so many denunciations had been poured out, was the device of this new tyrant. The Secret Island had lately been seen from the coast of Algarve, and the quay distinguished from which Sebastian was to embark, and the fleet in which he was to sail. The tongues of the dumb had been loosed, and an infant of three months had distinctly spoken in Lisbon, to announce his coming. One believer read prophecies in the lines of those sea-shells upon which a resemblance to musical characters may be fancied. The effect of this infatuation was that in whatever happened the Sebastianists found something to confirm their faith, and every fresh calamity was hailed by them as a fulfilment of what had been foretold. The emigration of the Prince and the entrance of the French were both in the prophecies, and both therefore were regarded with complacency by the believers. When the French flag was hoisted they cried Bravo! these are the eagles at the sight of which Bandarra, one of the greatest prophets that ever existed, shed tears! During the tumult in Lisbon their cry was, Let them fire! let

CHAP. II. them kill! all this is in the prophecies. This folly gave occasion to many impositions, which served less to expose the credulity of individuals, than to increase the prevalent delusion.

1808. April. One Sebastianist found a letter from King Sebastian in the belly of a fish, appointing him to meet him at night on a certain part of the shore. A more skilful trick was practised upon another with perfect success. An egg was produced with the letters V. D. S. R. P. distinctly traced upon the shell; the owner of the hen in whose nest it was deposited fully believed that it had been laid in this state, and the letters were immediately interpreted to mean *Vive Dom Sebastian Rei de Portugal*. The tidings spread over the city, and crowds flocked to the house. The egg was sent round in a silver salver to the higher order of believers. After it had been the great topic of conversation for three days, it was carried to Junot, by whom it was detained as worthy of being placed in the National Museum at Paris. These things naturally excited the contempt and ridicule of the French; nevertheless, when Junot, as if to put out of remembrance the very names of the Royal Family, ordered the ships that were called after the Prince and the Queen to be called the Portugueze and the City of Lisbon, he altered the name of the St. Sebastian also.

Neves, ii.
142.

Obs. Port.
p. 275.

Edicts to
prevent
emigration.

April 7.

The Comte de Novion was succeeded in the police department by Lagarde, the fame of whose rapacities in Venice and other parts of Italy prepared the people to expect in him what they found. The first edict of this new minister commanded the *Corregedores* and *Juizes do Crime*, or Criminal Judges, to make out in the course of the ensuing fortnight a list of all the persons who had emigrated from their respective jurisdictions, specifying in every instance the place of abode both in town and country, the parish and street, the number and the floor of the house. Sequestration of the emigrant's property was to follow as soon as possible; and any person, though father

or child, or in their default the nearest heir, who should attempt to conceal or cover any part of the property, was to be treated as having criminally taken possession of that to which he had no right. If any person fled after the publication of this decree, his name, with all particulars concerning him and his disappearance, must be sent to the Corregedor, or Criminal Judge, within eight-and-forty hours, by the owner of the house which he had inhabited; or its chief tenant, if it were divided among many; or all its inhabitants if the person dwelt in one of his own, and by those persons also to whom he should have left the keys and entrusted the care thereof. If any of these persons failed in informing in due time, they themselves would be considered as having intended to subtract property destined to sequestration. It had already been ordered that all flags of truce from the British squadron should be fired upon: that any person caught in attempting to reach the fleet should be punished with imprisonment for not less than six months, or with death, according to the circumstances; and that the master of the boat, and all other persons convicted of having consented to assist in the escape, should suffer capital punishment. It was now enacted, that every one having newspapers, letters, or any communication of any kind from the British ships, should instantly deposit them, or give account thereof, at the Intendant General's office, on pain of being treated as an agent of the English; and the same penalty was decreed against every one who should spread news from the fleet, unless he specified his authority and named the person from whom his intelligence came. Notice was also given that an office was opened to receive information against those who were seeking to emigrate, against the boatmen who would facilitate the escape of such persons, and against all agents of the English; and it was added, that on proof of the accusation, Junot would

CHAP.
II.

1808.

April.

Apr. 5.

Obs. Port.
p. 224.

CHAP. determine what reward should be given to the informer. La-
 II. garde had taken possession of the Inquisition; the old establish-
 1808. ment of that devilish tribunal gave place only to one for political
April. persecution, as if the edifice itself were polluted, and destined
 always to deserve the execrations of mankind.

*Special Cri-
 minal Tri-
 bunal.*

Apr. 8.

The next edict announced the formation of a special tribunal for all criminal cases. It was to consist of a President, who must be a superior French officer; a French *Capitam Relator*, which may be rendered Captain-Attorney-General; four other officers, of whom three must be French, the fourth a Portuguese; one Portuguese judge versed in criminal jurisprudence; and a secretary, who might be of either nation, but must speak both languages. Death was decreed against all who should be convicted of having been engaged in insurrection and popular commotion, or present at an armed assembly, these offences holding the first place: the same punishment for murder, either accomplished or attempted, arson, and robbery accompanied with violence; death or the galleys for burglary; stripes and the galleys for disobeying the law respecting the use of knives and other deadly weapons. It is remarkable, that though the preamble spoke of the insufficiency of the penal laws, all these punishments were, in the edict, sanctioned by references to the Portuguese, as well as to the French Code. But death for the crime of espionage, or for seducing any person to pass over to the enemy, was enacted by Junot's own authority. The sentences of the Tribunal were to be without appeal. In the body of the decree it was said, that inasmuch as robberies had infinitely multiplied both in Lisbon and the whole kingdom, this Court should take cognizance of all offences of that nature, the General in Chief having so decreed in his desire of protecting with all his power the property of the inhabitants: but the Tribunal was never embodied; when any persons were to

be *fusiladed*, a military tribunal sufficed for the summary forms with which these murders were committed.

The new Intendant was active in issuing edicts. Lisbon was infested by dogs, who, belonging to no one, found subsistence in the filth and offal which were cast into the streets. The police guards were ordered to kill all whom they met in their rounds; the French soldiers were invited and entreated to assist in delivering the city from this nuisance, and the rabble were tempted to exert themselves by the promise of fifty *reis* per head: as long as the premium was paid, these poor animals were hunted down without mercy; the French however soon became weary of the expense, and the butchery then ceased after more than 2000 had been killed. Another edict forbade old keys to be exposed for sale at the old iron stalls, because of the obvious facility which they afforded to thieves. These measures affected to reform glaring evils, though not of importance, and against which there were already existing laws; but Lagarde's chief attention was directed to the two objects of securing the intrusive government and enriching himself. There soon occurred a curious specimen of his administration of justice. A quarrel took place in the Mouraria between a Portuguese soldier and three Frenchmen, and the Portuguese was killed. The scene of this transaction happened to be the worst part of Lisbon, and it occasioned a great tumult among the inhabitants of the *Rua Suja*, or Dirty Street, and three other such sties of filth and iniquity: more French collected; the mob had the advantage, and the riot was not appeased till a French serjeant of grenadiers was killed, a soldier mortally wounded, and three others severely cut by the knives of the Portuguese. Upon this an order appeared from M. Lagarde, decreeing that twelve of the inhabitants of these streets, being persons who bore the worst character there, should be apprehended and imprisoned for three months, unless they declared

CHAP.
II.

1808.

April.

Measures of
Police.

Apr. 9.

Apr. 11.

CHAP. who were the chief instigators of the disturbance : that all the
 II. common strumpets who lodged in these four streets should quit
 1808. them within four days, on pain of having their heads shaved
April. and being banished from Lisbon ; and that all eating and
 drinking houses in the said streets should be shut up for six
 months, unless the owners would give information against some
 person concerned in the affray. The result of the order was,
 that every strumpet who could pay a six-and-thirty was suffered
 to continue in her abode as not having been concerned in the
 riot : that the taverners paid from one to five pieces each,
 according to their means ; the victuallers from eight milreis to
 two pieces ; the twelve hostages from twelve milreis to six pieces
 each ; and the sum total which M. Lagarde extorted from these
 wretches as the amends for two Frenchmen killed and three
 wounded amounted, according to an exact account, to 862 mil-
 reis ; more than five times the weekly sum distributed by the
 intrusive government among the starving population of Lisbon.

Obs. Port.
p. 250, 256.

Deputation
of Portu-
gueze to
Bayonne.
Apr. 22.

Obs. Port.
p. 249.

By another edict all gunpowder, artillery, fire-arms, and
 weapons of every kind, in the possession of merchants or other
 individuals, were ordered to be carried to the arsenal, and de-
 posited there till the owner having obtained a licence for his
 ship to sail, should want to embark them. As soon as they were
 delivered in, the best pieces of cannon were spiked and the
 musquets disabled. Such precautions were now become more
 needful for many reasons. May is the month in which * pro-
 visions are always dearest in Portugal ; and at this time Buona-
 parte's plots against Spain were drawing toward their com-
 pletion, and the ferment which had arisen in that country
 extended to Portugal. The Spanish troops from Alemtejo were

* O mez de Maio foi sempre de muito respeito em toda a península. He o mez da fome, e basta esta circumstancia para se lhe abaixar a cabeça.—*Neves*, ii. 231.

all removed to Lisbon, and so divided as to be completely within the power of the French ; and to amuse the Portuguese people with hopes, reports were circulated that the contribution was remitted, and that the sequestered property would be restored. Halcyon days were now to succeed. There was to be nothing but prosperity for Portugal. A deputation had been sent to Bayonne to offer the homage of their countrymen to Buonaparte. The persons appointed for this were either those who were thought dangerous in their own country, or useful in France. They were the Marquises of Penalva, Marialva, Valença, and Abrantes, father and son ; the Counts of Sabugal and Arganil ; Viscount de Barbacena, the Inquisitor-General, the Bishop of Coimbra, the Prior of Avis, D. Nuno Caetano Alves Pereira de Mello, D. Lourenço de Lima, Joaquim Alberto George, and Antonio Thomas da Silva Leitam. On the Prince's birth-day, when the streets were strongly patrolled lest that anniversary should call forth any expression of popular feeling, a letter from this deputation was made public. It assured the Portuguese, that if any thing could equal the genius of the Emperor Napoleon, it was the elevation of his soul, and the generosity of his principles : that with a truly paternal affability he had manifested those principles in his use of the rights which circumstances gave him. His army had not entered Portugal as conquerors. He bore no enmity to their Prince, nor to the royal family ; he sought only to connect them with the rest of Europe in the great continental system, of which they were to be the last and closing link, for he could not tolerate on the continent an English colony. It depended upon the Portuguese themselves to shew, by their conduct in this respect, whether they were now worthy still to form a nation, or must be annexed to a neighbour, from whom so many causes tended to divide them. The Emperor knew and lamented the privations which,

CHAP.
II.

1808.

May.*Obs. Port.*
*p. 262.**Letter from
the Deputa-
tion.*

CHAP.

II.

1808.

May.

in common with the continent and America, Portugal endured during the temporary interruption of her commerce ; but this was the consequence of a struggle, the result of which would amply compensate for them. The weight of the contributions had impressed his heart, and his goodness had dictated a promise that it should be reduced to just limits, compatible with their means. These intentions of the Emperor, the deputies said, would, they doubted not, excite in the Portuguese the greatest gratitude. They meantime would continue to fulfil near the person of the Emperor, and conformably to his orders, the duties of a mission which had no difficulties, since the goodness of Napoleon united with his wisdom to simplify their dearest interests.

*Junot made
Duke of
Abrantes.*

Upon the publication of this letter, the heads of the first corporate bodies were made to understand, that they must wait upon Junot, whom Buonaparte had created Duke of Abrantes, and request him to transmit the expression of their gratitude to the Emperor for the gracious reception with which their deputies had been honoured. The Dean of the Patriarchal Church spoke in the name of the clergy ; the *Desembargador do Paço* and High Chancellor for the magistracy : both these speeches were remodelled by the intrusive government, and then printed ; so that men who were groaning over the miseries of their country, were made appear to that country as if they crouched to lick the feet that trampled upon her. The Conde da Ega, one of the most devoted partizans of France, spoke for the nobles. Junot in reply told them, that Portugal, under the protection of the great Napoleon, would soon be replaced in that rank to which a Vasco da Gama and a Joam de Castro had raised it by their conquests ; a Luiz da Cunha and a Pombal by their policy ; and he desired that a Junta of the Three Estates might be assembled forthwith, to express the wishes of all

classes in a manner worthy of the nation, and worthy of the monarch to whom they addressed themselves. The intention of this meeting was, that the Portugueze should request to have Junot for their king, a business which Ega was to manage in the Junta. This intrigue was unexpectedly counteracted by another, of which Carrion de Nizas, a French officer of cavalry, M. Verdier, a French subject born and always resident in Portugal, and the Desembargador Francisco Duarte Coelho, are said to have been the prime movers. Carrion de Nizas had the reputation of being the best informed man in the French army. M. Verdier was a man of great knowledge and extraordinary talents, fond of the country in which he had passed his life, but too enlightened not to perceive and lament the abuses by which it had been debilitated and degraded. He was too far advanced in years, and too wise a man, to wish for those sudden and violent revolutions, of which the evil is great, certain, and immediate, and the good contingent and remote. Such a revolution however had occurred, and he was perforce involved in it, having been called from a numerous family at Thomar, where he had a large cotton manufactory, that Junot might avail himself of the knowledge which he was known to possess.

CHAP.
II.

1808.

May.

*He hopes to
be made
king of Por-
tugal.*

*Neves,
T. ii. C. 42.*

Whatever may have been the motives of the French officer in opposing Junot's pretensions to the crown, those of M. Verdier, and the Portugueze who acted with him, cannot be mistaken, and ought not to be condemned. Unlikely as it appeared that the House of Braganza should recover the throne, they desired in this dissolution of government, to build up the best system which circumstances seemed to allow; and for this purpose they drew up a paper which they entrusted to the Juiz do Povo, Jose de Abreu Campos, that he might produce it at the assembly. The Junta of the Three Estates was but a mere

*The Juiz do
Povo pro-
poses to ask
for a king
of Buona-
parte's fa-
mily.*

CHAP. name which might give colour to the proceedings of Junot; the
 II. Juiz do Povo was little more; but one name served well in array
 1808. against another, and moreover this had a popular sound with it,
May. favouring that order of things which these persons were properly
 desirous of restoring. Accordingly when the deputies of the
 clergy and the various bodies corporate assembled in the mock
 Junta, and some person, after the Conde da Ega's speech,
 would have answered for the Juiz do Povo, Campos spoke
 boldly and honestly for himself. He declared that he did not
 assent to what was going on, and that he had no authority to
 assent, for he was not a representative of the people. What
 was proposed could not be their wish, as the paper with which
 he had been entrusted would show. He then, amid the con-
 fusion which his unlooked-for opposition occasioned, produced
 and read a paper to this effect: that the Portuguese, looking
 upon France as their mother country, inasmuch as the first con-
 querors of Portugal from the Moors were French, and mindful
 of the aid which they had received from France when they
 recovered their independence in 1640, acknowledged with all
 gratitude the protection which the greatest of monarchs at this
 time offered them: they desired a constitution and a consti-
 tutional king, who should be a prince of the imperial family;
 the constitution with which they should be content was one in all
 things like that which had been given to the duchy of Warsaw,
 with only an alteration in the mode of electing the national re-
 presentatives, which should be by chambers. The better to con-
 form with their ancient customs, they desired that the Catholic
 and Apostolic Roman religion might be the religion of the
 state, requiring the admission of all the principles established
 by the last Concordat with France, whereby the free and public
 enjoyment of all modes of worship was tolerated: that there
 should be a minister specifically charged with the department of

public instruction: that the liberty of the press should be established as it then was in France, because ignorance and error had caused their decay: that the legislative power should be divided into two houses, and communicate with the executive: that the judges should be independent, and the Code Napoleon established: that causes should be publicly tried with justice and dispatch: that all property held in mortmain should be set free: that the public debt should be paid, for which means were not wanting: and that the number of public functionaries, who in the general change must be displaced, should all receive decent and equitable pensions, and upon every vacancy be preferred, provided they were duly qualified.

CHAP.
II.
1808.
May.

*News, T.
ii. C. 42.*

Junot and the sycophants who hoped to figure at his court were incensed at this opposition to their project. They easily overpowered the Juiz do Povo in the meeting, and the Intendant of Police was then instructed to find out the persons who had instigated him. M. Verdier in consequence was sent back to Thomar in disgrace. This was what he would most have wished, could he have returned to that tranquillity and domestic happiness which he was wont to enjoy. But the crimes of his countrymen were visited upon him. In the tumults which ensued, the people among whom he had lived so long, and by whom he had been deservedly loved and respected, imagined that as a Frenchman he must needs be a partizan of France, and he was compelled to return to Lisbon for safety. There, as long as the French continued in Portugal, he remained under the inspection of the police, a prisoner by Junot's orders in his own house. Upon the restoration of the legitimate government, the part which he had taken was remembered as a crime, and he was ordered to leave the kingdom. The forms of justice had long been dispensed with in Portugal; and a man who had violated no allegiance, who had broken no law, who had

*Fate of the
mover of
this scheme.*

CHAP. II. offended in no point of honour or of duty, was marked for
punishment, when those who had sinned in every point were
1808. overlooked. Junot however had little leisure to enjoy his
May. dreams of royalty; he was roused from them by the events in
Spain, to which it is now necessary to recur.

CHAPTER III.

AFFAIR OF THE ESCURIAL. SEIZURE OF THE SPANISH
FORTRESSES. TUMULTS AT ARANJUEZ. FERDINAND
MADE KING IN HIS FATHER'S STEAD.

THE six months which had now elapsed since the treaty of 1807. Fontainebleau had been the most eventful in Spanish history. On the 30th of October, a few days after the signature of that treaty, and a few weeks after Prince Ferdinand had written to Buonaparte, a proclamation was issued from the Escorial, in which the King of Spain accused his eldest son of conspiring to dethrone him. "God," said he, in this extraordinary paper, "who watches over his creatures, does not permit the consummation of atrocious deeds when the intended victims are innocent; thus his omnipotence has saved me from the most unheard-of catastrophe. An unknown hand has discovered a conspiracy carried on in my own palace against my person. My life was too long in the eyes of my successor, who, infatuated by prejudice, and alienated from every principle of Christianity that my parental care had taught him, had entered into a project for dethroning me. Being informed of this, I surprised him in my room, and found in his possession the cipher of his correspondence and of the instructions he had received from the vile conspirators. The result has been the detection of several malefactors, whose imprisonment I have ordered, as also the arrest of my son." In a letter to Buonaparte, written

*Affair of
the Escu-
rial.*

*Ferdinand
accused of
plotting to
dethrone his
father, and
attempting
his mother's
life.*

CHAP. the day before this proclamation was published, the King made
 III. a more horrible charge against the Prince, whom he accused
 1807. of having attempted the life of his mother. "An attempt so
November. frightful," said he, "ought to be punished with the most
 exemplary rigour of the laws. The law which calls him to the
 succession must be revoked: one of his brothers will be more
 worthy to replace him on my throne and in my heart. . . I
 thought that all the plots of the Queen of Naples would have
 been buried with her daughter!" This alluded to an opinion
 that the Prince's late wife had first instigated him to cabal
 against his father. She doubtless detested Godoy and her in-
 famous mother-in-law, and they therefore would not fail to in-
 dispose the King toward her.

*Persons im-
 plicated in
 the charge.*

*Ferdinand
 confesses
 himself
 faulty, and
 intreats for-
 giveness.*

The persons chiefly implicated in this accusation were the
 Duke del Infantado and D. Juan Escoiquiz, formerly tutor to
 the Prince, and author of an heroic poem upon the conquest of
 Mexico; the latter had acted as Ferdinand's agent with the
 French Ambassador; and the former had received from him an
 appointment with a blank date and a black seal, authorizing
 him to take the command of the troops in New Castille upon the
 event of the King's death. Six days after the first proclamation
 another was issued, in which two letters from the Prince were
 contained. The first was in these terms, addressed to the King:
 "Sire and father, I am guilty of failing in my duty to your
 majesty; I have failed in obedience to my father and king.
 I ought to do nothing without your majesty's consent, but I
 have been surprised. I have denounced the guilty, and beg
 your majesty to suffer your repentant son to kiss your feet."
 The other was to the Queen, asking pardon for the great fault
 which he had committed, as well as for his obstinacy in denying
 the truth; and he requested her mediation in his favour. In
 consequence of these letters, the King said, and of the Queen's

entreaty, he forgave him, "for the voice of nature unnerved the hand of vengeance." The Prince, he added, had declared who were the authors of this horrible plot, and had laid open every thing in legal form, consistent with the proofs which the law demanded in such cases. The Judges therefore were required to continue the process, and submit their sentence to the King, which was to be proportioned to the magnitude of the offence, and the quality of the offenders. Meantime, at the request of his Council, he ordered a public thanksgiving for the interposition of Divine Providence in his behalf.

CHAP.
III.
1807.
November.

This mysterious affair has never been clearly elucidated: it has been believed to be partly the work of Godoy, partly the intrigue of French agents: but there seems to be no ground for the latter supposition; and whatever part Godoy may have taken in it, he was clearly acting on the defensive. It is one of those transactions in which some disgrace attaches to all the parties concerned. The King cannot be acquitted of extreme rashness in so precipitately accusing his son, and bringing so perilous a subject before the public; nor of extreme credulity in advancing the shocking and most improbable charge of having attempted his mother's life. On the other hand, the fact that Ferdinand so soon afterwards actually did dethrone his father, renders it very difficult to exculpate him from having attempted it at this time: if he did not, it was only because the opportunity did not invite him, not from any sense of duty. In the lame justification which he afterwards published of himself and his partizans, it is said that the letter by which he requested pardon of his father was brought to him by Godoy for signature; and that he signed it because he would not refuse that new proof of filial respect to his august parents. But the letter was more than a mark of filial respect; it professed repentance, it implored forgiveness, and it impeached his friends.

*Disgraceful
to all
parties.*

CHAP.

III.

1807.

*November.**Not insti-
gated by
Buonaparte**His con-
duct.*

Buonaparte stood in no need of an intrigue of this kind, with its plot and counter-plot; his plan had already been formed and his means prepared : and Godoy was at that time held in such close dependence upon Buonaparte by his hopes and fears, that he would not have ventured upon so bold a measure without his concurrence, likely too as it was to draw down his displeasure. The secret denunciation may probably have come from the Queen, who realized in her feelings toward her son all that has ever been feigned in tragedy of unnatural mothers. There is a point at which any evil passion becomes madness, and it was afterwards evinced that her passion had reached that height. Fearing and hating her son, it may well be supposed that she would narrowly watch his conduct; enough might be discovered to excite a well-founded suspicion of his intentions; and the more atrocious part of the accusation might be prompted by her wickedness or her fears. If Buonaparte had instigated the proceedings against Ferdinand, they would have been carried to greater lengths; he was not a man to have drawn back in deference to popular opinion, even if at that time there had been any channel by which the popular feeling of the Spaniards could have been expressed. But on this occasion he acted as a friendly sovereign would have done. Without any appearance of interfering publicly, he instructed the Ambassador, Beauharnois, to mediate in favour of the Prince, and put a stop to proceedings which could only bring disgrace upon the royal family: thus keeping aloof from all parties, he made them all look to him with trembling dependence, while he steadily pursued his plans for the destruction of all. He did not however neglect to take advantage of the circumstance for furthering those nefarious plans; but on the receipt of the dispatches, affecting the most violent anger that a suspicion of his ambassador should have been entertained, ordered 40,000 men to Spain, to be prepared, as he

afterwards said, for every event, and to support the army of Portugal, and to counteract the policy of England, by which he pretended to believe these intrigues were put in motion.

CHAP.
III.

1807.

*Anxiety of
Godoy.*

Meantime Junot took possession of Lisbon. One part of the secret treaty having been thus fulfilled, Godoy was anxiously expecting to be installed in his new kingdom of the Algarves, where he flattered himself with the thought of being secure from Ferdinand's resentment, to which in his present situation he would otherwise be exposed upon the King's death. He relied upon the good offices of Joachim Murat, Grand Duke of Berg, who had married one of Buonaparte's sisters, the widow of General Le Clerc. With him he communicated through D. Eugenio Izquierdo, his agent at Paris; and if money to any amount should be necessary to expedite his wishes, the treasure which he had amassed during his administration enabled him to disburse it at command. Murat however informed him that the business was now become very delicate, owing to the extraordinary attachment which the Spaniards manifested toward the Prince of Asturias, the consideration due to a princess of the royal family, and the part taken by her relation, the Ambassador Beauharnois. Godoy now fully believed that the projected marriage was agreeable to Buonaparte, and yielding to every new circumstance with the facility of weakness, persuaded Charles to write and solicit an alliance which he had so lately dreaded. But Buonaparte assumed an air of displeasure towards Izquierdo, and kept him at a distance, in order to cut off the direct mode of communication; and he set off for Italy, giving to his journey an affected importance, which excited the expectation of all Europe. There carrying into execution those parts of the secret treaty which were to his own advantage, he expelled from Tuscany the widow Queen of Etruria and her children; and seized the public funds of a court who were ignorant of the very existence of the

December.

*The Q. of
Etruria ex-
pelled from
Tuscany.*

CHAP. compact by virtue of which they were called upon to surrender
 III. not only what he had given them, but those dominions which
 1807. they had possessed before he and his family were banished from
December. Corsica. It was in vain for this poor Queen to demand time
 for dispatching a courier to her father's court, or to plead that
 no communication had been made to her upon a subject in which
 the rights and interests of her son were vitally concerned ; she
 was desired in reply to hasten her departure from a country
 which was no longer hers, and to find consolation in the bosom
 of her family. On the journey they informed her that she was
 to receive a part of Portugal as a compensation. This only
 increased her affliction, for she neither wished for, she says, nor
 would accept of dominion over a state belonging to any other
 sovereign, still less over one which belonged to a sister and a
 near relation of her own. To this trial the Queen of Etruria
 was not exposed : upon reaching her parents and inquiring
 respecting the treaty, she was told that they also had been
 deceived, and that no such treaty was in existence !

*Memoir of
 the Q. of
 Etruria, p.
 20.*

*Buonaparte
 writes to the
 King of
 Spain.*

*Troops
 marched
 into Spain.*

From Italy Buonaparte answered the King of Spain's letters ;
 assured him that he had never received any communication from
 the Prince of Asturias, nor had had the slightest information of
 the circumstances respecting him which those letters imparted ;
 nevertheless, he said, he consented to the proposed intermar-
 riage. In a letter afterwards written to Ferdinand himself, he
 acknowledged the receipt of that letter which he now denied.
 Holding out these hopes to the Prince, and yet, at the same
 time, by his long silence, and his reserve towards Izquierdo,
 keeping him, his father, and the favourite, equally in suspense
 and alarm, he was, meantime, marching his armies into Spain.
 That they should enter it had been stipulated by the secret treaty
 of Fontainebleau ; and the court was not in a state to insist
 upon the condition that the two contracting powers were to

come to a previous agreement upon that point. It was essential to his views that he should make himself master of the principal fortresses ; and his generals were instructed to obtain possession of them in whatever manner they could. The wretched court, fearing they knew not what, were now punished by their own offences ; the treaty into which they had entered for the destruction of Portugal was turned against themselves ; and they had neither sense nor courage to take those measures for their own security which the people would so eagerly have seconded ; on the contrary they gave the most positive orders that the French should be received every where, and treated even more favourably than the Spanish troops. Thus were the gates of Pamplona, St. Sebastian, Figueras, and Barcelona thrown open to them.

CHAP.
III.
1808.

The next object of these treacherous guests was to get possession of the citadels. Pamplona was the first place where the attempt was made. General D'Armagnac having taken up his quarters in the city, received orders from Marshal Moncey, whose head-quarters were at Burgos, to make himself master of the citadel in any manner, and at whatever cost. Moncey had commanded the French army in Biscay in the year 1794, and at that time when the republican soldiers were accustomed to boast of acts of sacrilegious rapacity, left even among the people whom he had invaded the reputation of a just and generous and honourable man. It was his ill fortune now to be in the service of Buonaparte, and to be employed in acts like this ! D'Armagnac first tried a stratagem ; he requested permission from the Marquis de Vallesantoro, captain-general of Navarre, to secure two Swiss battalions in the citadel, under pretence that he was not satisfied with their conduct : the Marquis however perceived that such a permission would put one of the strongest bulwarks of Spain in the power of the French, and made answer

*Seizure of
Pamplona.
Feb. 9.*

CHAP. that he could not consent without an express order from the
III. court. Where there was prudence enough to prompt this answer,
1808. a certain degree of precaution might have been looked for, which
February. nevertheless was wanting. The French soldiers were permitted
every day to enter the citadel and receive their rations there, and
this with such perfect confidence on the part of the garrison, that
even the forms of discipline were not observed at such times.
One night, during the darkness, D'Armagnac secretly introduced
three hundred grenadiers into the house he occupied, which was
opposite the principal gate of the citadel. Some of the ablest
and most resolute men were selected to go as usual for the
rations, but with arms under their cloaks. The ground hap-
pened to be covered with snow, and some of the French, the
better to divert the attention of the Spaniards, pelted each other
with snow-balls ; and some running, and others pursuing, as if in
sport, a sufficient number got upon the drawbridge to hinder it
from being raised ; the signal was then given, some of the party
who had entered seized the arms of the Spaniards, which were
not, as they ought to have been, in the hands of the guard ; others
produced their own concealed weapons to support their comrades ;
the grenadiers from the general's house hastened and took pos-
session of the gate, the rest of the division was ready to follow
them, and the first news which the inhabitants of Pamplona
heard that morning was, that the French, whom they had re-
ceived and entertained as friends and allies, had seized the
citadel. When all was done, D'Armagnac addressed a letter
to the magistrates, informing them, that, as he understood he
was to remain some time in Pamplona, he felt himself obliged
to insure its safety in a military manner ; and he had therefore
ordered a battalion to the citadel, in order to garrison it, and
do duty with the Spanish troops : " I beseech you," he added,
" to consider this as only a trifling change, incapable of disturb-

ing the harmony which ought to subsist between two faithful allies." CHAP.
III.

The Spanish court had by its own folly and its treachery towards Portugal, reduced itself to so pitiable a state of helpless embarrassment, that it dared not resent this act of unequivocal insult and aggression. Not to perceive that some hostile purpose was intended, was impossible ; but Charles and his minister were afraid to remonstrate, or to express any feeling of displeasure, or to prepare for resistance, or even to take any measures for guarding against a like act of treason on the part of their formidable ally in the other strong holds, upon the security of which so much depended. This wretched court contented itself with repeating instructions to the commanders and captains-general, on no account to offend the French, but to act in perfect accord with them, and by all means preserve that good understanding which so happily subsisted between the two governments ! And when representations were repeatedly made of the suspicions which were entertained, and the danger which all the measures of the French gave so much reason for apprehending, the answers of the court were written in vague and empty official language, from which nothing could be understood, except that the government was determined to let the whole responsibility fall upon its officers, and to be answerable itself for nothing ! While D'Armagnac secured Pamplona, General Duhesme had been instructed in like manner to get possession of Barcelona, where he was quartered. Immediately on his arrival he requested that his troops might do duty in the city jointly with the Spaniards, and occupy with them the principal posts, assigning candidly as a reason for this suspicious request, his own personal security in the disturbed state of public feeling which was then apparent ; and as a farther reason, the probability that such a proof of perfect amity and confidence would

1808.
February.

*Seizure of
Barcelona.*

CHAP. more than any other measure tend to satisfy and tranquillize the
III. people. The Conde de Espeleta, captain-general of Catalonia,
1808. was so strictly charged in his instructions to offer no displeasure
February. to the French, that he could not refuse his assent to this insidious
proposal. If there had been any doubt of the intention which
it covered, that doubt was speedily removed; the usual guard at
the principal gate of the citadel was twenty men, but Duhesme
stationed a whole company of *chasseurs* there.

A people so intelligent, so active, and so high-minded, as the Catalans, were neither to be deceived nor intimidated; and if the inhabitants had not been restrained by obedience to their own government, Barcelona might certainly have been preserved. Duhesme felt himself in danger, and the Spanish troops, as well as the inhabitants, sometimes expressed an impatience, which at any moment might have produced a perilous conflict. The French reported that their passports from Madrid were arrived, and that they were to march for Cadiz as speedily as possible; on the morrow they were to be reviewed preparatory to their march. This welcome news completely deceived the inhabitants, and no surprise was excited by the beat of drum and the movement of battalions at the time appointed. Some regiments were drawn up upon the esplanade which separates the citadel from the town, and a battalion of Italian light troops were stationed upon the road leading from the custom-house to the principal gate of the citadel. At two in the afternoon, an hour when the people, satisfied with the spectacle, had mostly left the streets and returned to their dinner and their *siesta*, General Lechi came to review this body of Italians, and passed on, followed by his aides-de-camp and his staff, into the citadel. The French who were on duty received him under arms, according to military etiquette, and the Spaniards did the same. Under pretence of giving some orders to the officer of the guard, Lechi and his suite halted

on the drawbridge, and occupying it by that manœuvre, covered the approach of the infantry. The Italians defiled under cover of the ravelin which defended the gate, and knocked down the first Spanish centinel, whose voice when he would have given the alarm was drowned by the beating of the French drums under the archway. Lechi then advanced; the Spanish part of the guard could make no resistance, their French comrades being ready to act against them in the first moment when the treason was discovered; and immediately afterwards overpowering numbers were upon them. Four battalions followed the first, and the invaders were completely masters of the place. The Spanish governor, Brigadier Santilly, indignant at a treachery against which he should have taken some precautions, presented himself to Lechi as a prisoner of war: he was received however with perfect courtesy, and all protestations of friendship and alliance, which General Lechi, with an effrontery worthy of his master and his cause, made no scruple of repeating in the very act of breaking them. Upon the alarm of this aggression the Spanish and Walloon guards who belonged to the garrison hastened to their post; they were not permitted to enter the citadel till night, by which time the French had secured themselves in possession of the place. Having been admitted, they ranged themselves in arms opposite the French, and in that menacing position the night was passed, and the following morning, till orders came to quarter themselves in the town; and the French were then left sole masters of the place.

While one division of these treacherous allies surprised the citadel, another advanced upon Monjuic, a fort upon a hill which commands the town. An Italian colonel, by name Floresti, commanded this latter division. Monjuic is one of the strongest fortresses in Spain: it had a sufficient garrison, and the commander, D. Mariano Alvarez, was a man of the highest and most heroic

CHAP.
III.

1808.
February.

*Seizure of
Monjuic.*

CHAP. patriotism. When he was summoned to open the gate, he de-
 III. murred, saying he must receive instructions from his govern-
 1808. ment. Floresti insisted that his orders were peremptory and must
 February. be executed. He and his men were standing upon ground which
 was undermined, and Alvarez was strongly inclined, instead of
 admitting them, to fire the train. Could he have foreseen what
 a spirit was about to display itself in the Peninsula, this he
 would undoubtedly have done; but the spirit of Spain was still
 overlaid by its old wretched government; and the responsibility
 at such a time of involving his country in direct hostilities with
 France was more than even the bravest man would venture to
 take upon himself.

*Seizure of
 St. Sebastian's and
 Figueras.*

At St. Sebastian's General Thouvenot requested leave to
 place his hospital in the fort and in the Castle of S. Cruz, and
 to deposit there the baggage of the cavalry corps which was in
 his charge. Both the Spanish commanders did their duty by
 returning a refusal, and transmitting an account of their con-
 duct to the court; . . the court returned for answer, that there
 was no inconvenience in acceding to the wishes of the French
 general; and this fortress was thus, by the imbecility of Charles
 and his ministers, delivered up to the French. There still re-
 mained the strong and important fortress of Figueras. Colonel
 Pie had been left in the town with 800 men, and with instructions
 to get possession of the fort. He attempted to win it by the same
 stratagem which had been practised at Barcelona; but the
 Spaniards also knew and remembered that example, and raised
 the drawbridge in time. Here however the governor seems to
 have acted with more facility than had been shown elsewhere;
 two days after the treacherous attempt had been frustrated, he
 consented to let Pie introduce two hundred conscripts, whom
 he pretended he wished to secure; . . two hundred chosen men
 marched in under this pretext; the rest followed them, and the

March 18.

French then obtained from a government which dared deny them nothing, the keys of the magazines, and an order which removed the Spaniards from the garrison.

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*Depots established at
Barcelona.*

The government of Spain had not virtue enough to know the strength which it possessed in such a people as the Spaniards; feeling nothing but its own imbecility, it had not had courage to prevent these aggressions, and consequently dared not resent them; and as the French seized these places in the name of their Emperor as an ally, this wretched court consented to the occupation of them upon the same plea. Symptoms of a far different spirit appeared in Barcelona; and the Count of Espeleta, *Feb. 29.*

captain-general of Catalonia, found it necessary to issue a proclamation, calling upon all fathers of families, and heads of houses, to preserve tranquillity, and thus co-operate with the intentions of their rulers; and declaring that the late transactions did in no way obstruct or alter the system of government, neither did they disturb public nor private order. His proclamation was posted in all parts of the city. Duhesme, however, soon gave the inhabitants new cause for alarm, by calling upon the captain-general to fill the magazines, and establish depots for the subsistence of his troops. The Count of Espeleta returned for *March 18.* answer to this requisition, "that the French general might consider the whole city as his magazine: that, as he had no enemy to dread, and was quartered there as an ally, the measures which he proposed to take could only serve to create suspicion and distrust: and that the Emperor would be ill pleased to hear that he had alarmed, with fearful forebodings, a city which had afforded him so hospitable a reception. Your Excellency," he pursued, "will be pleased to request the opinion of his Imperial Majesty respecting your determination, before you carry it into effect, and to accompany your request with this explanation of

CHAP. mine ; as I shall also lay the business before the King my master,
 III. without whose orders I cannot give to your Excellency what the
 1808. forts in possession of the Spanish troops have not. Meanwhile
March. I wish to impress upon your mind, that it will serve no good
 purpose to supply the forts with stores of provisions ; that such
 an intention is pointed and offensive ; and that it will neither be
 in the power of your Excellency, nor of myself, to remedy the
 consequences of the feeling which such a measure may excite
 among the inhabitants."

*Alarm of the
Spaniards.*

When the French troops first began to enter Spain, various reports were circulated to account for so extraordinary a measure. The occupation of Portugal had been the first pretext ; and when Junot had taken possession of that country with one army, the possibility that the English would attack him there was a sufficient plea for having another near at hand to support him. An English expedition against Ceuta had been talked of ; it was pretended that they meant to make a descent upon the southern coast of Spain, and therefore French troops were to occupy the whole of that coast. The recovery of Gibraltar was another project, and another one an invasion of the opposite shore, which would exclude the English from the ports of Barbary, and give France entire command of the Mediterranean. Buona- parte, in his dreams of ambition, had sometimes looked that way, and had inquired of those who were best able to answer the question, what force would be sufficient for the conquest of Morocco. But he was resolved first to be master of the Peninsula, and the measures which he had now taken were such as could no longer leave a doubt in any reasonable mind of his intention. The occupation of four important fortresses, which were considered as the keys of Spain, astonished the Spaniards. Never before had the public mind been so agitated, but they knew the

weakness of the King and the incapacity of his counsellors; they had none to look to who should direct their willing hands; and though no people could be better disposed to stand forth in defence of their country, they remained in a state of helpless and hopeless astonishment.

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Godoy is said to have been the first person about the court whose eyes were opened to the real designs of Buonaparte. They flashed upon him as soon as he learnt the seizure of Pamplona; and he ordered the Spanish General Laburia, who had been stationed at Irun that he might provide every thing for the French troops, to demand from the French commander in chief an explanation of his conduct in having taken possession of that fortress. An answer was returned, half mockery, half insult, that the citadel had been occupied in order to secure the public tranquillity. Godoy had been the tool of Buonaparte, not the accomplice: he might have foreseen such a reply; but no means were left him of resenting the aggression, or repairing the follies of which he had been guilty. Buonaparte seems at this time to have intended that the royal family should fly to their American empire; he might then take possession of the kingdom as left to him by their abdication; and there were no means of ultimately securing Spanish America also, so likely as by letting this family retire there; both countries would needs be desirous that the intercourse between them should continue; nor were there any Spaniards who would with less reluctance submit to hold it in dependence upon him, than those persons who had given so many proofs of abject submission to his will. For the purpose of increasing the fear of Charles and his ministers, he wrote an angry letter, complaining, in the severest terms of reproach, that no farther measures had been taken for negotiating the proposed marriage. The King replied, that he was willing it should take place immediately. He probably con-

*Fears and
perplexities
of the
Spanish
Court.*

CHAP. III. sidered Buonaparte to be sincere in his intentions of forming this alliance, and never having been fit for business, and now, perhaps, for the first time really feeling its cares, a natural wish for repose began to be felt, and a thought of abdication passed across his mind. “Maria Louisa,” said he to the Queen, in the presence of Cevallos, and of all the other Ministers of State, “we will retire to one of the provinces, where we will pass our days in tranquillity, and Ferdinand, who is a young man, will take upon himself the burden of the government.” This was a thought which the example of his predecessors might readily suggest to a King of Spain. But it was not this which the Corsican desired; . . . that tyrant perceived his victim was not yet sufficiently terrified, and therefore Izquierdo, who had been kept at Paris in a state of perpetual suspense and agitation, was now commanded to return to Spain. No written proposals were sent with him, neither was he to receive any; and he was ordered not to remain longer than three days. Under these circumstances he arrived at Aranjuez, and was immediately conducted by Godoy to the King and Queen. What passed in their conferences has never transpired; but, soon after his departure from Madrid, Charles began to manifest a disposition to abandon Spain, and emigrate to Mexico. If he were capable of feeling any compunctious visitations, how must he have felt at reflecting that he had assisted in driving his kinsman and son-in-law to a similar emigration; that he was now become the victim of his own misconduct; and, envying the security which that injured Prince had obtained, was himself preparing, in fear and in peril, to follow his example!

*Measures
for protect-
ing the in-
tended emi-
gration.*

But there was a wide difference between the circumstances of Spain and Portugal, making that a base action in the sovereign of the former kingdom, which for the last half century would have been the wisest measure that the House of Braganza could

have adopted. This seems to have been felt, for the intention was neither avowed at the time, nor acknowledged afterwards. The ostensible intention was, that the royal family should remove to Seville, and that a camp should be formed at Talavera. Solano was summoned from his Utopian experiments in Portugal, and ordered to march to Badajoz without delay, that he might be ready to meet the court with a sufficient escort, and protect their embarkation; and Junot was requested to part with the Spanish troops who were at Lisbon, that they might be stationed in the southern provinces, which it was pretended were in danger from the English. This pretence did not impose upon Junot; neither could preparations for such a removal be made as easily at Madrid and Aranjuez as at Lisbon. Great agitation prevailed in the metropolis: the French were now rapidly advancing thither, and the intentions of the royal family were suspected; secretly perhaps divulged by those friends of Ferdinand in the ministry to whom they had necessarily been entrusted. Things were in this state when Godoy, as commander in chief, sent an order to Madrid for the Royal Guards, and all the other corps which were stationed there, to repair immediately to Aranjuez; at the same time he desired the Council of Castille would issue a proclamation to assure the people that this was merely a measure of precaution, for the purpose of preventing any disputes between the French and Spanish soldiery, and that the alliance between the King and the Emperor of the French remained unalterable. The Council demurred at this, and dreading the consequences of the intended flight, which they clearly perceived these troops were to protect, they sent a memorial to the King, representing the imminent danger to which, by such a measure, his royal person, his whole family, and the whole nation, would be exposed. This remonstrance produced no effect, but the Council escaped the infamy of asserting a direct falsehood to the people,

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CHAP. which they had been instructed to do ; and the troops obeying
 III. their orders left Madrid before a reply from Aranjuez could be
 1808. received, and without any attempt being made to calm or to
 March. deceive the populace.

*Hopes of
 the Prince's
 party.*

These movements revived the hopes of the Prince's party, who were also strengthened by the natural course of events, for men who had hitherto fawned on the favourite were now ready to forsake him, and imagining that the Prince's rise would be the consequence of Godoy's fall, hastened to offer their servilities and services to the rising sun. They remonstrated with the King upon the extreme impolicy of his intentions ; and observing to him that Buonaparte had left even his greatest enemies, the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia, upon their thrones, they represented how impossible it was to believe that he would think of dethroning a sovereign with whom he was in alliance, and with whose family he was about to connect his own by marriage.

*Vacillation
 of the King.*

Mar. 16.

With such men as Charles IV. the last counsellor will always have the most weight ; yielding to arguments which might have staggered a stronger mind, he suddenly changed his purpose, and issued a proclamation to tranquillize the people, and to disclaim any intention of leaving the country. The army of his dear ally, he said, was traversing his kingdom in peace and friendship toward those points which were menaced by the enemy : and the junction of his life-guards was not to protect his person, nor to accompany him upon a journey, which had been mischievously represented to be necessary. Surrounded by his loyal and beloved vassals, what had he to fear ? or if it were required, could he doubt of the strength which their generous hearts would offer him ? But they had only to remain quiet, and conduct themselves still as they had hitherto done towards the troops of their good King's ally. This paper was read by the people with delight ; they crowded to the palace and to the

gardens to manifest their joy : their loyal acclamations brought the King and his family to the balcony, and it is said that Charles was evidently affected by the marks of enthusiastic attachment which his subjects expressed, believing as they did, and as undoubtedly it was intended they should * believe, that he engaged himself by this declaration, not to forsake the country. But the paper was hardly dry upon the walls of Aranjuez where it was posted up, before some fresh alarm produced a second change in this poor, perplexed, intimidated sovereign. On the morning of the 17th of March the emigration was finally resolved upon, and the hour of eleven that night was fixed for commencing their flight.

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Ferdinand and his brother, the Infante D. Carlos, opposed this resolution, and entreated their parents to desist from what they called so rash and perilous a project. It is affirmed, that the former took an opportunity of saying to one of the body guards, the journey was to be that night, and that he was resolved not to go. His partizans meantime were not idle. Notwithstanding the proclamation of the preceding day, the people of Madrid were not satisfied ; the proofs of the court's intention were unequivocal ; carriages and horses had been embargoed ; loaded carts had set off ; and relays of horses were stationed on the road to Seville. From the metropolis the populace flocked to Aranjuez ; there the baggage was packed up for removal, and it was now beyond a doubt that their government was on the point of abandoning them. Godoy relied upon the soldiers ; he had

*Insurrec-
tion at
Aranjuez.*

* The authors of the official Spanish history excuse the King from the charge of putting forth a false declaration, upon the plea that no promise of remaining was expressed in it. But certainly this was implied, and it is less discreditable to Charles, and more consistent with his character, to suppose that he was sincere when he issued it, and changed his mind when the next tidings brought on a fresh access of fear.

CHAP. been accustomed to defy the opinion of the people, and it has
 III. been said, at this critical moment, when Ferdinand, trusting to
 1808. his interest with Buonaparte, and perhaps still more to his favour
March. with the mob, opposed with more vehemence his father's intentions, that the favourite with a threatening gesture told him, if he would not go voluntarily he should be carried in bonds. But insolent as the favourite was, it is not credible that at such a time he should have dared to insult the Prince with such a menace; his wish would rather have been to get rid of Ferdinand by leaving him in Spain. Indeed these transactions are perplexed with various and contradictory relations, which it is impossible to reconcile; many persons had an interest in misrepresenting them; the circumstances themselves were confused and tumultuous, and the event resulted perhaps more from accident, than from any preconcerted scheme or intended purpose. An alarm was given late at night, whether wantonly or in design, by one * of the body guards, who fired a pistol: others instantly assembled, and the mob gathered round Godoy's

* The Marquis de Caballero says, there was no intention of removal that night; that the Prince of the Peace was amusing himself, according to his custom, *tête-à-tête* with one of his numerous mistresses; that the lady left his apartment under an escort of his guards of honour; that the patrol chose to see who she was, she resisted, her escort fired in the air, the trumpet on guard took this for the signal of departure, he put his troop in motion, and then the populace assembled. Godoy must have possessed much more courage in critical circumstances than he has obtained credit for, if he could amuse himself with a mistress at such a moment as this!

Caballero says, that he proposed to the commanders of the body guards to disperse the rabble with twenty horsemen, if they could answer for their fidelity; and if they could not, that they should recal six hundred men from Ocaña, who certainly had not been corrupted, with whom and with the artillery he would undertake for the safety of the royal family, but he was told that no person except the Prince could appease the agitation. He affirms that the people would have suffered the King and Queen to depart, and even Godoy also, but that they would have stopped the Prince. The Conde

house, and endeavoured to force their way in. His own soldiers were faithful to him, and some of the life-guards fell in this attempt. Don Diego Godoy, brother to the favourite, came with the regiment which he commanded to his assistance, and ordered them to fire upon the people; they refused to obey, and suffered their commander to be disarmed and bound hand and foot. The tumult increased, and some cries were uttered, by which it appeared that the dethronement of Charles was desired as well as the death of Godoy. Ferdinand was at that hour the idol of the unreflecting multitude, and not a thought was expressed or felt of effecting any other change than that of removing the one king to make room for another. When the house of the favourite was at length forced, he himself was not to be found. In their indignation the people committed his furniture to the flames; many valuable ornaments were destroyed, but nothing was pilfered; and the insignia of his various orders, rich with gold and jewels, were carefully preserved and delivered to the King. In the height of their fury also they had compassion upon the wife and daughter of Godoy, the former perhaps had been made an object of popular favour because of the scandalous life of her husband, and they were conducted safely to the palace with a kind of triumph, but in a state of feeling which may well be conceived. The uproar continued through the night. At the earliest break of day Ferdinand appeared in the balcony, and by his presence some degree of order was restored. The populace were weary, if they were not satisfied; the

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de Montijo claims the merit of having directed the popular feeling on the occasion. Except a generous feeling on the part of the people, who knew not what they were doing, there is nothing in these whole transactions creditable to any of the parties concerned.

CHAP. troops ranged themselves under their respective banners, guards
 III. were posted at the door of the house which had been ransacked,
 1808. and quiet was apparently re-established. At seven in the morn-
March. ing the King issued a decree, saying, that as he intended to
 command his army and navy in person, he dismissed the Prince
 of the Peace from his rank of generalissimo and chief admiral,
 and permitted him to withdraw whithersoever he pleased. He
 also notified this in a letter to Buonaparte, wherein, as if the
 real cause of the dismissal could possibly be concealed, it was
 said that leave had been granted to the minister to resign
 these offices because he had long and repeatedly requested it :
 “but,” the King added, “as I cannot forget the services the Prince
 has rendered me, and particularly that of having co-operated
 with my invariable desire to maintain the alliance and intimate
 friendship that unite me to your imperial and royal Majesty, I
 shall preserve my esteem for him.”

*Abdication
 of Charles
 IV.*

The people were not to be appeased by a measure so ob-
 viously designed to save the favourite from their hatred, and
 give him an opportunity of effecting his escape. There were
 no seditious movements during that day and the ensuing night ;
 but the cause of alarm and agitation continued. Godoy, in the
 first moment of danger, had taken shelter in a garret, among a
 heap of mats, in one of which he wrapt himself. There he re-
 mained about two and thirty hours ; till, unable longer to endure
 the intolerable thirst produced by the feverishness of fear, on the
 morning of the 19th he left his hiding-place, and came forth to
 meet his fate, whatever it might be. It would have been a dread-
 ful one, if the soldiers had not first perceived him, and afforded
 him some protection against an infuriated populace. Notwith-
 standing the guard under which he was immediately placed, the
 raging mob fell upon him, and he was led away prisoner. He had

pistols when he had hid himself, and he has been reproached for not using them either against himself or his assailants; but though at such a time he could have little hope of life, he had a Catholic sense of the value of what little interval might be granted him, and he cried out for a confessor when death appeared to be at hand. That cry may sometimes avail with a Catholic mob, when it would be vain to entreat for any other mercy. He was, however, beaten * and wounded, and his escort would hardly have been able to have saved his life, if the King had not sent Ferdinand to save him. Under his protection—under the protection of the man whom he had most injured, and whom he justly regarded as his greatest enemy, he was deposited safely in the guard-house; and the Prince then in the name of his father satisfied the people, by assuring them that the fallen minister should be brought to condign punishment, according to the laws. The hope of seeing him publicly executed induced them to forego the immediate fulfilment of their vengeance, which would have been an inferior gratification. They dispersed accordingly, and there was another interval in the storm.

It broke out with renewed violence about middle day, when a carriage with six mules drew up to the guard-house. A report immediately spread that the culprit was to be removed to Granada, for the purpose of screening him from justice: the mob

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* *No se pudo evitar que le dieran algunas bofetadas y algunos palos, que algo le desfiguraron aquel rostro bello con que hizo su fortuna y la ruina de la nacion.* This is the sort of feeling with which the Spaniards relate the manner of Godoy's fall. In the same tract, "Manifiesto Imparcial y Exacto," it is said, that when he secreted himself he took with him some jewels, *de que su alma codiciosa pudo ocuparse en momento tan critico*; and that he was discovered at last, because he could no longer endure hunger and thirst.

CHAP. presently collected ; they cut the traces and broke the carriage
III. to pieces. They were once more quieted by the presence of
1808. Ferdinand, who repeated in his father's name a solemn promise
March. that Godoy should be punished in due course of justice. How
far these repeated commotions arose naturally from the strange
circumstances of the kingdom and the court, or how far they
may have been excited by intriguing men, who hoped for em-
ployment under a new reign, and by those who with warm hearts
and heated imaginations promoted the work of revolution for its
own sake, it is impossible to ascertain ; even those who were
present have not known what opinion to form. But whatever
the moving causes of these tumults may have been, the effect
was, that on the evening of that day Charles, in the presence of
Ferdinand, his ministers, and the principal officers of the court,
resigned the throne. One of the guards immediately spread
the news, and never was any intelligence more rapidly diffused.
The abdication was publicly announced by a proclamation from
Charles, stating that the infirmities under which he laboured (for
he suffered much from rheumatic pains) would not permit him
longer to support the burthen of public affairs ; and that as it was
necessary for the recovery of his health that he should enjoy the
tranquillity of a private life in a more temperate climate, he had,
after the most serious deliberation, determined to abdicate the
crown in favour of his very dear son. He therefore by this decree
of " free and voluntary abdication " made known his royal will,
that the Prince of Asturias should be acknowledged and obeyed
as king and natural lord of all his kingdoms and dominions.
The news of these events was received throughout the kingdom
with the most enthusiastic delight. At Madrid the rabble mani-
fested their joy by entirely destroying the houses of Godoy, of
his brother, his mother, and his more conspicuous adherents ;

his portraits and his escutcheons were burnt wherever they could be found. In many places Te Deum was performed as a thanksgiving for the favourite's fall ; in others, bull-fights were given with all the barbarity of the Spanish custom, horses always, and men oftentimes, being sacrificed in those abominable pastimes. At Salamanca the monks and students danced in the market-place.

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CHAPTER IV.

MURAT ENTERS MADRID. THE ROYAL FAMILY INVEIGLED
TO BAYONNE. TRANSACTIONS AT THAT PLACE.

1808.

March.

*Ministry
formed by
Ferdinand.*

THE first act of Ferdinand VII. evinced either his delusion with respect to the designs of Buonaparte, or his fear of offending him ; it was to dispatch instructions that Solano's troops, which were on their march to Talavera, should remain under Junot's orders ; and that the French, who were approaching Madrid, should be received as friends and allies. The new King reappointed the five Secretaries of State, whose offices terminated with the former reign. D. Pedro Cevallos, who was one, sent in his resignation ; perhaps he wished to withdraw as much as possible from increasing difficulties and dangers, against which there appeared no remedy ; and he was conscious that some degree of unpopularity attached to him because of his connexion with Godoy. Ferdinand, however, by a public decree, refused to accept his resignation : it had been proved to him, he said, that though Cevallos had married a cousin of the Prince of the Peace, he never participated in the projects of which that man was accused ; and he was therefore a servant of whom the King would not deprive himself. It was affirmed by the Prince and his friends that Godoy had actually aspired to the throne ; an accusation too absurd for any but the vulgarest credulity of an inflamed people. This wretched minion now felt that there are times when despotism itself proves even-handed as justice. He was sent prisoner to the Castle of Villa Viciosa : with that

measure wherewith he had dealt to others, it was now meted to him; a judicial inquiry into his conduct was ordered, and before any trial, . . . before any inquiry, the whole of his property was confiscated. . . . Processes were also instituted against his brother, and many of his creatures. The decree which announced this declared Ferdinand's intention of speedily coming to the capital to be proclaimed; expressing however his wish that the inhabitants would previously give him proofs of their tranquillity, since he had communicated to them his efficient edict against the late favourite. By the same proclamation the Duque del Infantado, a nobleman of the highest character, was appointed to the command of the Royal Spanish Guards, and to the presidency of Castille. All those persons who were confined in consequence of the affair which happened at the Escorial (thus the conspiracy was spoken of) were recalled near his royal person. D. Miguel Jose de Azanza, a man of high character, who had held the important office of viceroy of Mexico, was made minister of finance; D. Gonzalo de O'Farrel, who had recently returned from a military command in Tuscany, was first appointed director general of the artillery, and presently afterwards minister of war. The Marquis Caballero was retained in the council; and, true to the maxims and spirit of the vile system which he had so long supported, he contrived to give a character of ungraciousness to the best act of the new government. Next to the punishment of Godoy, what all men most desired was the release of Jovellanos; an order was immediately issued for this, but it passed through Caballero's hand, and he, instead of wording it in those honourable terms which were designed by the new King, expected by the people, and required by the case, expressed the royal pleasure as if it were an act of grace conferred upon a pardoned criminal, not an act of justice to an irreproachable and injured man. The

CHAP.
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March.*Godoy's
property
confiscated
without a
trial.*

CHAP. new government suspended the sale of certain church property,
 IV. upon which the fallen minister had ventured in the plenitude of
 1808. his power ; and they issued an edict for destroying wolves, foxes,
March. and other animals, which had been preserved about the royal
 residences to gratify Charles's passion for the chase. These
 measures were intended to court popular favour, and to cast
 a reproach upon the late reign. Some vexatious imposts
 were taken off; and a part of the police establishment of
 Madrid, which had been peculiarly odious, was abolished. The
 people regarded these acts as unequivocal proofs of the new
 Monarch's excellent intentions; and the accession of Ferdinand
 was considered by those who were ignorant of the difficulties by
 which he was beset, and of the perilous circumstances of the
 country, as the commencement of a Saturnian age, and as the
 point of time from which the regeneration of Spain would be
 dated.

*Murat en-
 ters Spain.
 Mar. 3.*

Meantime Joachim Murat, brother-in-law of Buonaparte and Grand Duke of Berg and Cleves, had arrived in Spain to take the command of all the French forces in that country. As soon as his arrival was known, Charles and Godoy dispatched an officer of artillery, by name Velarde, to congratulate him, on the part of the King, and to take care that nothing was wanting for the subsistence and accommodation of his troops. Murat reached Aranda, on the Duero, on the 17th, the day when the first disturbances broke out at Aranjuez; and there he desired Velarde would write to the court and inform them that his instructions were to march rapidly towards Cadiz; but that he should perhaps take it upon himself to stop some days at Madrid, though he had no orders to that effect: he should not, however, proceed farther than St. Augustine's without having determined with the Spanish government the number of troops which were to enter the capital, and the time, and the manner, so that they

might be no charge to the inhabitants. He added, that he was in momentary expectation of dispatches from his master; that he should very soon be able to inform the Spanish nation what were the Emperor's views; that he could now positively announce his intention of going to Madrid, and that probably in the course of eight days he would have crossed the Pyrenees. Velarde's letter, which communicated this intelligence, was addressed to the Prince of the Peace; but it was received by the new ministers, and it increased their perplexities and alarms.

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They informed the people however by a proclamation, that their King had notified the happy event of his accession to the French Emperor, and assured him, that far from changing the political system of his father toward France, he would endeavour to draw closer the bonds of friendship and strict alliance, which so fortunately subsisted between the French Emperor and Spain. This communication, it was said, was made in order that the council of Madrid might act conformably to the King's sentiments, by taking measures for restoring tranquillity in the metropolis, as well as for receiving the French troops who were about to enter that city, and for administering to them every requisite assistance. They were to endeavour also to convince the people that these troops were coming as friends, and for purposes advantageous to the King and to the nation. The very fact that it was thought necessary to tell the people this, shows that they were not so besotted as to believe it. These were strange times, when a Spanish King informed the people of his measures, and, as it were, appealed to popular opinion; . . but stranger events were at hand.

*The people
of Madrid
exhorted to
receive the
French as
friends.*

All the foreign ministers congratulated Ferdinand upon his accession, except Beauharnois, from whom, after the part which he had taken concerning the expected marriage and throughout the affair of the Escorial, congratulation might first

*The French
enter
Madrid.*

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have been expected; he withheld this act of recognition, because he had not been furnished with the necessary instructions. Murat was now advancing toward Madrid, and the general anxiety was heightened by the more unexpected intelligence that Buonaparte himself, he who made and unmade princes with a breath, was on the way to Bayonne. He supposed that the royal family were at this time on the coast and on the point of embarkation, and that the people, in their fear of anarchy, would receive the French commander with open arms as their deliverer. The occurrences at Aranjuez were altogether unexpected; and as soon as he was informed of them, Murat accelerated his march. The approach of such an army, the silence of the French Ambassador, the mysteriousness of Buonaparte, and his journey to Spain, perplexed and alarmed Ferdinand. He had communicated his accession to this Emperor in the most friendly and affectionate terms; . . . fear could suggest no other. Lest this should be deemed insufficient, he appointed a deputation of three grandees to proceed to Bayonne, and compliment him in his name; and another grandee was sent, in like manner, to compliment Murat, who had already reached the vicinity of Madrid. This worthy agent was fully in his master's confidence; he assured Ferdinand that Buonaparte might be every moment expected; and he spoke publicly of his coming. Orders were therefore given for preparing apartments in the palace suitable for such a guest; and the King, whose fears made him restless, wrote again to Buonaparte, saying how much he desired to become personally acquainted with him, and to assure him, with his own lips, of his ardent wishes to strengthen more and more the alliance which subsisted between them. Murat, evidently for the purpose of displaying his forces, reviewed them before the walls; then made his entrance into Madrid, preceded by the imperial horse-guards, and by his staff, and followed by all

Mar. 28.

the cavalry, and by the first division of foot under General Mounier; two other divisions were encamped without the city, and a detachment proceeded to take possession of Toledo. Ferdinand made his public entry on horseback the following day, amid the ringing of bells and the discharge of artillery, but with no other parade than that which, under happier circumstances, would have been the most grateful of all spectacles; . . . a concourse of all the people of the capital and its vicinity, rejoicing in his presence, and testifying, by their acclamations, that they expected from him the regeneration of their country. But never did poor prince succeed to such a crown of thorns.

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Mar. 24.

The conduct of the French Ambassador had shown what was to be expected from the French General. Murat declared that until the Emperor Napoleon had acknowledged Ferdinand VII. it was impossible for him to take any step which might appear like such an acknowledgment: he therefore must be under the necessity of treating with the royal family. But Murat was better acquainted than Beauharnois with his master's designs; as if taking the deposed King and Queen under his protection, he sent a numerous body of troops to Aranjuez to guard them; and he caused it to be understood that the French would interpose in behalf of Godoy. Both these measures might have been taken with honourable designs; but when the French General, Grouchy, was made governor of Madrid, a sort of military government established there, and patrols instituted to preserve the peace, under the joint superintendence of a French officer and a Spaniard, sufficient indications were given of an intention to occupy the capital as the frontier fortresses had been occupied. A legitimate government which should have had no other cause of disquietude, would have been perplexed at such a crisis; but the attention of Ferdinand and his ministers was distracted by personal considerations: instead of feeling like

General
Grouchy
made Governor
of Madrid.

CHAP. the sovereign of a proud and ancient people, the new King was
 IV. in the situation of one who had to defend a bad title, and that
 1808. not by an appeal to arms, but tremblingly before a superior and
 'March. a judge.

*Declaration
 concerning
 the affair of
 the Escu-
 rial, March
 31.*

A declaration concerning the affair of the Escorial was made public on the last day of the month, for the purpose of proving that neither Escoiquiz, nor the Duque del Infantado, nor the other persons implicated in the charge of conspiracy, had been guilty of any misconduct. It was acknowledged that the Prince had in his own hand-writing commissioned Infantado to assume the command of the troops in New Castille, in case of his father's demise, and the alleged reason was a fear lest Godoy should continue at such a time to make an improper use of his influence and power. Such a pretext was too shallow to obtain belief in any calm or considerate mind: the King's age and state of health rendered it probable that he might live many years, and in the event of his death, no man doubted but that Godoy, who held his power only upon favouritism, must instantly become the wretch that this revolution made him. As for his aspiring to the throne himself, it is impossible that he should even for a moment have entertained so frantic a thought, and almost as impossible that they who made the charge against him should themselves have believed it.

*The abdi-
 cation re-
 presented as
 a voluntary
 act.*

In the deed of abdication Charles called it his own free and voluntary act, and especial care was taken by the new administration to represent it as such. He had certainly remembered the examples of Charles V. and Philip V. and a thought of imitating them had passed across his mind in moments when difficulties pressed upon him, and he was sick of the cares of government. This is certain: it is probable also that the Prince's party might not have formed the plan of sending him into retirement unless they had known that he himself had enter-

tained, however transiently, a wish of retiring. To talk even among themselves of deposing the King, would have had a startling sound; and have brought into the prospect scaffolds and executioners as well as places and power. But it was easy to persuade both themselves and Ferdinand that their object was so to act as to make his father carry into effect that wish and wise intention, which, without some such external motive, he would for ever want resolution to effect for himself. They may have reasoned thus, and have meant well, and have acted with a patriotic purpose; nevertheless the act itself bore marks of deposition*, not less decided than the abdication of James in England.

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These circumstances tallied well with Buonaparte's designs, and they were dexterously improved by Murat. Even before he entered Madrid, General Mouthion was dispatched to Aranjuez with a letter to the Queen of Etruria, which contained assurances to the deposed King of Buonaparte's support. A snare was laid for the imbecile Charles, and he rushed into it. However compulsory the act of abdication might have been, it was now as much his interest as that of his family, that he should

*Charles
complains
to the
French.*

* The authors of the official history, published at Madrid, insist that the abdication was a pure voluntary act; that Charles, who was altogether incapable of deceit, displayed the greatest affection towards his son after that event; and that none of the innumerable Spaniards, who with the heroism of martyrs performed their duty through all the horrors of the subsequent struggle, ever entertained the slightest scruple upon that point. They maintain that the letters of the royal parents, which Buonaparte published, are so interpolated by him that they cannot be trusted; and they endeavour to show, that even in those letters proofs may be discovered that no violence was complained of by the writers. Perhaps this is the only point upon which these Spanish authors are not entitled to full and entire credit, . . . for they wrote under the sanction and by the appointment of Ferdinand. In every other part, their history, as far as it has reached me, is written with sound judgement and admirable impartiality.

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acquiesce in it. But actuated by a sense of his wrongs, and still more perhaps by the Queen, who, trembling for her paramour, hated her son with all the virulence of an adulterous mother, he committed his last and consummating folly, by appealing to the very tyrant, whose open and undisguised aggressions had driven him, not a week before, to the resolution of abandoning his throne and seeking refuge in America. He assured Mouthion that the revolution had been preconcerted and brought about by money; that his son and Caballero were the chief agents; that he had signed the act of abdication only to save the Queen's life and his own, knowing that if he had refused they would both have been murdered in the course of the night. The conduct of the Prince of Asturias was more shocking, he added, inasmuch as having perceived his desire to reign, and being himself near threescore years of age, he had agreed to surrender the crown to him on his marriage with a French princess, an event which he, the King, ardently desired. The Prince, he added, chose that he and the Queen should retire to Badajoz, though he had remonstrated against the climate as injurious to his health, and entreated permission to choose another place, his wish being to obtain leave of the Emperor to purchase an estate where he might end his days. The Queen said she had begged her son at least to postpone their departure for Badajoz, but even this was refused, and they were to set out on the following Monday. This fact alone would evince how little the inclinations of Charles were consulted throughout these transactions. The part of Spain where Badajoz stands is notoriously unhealthy during the summer months; and to have fixed upon that place for the residence of the deposed monarch, and persisted in the choice after he had objected to it on the score of his health, implied in the new government an equal want of feeling and of sense.

Having made these complaints, Charles delivered into Mou-

thion's hands a formal protest, declaring that the decree of abdication was compulsory, and therefore invalid. He charged him also with a letter for the Emperor. "Sir, my brother," he said, "you will not without some interest behold a King, who having been forced to resign his crown, throws himself into the arms of a great monarch his ally, placing every thing at the disposal of him who alone can make his happiness and that of all his family, and of his faithful and beloved subjects. I abdicated in favour of my son only under the pressure of circumstances, when the noise of arms and the clamours of a rebellious guard made me sufficiently understand that my choice was between life and death, and that my death would have been followed by the Queen's. I have been compelled to resign; but taking hope this day, and full of confidence in the magnanimity and genius of the great man who has already shown himself my friend, I have resolved to remit myself in every thing to him, that he may dispose as he thinks good both of us and our fate, that of the Queen and of the Prince of the Peace." Having consigned this letter to Mouthion, who may be suspected of having dictated the latter expressions, he renewed his complaints. His situation, he said, was one of the most deplorable. They had seized the Prince of the Peace and would put him to death, for no other crime than that of having been at all times attached to his sovereign. There were no solicitations which he had not made to save the life of his unhappy friend, but he found every one deaf to his prayers and bent upon vengeance; and the death of Godoy would draw after it his own, for he should not survive him.

No King ever placed his favour more unworthily than Charles, but there was a sincerity in his friendship which almost amounts to virtue, and would have done honour to a better monarch. The Queen's attachment also, which is more easily explained, had a character of enduring passion and self-abandonment seldom to

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*He writes to Buona-
parte, en-
treating him
to interfere.*

*Letters of
the Queen
to Murat.*

CHAP. be found in one at once so vicious and so weak. From this time
IV. she wearied Murat with letters, written in the most barbarous
1808. French and most confused manner, wherein she expressed her
April. fears and her resentments. Ferdinand, she said, was the enemy
of the French, though he declared the contrary. Infantado was
very wicked; the priest Escoiquiz one of the most wicked; and
San Carlos, the most crafty of all, had received all that he had
from the King at the solicitation of the poor Prince of the Peace,
whom he called his relation. She had no other support than the
Grand Duke and the Emperor, those two sacred and incomparable
persons. . . But the Prince of the Peace made the burthen of every
letter. "Nothing interests us," she said, "but the safe condi-
tion of our only and innocent friend the Prince of the Peace, the
friend of the Grand Duke; even in his prison when he exclaimed
on the horrid treatment they were giving him, he called always
upon his friend the Grand Duke. Before this conspiracy he
wished for his arrival, and that he would deign to accept of his
house as a residence. . . He had presents to make him. . . We are
in constant fear of their killing or poisoning him. Let the
Grand Duke cause troops to go without telling why, and with-
out giving a moment of time to fire a pistol at him separate the
guard that is set over him, which has no other glory in view, no
other desire but to kill him, . . that innocent friend, so devoted
to the French, to the Grand Duke and the Emperor, the poor
Prince of the Peace. They heap crimes on this innocent Prince,
our common and only friend, to inflame the public the more,
and make them believe it is right to inflict on him all possible
infamy. Afterwards they will come to me; . . they will make his
head be cut off in public, and afterwards mine, for they say so. . .
He suffers because he is a friend of the Grand Duke, of the Em-
peror, and of the French: the Grand Duke and the Emperor are
they alone who can save him, and if he be not saved and given

to us, the King my husband and I will die." Every letter was filled with these anxious solicitations : of the throne there seemed to be neither care nor thought ; with the mob at Aranjuez before her eyes, and the recollection of Marie Antoinette in her heart, this wretched woman was sick of royalty ; she asked only an allowance for the King, herself, and Godoy, upon which they might live all three together, in a situation suiting their health ; . . a corner wherein they might quietly finish their days ; . . some place near France, to be within reach of help against the bloody hands of his enemies. Her feelings toward Ferdinand were not less strongly expressed than her attachment to Godoy. " My son," she says, " has a very bad heart : his character is bloody ; his counsellors are bloody ; they take pleasure only in making wretchedness, and his heart has no feeling for father or mother. He will make his enmity to the French appear when he thinks he can see occasion. . . I fear they will make some attempt against them ; . . the people are gained with money. When the Grand Duke shall have placed the poor Prince of the Peace in safety, let rather strong measures be taken, for otherwise intrigues will go on increasing, above all, against the poor friend of the Grand Duke and me ; and the King my husband is not secure."

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Charles's protest and his appeal to Buonaparte were concealed from Ferdinand, and the correspondence with Murat was carried on by means of the Queen of Etruria, who having witnessed all which had passed at Aranjuez, and being therefore a competent judge how far the abdication of her father was voluntary, took part decidedly against her brother. Murat's intention was to frighten him into the toils ; an alarm that should have made him start, would have ruined the plot. The interest which this Grand Duke affected for Godoy, his refusal to acknowledge the new government, and the respect which he paid to Charles, all tended to this end. The rumour of Buonaparte's coming

*The Infante
D. Carlos
sent to meet
Buonaparte*

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April.

Apr. 2.

*Ferdinand
is urged to
go and meet
the Em-
peror.*

was carefully spread abroad ; fresh couriers were said to have arrived : . . . the Emperor had left Paris, and might speedily be expected in Madrid. Packages came marked as his, his hat and his boots were shown, Murat gave minute directions concerning the Emperor's bath, and accepted a table of twenty covers for him, and another for his suite. Preparations were made for processions to do honour to the august visitor, and for balls at the Palace of the Buen Retiro. The soldiers were told that he would lose no time in putting himself at the head of his armies in Spain ; they were ordered to put themselves in a state to appear before him ; and in this proclamation, which appeared in a Madrid gazette extraordinary, the ominous notice was given, that they would immediately be supplied with cartridge. It was hinted that it would be a delicate compliment to the Emperor, if the Infante, Don Carlos, (Ferdinand's next brother,) would set off to receive him on the way. His highness, Murat said, could not fail to meet him before he had proceeded two days upon his road. This was readily agreed to, and the Infante, accompanied by the Duke del Infantado, departed upon this fatal journey. Having secured this victim, Murat endeavoured to entice Ferdinand himself into the snare : what had at first been hinted at, and advised as a mark of attentive consideration, was now pressed upon him as a thing of importance ; a measure which would be attended with the happiest consequences to himself and the kingdom. The young King hesitated ; it was more than courtesy required, more than an ally was entitled to expect, and perhaps he felt that it was more than a King of Spain ought to perform. Cevallos constantly advised him not to leave his capital till he had received certain intelligence that Buonaparte had passed the Pyrenees, and was approaching Madrid ; and even then he urged him to proceed so short a way, that it should not be necessary for him to sleep out of his capital more than a

single night. His advice prevailed for a time against the repeated solicitations of Murat and the ambassador Beauharnois. It became necessary, therefore, to introduce a new actor in this detestable plot.

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*The sword
of Francis
I. restored
to the
French.*

During the interval which elapsed before another agent could appear, Murat informed Cevallos, that the Emperor would be gratified if the sword of Francis I. were presented to him; and he desired that this might be intimated to the new King. It might be supposed that this was designed not merely to gratify the French nation, but also to lower Ferdinand in the opinion of the Spaniards, if Buonaparte and his agents had ever taken the nobler feelings of our nature into their calculation. But it was a mere trick for the Parisians; and neither they nor the tyrant himself felt that France was far more dishonoured by the circumstances under which the sword was recovered, than by the manner in which it had been lost. Accordingly this trophy of Pescara's victory, which had lain since the year 1525 in the royal armoury at Madrid, was carried in a silver basin, under a silken cloth laced and fringed with gold, to Murat's headquarters, in a coach and six, preceded by six running footmen, and under the charge of the superintendent of the arsenal; the grand equerry and the Duke del Parque following in a second equipage with the same state. A detachment of the guards escorted them, and the sword was presented by the Marquis of Astorga to Murat; he, it was said, having been brought up by the side of the Emperor, and in the same school, and illustrious for his military talents, was more worthy than any other person could be to be charged with so precious a deposit, and to transmit it into the hands of his Imperial Majesty. The people of Madrid passively beheld the surrender of this trophy; it was the act, however compulsory, of their lawful king, the king of their choice; the compulsion was neither avowed on the one

March 31.

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April.*Alarm of
the people.*

side, nor confessed on the other ; from the imputation of beholding it with indifference, they amply redeemed themselves. Murat, upon receiving it, pronounced a flattering eulogium upon the Spanish nation, . . . that nation which he was in the act of plundering, and which he came to betray and to enslave.

Apr. 3.

In spite of the patroles and rounds, and military government, the suspicions of the people began to manifest themselves more and more, and their poor Prince was compelled, while he concealed his own fears, to exert his authority for suppressing theirs. By a new edict, it was enacted, that no liquors should be sold after eight in the evening ; master-manufacturers and tradesmen were ordered to give notice to the police if any of their workmen or apprentices absented themselves from their work ; fathers of families were enjoined to keep their children and domestics from mixing with seditious assemblies, and to restrain them by good example, good advice, and the fear of punishment. The King, it was said, was grieved to perceive that the imprudence or malevolence of a few individuals attempted to disturb the good understanding between the people of Madrid and the troops of his intimate and august ally ; and, as this conduct arose, perhaps, from a ridiculous and groundless misapprehension of the intention of those troops who were quartered in that city, and in other parts of the kingdom, he affirmed, that his subjects ought to set aside every fear of that nature, for the intention of the French government accorded with his own ; and so far from concealing any hostile prospects, or the slightest invasion, had no other object than the great measures requisite against their common enemy. If, however, any person, after this declaration, should be rash enough, either by words or actions, to aim at disturbing the friendship between the two nations, the guilty would be most rigorously punished, without remission and without delay.

In thus attempting to quiet the just alarm of the people, Ferdinand's ministers affected a security which they were far from feeling. Murat had fixed his head-quarters in Godoy's house, within two hundred steps of the palace; not like a visitor or the representative of a friendly power, but as the general of an army with his staff, a numerous guard, and pieces of field artillery, evidently brought there rather for use than for parade. He had ten thousand men in the city, and forty thousand surrounding it, horse and foot, in perfect discipline, and provided with every thing, as if they were the next hour to take the field. Their communication with Bayonne was kept open by thirty thousand more, all of whom, if they were needed, might within a few days arrive to support the main body of the army: there was Junot with a force estimated at thirty thousand men in Portugal, ready to co-operate; while of the Spanish army the flower had been sent under Romana to the North, some were under the French orders in Italy; the rest under their power in Portugal; there remained three thousand troops in Madrid, and a single Swiss regiment in Toledo, of which the fidelity was suspected. The privy council, rather than that it might be said they had made the inquiry than for any hope of profiting by it, demanded from the minister of war, Olaguer Feliu, an account of the number of troops in Spain, and their present situation. His answer was, that neither he, nor those in his department, had been permitted to meddle with these things; Godoy was the only person who knew; but that he believed, according to the general opinion, that except the scanty garrisons in the sea-ports and at S. Roque, the few troops which remained in the Peninsula were in Portugal under Junot.

A thought of the safest course in this exigence seems to have passed across the mind of Escoiquiz, . . . that Ferdinand should escape from Madrid to Algeiras, where there were more troops

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April.

*Perplexity
of Fer-
dinand and
his mini-
sters.*

CHAP. IV. than in any other part of his dominions, and from whence he could always command a sure retreat to Gibraltar. But this thought was speedily dismissed; resistance was never seriously contemplated: perplexed and helpless as Ferdinand and his counsellors were, they willingly deceived themselves as to the impending danger, and there came at this time dispatches from Izquierdo, the favourite's agent at Paris, which contributed greatly to deceive them. These letters stated the result of his conferences since he returned from Aranjuez, with Duroc, the grand marshal of the imperial palace, and with Talleyrand. An arrangement, they said, between the French and Spanish governments, might arrest the course of events, and lead to a solemn and definitive treaty upon these bases: 1st, That there should be a perfect reciprocity of free commerce for French and Spaniards in their respective colonies; each granting to the other this privilege, to the exclusion of all other nations. 2ndly, Portugal being possessed by France, France necessarily required a military road to that country; and the continual passage of troops through Spain, to garrison it and defend it against England, would be a constant occasion of expense, of disputes, and unpleasant consequences, which might all be avoided, France giving the whole of Portugal to Spain, and receiving an equivalent in the Spanish provinces adjacent to her own empire. 3rdly, The succession of the throne must be regulated once for all: and, lastly, there must be an offensive and defensive alliance. Upon these grounds, the French negotiators said, an arrangement might be concluded which would terminate happily the actual crisis between France and Spain. Izquierdo remarked, in transmitting these propositions, that when the existence and honour of the state and the government were thus matter of discussion, the decision must come from the Sovereign and his council; nevertheless, that his ardent love for his country had

1808.

April.*Dispatches
from Iz-
quierdo.*

compelled him to make some observations to Talleyrand upon each of these points. Upon the first he had observed, that to open the commerce of the Spanish Americas to France was in reality to divide them with that power; and, moreover, that unless the pride of England were effectually beaten down, such a measure would render peace more distant than ever, while till peace was made, the communications of both countries with those colonies would be cut off. He added, that even if French commerce were permitted, French subjects could not be allowed to settle there in derogation of the fundamental laws. With regard to Portugal, he reminded Talleyrand of the secret treaty of Fontainebleau, the sacrifice of the King of Etruria, the little that Portugal was worth, if separated from its colonies, and its utter uselessness to Spain: then for the cession of the Pyrenean provinces, he had dwelt upon the horror which the loss of their laws, liberties, privileges, and language, would excite in the people, and their abhorrence at being transferred to a foreign power; adding, that as a Navarrese himself he never could sign a treaty for ceding Navarre to France, and by such an act draw upon himself the execration of his countrymen. But Izquierdo, who was but too well assured that the French government demanded in such negotiations as these nothing which it was not determined to obtain, qualified his objections by hinting, that if there were no other remedy, a new kingdom or viceroyalty of Iberia might be erected, and given to the King of Etruria, or some other Infante of Castille. In reply to the point of succession, he stated what the King had commanded him to say, and in a manner which he supposed would counteract whatever calumnies had been invented by the malignant in one country, and infected public opinion in the other: . . . these expressions probably allude to Charles's intention of withdrawing from the government, and to the reports that Godoy was seeking to set

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aside Ferdinand from his inheritance. Lastly, with something of a Spaniard's feeling, he asked Talleyrand if it was expected that Spain must be put upon a footing with the states of the Confederacy of the Rhine, and obliged to furnish her contingent, covering this tribute with the decorous name of a treaty offensive and defensive? Being at peace with France, she needed not the help of France against any other enemy, as Teneriffe, and Ferrol, and Buenos Ayres, might bear witness. Izquierdo added, in his dispatch, that the marriage was a thing determined; that there would be no difficulty as to the title of Emperor, which the King was to take; that he had been asked whether the royal family were going to Andalusia, and replied according to the truth, that he knew nothing of their intentions. He had in vain solicited that the French troops should evacuate Castille, and he requested that not a moment might be lost in replying to this communication, for the least delay in concluding an arrangement might produce fatal consequences.

The ministers deceived by these dispatches.

If these dispatches had been written for the purpose of deceiving those into whose hands they fell, they could not have been better adapted to that intent. Under Godoy the foreign minister knew as little concerning the state of foreign negotiations, as the minister at war knew of the state of the army; and when the bearer of these papers, finding the favourite in prison, delivered them to the new ministers, they thought they had now obtained an insight into the real cause of all the alarming movements of the French. Well might France think that demands so extravagant as these could only be obtained by force; and this would explain the seizure of the fortresses, and the advance of an army to Madrid. To men who had feared the whole evil which was intended, it was a relief to imagine that Buonaparte designed to take only the provinces beyond the Ebro, or perhaps only Navarre; propositions which would have roused the nation

to arms, were yet so far short of the danger they apprehended, that they contemplated the required cessions with something like complacency, and flattered themselves, that by a constant friendship toward France, and the feeling which the marriage would produce between the two courts, the terms might possibly be mitigated;...at all events, that by yielding for the present they should obtain the restitution of Barcelona and the other fortresses; and that what with the war which ere long must be renewed in the north, and the thousand chances to which the game of politics is subject, they should find opportunity when they had recovered strength, to throw off this temporary yoke.

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Such were their dreams when General Savary was announced as envoy from the Emperor, and demanded audience in that capacity. Of course it was immediately granted. At this audience he professed that he was sent merely to compliment Ferdinand, and to know whether his sentiments with respect to France were conformable to those of the King his father; if it were so, the Emperor would forego all consideration of what had passed; would in no degree interfere with the interior concerns of the kingdom; and would immediately recognize him as King of Spain and of the Indies. To this the most satisfactory answer was given. It neither was, nor could have been the intention of the Prince's party to offend France; the only hope which they had hitherto entertained of regenerating their government, had been by allying themselves with Buonaparte, and availing themselves of his power. One of the charges which were current against Godoy among the people, was that of a secret understanding with the English, and that he intended to deliver Ceuta into their hands, and fly with all his treasures under their protection. Nothing could be desired more flattering than the language of Savary during this audience; and he concluded it by asserting that the Emperor was already near

*Arrival of
General
Savary at
Madrid.*

CHAP. Bayonne, and on his way to Madrid. No sooner, however, had
 IV. this envoy left the audience-chamber, than he began, as if in his
 1808. individual capacity, to execute the real object of his mission. It
April. would be highly grateful and flattering to his Imperial Majesty,
 he said, if the King would meet him on the road ; and he asserted
 repeatedly, and in the most positive terms, that his arrival might
 be expected every hour.

*Ferdinand
 persuaded
 to go and
 meet Bu-
 naparte.*

The pressing instances of Savary upon this subject, while he repeatedly and positively asserted this falsehood, were accompanied with such intermixture of flattery and intimidating hints, as might best operate upon a man like Ferdinand placed in such circumstances. Murat failed not to enforce the same assurances, the same falsehoods, and the same menaces ; and the ministers therefore determined upon consenting to what they dared not refuse. The immediate fear before their eyes was that Buonaparte might espouse the cause of the father against the son, in which case the least evils to be apprehended were the renovation of the Escorial-cause, the disinheritance of the Prince, and for themselves that condign punishment which in that case they would not only suffer, but be thought to have deserved. They knew how vain it was to rely upon the popular favour, even if the people of Madrid had not been under the French bayonets ; it was but for Buonaparte to prevent the Queen from taking part in public business, and to remove Godoy from the government. Charles was not personally disliked, and his restoration would then be hailed with as much apparent joy as had lately been manifested for his deposal.

Apr. 8.

This resolution was made public by Ferdinand in the form of a communication to the president of the council. “ He had received,” he said, “ certain intelligence, that his faithful friend and mighty ally, the Emperor of the French and King of Italy, was already arrived at Bayonne, with the joyful and salutary

purpose of passing through this kingdom, to the great satisfaction of himself (the King), and to the great profit and advantage of his beloved subjects. It was becoming the close friendship between the two crowns, and the great character of the Emperor, that he should go to meet him; thus giving the most sure and sincere proofs of his sentiments, in order to preserve and renew the good harmony, confidential friendship, and salutary alliance which so happily subsisted, and ought to subsist between them. His absence could last only a few days, during which he expected, from the love and fidelity of his dear subjects, who had hitherto conducted themselves in so praiseworthy a manner, that they would continue to remain tranquil; that the good harmony between them and the French troops would still be maintained; and that those troops should be punctually supplied with every thing necessary for their maintenance." On the same day he appointed his uncle, the Infante Don Antonio, president of the high council of government, as well, it was said, on account of the ties of blood, as because of the distinguished qualities with which he was endowed, to transact all pressing and necessary business which might occur during his absence. In this decree he stated, that he should go to Burgos, evidently implying an intention at that time of not proceeding farther.

Deceived, or fain to act as if he were deceived himself, Ferdinand thought to deceive his father. He wrote to him, saying, that a good understanding subsisted between the Emperor and himself, as General Savary had testified; and for this reason he thought it fit that his father should give him a letter for the Emperor, to congratulate him on his arrival, and assure him that Ferdinand's sentiments toward him were the same as his own. Charles, in reply, ordered the messenger to be told, that he was gone to bed, . . . being determined not to write such a letter unless he were compelled to it, as he had been to the abdication. The

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IV.

1808.

April.

*Ferdinand
sets out
from Ma-
drid.*

CHAP. son, without any such testimonials, began, on the morning of
 IV. the 11th of April, his ill-omened journey. Savary, affecting
 1808. the most assiduous attention, solicited the honour of accompany-
April. ing him; . . he had just, he said, received information of the
 Emperor's approach, and it was not possible that they should
 proceed farther than Burgos before they met him. They reached
 Burgos, and Buonaparte was not there, neither were there any
 tidings of his drawing near. Savary, who had followed the
 young King in a separate carriage, urged him to proceed to
 Vittoria. Ferdinand hesitated; but the same protestations and
 urgent entreaties on the part of the French envoy, and the same
 anxiety and secret fear which had induced him to come thus far,
 made him again consent; yet so reluctantly, that the French-
 man, on their arrival at Vittoria, thinking it would be useless to
 renew his solicitations, left him there, and continued his jour-
 ney to Bayonne, there to arrange matters with his master for
 securing the prey, who was now already in the toils. At Vit-
 toria, Ferdinand received intelligence that Buonaparte had
 reached Bourdeaux, and was on his way to Bayonne. In con-
 sequence of this advice, the Infante Don Carlos, who had been
 waiting at Tolosa, proceeded to the latter place, whither the
 Emperor had invited him: he reached that city some days
 before him; and when this modern Cæsar Borgia arrived there,
 he found one victim in his power. It is said that Don Carlos
 soon discovered the views of Buonaparte; and, having com-
 municated his fears to one on whom he relied as a Spaniard,
 and a man of honour, drew up, with his advice, a letter to Fer-
 dinand, beseeching him, as he valued the independence of his
 country and his personal safety, not to proceed to Bayonne;
 but this person was in the tyrant's interest, and intercepted the
 messenger.

While Ferdinand, meantime, was chewing the cud of re-

flection at Vittoria, without those opiates of falsehood and flattery which Savary had continually administered, D. Mariano Luis de Urquijo waited upon him : one of the persons who had suffered under Godoy's administration, and who had hitherto been regarded as one of the most enlightened Spaniards, and truest friends of his country. The new King had annulled the proceedings against him, and he now came to offer his homage and his thanks, and his advice in this critical position of affairs. He told the King's counsellors that Buonaparte certainly intended to extinguish the dynasty of the Spanish Bourbons ; that the language of the *Moniteur* concerning the tumults at Aranjuez, the movement of his troops, the seizure of the fortresses, and the whole scheme of his policy, made this evident. Fearing and believing this, he asked them what they could propose to themselves from this journey ? how they could suffer a king of Spain thus publicly to degrade himself by going towards a foreign state without any formal invitation, without any preparations, without any of the etiquette which ought in such cases to be observed, and without having been recognized as King, for the French studiously called him still Prince of Asturias ? To these reasonable questions the poor perplexed ministers could only reply, that they should satisfy the ambition of the Emperor by some cessions of territory, and some commercial advantages. He made answer, that perhaps they might give him all Spain. The Duke del Infantado appeared to feel the force of Urquijo's remonstrances, but asked if it were possible that a hero like Napoleon could disgrace himself by such an action as this apprehended treachery. Urquijo answered, that both in ancient history and in their own they might find that great men had never scrupled at committing great crimes for great purposes, and posterity nevertheless accounted them heroes. The Duke observed, that all Europe, even France itself, would be shocked

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Urquijo's
advice to
Ferdinand
at Vittoria.

CHAP. at such an act ; and that Spain, with the help of England, might
IV. prove a formidable enemy. To this Urquijo replied, that Europe
1808. was too much exhausted to engage in new wars ; and that the
April separate interests and ambitious views of the different powers
prevailed with each of them more than a sense of the necessity
of making great sacrifices in order to destroy the system which
France had adopted since her fatal revolution. Austria was at
this time the only power capable of opposing Buonaparte, if
Spain should rise against him ; but if Russia and Germany and
the rest of Europe were on the opposite side, Austria would be
vanquished ; the Spanish navy would be destroyed, and Spain
would become nothing more than a theatre of war for the English
against the French ; in which, moreover, the English would
never expose themselves unless they had something to gain, for
England was not capable of making head against France in a
continental war : the end would be the desolation of Spain and
its conquest. As little reason was there to rely upon any dis-
gust which might be felt in France at the injustice of its Em-
peror. In France there was no other public spirit but what
received its impulse from the government. The French would
be flattered if their Emperor placed a member of his family on
the throne of Spain ; they would perceive in such a change
great political and commercial advantages to themselves ; and
the numerous classes who had a deep interest in the revolution,
all who had taken part in it, all who had grown up in its prin-
ciples, . . the men of letters, the Jews, and the protestants, would
regard with satisfaction an event which, by completing the de-
struction of the house of Bourbon, gave them a farther security
against the dreaded possibility of its restoration in France.
What then, he asked, was to be done ? Nothing could be hoped
from arming the nation ; the internal state of Spain rendered it
impossible to form a government capable of directing its force,

and popular commotions must in their nature be of short duration: an attempt of this kind would produce ruinous consequences in the Americas, where the inhabitants would wish to throw off a heavy yoke, and where England would assist in just revenge for the imprudence with which Spain had promoted the insurrection in her colonies. He advised therefore, as the only means which offered any hope of extricating the new King from the danger which awaited him, that he should escape from the French, in whose hands he already was in fact a prisoner. This might be done at midnight, through the window of one of the adjoining houses; the Alcaide of the city would provide means for conducting him into Aragon. Meantime Urquijo offered to go to Bayonne as ambassador, and make the best terms he could with the Emperor: a business so ill begun, so ill directed, and in every way so inauspicious, could not end well; but it might be expected, that when Napoleon saw the King had escaped the snare, and was in a situation where he could act for himself, he would find it prudent to change his plans.

These forcible representations were strengthened by D. Joseph Hervas, son of the Marquis de Almenara; he was the brother-in-law of General Duroc, and the intimate friend of Savary, with whom he had travelled from Paris. Through these connexions he had obtained, if not a certain knowledge of Buonaparte's intentions, such strong reasons for suspecting them, as amounted to little less; and he communicated his fears to Ferdinand's counsellors, and besought them, while it was yet possible, to save him from the snare. These warnings were in vain. But though Ferdinand's counsellors could not be made to apprehend the real danger, that poor Prince felt his first apprehensions return upon him with additional force; disappointed of seeing Buonaparte, disappointed of hearing from him, he compared this mortifying neglect with the conduct of Murat

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*Ferdinand
writes to
Buonaparte
from Vitoria.*

CHAP. and the ambassador, and as if to relieve his mind by complain-
IV. ing, wrote to the tyrant in a tone which confessed how entirely
1808. he was at his mercy. Elevated to the throne, he said, by the
April. free and spontaneous abdication of his august father, he could
Apr. 14. not see without real regret that the Grand Duke of Berg and
the French ambassador had not thought proper to felicitate him
as King of Spain, though the representatives of other courts
with which he had neither such intimate nor such dear relations,
had hastened so to do. Unable to attribute this to any thing
but the want of positive orders from his Imperial Majesty, he
now represented with all the sincerity of his heart, that from the
first moment of his reign he had never ceased to give the Em-
peror the most marked and unequivocal proofs of attachment
to his person ; that his first order had been to send back to the
army of Portugal the troops which had left it to approach Ma-
drid ; and his first care, notwithstanding the extreme penury of
the finances, to supply the French troops, making room for them
by withdrawing his own from the capital. . . He spoke of the
letters he had written, the protestations he had made, the de-
putations he had sent. "To this simple statement of facts," said
he, " your Majesty will permit me to add an expression of the
lively regret I feel in seeing myself deprived of any letters from
you, particularly after the frank and loyal answer which I gave
to the demand that General Savary came to make of me at
Madrid in your Majesty's name. That general assured me that
your Majesty only desired to know if my accession to the throne
would make any change in our political relations. I answered
by reiterating what I had already written, and willingly yielding
to this general's intreaties that I should come to meet your Ma-
jesty to accelerate the satisfaction of being personally acquainted
with you, I have in consequence come to my town of Vittoria,
without regarding the cares indispensable from a new reign,

which required my residence in the centre of my states. I therefore urgently intreat your Majesty to put an end to the painful situation to which I am reduced by your silence, and to relieve by a favourable answer the disquietude which too long an uncertainty may occasion in my faithful subjects."

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From this time Ferdinand had no longer to complain of Buonaparte's silence: an answer was brought to Vittoria by Savary. It began by acknowledging the receipt of that letter which the Prince had written respecting the projected marriage before the affair of the Escorial, and the receipt of which Buonaparte had formerly denied. "Your Highness," said he, (for the title of King was carefully withheld,) "will permit me, under the present circumstances, to address you with frankness and sincerity. I expected that, on my arrival at Madrid, I should have persuaded my illustrious friend to make some necessary reforms in his dominions, which would give considerable satisfaction to the public feeling. The removal of the Prince of the Peace appeared to me indispensable to his happiness and the interests of his people. I have frequently expressed my wishes that he should be removed; and, if I did not persevere in the application, it was on account of my friendship for King Charles, and a wish, if possible, not to see the weakness of his attachments. O wretchedness of human nature! imbecility and error! such is our lot. The events of the North retarded my journey, and the occurrences at Aranjuez supervened. I do not constitute myself judge of those events: but it is very dangerous for Kings to accustom their subjects to shed blood, and to take the administration of justice into their own hands. I pray God that your Highness may not one day find it so. It would not be conformable to the interests of Spain to proceed severely against a Prince who is united to one of the Royal Family, and has so long governed the kingdom. He has no longer any

*Buona-
parte's re-
ply.*

CHAP. friends ; as little will your Royal Highness find any, should you
IV. cease to be fortunate. . . The people eagerly avenge themselves
1808. for the homage which they pay us.”

April.

This was the language of one who felt that he held his power by no other tenure than that of force, and reconciled himself to that tenure by a base philosophy, . . . thinking ill of human nature because he could not think well of himself. What followed was more remarkable. “How,” said he, “could the Prince of the Peace be brought to trial without implicating the King and Queen in the process of exciting seditious passions, the result of which might be fatal to your crown? Your Royal Highness has no other right to it than what you derive from your mother. If the cause injures her honour, you destroy your own claims. Do not give ear to weak and perfidious counsels. You have no right to try the Prince ; his crimes, if any are imputed to him, merge in the prerogative of the crown. He may be banished from Spain, and I may offer him an asylum in France.”

With respect to the abdication, Buonaparte said, that, as that event had taken place when his armies were in Spain, it might appear in the eyes of Europe and of posterity as if he had sent them for the purpose of expelling a friend and ally from his throne. As a neighbouring sovereign, it became him, therefore, to inform himself of all the circumstances before he acknowledged the abdication. He added, “I declare to your Royal Highness, to the Spaniards, and to the whole world, that, if the abdication of King Charles be voluntary, and has not been forced upon him by the insurrection and tumults at Aranjuez, I have no difficulty in acknowledging your Royal Highness as King of Spain. I am therefore anxious to have some conversation with you on this subject. The circumspection which I have observed on this point ought to convince you of the sup-

port you will find in me, were it ever to happen that factions of any kind should disturb you on your throne. When King Charles informed me of the affair of the Escorial, it gave me the greatest pain, and I flatter myself that I contributed to its happy termination. Your Royal Highness is not altogether free from blame; of this the letter which you wrote to me, and which I have always wished to forget, is a sufficient proof. When you are King, you will know how sacred are the rights of the throne. Every application of an hereditary prince to a foreign sovereign is criminal." The proposed marriage, Buonaparte said, accorded, in his opinion, with the interests of his people; and he regarded it as a circumstance which would unite him by new ties to a house whose conduct he had had every reason to praise since he ascended the throne.

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A threat was then held out. . . "Your Highness ought to dread the consequences of popular commotions. It is possible that assassinations may be committed upon some stragglers of my army, but they would only lead to the ruin of Spain. I have learnt, with regret, that certain letters of the Captain-General of Catalonia have been circulated at Madrid, and that they have had the effect of exciting some irritation." After this menace, Buonaparte assured the young King that he had laid open the inmost sentiments of his heart, and that, under all circumstances, he should conduct himself towards him in the same manner as he had done towards the King his father; and he concluded with this hypocritical form, . . . "My Cousin, I pray God to take you into his high and holy keeping."

This letter might well have alarmed Ferdinand and his counsellors; but there came at the same time letters from the persons who had been sent forward to Bayonne, urging him to show no distrust of Buonaparte, but to hasten forward and meet him, as the sure and only means of averting the fatal effects of

*Ferdinand
advised to
proceed.*

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his displeasure, and securing his friendship. They had now indeed advanced too far to recede ; and their thoughts were rather exercised in seeking to justify to themselves the imprudence which they had already committed, than in devising how to remedy it. They persuaded themselves that Buonaparte was not ambitious of adding territory to the French empire ; that his conduct, even toward hostile powers, was marked by generosity and moderation ; and that his leading maxims of policy were, not wholly to despoil his enemies, but to aggrandize and reward his allies at their expense, and with what he took from them to form states more or less considerable for his relations, whose interest it would be to observe his system and support his empire. The instances of Holland and Naples might indeed seem not very well to agree with this view of his conduct ; but it was obvious, they said, that while Holland remained under a republican form it would unavoidably connive with England, and the Dutch themselves were desirous of the change ; and with regard to Naples, Napoleon could not possibly act otherwise than he had done, after the conduct of that court. Such was the miserable reasoning with which Ferdinand's advisers flattered themselves at the time, and which they have since offered to the world as their justification ; instead of fairly confessing, that in consequence of the events at Aranjuez they had placed themselves in a situation in which there was no alternative for men of their pitch of mind but to surrender at discretion to Buonaparte.

*Escoiquiz.
Idea Sen-
cilla, c. 3.*

*Promises of
Savary, and
prepara-
tions for
seizing
Ferdinand.*

All of them were not thus deluded. Cevallos would fain have gone no farther ; and the people of Vittoria, more quick-sighted than their Prince, besought him not to proceed. On the other hand, General Savary assured him with the most vehement protestations, as Murat had done before, that the Emperor did not wish to dismember Spain of a single village ; and he offered to pledge his life, that within a few minutes after his arrival at Bayonne

he would be recognized as King of Spain and the Indies. The Emperor, to preserve his own consistency, would begin by giving him the title of Highness ; but he would presently give him that of Majesty ; in three days every thing would be settled, and he might return to Spain. General Savary, if these persuasions had proved ineffectual, was prepared to use other methods not less congenial to his own character and his master's ; for not only were there troops in the neighbourhood of Vittoria surrounding this ill-fated Prince, to intercept his retreat, if he should attempt it ; but soldiers were ready that night to have seized him, and a French aide-de-camp was in the apartment waiting for the determination. Confused and terrified as Ferdinand was, and feeling himself in the power of the French, the only ease he could find was by endeavouring implicitly to believe their protestations of friendship. Accordingly the next morning he renewed his journey, though the people, finding their cries and intreaties were of no avail, even cut the traces of his coach, and led away his mules.

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Escoiquis,
41.

Apr. 19.

He proceeded, and crossed the stream which divides the two kingdoms. Scarcely had he set foot on the French territory, before he remarked, that no one came to receive him ; a neglect more striking, as he had travelled so far to meet the Emperor. At St. Jean de Luz, however, the mayor made his appearance, attended by the municipality. Too humble to be informed of Buonaparte's designs, and probably too honest to suspect them, he came to the carriage and addressed Ferdinand, expressing, in the most lively manner, the joy he felt at having the honour of being the first person to receive a sovereign, the friend and ally of France. Shortly afterwards he was met by the grandees, who had been sent to compliment the Emperor : their account was sufficiently discouraging ; but he was now near Bayonne, and it was too late to turn back. The Prince of Neufchatel

*Ferdinand
passes the
frontiers.*

CHAP. (Berthier) and Duroc, the marshal of the palace, came out to
 IV. meet him, and conduct him to the place which had been ap-
 1808. pointed for his residence, . . a place so little suitable to such a
April. guest, that he could not for a moment conceal from himself, that
 it marked an intentional disrespect. Before he had recovered
 from the ominous feeling which such a reception occasioned,
 Buonaparte, accompanied by some of his generals, paid him a
 visit. Ferdinand went down to the street door to receive him ;
 and they embraced with every appearance of friendship. The
 interview was short, and merely complimentary ; Buonaparte
 again embraced him at parting. The kiss of Judas Iscariot was
 not more treacherous than this imperial embrace.

*Buonaparte
 receives him
 with an em-
 brace.*

*Ferdinand
 is required
 to renounce
 the throne
 for himself
 and all his
 family.*

Ferdinand was not long suffered to remain uncertain of his
 fate. Buonaparte, as if to prove to the world the absolute cal-
 lousness of his heart, . . as if he derived an unnatural pleasure in
 acting the part of the deceiver, . . invited him to dinner, . . sent his
 carriage for him, . . came to the coach steps to receive him, . .
 again embraced him, and led him in by the hand. Ferdinand
 sate at the same table with him as a friend, a guest, and an ally ;
 and no sooner had he returned to his own residence, than Ge-
 neral Savary, the same man who, by persuasions and solemn pro-
 testations, had lured him on from Madrid, came to inform him
 of the Emperor's irrevocable determination, that the Bourbon
 dynasty should no longer reign in Spain ; that it was to be suc-
 ceeded by the Buonapartes ; and therefore, Ferdinand was re-
 quired, in his own name, and that of all his family, to renounce
 the crown of Spain and of the Indies in their favour.

*Conversa-
 tion between
 Buonaparte
 and Escoi-
 quiz.*

On the following evening Escoiquiz was summoned to Buo-
 naparte's cabinet in the Palace of Marrac, which had been built
 as a residence for the Queen-dowager, Mariana of Neuburg,
 widow of that poor prince Charles II. A curious conversa-
 tion ensued. The Corsican began by saying, that from the

character which he had heard of this canon, he had long wished to talk with him respecting Ferdinand. "All Europe," said he, "has its eyes upon us. My armies being at this time in Spain, it will be believed that the violent proceedings at Aranjuez, which have given to all courts the evil example of a son conspiring against his father and dethroning him, were my work. I must avoid this imputation, and make the world see that I am not capable of supporting an attempt equally unjust and scandalous. Consequently I could never consent to acknowledge Prince Ferdinand as King of Spain, unless his father, who has sent in a formal protest against the pretended abdication, should in full liberty renew that abdication in his favour. But on the other hand, the interests of my empire require that the house of Bourbon, which I must ever regard as the implacable enemy of mine, should no longer reign in Spain. This is your interest also ; rid of a dynasty whose latter kings have caused all those evils by which the nation is so exasperated, it will enjoy a better constitution under a new race ; and being by these means intimately connected with France, it will be always secure of the friendship of the only power whose enmity could endanger it. Charles himself, knowing the inability of his sons to hold the reins of government in times so difficult, is ready to cede to me his own rights and those of his family. I will therefore no longer suffer the Bourbon family to reign ; but for the esteem which I bear toward Ferdinand, who with so much confidence has come to visit me, I will recompense him and his brothers as far as possible for what my political interests require that they should lose in their own country. Let him cede all his claims to the crown of Spain, and I will give him that of Etruria, in full sovereignty for himself and his heirs male in perpetuity, and advance him as a donation a year's revenue of that state, to establish himself in it. I will give him also my niece in marriage. If this pro-

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CHAP. position be accepted, the treaty shall immediately be made with
 IV. all solemnities ; but if not, I will then treat with the father, and
 1808. neither the Prince nor his brothers shall be admitted as parties,
 April. nor can they expect the slightest compensation. To the Spanish
 nation I shall secure their independence and total integrity under
 the new dynasty, with the preservation of their religion, laws,
 and customs ; for I want nothing for myself from Spain, not
 even a village. If your Prince does not like this proposal, and
 chooses to return to Spain, he is free ! he may go when he
 pleases ! but he and I must fix a time for his journey, after
 which hostilities shall commence between us."

Escoiquiz replied to this extraordinary speech by entering into an elaborate apology for the transactions at Aranjuez, to which Buonaparte listened with great patience, observing only from time to time, that however these arguments might appear to those persons who were intimately acquainted with the character of Charles and his Queen, it must ever be impossible to make the rest of the world believe that an abdication made under such circumstances of public and notorious force, was in any thing different from a deposal. But be that as it might, the interests of his house and of his empire required that the Bourbons should no longer reign in Spain ; and then, Escoiquiz says, taking him by the ear, and pulling it with the best humour in the world, he added, " If all which you say were true, canon, I should still repeat . . bad policy. Exposed as I am every moment to a renewal of the war in the north, I should never have my back secure while the Bourbons occupied that throne ; and Spain, with a man of talent at its head, could give me the greatest annoyance." The canon again entered into a long reply, showing how completely the court of Spain had abandoned the Bourbons of France and of Naples, imputing the wish to join with Prussia wholly to Godoy, and observing that

a marriage into the august imperial family would secure the attachment of Ferdinand. All Europe, he said, had fixed their eyes upon Bayonne; the Spaniards were looking with inconceivable impatience for the return of their young and beloved monarch, flattering themselves that Buonaparte would be to him both as father and mother, . . . for it had been Ferdinand's fate only to know his parents by the unnatural hatred which they had borne towards him. There would be no bounds to their gratitude, if, according to his imperial promise, he should honour the capital with his presence, bringing back with him the young King. The whole nation would receive him on their knees, would bless him, and would never forget his goodness; and Spain, thus restored to strength, would become a more efficient ally to France than she had ever yet been, and afford her the only means for reducing England to reason. But if the Emperor persisted in his present intentions the Spaniards would vow an inextinguishable hatred against him. Experience might show how deeply such feelings took root in the Spanish heart. An age had now elapsed since the war of the succession, and yet the rancour which had then been felt in Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia, against the Bourbon family, against France, and even against the Castillians, had never been wholly allayed till the recent accession of Ferdinand. But if this feeling had arisen in a question merely of doubtful right, what would it be if the people saw themselves deprived of a King whom they adored, to have a stranger set over them in his place? The Spaniards must be exterminated before such a King could be established upon his throne.

To this Buonaparte replied, that he was assured of the only power which could give him any uneasiness; the Emperor of Russia, to whom he had imparted his plans at Tilsit, having approved of, and given his word not to oppose them. As for

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CHAP. the Spaniards themselves, they would make little or no opposi-
IV. tion. The nobles and the rich would certainly remain quiet for
1808. fear of losing their property, and would exert all their influence
April. to quiet the people. The clergy and the friars, whom he would
make responsible for any disorder, would for their own sake,
and for the like motives, do the same. The populace might
excite tumults here and there, but a few severe chastisements
would make them return to their duty. Countries in which
there were many friars were easily subdued; . . he had had ex-
perience of this: and if the opposition were general, the result
must be the same, even if it should be necessary to sacrifice
200,000 men. Escoiquiz made answer, that in that case the
new dynasty would be placed upon a volcano; . . 200,000 or
300,000 men would be required to keep the provinces down,
and the Monarch would reign in the midst of carcasses and
ruins, over a race of indignant slaves, ready upon the slightest
occasion to break their chains. And of what utility would such
an alliance prove? Spain, ruined, deserted, and deprived of
her colonies, would become a burden to France. Buonaparte
upon this observed, that the canon was proceeding too fast in
taking it for granted that Spain would lose her colonies: he
on his part had well-founded hopes of preserving them. “Do
not suppose,” said he, “that I have been sleeping. I have
communications with Spanish America, and have sent frigates
to those coasts to maintain them.” Escoiquiz replied, that
America even now was held by no other bond than the slight
thread of habit; the least disgust, even under Ferdinand himself,
would break the connexion, and beyond all doubt the whole of
the colonies would separate themselves from the mother country
rather than acknowledge the new dynasty. What too would be
the effect of such a measure upon the European powers, and
how might England be expected to act? Would not England

regard it as the most favourable of all events? would it not at once open the whole commerce of America to her, and with the treasure from thence derived, enable her to purchase all the people of Europe, and arm them against France: and even to stir up domestic movements against the Emperor, which would be yet more perilous, for money was the most powerful of engines? Buonaparte then put an end to the conference by observing that they did not agree in the principles upon which they reasoned; that he would think again upon the matter, and on the morrow communicate his irrevocable determination.

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On the morrow accordingly Escoiquiz was again summoned, and the irrevocable determination was announced that the Bourbon dynasty must cease to reign upon the Spanish throne: that if Ferdinand would accede to the proposed exchange, Etruria should be given him; but that if he refused, the King his father would make the cession, Etruria would remain annexed to France, and he would lose all compensation. Escoiquiz, after touching again upon his yesterday's argument, began to lament the disgrace which would fall upon the advisers of Ferdinand, and especially upon himself as being supposed to have most influence with him. For even, he said, if it should be known that the Prince, before he consulted them, had determined upon this journey, and yielding to the solicitations of the ambassador had given his word to set out, the nation would always accuse them for not having dissuaded him from it. Buonaparte seems in these conferences to have considered Escoiquiz not as a statesman, but as a good easy man of letters, whom a little flattery would win to his wishes. He argued with him therefore in the same temper as on the preceding day; and giving him another pull by the ear, said to him at last with a smile, "So then, canon, you will not enter into my ideas." The canon replied, "On the contrary, I wish with all my heart that

Second conference with Escoiquiz.

CHAP. your Majesty would enter into mine, . . though it should be at
 IV. the cost of my ears,"—for the Emperor was pulling there some-
 1808. what too forcibly.

April.

*Cevallos is
 required to
 discuss the
 terms of re-
 nunciation
 with M.
 Champagny*

But Buonaparte, when he found that Ferdinand was not to be cajoled into the cession, laid by the semblance of these gracious manners, and proceeded in the temper of a tyrant to effect the usurpation which he had begun. Cevallos was now summoned to the palace, to discuss the terms of the renunciation with the French minister for foreign affairs, M. Champagny. The Spaniard assumed a firm and manly tone; he complained of the perfidy which had been practised, protested in Ferdinand's name against the violence done to his person, in not permitting him to return to Spain; and, as a final answer to the Emperor's demand, declared that the King neither could nor would renounce his crown; he could not prejudice the individuals of his own family, who were called to the succession by the fundamental laws of the kingdom; still less could he consent to the establishment of another dynasty, it being the right of the Spanish nation to elect another family whenever the present should become extinct.

M. Champagny replied, by insisting on the necessity of the renunciation, and contending that the abdication of the father-king had not been voluntary. Of this assertion, which was as ill-timed as it was irrelevant, Cevallos readily availed himself, expressing his surprise that, while they condemned the abdication of Charles, as not having been his own free act, they, at the same time, were endeavouring to extort a renunciation from Ferdinand. He then entered into details designed to prove that no violence had been done to the father-king, either by the people, the prince, or any other person, and that he had retired from government by his own unbiassed will. But Cevallos protested against acknowledging the smallest authority in the Em-

peror to intermeddle with matters which exclusively belonged to the Spanish government ; following, he said, in this respect, the example of the cabinet of Paris, which rejected, as inadmissible, the applications of the King of Spain in behalf of his ally and kinsman Louis XVI. It was of little consequence that Ferdinand's minister triumphed in argument. M. Champagny abruptly turned the subject, by saying that the Emperor never could be sure of Spain while it was governed by the Bourbon dynasty ; for that family must necessarily regret to see its elder branch expelled from France. Cevallos answered, that, in a regular system of things, family prepossessions never prevailed over political interests, of which the whole conduct of Charles IV. since the treaty of Basle, was a proof. Every reason of policy induced Spain to maintain a perpetual peace with France, and there were reasons why the continuance of that system was not of less importance to the Emperor. The generosity and loyalty of the Spaniards were proverbial ; from that loyalty they had submitted to the caprices of despotism ; and the same principle, if they saw their independence and the security of their sovereign violated, would call forth their well-known valour. If so atrocious an insult were committed, France would lose the most faithful and useful of her allies ; and the Emperor, by the artifices with which he entrapped the King to Bayonne, in order there to despoil him of his crown, would have so effectually stained his own character, that no confidence hereafter could be placed in treaties with him ; and war with him could be concluded by no other means than that of total destruction and extermination.

Buonaparte was listening to this conference. He lost patience now, and ordering Cevallos into his own cabinet, the violence of his temper broke out. He called that minister traitor, for continuing to serve the son in the same situation

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Buonaparte's declaration to Cevallos.

CHAP. which he had held under the father ; he accused him of having
 IV. maintained, in an official interview with General Moutheon,
 1808. that Ferdinand's right to the crown stood in no need of his re-
April. cognition, though it might be necessary to the continuance of
 his relations with France : and he reproached him still more
 angrily for having said to a foreign minister at Madrid, that,
 if the French army offered any violation to the integrity and
 independence of the Spanish sovereignty, 300,000 men would
 convince them that a brave and generous nation was not to be
 insulted with impunity. The tyrant then entered upon the
 business of the renunciation, which he was determined should
 be made ; and finding that Cevallos still insisted upon the rights
 of his master, the reigning dynasty, and the people of Spain, he
 concluded the conversation by these remarkable and charac-
 teristic words : " I have a system of policy of my own. You ought
 to adopt more liberal ideas ; to be less susceptible on the point
 of honour ; and not sacrifice the prosperity of Spain to the
 interest of the Bourbon family."

*Terms pro-
 posed to
 Escoiquiz.*

Having found Cevallos so little inclined to yield, Ferdinand
 was informed that he must appoint another person to carry on
 the negotiation. While he was deliberating whom to choose,
 one of the French agents insinuated himself into the confidence
 of Escoiquiz, and persuaded him to pay a visit to Champagny,
 from whom he received the propositions of Buonaparte in
 writing. These, which were to be considered as the tyrant's
 definitive demands, from which he would not recede, and which
 were the most favourable he would grant, declared his irre-
 vocable determination that the Bourbon dynasty should no
 longer reign in Spain, and that one of his brothers should pos-
 sess the throne. The complete integrity of that kingdom and
 all its colonies was to be guaranteed, together with the preserva-
 tion of religion and property. If Ferdinand agreed to renounce

his rights in his own name, and that of his family, the crown of Etruria should be conferred upon him according to the Salic law; and the Emperor's niece be given him in marriage immediately, if he chose to demand her, upon the execution of the treaty. If he refused, he should remain without compensation, and the Emperor would carry his purposes into effect by force.

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Escoiquiz was of opinion that Ferdinand would do well to yield to a force which he could not resist, and save what he could from the wreck. He argued that it was their business to mitigate the evil as far as possible, saving always the honour of the King and the interests of Spain; and that as Ferdinand was yet but a youth, he might hope, in some of those changes which are incident to human affairs, to regain what he now lost. The cession which was demanded would be palpably invalid, and would not prevent the Spanish nation from making any exertions which their loyalty and spirit might prompt. By accepting Etruria, he would secure to himself the kingly title and kingly treatment from Buonaparte; for though he would certainly be detained in France as long as Spain resisted, still it would be with all outward marks of honour; he would be kept like a slave in fetters of gold, not imprisoned in some castle where misery and ill-treatment would put an end to him and his brothers. If Spain should make a successful stand, by the help of England, which might be expected, and perhaps that of other powers also, Etruria would be always something in possession, the exchange of which would facilitate his return to his lawful throne; but if unhappily, after all efforts, Spain should succumb in the strife, her disherited princes would still remain with an honourable and princely asylum. It was moreover especially to be considered, that if Ferdinand refused to treat with the Emperor Napoleon, and cede his rights as King of Spain, the cession would beyond all doubt be made by his father, and Ferdinand would then be

*Debates
among Fer-
dinand's
counsellors.*

CHAP. dealt with in the character of an undutiful and rebellious son.

IV.

1808.

April.

These arguments did not prevail; the majority of Ferdinand's advisers, notwithstanding all that had passed, could not be persuaded that Buonaparte meant seriously to depose him; they continued to believe that all these measures were only designed to extort a cession of territory, and that if Ferdinand continued firm in his refusal, he need not sacrifice the provinces on the left of the Ebro, nor even Navarre, but that some of the colonies would suffice. They urged this persuasion so strongly, that Escoiquiz, without altering his own opinion, assented to theirs. But all these discussions were made known to Buonaparte by one of their own number, who was sold to the tyrant.

*Labrador
appointed
to treat
with M.
Champagny*

Apr. 27.

Ferdinand therefore now invested Don Pedro de Labrador, honorary counsellor of state, in whose talents he had great reliance, with full powers, instructing him to present them to the French minister for foreign affairs, and to demand his full powers in return, that the proposals of Buonaparte might be communicated in an authentic manner. The instructions given him, which were drawn up by Cevallos, were to ask M. Champagny if King Ferdinand were at full liberty? for if he was, he would return to his dominions, and there give audience to the plenipotentiary whom the Emperor might depute: if he were not, all acts at Bayonne were nugatory, and could have no other effect than to stain the reputation of Buonaparte before the whole world. Ferdinand, he was charged to say, was resolved not to yield to the Emperor's demands: neither his own honour, nor his duty to his subjects, permitting him. He could not compel them to accept of the Buonaparte dynasty, much less could he deprive them of their right to elect another family to the throne, when the reigning one should be extinct. It was not less repugnant to his feelings to accept of the throne of Etruria as a compensation; that country belonged to its lawful sove-

reign, whom he would not wrong, and he was contented with the kingdom which providence had given him. CHAP.
IV.

When Labrador presented his powers, and required the usual return, M. Champagny replied, these things were mere matters of form, and wholly unconnected with the essential object of which they were to treat. Buonaparte, indeed, had determined to force from Ferdinand the form of a voluntary renunciation, but he and his ministers considered all other forms as useless. The Frenchman proceeded to talk of the propositions: Labrador declared he could discuss no subject till the previous formalities had been observed; and asked if the King were at liberty? M. Champagny made answer, undoubtedly he was. Then, said the Spaniard, he ought to be restored to his kingdom. But M. Champagny replied, that, with respect to his return, it was necessary he should come to a right understanding with the Emperor, either personally or by letter. Already, Ferdinand had had sufficient reason to feel himself a prisoner; this language was such as could leave no doubt. But that the violence might be apparent and notorious, Cevallos addressed a note to the French minister of state, saying, that the King had left Madrid with the intention of meeting the Emperor at Burgos, on the assurances which the Grand Duke of Berg, the ambassador Beauharnois, and General Savary, had given of his approach; and that, in consequence of the agitation of the public mind in Spain, it was impossible to answer longer for the tranquillity of the people, especially as they were apprized that their King had now been six days at Bayonne. He had, in the most solemn manner, promised them on his departure that he would speedily return. This, therefore, he was about to do; he now made known his intentions, that they might be communicated to the Emperor, whose approbation they would doubtless meet; and he should be ready to treat, in his dominions, on all con-

1808.

*April.**Ferdinand
is prevented
from re-
turning.**Apr. 28.*

CHAP. venient subjects, with any person whom it might please his Imperial Majesty to authorize. No answer was returned to this
 IV. dispatc; but the spies within the palace and the guards without
 1808. were doubled. A guard at the door even ordered the King and
April. his brother one night to retire to their apartments. Ferdinand's mind was not yet so subdued to his fortunes as to brook this insult. He complained bitterly of it; and the governor in consequence soothed him with courteous language, and expressed his disapprobation of such conduct. The act, however, was repeated; and, not choosing to expose himself a third time to insults, which he had no means of resenting, he abstained from going out.

*Buonaparte
sends for
Charles and
the Queen
to Bayonne.*

Buonaparte had expected that Ferdinand would more easily be intimidated into compliance; in that case he would have recognized the validity of the father's abdication; which, in fact, he did virtually acknowledge, while treating with the son for his renunciation. He now found it necessary to alter his plan of proceedings, and ordered Murat to send off Charles and the Queen as expeditiously as possible to Bayonne. There was no danger of exciting any popular commotion by removing them; but the deliverance of Godoy was also to be effected; and artifice must be employed for this, unless he resorted immediately to force, which it was his purpose to avoid till the whole of the royal family were in his hands. The release of the fallen favourite had been requested of Ferdinand during his stay at Vittoria. He replied, that he had promised his people to publish the result of a process, on which the honour of many of his subjects, and the preservation of the rights of the crown, depended. Throughout the whole extent of Spain, he said, there was not a single district, however small, which had not addressed complaints to the throne against that prisoner: the joy at his arrest had been general, and all eyes were fixed upon the pro-

ceedings. Nevertheless, he gave his royal word, that, if, after a full examination of the case, Godoy should be condemned to death, he would remit that punishment in consequence of the Emperor's interposition. At the time when Ferdinand returned this answer to Buonaparte, he received advices from the Junta of government that Murat had required them to release Godoy; threatening, if they refused, to deliver him by force, and put his guards to the sword if they offered the slightest resistance. They were informed, in reply, of the answer which had been sent to Bayonne, and were instructed to tell the Grand Duke, if he renewed his applications, that the business was in treaty between the two sovereigns, and that the result depended exclusively on the decision of the King.

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1808.
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The French have at all times had less public faith than any other nation in Europe; but whether under their old monarchy, their democracy, or the absolute tyranny in which that democracy had its natural end, they have effectually protected their agents and partizans in other countries. Godoy had been the creature of France, and Buonaparte was resolved to save him: he treated, therefore, the letter of Ferdinand with contempt; and, having recourse to direct falsehood, sent information to Murat, that the Prince of Asturias had put the prisoner entirely at his disposal, and ordered him to demand and obtain the surrender of his person. A note was accordingly delivered to the Junta, in Murat's name, by General Belliard, demanding the prisoner. This, he said, was only a new proof of the interest which the Emperor took in the welfare of Spain; for his Imperial Majesty could not recognize as King any other than Charles IV.; and, by removing the Prince of the Peace, he wished to deprive malevolence itself of the possible belief, that that monarch would ever restore him to confidence and power. One member of the government, Don Francisco Gil, protested against yielding to

Godoy released by Murat, and sent to Bayonne.

Apr. 20.

CHAP. the demand, because it was not authorized by Ferdinand their
 IV. King: the others deemed it wiser to submit, and the Infante
 1808. D. Antonio declared, that it depended upon their compliance
 April. in this point whether his nephew should be King of Spain. The
Memoria de Marquis de Castellar, therefore, to whose custody Godoy had
Avanza y been committed, was instructed to deliver him up, and he was
O'Farrel, removed by night. Had the people been aware that this mi-
p. 25. nister was thus to be conveyed away from their vengeance, that
 indignation which soon afterwards burst out would probably
 have manifested itself now, and Godoy would have perished by
 their hands. He was immediately sent under a strong escort
 to Bayonne.

*He is re-
 instated as
 Charles's
 minister.*

In obtaining the release of this wretch, Buonaparte had probably no other view at the time, than of preserving that uniform system of protection towards his agents, which pride as well as policy dictated. But when he found his designs unexpectedly impeded by the firmness which Ferdinand and his counsellors then displayed, he perceived that Godoy might yet be useful; and when Charles arrived at Bayonne, the favourite was restored to him, and reinstated as minister, that he might, by a last act of office, consummate his own infamy, and complete the destruction of the dynasty which had raised him, and the country which had given him birth. Willing to be revenged on Ferdinand, and now also hating Spain, Godoy, who had hitherto seconded the projects of Buonaparte, because he was duped by the hopes of aggrandizement, now forwarded them with equal eagerness for the sake of vengeance. It was necessary that Charles should be induced to treat his son as an enemy, a rebel, and a traitor; and that, while he punished him as such for having accepted his abdication, he should be made to resume the crown, solely for the purpose of transferring it to a stranger; and that stranger one from whose treacherous and

unprovoked aggressions he himself but a few weeks before had attempted to fly to America, abandoning his kingdom. To this resolution, monstrous as it was, the unhappy King was brought ; nor was compulsion needful ; the ascendancy of the favourite was sufficient to make him fancy it his own act and deed. Fear might have extorted the renunciation ; but the manner in which he personally treated his son sprung evidently from his own feelings, thus exasperated.

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April.

Ferdinand had now only to choose between degradation and destruction. He made, however, one effort in behalf of himself and of Spain, and addressed his father in a letter not less dignified than respectful, in which he at the same time asserted his right to the crown, and his readiness to restore it. The King, he said, had admitted that the proceedings at Aranjuez were in no degree occasioned or influenced by him ; and had told him, that the abdication had been voluntary, and that it was the happiest act of his life. He still declared, that it was an act of his own free-will ; but professed that it had been made with the mental reservation of a right to resume the crown whenever he thought proper ; and now he reclaimed it, avowing at the same time, that he would neither return to the throne nor to Spain. The fundamental laws of the kingdom conferred the crown upon himself, he said, upon his father's free resignation of it. His father had freely resigned ; and yet now reclaimed his power, without any intention of retaining it. Here, then, he required an act of duty which the son could not perform, without violating the duty which he owed to his subjects. But both might be reconciled ; and Ferdinand would willingly restore the crown to his father, on condition, 1. That they both returned to Madrid ; 2. That a Cortes should be assembled there ; or, if Charles objected to so numerous a body, that all the tribunals and deputies of the kingdom should be convoked ; 3. That the

Ferdinand's proposals to his father.

May 1.

CHAP. renunciation should be executed in due form, in the presence of
 IV. the council, and the motives stated which induced him to make
 1808. it: these, Ferdinand said, were the love which he bore to his
May. subjects, and his anxiety to secure their tranquillity, and save
 them from the horrors of a civil war; 4. That the King should
 not be accompanied by individuals who had justly excited the
 hatred of the whole nation; and, 5. That, if the King persisted in
 his present intention, neither to reign in person nor return to
 Spain, Ferdinand should govern in his name: "there is no
 one," said he, "who can have a claim to be preferred before
 me. I am summoned thereto by the laws, the wishes, and the
 love of my people, and no one can take more zealous and
 bounden interest in their welfare."

*Letter from
 Charles to
 his son.
 May 2.*

In the answer to this letter, the dictation, as well as the purposes of Buonaparte, is apparent. Charles began, by declaring, that Spain could be saved by the Emperor alone. Since the peace of Basle, he had seen that the essential interests of his people were inseparably connected with the preservation of a good understanding with France; and he had spared no sacrifices to preserve it. Spain had been forced by the aggression of England into the war, and having suffered more by it than any other state, the consequent calamities had been unjustly attributed to his ministers; nevertheless, he had the happiness of seeing the kingdom tranquil within, and was the only one among the Kings of Europe, who sustained himself amid the storms of these latter times. That tranquillity Ferdinand had disturbed: misled by the aversion of his first wife towards France, he thoughtlessly participated in the prejudices which prevailed against the minister and his parents. "It became necessary for me," said Charles, "to recollect my own rights, as a father and a King. I caused you to be arrested; . . . I found among your papers the proof of your crime. But I melted at seeing my son on the

scaffold of destruction. I forgave you ; and, from that moment, was compelled to add to the distresses which I felt for the calamities of my subjects, the afflictions occasioned by dissensions in my own family."

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The part which followed must have been designed by Buonaparte to conceal the manifest proofs of his own hand, which appear in the rest of the letter. The Emperor of France, it was here said, believing that the Spaniards were disposed to renounce his alliance, and seeing the discord that prevailed in the royal family, inundated the Spanish provinces with his troops, under various pretences. While they occupied the right bank of the Ebro, and appeared to aim only at maintaining the communication with Portugal, the King was not alarmed ; but when they advanced towards the capital, then he felt it necessary to collect his army round his person, that he might present himself, in a manner becoming his rank, before his august ally . . all whose doubts he should have removed. For this purpose, his troops were ordered to leave Portugal and Madrid, not that he might abandon his subjects, but that he might support with honour the glory of the throne. Sufficient experience had also convinced him, that the Emperor of the French might entertain wishes conformable to his particular interest, and to the policy of the vast system of the continent, which might be inconsistent with the interests of the Spanish Bourbons. Ferdinand availed himself of these circumstances, to accomplish the conspiracy of the Escorial. Old, and oppressed by infirmity, his father was not able to withstand this new calamity ; . . he repaired, therefore, to Buonaparte, not as a King, not at the head of his troops, not with the pomp of royalty, but as an unhappy and abandoned prince, who sought refuge and protection in his camp. To that Emperor he was indebted for his own life, and for the lives of the Queen, and of the minister whom he had appointed and

CHAP. adopted into his family. Every thing now depended upon that
IV. great monarch. "My heart," said Charles, "has been fully
1808. unfolded to him. He knows the injuries I have received, and
May. the violence which has been done me ; . . he has declared that you
shall never be acknowledged as King ; and that the enemy of his
father can never acquire the confidence of foreign states. He
has, in addition to this, shown me letters written with your own
hand, which clearly prove your hatred of France.

"Things being thus situated," he continued, "my rights are clear, and my duties are much more so. It is incumbent upon me to prevent the shedding the blood of my subjects ; to do nothing at the conclusion of my career, which should carry fire and sword into every part of Spain, and reduce it to the most horrible misery. If, faithful to your primary obligations, and to the feelings of nature, you had rejected perfidious counsels, and placed yourself constantly at my side, for the defence of your father ; if you had waited the regular course of nature, which would have elevated you in a few years to the rank of royalty, I should have been able to conciliate the policy and interests of Spain, with those of all. For six months, no doubt, matters have been in a critical situation ; but notwithstanding such difficulties, I should have obtained the support of my subjects. I should have availed myself of the weak means which yet remained to me, of the moral aid which I should have acquired, meeting always my ally with suitable dignity, to whom I never gave cause of complaint ; and an arrangement would have been made which would have accommodated the interests of my subjects with those of my family. But in tearing from my head the crown, you have not preserved it for yourself ; you have taken from it all that is august and sacred in the eyes of mankind. Your behaviour with respect to me . . your intercepted letters, have put a brazen barrier between yourself and

the throne of Spain ; and it is neither your own interest, nor that of the country, that you should reign in it. Take heed how you kindle a fire which will unavoidably cause your complete ruin, and the degradation of Spain ! I am King by the right derived from my forefathers ; my abdication was the result of force ; I have nothing to receive from you ; nor can I consent to the convocation of the Cortes . . an additional absurdity, suggested by the inexperienced persons who attend you. I have reigned for the happiness of my subjects, and I do not wish to bequeath them civil war, mutiny, popular Juntas, and revolution. Every thing ought to be done for the people, and nothing by the people : to forget this maxim, were to become an accomplice in all the crimes that must follow its neglect. I have sacrificed the whole of my life to my people ; and in the advanced age to which I have arrived, I shall do nothing in opposition to their religion, their tranquillity, and their happiness. I have reigned for them ; I will constantly occupy myself for their sakes ; I will forget all my sacrifices ; and when at last I shall be convinced that the religion of Spain, the integrity of her provinces, her independence, and her privileges are preserved, I shall descend to the tomb, forgiving those who have embittered the last years of my life."

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However suspicious were the circumstances under which the decree of abdication appeared, the probabilities that that decree was obtained by compulsion were not in the slightest degree strengthened by the testimony of Charles at Bayonne, where he was in far stricter duress, and far greater danger, than at Aranjuez. But, in every line of this letter, the language of Buonaparte may be recognized : his dread and hatred of popular assemblies . . the tone and manner of his philosophy . . his perpetual reference to force, as that to which all things must bow ; and there is one of those direct, plain, palpable, demonstrable

CHAP. falsehoods, of which no other man, who ever affected greatness,
 IV. so often and so impudently availed himself. If Ferdinand
 1808. originally intended to supplant his father, it was by the help of
 May. France that he hoped to effect it. The only act of conspiracy
 proved against him and his party was, that they had attempted
 to form such an alliance. For this very act, Buonaparte, in his
 letter to Vittoria, had censured him; and yet, one reason here
 assigned for depriving him of the crown, is his hatred of France.

May 4.
 Ferdinand's
 reply.

Ferdinand's answer to this extraordinary paper was, like
 his former letter, honourable to himself and his advisers. He
 calmly reminded his father of the inconsistencies in the charges
 thus adduced against him. Concerning the affair of the Escorial,
 he said, eleven counsellors, chosen by the King himself, had
 unanimously declared their opinion, that there was no ground for
 the accusation; nor could such an opinion have been obtained by
 undue means, wholly without influence as he was at that time,
 and virtually a prisoner. The King spoke of the distrust occa-
 sioned by the entrance of so great a foreign force into Spain: . .
 might he be told, that no alarm need have been given by troops
 entering as friends and allies? He said, that his own troops were
 collected at Aranjuez to support the glory of the throne: . . might
 he be reminded, that he had given orders for a journey to Seville,
 and the troops were intended to keep open that road? Every
 person believed there was an intention of emigrating to America,
 manifest as it was that the royal family were going to the coast
 of Andalusia; and it was this universal belief which occasioned
 the tumults at Aranjuez. In those tumults, the King knew that
 his son had taken no other part than by his own command, to
 protect from the people the object of their hatred, who was
 believed to be the proposer of the journey. The Emperor, in
 a letter to Ferdinand, had said, his motive was to induce the
 King to make certain reforms, and separate from his person the

Prince of the Peace, whose influence was the cause of every calamity. The universal joy which his arrest produced throughout the whole nation, evidently proved that this was indeed the case. As to the rest, Charles himself was the best witness that, in the tumults at Aranjuez, not a word was whispered against him, nor against any one of the royal family : . . on the contrary, he was applauded with the greatest demonstrations of joy, and heard the loudest professions of fidelity to his august person. On this account, the abdication surprised every one, and no person more than Ferdinand himself. No one expected, or would have solicited it. . . . "Your Majesty," said Ferdinand, "yourself communicated your abdication to your ministers, enjoining them to acknowledge me as their natural lord and sovereign. You communicated it verbally to the diplomatic body, professing that your determination proceeded from your own will, and that you had before determined upon it. You yourself told it to your beloved brother, adding, at the same time, that the signature which your Majesty had put to the act of abdication was the happiest transaction of your life; and, finally, your Majesty told me personally, three days afterwards, I should pay no attention to any assertion that the abdication had not been voluntary, inasmuch as it was in every respect free and self-originating."

He proceeded to comment upon the charge of his hatred towards France. Wherein had it appeared? Were not the various letters which, immediately after the abdication, he addressed to the Emperor, so many proofs that his principles, with respect to the relations of friendship and strict alliance happily subsisting between the two countries, were those that the King had impressed upon him? Had he not shown his unbounded confidence in the Emperor, by going to Madrid the day after the Grand Duke of Berg had entered that city with a great part of

CHAP. his army, and garrisoned it ; so that, in fact, to go there, was to
 IV. deliver himself into his hands ? Had he not, in conformity to
 1808. the principles of alliance, and to his father's wish, written to
May. request a princess of the house of Buonaparte in marriage ?
 Had he not sent a deputation to Bayonne to compliment the
 Emperor in his name ? then persuaded his brother the Infante
 Don Carlos to set off, that he might pay his respects to him on
 the frontier ? lastly, had he not left Madrid for the same pur-
 pose himself, on the faith of the assurances given him by the
 French ambassador, by the Grand Duke, and by General Sa-
 vary, who had just arrived from France, and who solicited an
 audience, to tell him that the Emperor only expected he should
 follow the same system towards France which his father had
 adopted, in which case he was to be acknowledged as King of
 Spain, and all the rest would be forgotten ? How any of his
 letters, proving an enmity towards France, should have come
 into the Emperor's hands, he could not comprehend, knowing,
 as he did, that he had never written any.

*Terms upon
 which he
 offers to
 restore the
 crown.*

Ferdinand then referred to his former proposals. “ I signi-
 fied,” said he, “ my willingness to renounce the crown in your
 favour, when the Cortes should be convened ; and if not con-
 vened, when the council and deputies of the kingdom should be
 assembled ; not because I thought this was necessary to give
 effect to the renunciation, but because I judged it convenient to
 avoid injurious novelties, which frequently occasion divisions and
 contentions, and wished every thing might be attended to which
 concerned your dignity, my own honour, and the tranquillity of
 the realm. If your Majesty should not choose to reign in person,
 I will govern in your royal name, or in my own ; for no one
 but myself can represent your person, possessing, as I do, in my
 favour, the decision of the laws, and the will of the people ; nor
 can any other person have so much interest in their prosperity.

I repeat again, that, in such circumstances, and under such conditions, I am ready to accompany your Majesty to Spain, there to make my abdication in the form expressed. But in respect to what you have said of not wishing to return to Spain, with tears in my eyes, I implore you, by all that is most sacred in heaven and earth, that in case you do not choose to re-ascend the throne, you will not leave a country so long known to you, in which you may choose a situation best suited to your injured health, and where you may enjoy greater comforts and tranquillity of mind than in any other.

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“ Finally, I beg your Majesty most affectionately, that you will seriously consider your situation, and that you will reflect on the evil of excluding our dynasty for ever from the throne of Spain, and substituting in its room the imperial family of France. It is a step which we cannot take without the express consent of all the individuals who have, or may have, a right to the crown; much less without an equally-expressed consent of the Spanish people, assembled in Cortes in a place of security; and besides, being now in a foreign country, it would be impossible for us to persuade any one that we acted freely; and this consideration alone would annul whatever we might do, and might produce the most fatal consequences. Before I conclude, your Majesty will permit me to say, that the counsellors whom you call perfidious, have never advised me to derogate from the love, respect, and honour, which I have always professed to your Majesty, whose valuable life I pray God to preserve to a happy and good old age.”

On the day after this letter was written, Buonaparte had an hour's conference with Charles; at the conclusion of which, Ferdinand was called in by his father, to hear, in the presence of this tyrant, and of the Queen, expressions, says Cevallos, so

*May 3.
Interview
between
Charles and
Ferdinand
in presence
of Buona-
parte.*

CHAP. disgusting* and humiliating, that I do not dare to record them.
 IV. While all the rest were seated, he was kept standing, and his
 1808. father ordered him to make an absolute renunciation of the
 May. crown, under pain of being treated as an usurper, and a con-
 spirator against the lives of his parents. His household also
 were threatened to be proceeded against as men guilty of treason.
 Overcome by the sense of their danger, and of his own, the poor
 pitiable Prince submitted, and delivered in a renunciation,
 couched in such terms as at once to imply compulsion, and
 reserve the condition of his father's return to Spain. "His
 former renunciation," he said, "he had believed himself bound
 to modify with such conditions as were equally required by the
 respect due to the King, the tranquillity of his dominions, and
 the preservation of his own honour. These modifications, to
 his great astonishment, had excited indignation in the King,
 who, without any other grounds, had thought proper, in the
 presence of Buonaparte and*of his mother, to revile him with

May 6.
*Ferdi-
 nand's re-
 nunciation.*

* These bitter expressions of the father have never transpired, and this very concealment seems to confirm what all other circumstances render probable, that his abdication at Aranjuez was produced by fear and compulsion. The Queen is said (with an effrontery scarcely credible even when the greatest criminality derives boldness from the highest rank) to have told her son in the presence of the King her husband that he had no right to the crown, for that Charles was not his father. Buonaparte, in his letter to Ferdinand, had indirectly told him he was the child of an adulterous intercourse: and it is more probable that this story of the Queen's avowal should have been invented and promulgated by him or his agents, for the sake of blackening the royal family, and weakening the popularity of Ferdinand, by destroying his hereditary right, than that so flagitious a declaration should really have been made. I know not whether there be likeness enough of family features to disprove the aspersion of his spurious birth, but I am sure, that in conduct and temper Ferdinand has sufficiently proved himself a Spanish Bourbon.

the most humiliating appellations, and to require from him an unconditional renunciation, on pain of being treated, with all those of his council, like a traitor. "Under these circumstances," said he, "I make the renunciation which your Majesty commands, that you may return to the government of Spain in the same state as when you made your voluntary abdication in my favour."

CHAP.
IV.
1808.
May.

Ferdinand was not aware, when he executed this form of renunciation, that his father was no longer qualified to receive it. The tyrant had not waited for this preliminary to conclude his mock negotiations with Charles. This wretched puppet addressed an edict on the 4th to the supreme Junta at Madrid, nominating Murat lieutenant-general of the kingdom, and in that quality, president of the government: the reason assigned was, that one same direction might be given to all the forces of Spain, in order to maintain the security of property and public tranquillity against enemies, as well exterior as interior. All persons, therefore, were enjoined to obey the Grand Duke's orders. A proclamation to the people accompanied this edict. They were told that their King was occupied in concerting with his ally the Emperor whatever concerned their welfare, and they were warned against listening to perfidious men, who sought to arm them against the French, and the French against them. All those who spoke against France were said to be men who thirsted for the blood of the Spaniards, enemies of that nation, or agents of England, whose intrigues would involve the loss of the colonies, the separation of provinces, and a series of years of calamity for the country. "Trust to my experience," said this poor mouthpiece of a perfidious and remorseless tyrant; "and obey that authority which I hold from God and my fathers! Follow my example, and think that, in your present situation, there is no prosperity or safety for the Spaniards, but in the friendship of the great Emperor, our ally." On the same day,

Proclamation of Charles to the Spaniards.

CHAP. Charles addressed a letter to the supreme council of Castille and
 IV. the council of Inquisition, informing them, that having resolved,
 1808. in the present extraordinary circumstances, to give a new proof
 May. of affection towards his beloved subjects, he had abdicated all
 claims upon the Spanish kingdoms, in favour of his friend and
 ally, the Emperor of the French. The treaty of resignation, he
 said, stipulated for the integrity and independence of those king-
 doms, and the preservation of the Catholic faith, not only as the
 predominant, but as the sole and exclusive religion in Spain.
 The councils were ordered to make every exertion in support of
 the Emperor, and, above all, with their utmost care to preserve
 the country from insurrections and tumults.

May 5.
 Charles
 cedes his
 rights to
 Buonaparte

The preamble to the treaty of resignation stated, that the
 object of the two contracting princes was to save Spain from the
 convulsions of civil and foreign war, and to place it in the only
 position, which, under its present extraordinary circumstances,
 could maintain its integrity, guarantee its colonies, and enable
 it to unite all its means to those of France, for the purpose of
 obtaining a maritime peace. By the first article, Charles ceded
 all his rights to the throne of Spain and the Indies, having only
 had in view, he said, during his whole life, the happiness of his
 subjects, and constantly adhering to the principle, that all the
 acts of the sovereign ought to be directed to that object solely.
 This cession was represented as the only means which could re-
 establish order; and it was covenanted, 1. that it took place
 only on condition that the integrity of the Spanish kingdom
 should be maintained; that the prince whom it might please the
 Emperor to place on the throne should be independent; and
 that the limits of Spain were to undergo no alteration: 2. that
 the Catholic, Apostolic, and Roman religion, should be the only
 one in Spain; no reformed religion should be tolerated, still
 less should infidelity: these things were to be prevented or

punished according to the established usage. 3. All property confiscated since the revolution at Aranjuez should be restored ; and all decrees which had been passed against the friends of Charles were declared null and void. 4. Charles having thus secured the prosperity, the integrity, and the independence of his kingdom, (such was the monstrous language of this convention!) the Emperor engaged to grant an asylum in his states to him, the Queen, the Prince of the Peace, and such of their servants as might choose to follow them, who should enjoy in France a rank equivalent to that which they possessed in Spain. 5, 6, 7, 8. The palace of Compeigne, with its parks and forests, should be at the disposal of King Charles during his life, and a civil list of 80,000,000 *reales* should be paid him in monthly payments : after his death the Queen should have a revenue of 2,000,000 for her dowry. An annual rent of 400,000 *livres* should be granted to each of the Infantes, in perpetuity, reverting from one branch to another, in case of the extinction of one, according to the civil law, and to the crown of France, in case of the extinction of all the branches. It was to be understood that this civil list and these rents were to be looked for exclusively from the treasury of France. The Infantes were, however, by a subsequent article, to continue to enjoy the revenues of their commanderies in Spain. 9, 10. The Castle of Chambord, with its parks, forests, and farms, was given by the Emperor to King Charles, in full property, being in exchange for all the allodial and particular property appertaining to the crown of Spain, but possessed personally. . . This convention was signed by General Duroc, grand master of the palace, on the part of Buonaparte, and on the part of Charles by Godoy, under his titles, Spanish and Portugeze, of Prince de la Paz, and Count of Evora-monte. Thus did this man, the last and worst of that

CHAP.
IV.
1808.
May.

CHAP. succession of favourites who have been the curse of Spain, consummate his own crimes, and, as far as in him lay, the total
 IV. degradation of his country; rejoicing probably in the vengeance
 1808. which he was taking upon a nation by whom he was so righteously abhorred. Having done his work, he passed on into France, to live out the remainder of his days, neglected and despised, and to leave behind him a name more infamous than any in Spanish history. One proclamation more was issued in the name of Charles, calling upon all his former subjects to concur in carrying into effect the dispositions of his "dear friend the Emperor Napoleon," and exhorting them to avoid popular commotions, the effect of which could only be havoc, the destruction of families, and the ruin of all.

Ferdinand threatened by Buonaparte.

Ferdinand had hitherto renounced his right in reference to his father only. A farther renunciation was demanded from him: it was not tamely yielded; and in his last conference with him upon the subject, Buonaparte bade him choose between cession and death. He was informed that he might return to Spain, and that a convoy of French soldiers should escort him to any part of the Peninsula which he might choose. But he was also told, that France would immediately make war upon him, and never suffer him to reign; for it was the duty of the Emperor to maintain the rights of his crown, and those which had been ceded to him by Charles, and to destroy the projects of the partizans of England.

His act of renunciation.

That Ferdinand should at length have yielded, is not to be severely condemned; it is rather to be admired that he should have resisted so long. Even had he been of a more heroic frame, than his family and education were likely to produce, imprisonment, and death, by some dark agency, were all he could expect from farther opposition. Thus intimidated, he authorized

Escoiquiz to treat with Duroc for the surrender of his own rights, and those of his brothers and his uncle Don Antonio, who had now been sent from Madrid, rather as prisoners, than in any other character. The preamble declared, that the Emperor of the French and the Prince of Asturias having differences to regulate, had agreed to these terms: 1. That Ferdinand acceded to the cession made by his father, and renounced, as far as might be necessary, the rights accruing to him as Prince of Asturias. 2. The title of royal highness, with all the honours and prerogatives which the Princes of the Blood enjoyed, should be granted to him in France: his descendants should inherit the titles of Prince and Serene Highness, and hold the same rank as the prince-dignitaries of the empire. 3, 4. The palaces, parks, and farms of Navarre, with 50,000 acres of the woods dependent on them, should be given to him, free from incumbrance, in full property for ever; and pass, in default of his heirs, to those of his brother and uncle, in succession: and the title of Prince should be conferred, by letters patent and particular, upon the collateral heir to whom this property might revert. 5, 6. Four hundred thousand *livres* of appanage on the treasury of France, payable in equal monthly portions, should be settled on him, with reversion, in like manner, to the Infantes, and their posterity; and a life-rent of 600,000 should be given the Prince, the half remaining to the Princess, his consort, if he left one to survive him. 7. The same rank and titles should be assigned to the Infantes and their descendants as to the Prince; they should continue to enjoy the revenues of their commanderies in Spain, (as had been agreed in the convention with Charles,) and an appanage of 400,000 *livres*, (as also there stipulated,) should be settled on them in perpetuity, with reversion to the issue of Ferdinand. No mention was made in the treaty of the

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IV.

1808.

May.

May 10.

CHAP. Queen of Etruria and her son, a boy of eight years old, who,
IV. by the doubly-villainous treaty of Fontainebleau, was to have
1808. been made King of Northern Lusitania. Involved in the
May. common ruin of their house, they also had been escorted to
Bayonne; and the whole of this unhappy family, now that the
mockery of negotiation was at an end, were sent into the in-
terior of France.

CHAPTER V.

INSURRECTION AND MILITARY MURDERS AT MADRID. SUBMISSION OF THE CONSTITUTED AUTHORITIES TO THE PLEASURE OF BUONAPARTE. ASSEMBLY OF NOTABLES CONVOKED BY HIM AT BAYONNE.

THUS had Buonaparte succeeded in dispossessing the Bourbon dynasty of the throne of Spain. Having, under pretence of a treaty, secured the passes of the Pyrenees, seized the three strong places upon the frontier, and the important city of Barcelona, marched his armies into the heart of the kingdom, and occupied the capital itself, he had now drawn the royal family within his reach, serpent-like, by the fascination of fear, and compelled them to sign the act of their abdication and disgrace. The train of perfidy whereby he had thus far accomplished his purpose is unexampled even in the worst ages of history. The whole transaction was a business of pure unmingled treachery, unprovoked, unextenuated, equally detestable in its motive, its means, and its end. The pretext that there existed an English party in Spain was notoriously false. Those Spaniards who felt and lamented the decline of their country, had rested their hopes of its regeneration upon him. There was not any possible way by which he could so surely have confirmed the alliance between France and Spain, secured the affection of the Spanish people, and strengthened his own immediate individual interest, (if the vulgarest ambition had not blinded him,) as by connecting his own family with the royal house in marriage, in conformity with

1808.
April.

CHAP. Ferdinand's desire, and directing him and his ministers how to
 V. bring about those reforms which would restore to health and
 1808. strength a country that was still sound at heart. No other
April. mortal has ever in any crisis of the world had it in his power to
 produce such great and extensive good as this opportunity in-
 vited, without risk, effort, evil, or any contingent inconvenience.
 He had only to say, let these things be, and the work of pro-
 gressive reformation would have begun in Spain and in the
 Spanish Indies, while he, like a presiding deity, might have
 looked on, and have received the blessings of both countries for
 his benignant influence.

*Conduct of
 Murat to-
 wards the
 Junta of
 government.*

The artifices which he had employed were of the basest kind. Never perhaps had any plot of perfidious ambition been so coarsely planned. His scheme was to use falsehood and violence without remorse; to repeat protestations enough for deceiving the Prince, and employ force enough for intimidating the people. The former object had been accomplished . . . and Murat, perceiving a spirit in the Spaniards which neither he nor his master had expected, was looking for an * opportunity to effect the latter. His measures, as soon as he entered Madrid, were intended to make them understand that they were no longer an independent nation, but that they must learn obedience to a military yoke. A French governor of the city had been appointed, a French patrol established, and notice was given that every house would be called upon to contribute great coats for the French troops, their own not having arrived. The Junta of government were made to feel the misery of their degrading and helpless situation ; a situation

* “ *Les observateurs de sang-froid, Français et Espagnols, voyaient une crise s'approcher, et la voyaient avec plaisir. Sans une leçon severe il étoit impossible de ramener à des idées de raison cette multitude égarée.*”—*Moniteur.*

in which they were compelled to witness and sanction the most grievous injuries and the most intolerable insults to their country. While Ferdinand was at Vittoria, Murat sent for the war-minister O'Farrill, to complain to him that some of the French soldiers had been * murdered, that the people of Madrid openly manifested their dislike of the French, that the guards displayed a similar disposition, that an hundred thousand muskets had been collected in Aragon, and that Solano had not received the promised instructions to put himself under Junot's command. O'Farrill vindicated the Junta from these accusations, some of which were groundless, and others arose from causes over which they had no control; but Murat cut him short, told him he had received orders from the Emperor to acknowledge no other sovereign in Spain than Charles IV. and put into his hands a proclamation in the name of that King, declaring that his abdication had been compulsory, and requiring again from his subjects that obedience which they owed to him

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* It was reported that a decree was passed for seizing the church plate, and raising a heavy contribution, as had been done in Portugal. A poor ignorant Spaniard, believing this, bought a razor, and sallying out with it, attacked every Frenchman he met. The man was soon secured. Upon his examination he was asked if the razor was his; yes, he replied, by this token, that he had bought it at such a place for five and thirty quartos. Had the French whom he had assaulted and cut, offered him any injury?... No... For what reason then had he attacked them?... That he might kill them, and as many more Frenchmen as he could; these villains were come to plunder the temples of the living God, and to rob the people of the fruit of their labours, and he had supposed that every honest man would do the same as himself, but he found himself alone when he began. The author of the "Manifiesto Imparcial y Exacto" relates this anecdote, and adds, *En Roma y en Grecia este hombre hubiera parecido bien en la lista de los Horacios y de los trescientos. ; En Madrid estaba destinado a un suplicio!* In any country such a man would either have been put to death like a wild beast, or confined as a madman: but the fact, and still more the manner in which it is related, shows the feeling of the Spaniards towards their treacherous invaders,

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as their lawful monarch. O'Farrill replied, that none of the constituted authorities would obey the proclamation, and still less would the nation: then, said Murat, the cannon and the bayonet shall make them. But he appeared to hesitate in his resolution of immediately publishing and enforcing it, when the Spanish minister represented to him that the fate of Spain did not necessarily depend upon that of Madrid, nor the Spanish monarchy upon that of Spain; and that it never could be good policy for the Emperor to act in a manner so suitable to the wishes of the English. The result of the conference was, that the Junta agreed to receive King Charles's reclamation, to forward it to Ferdinand from whom they held their authority, and await his answer. Before that answer could arrive, Charles and the Queen were summoned to Bayonne.

*The Junta
apply to
Ferdinand
for instruc-
tions as to
resisting
the French.*

From the time when Ferdinand began his inauspicious journey, Cevallos had every night dispatched an account of their proceedings to the Junta; after his arrival at Bayonne it was soon found that his couriers were intercepted. Cevallos complained to M. Champagny, and was told in reply, that as the Emperor acknowledged no other King than Charles IV. he could not admit in his dominions any act in the nature of a passport given by Ferdinand; but the letters which, for this reason, had been detained, had been put into the French post-office, and would be safely delivered, as would any others which he might think proper to send either by the ordinary post or the French courier. Cevallos therefore from that time sent duplicates of his dispatches by various conveyances, and succeeded in informing the Junta that Ferdinand was actually a prisoner, and in conveying an order to them from Ferdinand, whereby they were enjoined to do whatever they deemed expedient for the service of the King and the kingdom, and authorized to act with as full power as if he himself were on the

spot. Nothing could be more intelligible than such an order. Nevertheless, such was the timidity of the better members, and the faithlessness of others, that instead of acting upon it, they dispatched two confidential persons to inquire of Ferdinand whether he would empower them to transfer their authority to certain other persons, whom he should nominate, who, in case the Junta should be completely under constraint, might remove to some place where they could act at freedom? whether it was his will that hostilities should be commenced, and when, and how? whether they should prevent the entrance of more French troops by closing the passes of the Pyrenees? and whether he thought it advisable to convoke a Cortes, addressing a decree for that purpose either to the Council, or to any Chancery or Audience in the kingdom, which might be free from the control of the French? If the Cortes were to be assembled, they asked likewise what subjects it should proceed to discuss?

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April.

Public affairs, in the most momentous times, have often been conducted with a degree of folly seldom discovered in the management of private concerns; and this folly has so effectually done the work of treason, that it has sometimes been mistaken for it. But it is scarcely possible even upon this plea to excuse the Junta. When every hour was of importance, they dispatched a messenger four hundred miles to ask Ferdinand's opinion upon points, on every one of which he would have asked theirs had he been in Madrid; all which they were better able to determine than he could be, and on which, in fact, he required that information which they possessed. When it is considered how preposterous it was to propose that the passes should be closed while the French commanded them, and how perfectly they must have known that Ferdinand was in no condition to plan the opening of a campaign, a suspicion may well be entertained of the sincerity of the persons who propounded

*Absurdity
of their
conduct.*

CHAP. such questions. Shrinking from responsibility, and appalled
 V. at danger, they referred every thing to Ferdinand, and suffered
 1808. events to take their course. Meantime, if their own statement
April. on such a point may be received, they secretly prepared orders
 for the Spanish troops to leave Madrid, even by dispersing, or
 by encouraging their desertion, if there should be no other way;
 for assembling soldiers at appointed places, collecting stores and
 ammunition, destroying the means of transport near the fortresses
 and cantonments which the enemy occupied, and spoiling the
 arms and artillery which could not be secured. Such orders
 were certainly not in accord with the feelings of the men who
 say that they prepared them: but they would have accorded
 entirely with the spirit of the nation. From the time of Fer-
 dinand's departure, the anxiety and agitation of the people in
 Madrid had hourly increased. They knew that he expected to
 meet Buonaparte at Burgos, and the tidings that he had passed
 the frontier, and proceeded to Bayonne, excited in them as much
 alarm as wonder. Every evening an extraordinary courier ar-
 rived from that city; the intelligence which he brought was never
 published in the Gazette, but circulated as extracts from pri-
 vate correspondence: the first account detailed nothing but the
 honours with which Ferdinand had been received by the Em-
 peror; subsequent ones were each more unsatisfactory than the
 last; and the intentions of the tyrant became more and more
 apparent, till it could no longer be doubted that Ferdinand was
 to be deprived of his crown.

*Agitation
 of the pub-
 lic mind.*

*Orders for
 sending the
 Queen of
 Etruria
 and the In-
 fante Don
 Francisco
 to Bayonne.*

On the last day of April, Murat presented to the Infante Don Antonio a letter from his brother King Charles, requiring him to send off to Bayonne the Queen of Etruria * with her children,

* One of the falsehoods published officially in the *Moniteur* concerning these transactions was, that the Queen of Etruria and the Infante Don Francisco solicited and

and the Infante Don Francisco de Paula, Ferdinand's youngest brother, . . the other was already in the snare. The Junta were assembled at the time, and proposed to make the demand known to Ferdinand, and await his pleasure ; but Murat replied, that this was unnecessary ; the Queen of Etruria was her own mistress, and Don Francisco being a minor, was bound to obey his father. The Junta then said they would consult the Queen, who might certainly go if she were so pleased, but to the departure of the young Infante they could not consent. The Queen of Etruria will be remembered hereafter among those high-born sufferers whose strange and undeserved afflictions are recorded as examples of the instability of fortune. Her only desire was to return to Tuscany ; but she loved her parents, and declared herself ready to obey their summons without hesitation, not expecting farther perfidy from Buonaparte, even after the perfidious manner in which she had been despoiled. With regard to the Infante, the Junta were informed by Murat that he must go also, or force would be used to make him. These poor pageants of authority summoned to their assistance in this new perplexity the chief persons of all the different councils, and held a meeting that night, less with the hope of coming to any salutary and dignified determination, than for the sake of finding in the exposure of their own helplessness, an excuse to themselves and others for passive submission. One person proposed, that if force were employed to remove the Infante, it should be resisted, and O'Farrill was then called upon to relate what means of resistance could be calculated upon. He entered into a

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The Junta deliberate concerning the Infante.

obtained permission to go to Bayonne, because of the insults to which they were every day exposed, . . and this is so worded as to make it appear that it was the people who insulted them.

CHAP. V. mournful statement. There were 25,000 French in, and immediately about Madrid, and they occupied the Buen Retiro and the heights of the Casa del Campo, which were the strongest positions; besides this force they had 10,000 men in Aranjuez, Toledo, and at the Escorial. The Spanish troops in Madrid were only 3000, and the people were unarmed and had never been disciplined in any militia service; therefore to attempt resistance would be to deliver up the city to be sacked. The effect of this representation, which might have dismayed firmer hearts than those to which it was addressed, was strengthened by the opportune arrival that night of D. Justo Maria de Ibar Navarro, whom Ferdinand had dispatched to apprise the Junta of his situation, and his resolution not to accede to any thing incompatible with the dignity of the throne, and with his own just rights; but while the event was undecided, he charged them carefully to preserve a good understanding with the French, and to avoid any thing which might increase his difficulties and even his personal danger. They agreed upon the necessity of observing these instructions, glad that they were thus instructed to do nothing, where they were incapable of perceiving what they ought to do.

*Agitation of
the people
of Madrid.
May 1.*

The courier who was expected on that evening did not arrive. Great multitudes assembled the next day at the Puerta del Sol, and in the streets near the post-office, anxiously waiting for the news which he would bring. During the whole day it was apparent that some dreadful crisis was coming on. The French made an ostentatious display of their troops and their artillery, and on the part of the Spaniards the ordinary duties and diversions of the Sabbath seemed to be suspended in the general agitation that prevailed. Nothing was concerted among them; no one knew what was to be done, nor what was to be hoped, but that some great calamity might be looked for; and

every man read in the manner and countenance of others an apprehension and a feeling of indignation like his own. Murat appeared in the streets at noon, and was received with hisses and outcries. Evening came, and the courier was not arrived. The French garrison were under arms all that night, and their commanders, "cool spectators of these things," according to their own relation, saw the crisis approaching, and saw it with pleasure. The following morning had been fixed for the departure of the Queen of Etruria and the Infante D. Francisco de Paula, and many persons, chiefly women, collected before the Palace to see them set off. Among the many rumours, true and false, with which the city was filled, it was reported that the Infante D. Antonio had been ordered by Murat to join his brother and nephew at Bayonne, and leave him to act as regent during his absence; that the Infante had refused to obey, and that in consequence of his refusal Murat had recalled some troops to Madrid which had been ordered to a different station, intending to seize the Infante, and assume the government. Enough had transpired to make this report probable: one of the carriages which drove up to the gate was said to be for D. Antonio; and some of the populace, being determined that the last of the royal family should not be taken from them without resistance, and that one especially who had been left to represent the King, cut the traces, and forced it back into the yard. Being however assured that D. Antonio was not to leave Madrid, they permitted it again to be yoked and brought out. This occasioned so much stir that Murat sent an aide-de-camp to inquire into the cause; the people were disposed to treat him roughly, but some Spanish officers interfered and rescued him from their hands. The carriages, with the Queen of Etruria and her children, and her brother D. Francisco, then set out; the latter, a lad of fourteen, is said to have wept bitterly, and to have manifested the fear

CHAP.
V.

1808.

May.*May 2.
Departure
of the
Queen and
the Infante.*

CHAP. and reluctance with which he undertook the journey. Men are
 V. never so easily provoked to anger as when their compassion is
 1808. excited. Just at this time, while their hearts were full, the aide-
 May. de-camp whom they had maltreated returned with a party of
 soldiers, and a scene of bloodshed presently began, . . in what
 manner never will be known.

*Insurrec-
 tion of the
 people.*

The indignation and hatred of the Spaniards, which had so long been repressed, now broke forth. As fast as the alarm spread, every man of the lower ranks who could arm himself with any kind of weapon, ran to attack the French. There is no other instance upon record of an attempt so brave and so utterly hopeless, when all the circumstances are considered. The Spanish troops were locked up in their barracks, and prevented from assisting their countrymen. Many of the French were massacred before they could collect and bring their force to act: but what could the people effect against so great a military force, prepared for such an insurrection, and eager, the leaders from political, the men from personal feelings, to strike a blow which should overawe the Spaniards and make themselves be respected? The French poured into the city from all sides, their flying artillery was brought up, in some places the cavalry charged the populace, in others the streets were cleared by repeated discharges of grape-shot. The great street of Alcala, the Puerta del Sol, and the great square, were the chief scenes of slaughter. In the latter the people withstood several charges, and the officer who commanded the French had two horses killed under him: General Grouchy also had a horse wounded. The infantry fired volleys into every cross street as they passed, and fired also at the windows and balconies. The people, when they felt the superiority of the French, fled into the houses; the doors were broken open by command of the generals of brigade, Guillot and Daubrai, and all within who were found with arms were

bayoneted; and parties of cavalry were stationed at the different outlets of Madrid to pursue and cut down those who were flying from the town. A part of the mob, seeking an unworthy revenge for their defeat, attacked the French hospital; and some of the Spaniards who were employed within, encouraged at their approach, fell upon the sick and upon their medical attendants. But these base assailants were soon put to flight.

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V.
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At the commencement of the conflict Murat ordered a detachment of 200 men to take possession of the arsenal*. Two officers happened to be upon guard there, by name Daoiz and Velarde, the former about thirty years of age; the latter, some five years younger, was the person who had been sent to compliment Murat on his arrival in Spain. Little could they have foreseen, when they went that morning to their post, the fate which awaited them, and the renown which was to be its reward! Having got together about twenty soldiers of their corps, and a few countrymen who were willing to stand by them, they brought out a twenty-four pounder in front of the arsenal, to bear upon the straight and narrow street by which the enemy must approach, and planted two others in like manner to command two avenues which led into the street of the arsenal. They had received no instructions, they had no authority for acting thus, and if they escaped in the action, their own government would without doubt either pass or sanction a sentence of death against them for their conduct; never therefore did any men act with more perfect self-devotion. Having loaded with grape, they

*Defence of
the arsenal
by Daoiz
and Ve-
larde.*

* This building had been the residence of the British ambassador, Sir Benjamin Keene, in the middle of the last century; there he died, and there he was interred; for there is no burial-place for protestants at Madrid, and the body of a heretic could not be suffered to pollute a Catholic church!

CHAP. waited till the discharge would take full effect, and such havoc
 V. did it make, that the French instantly turned back. The pos-
 1808. session of the arsenal was of so much importance at this time,
 May. that two columns were presently ordered to secure it: they at-
 tempted it at the cost of many lives, and the Spaniards fired
 above twenty times before the enemy could break into the
 neighbouring houses, and fire upon them from the windows.
 Velarde was killed by a musket-ball. Daoiz had his thigh
 broken; he continued to give orders sitting, till he received
 three other wounds, the last of which put an end to his life.
 Then the person to whom he left the command offered to sur-
 render: while they were making terms a messenger arrived
 bearing a white flag, and crying out that the tumult was ap-
 peased. About two o'clock the firing had ceased every where,
 through the personal interference of the Junta, the council of
 Castille and other tribunals, who paraded the streets with many
 of the nobles, and with an escort of Spanish soldiers and imperial
 guards intermixed. It might then have been hoped that the
 carnage of this dreadful day was ended; the slaughter among
 the Spaniards * had been very great; this however did not

* The Moniteur stated the French loss at twenty-five killed, and from forty-five to fifty wounded, that of the Spaniards at "*plusieurs milliers des plus mauvais sujets du pays.*" On the other hand, D. Alvaro Florez Estrada, on the alleged authority of a return sent by Murat to Berthier, states the loss of the French at 7100, and that of his own countrymen, according, he says, to an account afterwards taken by the government, as not exceeding 200. Both statements are palpably false: in Estrada's there may probably have been a mistake, (not of the printer, for the numbers are written in words), copied from some misprinted document; because there are accounts which reckon the French loss at 1700. Azanza and O'Farrill quote the Council of Castille as authority for affirming, that of the people 104 were killed, 54 wounded, and 35 missing. This is probably much below the truth; the Council at that time was acting under the fear of Murat, and Azanza and O'Farrill endeavour to pass as lightly as

satisfy Murat; conformably to the system of his master, the work of death was to be continued in cool blood. A military tribunal under General Grouchy was formed, and the Spaniards who were brought before it were sent away to be slaughtered with little inquiry whether they had taken * part in the struggle or

CHAP.
V.

1808.

May.

Executions
by sentence
of a mili-
tary tri-
bunal.

they can over the atrocities committed by that party which they afterwards served to the utmost of their power. Baron Larrey, in his *Memoires de Chirurgie Militaire*, (t. iii. 139.) says, that the wounded of both nations were carried to the French military hospital, and that before night they had received there about 300 patients, 70 of whom belonged to the Imperial Guards. It may be suspected that there were very few Spaniards in this number, . . . some of the wounded, we know, having been sent to the military tribunal, and delivered over not to the surgeons, but to the executioners: and it is certain, that in a contest of this kind, where, on the one part, stabbing instruments were almost the only weapons used, there would, on the other, be more persons killed than wounded. Wherever the French were found in small parties, they were massacred. An Englishman who was in the midst of this dreadful scene, told me the carnage was very great, and that he believed the French lost more than the Spaniards. This gentleman happened to be lodging with the same persons with whom I had lodged in the year 1796. Two women were killed in the house. The mistress (an Irish Catholic) dressed up a stool as an altar, with a crucifix in the middle, St. Antonio on one side, and St. I know not who on the other, and before these idols she and her husband and the whole family were kneeling and praying while the firing continued. This poor woman actually died of fear.—In the *Memoires d'un Soldat* the Mamalukes are said to have made a great slaughter that day. One of them breaking into a house from which a musket had been fired, was run through with a sword by a very beautiful girl, who was immediately cut down by his companions. A man who got his livelihood by the chase, and was an unerring shot, expended eight and twenty cartridges upon the French, bringing down a man with each; when his ammunition was spent, he armed himself with a dagger, and rushing against a body of the enemy, fought till the last gasp.

* A party of poor Catalan traders (who are privileged to carry arms) were seized and led to execution. They were met in time by O'Farrill, who, with the French general Harispe, was endeavouring to quiet the city, and Harispe being made by his companion to understand the circumstances of the case, obtained their release. This general distinguished himself greatly during the war by his military talents, and it is an act of justice to relate in what manner he was employed during the dreadful scenes of the 2d of May.

CHAP. not. Three groupes of forty each were successively shot in the
 V. Prado, . . the great public walk of Madrid. Others, in like
 1808. manner, were put to * death near the Puerta del Sol, and the
 May. Puerta del S. Vicente, and by the Church of N. Señora de la Sole-
 dad, one of the most sacred places in the city. In this manner
 was the evening of that second of May employed by the French
 at Madrid. The inhabitants were ordered to illuminate their
 houses, a necessary means of safety for their invaders, in a city
 not otherwise lighted; and through the whole night the dead
 and the dying might be seen distinctly as in broad noon-day,
 lying upon the bloody pavement. When morning came the
 same mockery of justice was continued, and fresh murders were
 committed deliberately with the forms of military execution
 during several succeeding days.

*The Infante
 D. Antonio
 sent to
 Bayonne.*

On the night of the third, the Comte de Laforest, and M. Freville, had a private conference with the Infante D. Antonio; and the Infante, whether inveigled by their persuasions, or influenced by his own fears after the dreadful scenes which had been exhibited, informed the Junta in the course of that night, that he should set off at daybreak for Bayonne, to share the fate of his family. They represented to him, that his presence in Spain would be infinitely more useful to the interest of the Bourbons, than it could possibly be in Bayonne; but he replied that his word was given, and his resolution fixed, and accordingly at daybreak he departed. Murat had shown some little degree of respect toward this personage; as soon as he was gone, he informed the Junta that he should think proper to assist at their

*Murat
 claims a
 place in
 the Junta.*

* D. Alvaro Florez Estrada says, that care was not taken to dispatch these victims of an atrocious system, . . that their groans were heard through the night, and that to strike the more terror, permission was not given to remove the bodies for interment till after they had lain there two days.

deliberations in future. O'Farrill and Azanza protested against his intrusion, and would have retired from the nominal authority which they held; they soon however assented to the will of the majority, pleading in excuse for their assent an unwillingness to appear as if they consulted their own interests alone, and a fear lest others should imitate the example of resignation, and then the capital of the kingdom would be left at the discretion of a hostile power, without any native authorities to protect it; . . a poor apology this, when they were mere instruments of that power.

CHAP.
V.
1808.
May.

Murat now affected to soothe and conciliate the people. He told them in his proclamations that thenceforth their tranquillity would be undisturbed, a blessing which they would owe to the loyalty of their character, and which would be assured to them by the confidence that the laws inspire; for in obedience to the dictates of humanity, he said, the military commission was suppressed. From this time every inhabitant, whatsoever his rank, who might have given cause for being seized by the French troops, provided * he had not borne arms against them, should be immediately delivered over to his proper judges, and tried by them: even in the excepted case, a judge nominated by the competent tribunal of the land should assist in regulating the process against the accused, till sentence was pronounced. No countrymen, or strangers, or ecclesiastics, should be molested on account of their dress. This alluded to an order which had been issued, prohibiting the cloak, lest arms should be concealed under it; but the cloak is so universally worn by the Spaniards,

*Edicts for
preserving
peace in the
capital.
May 5.*

* It appears therefore that men who had not borne arms had been delivered over to Grouchy's bloody tribunal; and that though the commission was suppressed, the French reserved to themselves the power of trying and punishing the Spaniards who had taken part in the insurrection.

CHAP. that the prohibition was thus modified on the third day after
 V. it had been issued, and repealed altogether on the following.
 1808. Carriers, it was said, who were employed in bringing provisions
 May. to the town, should from that time be subjected to no vexation,
 neither should their carriages and beasts be detained ; and only
 half the cattle of the muleteers should be put in requisition even
 in the most urgent necessity, and then they should be paid for
 at the regulated price, and not detained longer than three or
 four days. At those gates where carriers had suffered arbitrary
 detention in order to be searched and stript of their arms, in-
 structions should be given to prevent abuse : but it was neces-
 sary, the edict said, to repeat the injunction against introducing
 fire-arms or other prohibited weapons ; these were to be depo-
 sited at the gate.

*Circular
 letter of the
 Inquisition.*

May 6.

The Holy Office, as that execrable tribunal impiously styled
 itself, which has been the disgrace and the bane of every country
 wherein it was established, lent its last aid toward the degrada-
 tion of Spain. Four days after the insurrection, a circular letter
 was addressed by the Inquisitor-general, in the name of the
 Supreme Council, to all its subordinate tribunals. That in-
 surrection, the anniversary of which, hopelessly as it began, and
 disastrously as it terminated, will be celebrated in after ages by
 the Spaniards as a day of proud and pious commemoration, . .
 one of the most solemn in their calendar, . . was called by the
 Inquisition a disgraceful tumult, occasioned by the evil intentions
 or the ignorance of thoughtless men, who under the mask of
 patriotism and loyalty were preparing the way for revolutionary
 disorders. The melancholy consequences which had already
 occurred, rendered, it was said, the utmost vigilance necessary
 on the part of all the magistracies and respectable bodies, to
 prevent the renewal of such excesses, and to preserve tranquil-
 lity ; the nation being indeed bound to this good behaviour,

not only by its own interests, but by the laws of hospitality toward a friendly army which injured no one, and which had given the greatest proofs of good order and discipline. It became therefore the duty of the well-informed to enlighten the people, . . . to deliver them from their dangerous error, and to show them, that tumultuary proceedings could only serve to throw the country into confusion, by breaking those bonds of subordination upon which the peace of the community depends; . . . by destroying the feelings of humanity, and by annihilating all confidence in government, from which alone the direction and impulse of patriotic feeling ought to proceed. "These most important truths," said the address, "can by no persons be impressed upon the minds and hearts of the people with more effect, than by the ministers of the religion of Jesus Christ, which breathes nothing but peace and brotherly love among men, and subjection, honour, and obedience to all that are in authority: and as the Holy College ought to be, and always has been, the first to give an example to the ministers of peace, it accords with our duty and office to address this letter to you, that you may co-operate in the preservation of the public tranquillity. You are required to notify the same to all the subordinate officers of your respective courts, and also to the commissioners of districts, that all and each of you may with all possible zeal, vigilance, and prudence, co-operate in the attainment of so important an object."

On the 7th the decree arrived from Bayonne, by which Charles announced the reassumption of his authority, and appointed Murat lieutenant-general of the kingdom. A proclamation came with it, exhorting the Spaniards to trust in the experience of their old King, to obey the authority which he had received from God and his ancestors, to imitate his example, and to believe that there could be no prosperity or salvation for

CHAP.

V.

1808.

May.

*The Junta
discharged
from their
authority
by Charles's
reassump-
tion.*

CHAP. Spain, save in the friendship of her ally the great Napoleon.
 V. The next courier brought Ferdinand's act of resignation to the
 1808. Father-king, and dispatches whereby the Junta were discharged
 May. from their allegiance to him, and instructed to obey the orders
 of Charles IV. They were thus relieved from a situation in
 which, if it would have been difficult for any men to have acted
 well, it was scarcely possible to have acted worse: for they
 had never been ignorant of Ferdinand's real situation, and they
 had received from him discretionary powers which would have
 authorized the most patriotic and determined measures.

*Means of
 resistance
 authorised
 by Fer-
 dinand.*

A day or two after the reassumption of the Father-king had
 been announced in Madrid, there arrived Ferdinand's answer
 to the preposterous questions which the Junta had proposed.
 However great the previous and the subsequent errors of this
 unhappy Prince, he was not wanting on this occasion to himself
 or to his country. He told the Junta that he was not in a state
 of freedom, and being therefore incapable himself of taking
 measures either for his own preservation or that of the monarchy,
 he invested them with full power to remove whithersoever they
 might deem most advisable, and exercise all the functions of
 sovereignty in his name, as representatives of his person. He
 instructed them to commence hostilities as soon as they should
 know that he was proceeding into the interior of France, which
 he would not do unless he were compelled; and he enjoined
 them to prevent in the best manner they could the introduction
 of more French troops into the Peninsula. This was the sub-
 stance of one decree. A second, which accompanied it, was
 directed to the Junta, and as they had suggested, to any chancery
 or audience of the kingdom, in case they should not be in a
 situation to act when it arrived. In this Ferdinand declared it
 to be his royal will that the Cortes should be assembled in what-
 ever place might be deemed most convenient; that they should

occupy themselves exclusively at first in attending to the levies and subsidies necessary for the defence of the kingdom, and that their sittings should be permanent.

CHAP.
V.

1808.

May.

*The Junta
resolve that
they have
no longer
authority
to obey these
instructions*

These decrees were dated on the 5th, a few hours only before Ferdinand was confronted with his parents, and exposed to those outrages and threats which extorted from him his renunciation. The messenger took a circuitous route, and travelled on foot, for the sake of security; he did not reach Madrid therefore till after Charles's reassumption of the crown had been officially announced there; and the Junta gladly perceived that the instructions which enjoined them to obey the orders of the father, discharged them from the duty of obeying the son in this instance, Ferdinand being no longer King, and they no longer his servants. By proposing the questions they had gained time for events to take their course, and relieve them, as they vainly hoped, from responsibility and danger. Other hope or motive in proposing them they could have none: and having so far succeeded, they concealed the dispatches for a time, and afterwards destroyed them. To have acted upon them now, they alleged, would have endangered Ferdinand * as well as themselves.

* Azanza and O'Farrill say that they were confirmed in this opinion by the arrival of Perez de Castro, a day or two afterwards, from Bayonne, who assured them that Ferdinand and his friends had been in the greatest alarm lest the Junta should have begun to act upon these instructions, or lest they should by any means have fallen into the Emperor's hands. (*Memoria*, sec. 85.) This is very possible, after the renunciation had been made, and they had submitted to their fate. But when the apology proceeds to say how well and bravely the instructions would have been acted upon had they arrived in time, the writers give themselves credit for a higher degree of virtue than was evinced either by their conduct then or afterwards. (*Id.* sec. 90, 91.) Among the *inconveniences* of resisting the French, they represent the necessity of putting the

CHAP.

V.

1808.

May.

*Address
from Fer-
dinand and
the Infante,
exhorting
the people
to submis-
sion.*

The abdications both of the son and father had now been made public, and the people of Madrid, the blood of their townsmen still fresh in their streets, and the yoke upon their necks, read the address by which their late sovereign enjoined them to submit to the will of the Emperor Napoleon. That no colour of authority for the intended usurpation might be wanting, the names of Ferdinand, his brother Don Carlos, and the Infante Don Antonio, were affixed to a proclamation from Bourdeaux, condemning the spirit of resistance which had shown itself, absolving the people from all duties towards them, and exhorting them to obedience to France. In this address, the Infantes were made to say, that, “being deeply sensible of the attachment displayed towards them by the Spaniards, with the utmost grief they beheld them on the point of being plunged into anarchy, and threatened with all the dreadful calamities consequent thereupon. Aware that these might proceed from the ignorance in which the people were, both as to the principles of the conduct pursued by their highnesses, and the plans formed for the benefit of their country, they found themselves under the necessity of making an effort to open their eyes, by salutary counsel, in order to prevent any obstruction to the execution of those plans; and thus to give them the dearest proof of their affection. The circumstances under which the Prince assumed the government; the occupation of several provinces, and of all the frontier fortresses, by French troops; the actual presence of more than 60,000 of that nation in the capital and its environs;

English in possession of certain maritime posts, and the probability that England would have retained those posts for herself, to be another reproach to the Spaniards like Gibraltar! (*Id.* sec. 89.)

and many other circumstances known only to themselves, convinced them that, surrounded by difficulties, they had only chosen, among various expedients, that which was likely to produce the least evil; and, as such, they resolved upon the journey to Bayonne. On their arrival, the Prince, then King, was unexpectedly apprised that his father had protested against his act of abdication. Having accepted the crown only under the impression that the abdication was voluntary, he was no sooner informed of such a protest, than his filial duty instantly determined him to give back the throne. But a short time after, the King his father abdicated it in his own name, and that of his whole race, in favour of the Emperor of the French, in order that the Emperor, consulting the good of the nation, should determine the person and race which should hereafter occupy it. In this state of things, considering that any attempt of the Spaniards for the maintenance of their rights could tend only to make streams of blood flow, and to render certain the loss of at least a great part of her provinces, and all her colonies: . . . being further convinced, that the most effectual means of preventing these evils, was that their royal highnesses, for themselves, and all connected with them, should assent to the renunciation; taking also into consideration, that the Emperor engaged, in this case, to maintain the independence and integrity of the Spanish monarchy, and its colonies, without retaining the smallest of its dominions for himself, or separating any part from the whole; that he engaged to maintain the unity of the Catholic religion, the security of property, and the continuance of the existing laws and usages which have for so long a time preserved the power and honour of the Spanish nation . . . they conceived that they were affording the most undoubted proof of their affection towards it, by sacrificing their individual and personal interests for the benefit of that nation, and by this

CHAP.
V.
1808.
May.

CHAP. instrument assenting, as they already had assented in a particular
 V. treaty, to the renunciation of all their rights to the throne...

1808. They accordingly released the Spaniards from all their duties
May. in this respect, and exhorted them to consult the interest of
 their country, by conducting themselves peaceably, and by
 looking for their happiness to the power and wise arrangements
 of the Emperor Napoleon... The Spaniards might assure them-
 selves, that, by their zeal to conform to those arrangements, they
 would give their Prince and the two Infantes the strongest proof
 of loyalty, in like manner as their royal highnesses gave them
 the greatest example of paternal affection, by renouncing their
 rights, and sacrificing their own interests for the happiness of
 the Spaniards, the sole object of their wishes."

*Joseph Buonaparte
 chosen by
 his brother
 for King of
 Spain.*

When the Emperor Napoleon had resolved upon dethroning
 the Spanish Bourbons, it was his wish to have made Lucien
 Buonaparte King of Spain, the ablest of his brethren, and the
 only one who was unprovided with a kingdom. His first eleva-
 tion to the consulship, which was the passage of the Rubicon in
 his career, had been chiefly brought about by Lucien's intre-
 pidity and talents. But Lucien, who fancied himself the abler,
 as in some respects he was indeed the wiser man, had not ob-
 tained that ascendancy in his brother's councils to which he
 thought himself in many ways entitled; as a lover of consti-
 tutional freedom, he heartily disapproved the system which
 Napoleon pursued, and was therefore in some degree estranged
 from him, though the bond of fraternal feeling had not been
 broken. Having in his diplomatic employments found means
 to amass a princely fortune, he was then residing at Rome, happy
 in his family and in his pursuits, collecting pictures, and busy
 in the composition of a long and elaborate poem. This con-
 dition of honourable and enviable privacy Buonaparte hoped
 he might be induced to relinquish for the throne of Spain and

of the Spanish Indies. But Lucien knew something of Spain and of the Spaniards, whereas the Emperor had neither taken into consideration the nature of the country nor the character of the people; and even if the injustice and odium of the usurpation had not determined his refusal, the insecurity of such a throne might have decided him, and the certainty that he who accepted it must submit to be the mere instrument of Napoleon's ambition. The choice therefore then fell upon his brother Joseph, who was reigning not without some popularity at Naples, over a kingdom which had long been grievously misgoverned, and which had submitted in fair war to the right of conquest. He too, by Lucien's earnest advice, declined the odious elevation; but while he pursued his journey to Bayonne, whither he had been summoned, intending to persist in his refusal, the Emperor, who would take no denial from him, proceeded in his arrangements; well knowing that he would submit to that ascendancy which so few were capable of resisting.

Murat, who was the person intended to succeed at Naples, intimated to the Spanish Junta whom they were to expect for their new King, and procured from them an address upon that subject to the Emperor. Convinced, they said, that the condition of Spain required the closest connexion with the political system of the empire, which he governed with so much glory, they considered the resignation of the Bourbons as the greatest proof of kindness to the Spanish nation which their sovereign had ever given. "Oh! that there were no Pyrenees!" exclaimed these sycophants and slaves. "This was the constant wish of good Spaniards; because there could be no Pyrenees, whenever the wants of both countries should be the same, when confidence should be restored, and each of the two nations have received, in the same degree, the respect due to its independence

CHAP.

V.

1808.

May.

*Addresses
from the
Junta and
the council
of Castille
to Buona-
parte.*

May 13.

CHAP. and worth. The interval which yet separates us from this happy
 V. moment cannot now be long. Your Imperial Majesty, who
 1808. foresees all things, and executes them still more swiftly, has
 May. chosen for the provisional government of Spain, a Prince
 educated for the art of government in your own great school. He has succeeded in stilling the boldest storms, by the moderation and wisdom of his measures. What have we not, therefore, to hope, now that all Spaniards unite in devoting to him that admiration to which he has so many claims! The Spanish monarchy will resume the rank which belongs to it among the powers of Europe, as soon as it is united by a new family compact to its natural ally. Whoever the Prince may be whom you destine for us, chosen from among your illustrious family, he will bring that security which we need so much. The Spanish throne rises to a greater height. The consequences resulting from its relation to France, are of an importance commensurate with the extent of its possessions. It seems, therefore, that the throne itself calls for your Majesty's eldest brother to govern it. Surely it is a happy presage, that this arrangement, which nature has confirmed, so well corresponds with the sentiments of reverence and admiration, with which the actions of this Prince, and the wisdom of his government, had inspired us." The Council of Castille were implicated in the shame of this address. Their wisdom, it was said, obliged them to give all their support to these principles, and they united in the expression of the wish of the Supreme Junta.

*Address
from the
city of
Madrid.*

May 15.

An address was also framed in the name of the city of Madrid, to Murat, as "Lieutenant-general of the kingdom of Spain." "That city," it said, "thinking it certain that the Emperor of the French intended to place the crown upon the head of his illustrious brother Joseph Napoleon, King of Naples;

and being distinguished for its love of its sovereigns and its obedience to them, could not omit joining its homage to that of the Supreme Junta and of the Council, and requested his Highness would notify the same to the Emperor. The city also availed itself of that opportunity to assure him of its respect and submission." Graves could hardly yet have been dug for those who were massacred, and the places of execution were still covered with flakes of blood, when the existing authorities thus fawned upon Murat, and praised his moderation: and this address was presented in the name of the city, where mothers, widows, and orphans, were cursing him and the tyrant his master in every street, and well nigh in every house! A letter was also obtained from the Cardinal Archbishop of Toledo, the last of the Bourbons who remained in Spain. "The resignation of Charles," he said, "and the confirmation of that act, by the Prince and the Infantes, imposed upon him, according to God's will, the pleasing duty of laying at the Emperor's feet the assurance of his homage, fidelity, and reverence. May your Imperial and Royal Majesty (he added) be graciously pleased to look upon me as one of your most dutiful subjects, and instruct me concerning your high purposes, that I may be furnished with the means of manifesting my unfeigned and zealous submission."

CHAP.
V.
1808.
May.

May 22.

The next demand of Murat was that the Council of Castilla should send a deputation of its members to repeat what their address had expressed, and renew their petition that the Emperor would deign to nominate the King of Naples, Joseph Napoleon, to the throne of Spain. This also was obeyed, the Council, like the Junta of Government, being now in a state of habitual submission to his supreme commands. An Assembly of Notables was then, first by a circular decree from Murat, and

*Assembly of
Notables
convoked at
Bayonne.*

May 25.

CHAP. afterwards by Buonaparte himself, in virtue of the right which
 V. had been ceded to him, convoked to meet at Bayonne on the
 1808. 15th of June, charged with the wishes, the demands, and wants
 May. and complaints of those whom they represented, that they might
 fix the bases of the new constitution by which the monarchy was
 thenceforth to be governed. Till that should be effected Murat
 was to continue in the exercise of his power as Lieutenant-general
 of the kingdom ; the course of justice was to proceed as usual,
 and the existing ministers, the council of Castille, and all other
 authorities, religious, civil, and military, were confirmed for
 as long a time as might be necessary. This edict was accom-
 panied by a proclamation in that peculiar style which Bu-
 onaparte affected : “ To all who shall see these presents, health !
 Spaniards, after a long agony your nation was perishing. I saw
 your evils. I am about to remedy them. Your greatness, your
 power, are part of mine. Your Princes have ceded to me all
 their rights to the crown of the Spains. I will not reign over
 your provinces, but I will acquire an eternal title to the love
 and gratitude of your posterity. Your monarchy is old ; my
 mission is to rejuvenize it. I will improve all your institutions,
 and I will make you enjoy, if you will second me, the benefits
 of a reformation without destruction, without disorder, without
 convulsions. Spaniards, I have convoked a general assembly
 of deputies from your provinces and towns. I myself well know
 your wishes and your wants. Then I will lay down all my rights,
 and will place your glorious crown upon the head of one who is
 my other self, guaranteeing to you a constitution which con-
 ciliates the sacred and salutary authority of the Sovereign, with
 the liberties and the privileges of the people. Spaniards, re-
 member what your fathers were ; behold what you yourselves
 are become ! The fault is not yours, but that of the bad ad-

*Proclama-
 tion of
 Buonaparte
 to the Spa-
 niards.*

ministration which has governed you. Be full of hope and of confidence in the existing circumstances, for it is my wish that your latest descendants shall preserve my memory, and say of me, he was the regenerator of our country.”

CHAP.
V.
1808.
May.

But these vain promises and hypocritical professions were too late.

CHAPTER VI.

GENERAL INSURRECTION. PROCEEDINGS IN ASTURIAS AND GALICIA. JUNTAS FORMED IN THE PROVINCES. JUNTA OF SEVILLE. MURDER OF SOLANO AT CADIZ; CAPTURE OF THE FRENCH SQUADRON IN THAT HARBOUR. MASSACRE OF THE FRENCH AT VALENCIA. PROCLAMATIONS OF THE PATRIOTS. MOVEMENTS OF THE FRENCH AGAINST THEM.

1808.

May.
General in-
surrection.

THE seizure of the fortresses, and the advance of the French troops, had roused the spirit of the Spaniards; their hopes had been excited to the highest pitch by the downfall of Godoy and the elevation of Ferdinand; and in that state of public feeling, the slaughter at Madrid, and the transactions at Bayonne, were no sooner known, than the people, as if by an instantaneous impulse over the whole kingdom, manifested a determination to resist the insolent usurpation. Abandoned as they were by one part of the Royal Family, deprived of the rest; forsaken too by those nobles and statesmen, whose names carried authority, and on whose talents and patriotism they had hitherto relied; . . . betrayed by their government, and now exhorted to submission by all the constituted authorities civil and religious which they had been accustomed to revere and to obey; . . . their strong places and frontier passes in possession of the enemy; the flower of their own troops some in Italy, others in the north of Europe; and a numerous army of the French, accustomed to victory, and now flushed with Spanish slaughter, in their capital and in the heart of the country; under these complicated disadvantages and

dangers, they rose in general and simultaneous insurrection against the mightiest military power which had ever till that time existed ; a force not more tremendous for its magnitude than for its perfect organization, wielded always with consummate skill, and directed with consummate wickedness. A spirit of patriotism burst forth which astonished Europe, and equalled the warmest hopes of those who were best acquainted with the Spanish nation : for those persons who knew the character of that noble people, . . who were familiar with their past history, and their present state ; who had heard the peasantry talk of their old heroes, of Hernan Cortes and of the Cid ; . . who had witnessed the passionate transfiguration which a Spaniard underwent when recurring from the remembrance of those times to his own ; . . his brave impatience, his generous sense of humiliation, and the feeling with which his soul seemed to shake off the yoke of these inglorious days, and take sanctuary among the tombs of his ancestors, . . they knew that the spirit of Spain was still alive, and had looked on to this resurrection of the dry bones. As no foresight could have apprehended the kind of injury with which the nation had been outraged, nor have provided against the magnitude of the danger, so by no possible concert could so wide and unanimous a movement have been effected. The holiest and deepest feelings of the Spanish heart were roused, and the impulse was felt throughout the Peninsula like some convulsion of the earth or elements.

The firing on the 2d of May was heard at Mostoles, a little town about ten miles south of Madrid, and the Alcalde, who knew the situation of the capital, dispatched a bulletin to the south, in these words : “ The country is in danger ; Madrid is perishing through the perfidy of the French. All Spaniards, come to deliver it ! ” No other summons was sent abroad than this, which came from an obscure and unauthorized individual,

CHAP.
VI.
1808.
May.

CHAP. in a state of mind that would have made him rush upon the
VI. French bayonets ; but this stirred up the people in the southern
1808. provinces ; and in truth no summons was needed, for the same
May. feeling manifested itself every where as soon as the details of the
Alvaro Flo- massacre were known, and the whole extent of the outrage which
rez Estrada, had been offered to the nation. Buonaparte was totally ignorant
p. 126. of the Spanish character, and in that ignorance had pursued the
 only course which could have provoked a national resistance.
 If he had declared war against Spain, at the beginning, no
 enthusiasm could have been raised in favour of the government,
 and he might have dictated the terms of submission as a con-
 queror. The opinion of his magnanimity and greatness would
 have gone before him ; the Spaniards, prone to admire what is
 romantic and miraculous, and taught by their own history to
 disregard the injustice and the inhumanity of wars which are
 waged for conquest, had been dazzled by the splendour of his
 portentous career ; and had he appeared to them as an open,
 honourable foe, the pretension that he was appointed to fulfil
 the ways of Providence, might have found among them a sub-
 missive, and perhaps a willing belief.

*Deputies
from Astu-
rias sent to
England.*

Asturias was the first province in which the insurrection as-
 sumed a regular form. A Junta of representatives was elected,
 who assembled at Oviedo, and declared that the entire sove-
 reignty had devolved into their hands. The commander in chief
 in that principality, who attempted to suppress these movements,
 was in danger of losing his life ; and the Conde del Pinar, and
 the poet, D. Juan Melendez Valdes, who were sent by Murat
 from Madrid to appease the people, were glad to escape from
 the indignation which their mission provoked. The first act
 of the Junta was to dispatch two noblemen to solicit aid from
May 25. England: they put off from Gijon in an open boat, and got on
 board an English privateer which happened to be cruising off

that port. Agents also were sent to Leon and to Coruña, inviting the Leonese and the Gallicians to unite with them against the common enemy.

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*Insurrec-
tion at Co-
ruña.*

The Asturian who came to Coruña upon this mission was ordered by one of the magistrates to leave the town immediately, and not to make his errand known to any person, on pain of being arrested and treated as a criminal. On the way back he stopped at Mondoñedo, where he learnt that the Leonese were in insurrection, and met as emissary from that kingdom one of those generous spirits who were then every where employed in rousing the nation, and preparing it for the struggle which must ensue. The people of Mondoñedo entered with ardour into the common cause; and a student from the seminary there accepted the office of deputy from that city to Coruña, notwithstanding the risk which the Asturian had run. He went with the fair pretext of asking from the provincial government what course ought to be taken by the authorities at Mondoñedo, in consequence of the events in Asturias and Leon. Coruña was in a state of great ferment when he arrived; true and false reports were received with equal belief by the populace; it was affirmed that the sale of church property which Ferdinand had suspended was to be resumed; that Buonaparte would order off all the Spanish troops to the north of Europe, and that cart-loads of chains were on the way to manacle those soldiers who should refuse to march willingly. The captain-general of Galicia and governor of Coruña, D. Antonio Filangieri, believed that the only course which it behoved him to pursue in the strange and perilous state of Spain, was to preserve order as far as possible; but the very precaution which he took to prevent an insurrection became the signal for it. The festival of St. Ferdinand, King of Spain, which is commemorated on the 30th of May, had always been celebrated as the saint's-day of Ferdinand since he

CHAP. VI. was acknowledged as Prince of Asturias ; and in all fortified towns the flag should have been displayed and a salute fired. 1808. Filangieri forbade this to be done, lest it should occasion a dangerous movement among the people. The omission excited them more forcibly than the ceremony would have done : it was a silent but unequivocal act of assent to the iniquitous proceedings at Bayonne ; and the people understanding it as such, collected in great numbers about the governor's house, and insisted that the flag should be hoisted. Filangieri was a Neapolitan, who might have transferred his allegiance from a Bourbon King of Spain to a Buonaparte without any sacrifice of feeling, or violation of duty. His inclinations, however, were in favour of the country which had adopted him, and he obeyed the popular voice. They then required that a regiment which he had removed to Ferrol should be recalled, that the arms in the arsenal should be distributed among the inhabitants, that Ferdinand should be proclaimed King, and that war should be immediately declared against France. The governor demurred at this last demand ; . . they broke into his house and seized his papers, and his life would probably have been sacrificed if he had not escaped at a garden door, and found shelter in a convent.

The multitude then hastened to the arsenal, and took possession of the arms ; the soldiers offered no resistance, and soon openly declared for the cause of their country. Some officers who attempted to restrain the people were hurt ; some houses were attacked ; a warehouse was broke open because it was said the fetters in which refractory conscripts were to be conveyed to France were deposited there, and the French Consul would have been murdered, if some humaner persons had not conveyed him in time to Fort St. Antonio, upon an island in the sea. A portrait of Ferdinand was carried in procession through the streets ; and the *Vivas* which accompanied that popular name were fol-

lowed by a fearful cry of "Down with the French and the traitors!" But order was soon restored, and in great measure by the exertions of the clergy, who possessed at this time a double influence over the people, because no class of men displayed more fervour of patriotic loyalty. The heads of the monasteries and the parochial priests assembled with the constituted authorities of the town, the Regent of the Royal Audience, and the Governor, to whom obedience was now restored; they formed a permanent Junta of government, they sent officers to treat with the English squadron which was then blockading Ferrol, and they dispatched advices to Santiago, Tuy, Orense, Lugo, Mondoñedo, and Betanzos, requiring each of those cities to send a deputy to the Junta, and make the news known throughout their respective jurisdictions. In the course of three days the whole of Galicia was in a state of insurrection, and a communication was immediately opened with England.

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May.

*Nellerio.
Mem. t. 3,
No. 149.*

At Badajoz and at Seville the first popular movements were repressed by the local authorities; but they soon broke out again with renewed violence. The Count de la Torre del Fresno was governor at Badajoz; the people collected before his palace, calling upon him to enrol them, and give them arms for the defence of the country. A second time he endeavoured to control a spirit which was no longer to be restrained; and the furious multitude, who perceived that to remain quiet was in fact to acknowledge the foreign King who was to be forced upon them, considered all attempts to abate their ardour as proceeding from a traitorous intention, forced their way into the house, dragged him forth, and murdered him. For in the sudden dissolution of government, by which free scope was for the first time given to the hopes and expectations of enthusiastic patriotism, the evil passions also were let loose, and the unreasonable people were sometimes hurried into excesses by their

*Excesses of
the popu-
lace.*

May 30.

CHAP. own blind zeal, sometimes seduced into them by wretches who
 VI. were actuated by the desire of plunder, or of private revenge.
 1808. Men were sacrificed to the suspicions and fury of the multitude,
 May. as accomplices and agents of the French, whose innocence in
 many cases was established when too late. Such crimes were
 committed at Valladolid, Cartagena, Granada, Jaen, San Lucar,
 Carolina, Ciudad Rodrigo, and many other places. But this
 dreadful anarchy was of short duration. The people had no
 desire to break loose from the laws and the habits of subordina-
 tion ; the only desire which possessed them was to take vengeance
 for their murdered countrymen, and to deliver their country
 from the insolent usurpation which was attempted. If any
 obstruction was offered to this generous feeling, they became
 impatient and ungovernable : otherwise, having always been
 wont to look to their rulers, never to act for themselves, their
 very zeal displayed itself in the form of obedience ; they were
 eager to obey any who would undertake to guide them, and no
 person thought of stepping beyond his rank to assume the di-
 rection. Because Ferdinand, when he set out upon his journey
 to Bayonne, had left a Junta of government at Madrid, the
 people were familiar with that name, and Juntas, in conse-
 quence, were formed every where ; those persons being every
 where appointed whom the inhabitants were accustomed to
 respect.

*Juntas esta-
 blished every
 where.*

*Formation
 of the Junta
 of Seville.*

Though the provisional governments thus suddenly formed
 were altogether independent of each other, a certain degree of
 ascendancy was conceded by general consent to the Junta of
 Seville ; that city, for its size and importance, being regarded
 by the Spaniards as their capital, while Madrid was in the
 enemy's possession. After the magistracy had repressed the
 first tumultuous indications of patriotism in the Sevillians, a
 movement too general for them to withstand was excited by a

man of low rank by name Nicolas Tap y Nuñez. He came there as a missionary to preach the duty of insurrection against the French ; and at a time when every hour brought fresh excitement to the hopes and the indignation of the people, this man by his ardour and intrepidity obtained a great ascendancy, which he did not in the slightest instance abuse. When the persons in authority found it impossible to withstand the tide of popular feeling, the formation of a Junta was proposed, and the first thought of the people was, that the parochial clergy and the heads of the convents should assemble to choose the members, so little did they think of exercising any right of election themselves, and so naturally did they look up to those by whom they were wont to be directed. Some of these persons assembled, accepting unwillingly the power with which they were by acclamation invested, and confounded, if not intimidated, by their apprehensions of the French, the injunctions of the constituted authorities at Madrid, and the presence of a multitude who had given murderous proofs that their pleasure was not to be resisted with impunity: in this state of mind many withdrew from the meeting, and they who remained were glad to rid themselves of immediate responsibility by assenting to any nominations which were proposed. Such a choice was made as might be expected under such circumstances ; some who thrust themselves forward with the qualifications of wealth and effrontery were chosen, and they to accredit their own election added others who held the highest place in public opinion for rank or talents. Among them were D. Francisco Saavedra, who had formerly been minister of finance, and P. Gil de Sevilla ; both had been sufferers under Godoy's administration, and they who were persecuted by him were for the most part entitled to respect as well as commiseration. Though the populace had thus obtained their immediate object, they still remained in a state of ferocious excite-

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CHAP. VI.
 1808. May. ment, and their fury was directed (by private malice, it was believed) against the Conde del Aguila, one of the most distinguished inhabitants of Seville, whose collection of pictures, books, and manuscripts, was justly esteemed among the treasures of that city. The maddened and misguided rabble attacked him first with insults, then dragged him from his carriage, killed him, and exposed his body upon one of the city gates. And even when order was restored, the magistrates did not venture to institute any proceedings for bringing to justice the perpetrators or instigators of the murder.

Tap y Nuñez, who was for that day the Lord of Seville, assisted at the election of the Junta, and being a stranger, and ignorant of the good or ill deserts of those who were proposed, assented to all the nominations. Learning however that two members, more likely to discredit the cause of the country than to serve it, had been chosen, he went the next day to their sitting, and required that these individuals should be expelled. All hope of establishing subordination would have been lost, if a demagogue like this, however meritorious his intentions, were allowed to make and unmake the members of the government at his pleasure. The Junta therefore immediately arrested him, and sent him prisoner to Cadiz. This was a necessary act of vigour, without which no authority could have been maintained. But some merciful consideration was due to this man, because he had shown no disposition to abuse his dangerous influence, nor to aggrandize himself, when it was in his power: he was, however, made to feel, that the forms and realities of justice were as little to be looked for under the provisional government, as under the old despotism; and having been thrown into prison, there he was left to linger, hopeless of a trial, and having nothing to trust to for his deliverance but the chance that they might be weary of supporting him there, or that his place might be wanted for another.

The vigour which they had shown in thus asserting their authority was not belied by their subsequent conduct. Their first measure was to establish, in all towns within their jurisdiction, containing 2000 householders, corresponding Juntas, who were to enlist all the inhabitants between the ages of sixteen and forty-five, and embody them. Funds were to be raised by order of the Supreme Junta, by taxes on all corporations and rich individuals; and, above all, by voluntary subscriptions. They declared war against the Emperor Napoleon and against France, in the name of Ferdinand and of all the Spanish nation, protesting that they would not lay down their arms till that Emperor restored to them the whole of their Royal Family, and respected the rights, liberty, and independence of the nation which he had violated. This, said they, we declare with the understanding and accordance of the Spanish people. By the same declaration, they made known that they had contracted an armistice with England, and that they hoped to conclude a lasting peace.

Solano was at this time on the frontiers with his army, having been recalled from Portugal. If any man in such times could rely for security upon his character, his popularity, and the whole tenor of his life, this nobleman might have felt himself secure. The arbitrary authority which he possessed at Cadiz had always been exercised for the good of the inhabitants and the improvement of the city: the military and naval officers respected him, the higher orders were his personal friends, and the populace looked with full confidence to his justice. No one more deeply felt and regretted the decline and degradation of Spain; yet had he partaken of its degradation, for he resigned himself to it, and despairing of his country, would have submitted to a nominal reform of government imposed by a foreign power, and under an intrusive dynasty. Upon the first movements at Seville, he hastened thither; and Saavedra, P. Gil,

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*They de-
clare war
against
France.*

*Solano hesi-
tates to co-
operate with
them.*

CHAP. VI. Count de Tilly, and others, who were willing to stand forward against the usurpation, and encourage a spirit from which every thing might be hoped, communicated their desires and intentions to him, as a true Spaniard, whose genuine patriotism could not be called in question. But Solano was one of those persons who believed the power of the French to be irresistible; the leading men whose opinions were most conformable to his own, and who, till this fatal time of trial, had been thought capable and desirous of introducing those reforms which the system of administration required, had submitted to Buonaparte's pleasure; and while they, in common with all the constituted authorities in the metropolis, in the most earnest terms exhorted their countrymen to submission, the French, he knew, were ready to march troops wherever their presence might be required, and to repress an insurrection as promptly and severely in Seville as they had done at Madrid. He was not aware that the spirit which had manifested itself at Madrid, and was ready to break out in Seville, was felt at that time throughout every city and every village in the Peninsula. A proper fear also lest the people should possess themselves of power which they would certainly abuse, influenced him also; and determining hastily to support what appeared to him the cause of order and the laws, he received the communications which were made to him with coldness and distrust, required time to deliberate before he could assent to their views, and hastened with all speed to resume his command at Cadiz, and preserve that important city for the intrusive government.

*He refuses
the assistance of the
British
squadron.*

There he gave out that he had returned thus suddenly to provide against a bombardment of the city which the English were about to commence. This gave him a pretext for removing cannon from the land side, in order to strengthen the batteries toward the sea; it is said that he removed the military

stores also, under pretence that the casemates would be wanted as shelter for the inhabitants; and that he sent to the French General Dupont, who had been ordered to Andalusia, urging him to hasten thither by forced marches. The truth of these reports it is impossible to ascertain; and some who knew and loved Solano have asserted their belief, that if he had lived to witness the national virtue which was so soon afterwards displayed, he would have been one of the most ardent and able supporters of the national cause. Admiral Purvis, who commanded the British squadron before Cadiz, sent in flags of truce, and offered to co-operate with him against the French, who had five sail of the line and a frigate, under Admiral Rossilly, then lying in the bay; offers of assistance on the part of England were also made by the governor of Gibraltar, Sir Hugh Dalrymple, who was already in communication with General Castaños, then commanding the Spanish force in the camp of St. Roque. Solano replied, that all overtures must be addressed to the government at Madrid, which was in fact declaring his adherence to Joseph Buonaparte.

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Yet he appears to have wavered in purpose, if not in inclination. As soon as the popular cause had obtained the ascendancy at Seville, the Junta of that city sent out four artillery officers with dispatches to the commanders at Cadiz, Badajoz, Granada, and St. Roque, declaring, that in the present dissolution of government, the duty of providing for the public weal had been committed to them, and informing them that war had been declared against France, and peace with England. The Conde de Teba, Cipriano Palafox, was the person entrusted with this mission to Cadiz: his brother, the Conde de Montijo, had taken a decided part in promoting the insurrection; and this young officer was charged with these dispatches not only because it was an honourable office, but

Solano summons a council of officers.

CHAP. VI. because he was capable of explaining to Solano the state of affairs at Seville more fully than there had been time to do in writing. Full of zeal in a cause which he afterwards deserted, he entered Cadiz cracking his whip like a courier, and communicated to the people who flocked about him, the news which he brought; which was also speedily diffused by means of private couriers, whom the merchants of Seville sent to their correspondents, and by the zeal of propagandists who, doubting the determination of the persons in authority, came to make the people declare themselves. Solano was intimate with the Count de Teba, and, according to that nobleman's relation, would have considered himself criminal if he had acknowledged the authority of the Junta of Seville, derived, as he conceived it to be, merely from the people of that city in a state of insurrection; but he saw how dangerous it would now be openly to disclaim their authority, and therefore summoned to council all the general officers, military and naval, eleven in number, who were within reach, and an address to the people was drawn up in their name. It stated, that of all undertakings a war against France was the most difficult, considering the numbers and discipline of the French army; the want of Spanish troops, and the indiscipline of the new levies which might be raised. The right of declaring who were the enemies of the nation belonged, they said, exclusively to the King; he had repeatedly assured them that the French were his friends and intimate allies; in that character they had entered Spain, and the King had not manifested any change in his opinions concerning them; it was doubtful therefore whether he required from the people those sacrifices which were now called for. If nevertheless the people would decide upon war, they ought to know that great sacrifices must be made; men must be enrolled, embodied and disciplined, they must quit their homes for a long time, perhaps for ever,

They exhort the people not to engage in hostilities with the French.

and they who were not enrolled must return to their ordinary state of tranquillity; for it was for soldiers alone to fight, while the other inhabitants of a country remained neutral and passive, as might be seen by the example of the Germans, the Prussians, the Russians, and other nations. Were the people to act otherwise, and take an active part, the enemy would plunder their houses, and lay waste every thing with fire and sword. Moreover the most dreadful disorganization of society would ensue; and the English who were in the bay might take advantage of this dissolution of government to get possession of the port and city, and convert Cadiz into a second Gibraltar. The governor and the eleven general officers whom he had assembled concurring in these views, laid their opinions, they said, before the people, who were now to determine what part should be taken, and who could accuse no person of having deceived them, if the evils which were thus foreseen and foretold should in the event come upon them. But if, in despite of these representations, they persisted in the resolution of making war against the French, the generals were ready to begin hostilities, that they might not be accused of having given their advice from pusillanimity or any other motives unworthy of their patriotism, their honour, and their courage.

The tenor of this address evinced little resentment of the wrongs of their country in the persons by whom it was framed; and the manner in which it was published discovered as extraordinary a want of judgement in the governor, as he had displayed in his legislative experiments at Setubal. Instead of waiting till the next day, he increased the agitation and alarm of the people, ordering the address to be read at night in the streets by the light of torches, and summoning the restless part of the population, and alarming the peaceable, by the sound of military music; sure means of counteracting the sedative effect

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*The people
insist upon
taking arms.*

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which the proclamation was intended to produce. The bolder spirits who were engaged in the better cause did not fail to perceive the advantage which the address afforded, by the heartlessness of its reasoning, and its full recognition of the right of the people to direct the conduct of the governor. There was no rest for the inhabitants that night; an answer was prepared to the generals, which was brought by a disorderly multitude, bearing torches, at midnight, to the governor's palace. Solano was summoned to the balcony; and a young man, standing on the shoulders of one of the stoutest of his companions, read to him a writing in the name of the people, declaring that they had decided upon war, because they could confute all the reasons which had been advanced against it; and accordingly he read aloud an answer to the address, point by point. The mob applauded, and required that the French squadron should immediately be summoned to surrender. Solano assured them that their wishes should be fulfilled, and that on the morrow all the general officers should be assembled in consequence. Had he sympathized with the national feeling, and given at first that assent which he now reluctantly yielded, he might have directed their ardour, and maintained subordination, though not tranquillity. But the populace had now gained head, and broken loose, and at such times the bloodiest ruffian has always the most influence.

*Solano is
advised to
withdraw.*

Part of the mob went to the arsenal, and these were the better-minded Spaniards, who wanted arms, that they might use them in the defence of their country. They found no opposition, because the soldiers every where partook of the general impulse of indignation against the French. Others broke open the prisons to deliver their friends and companions in guilt. The house of the French Consul was attacked and forced, for the purpose of putting him to death: he had taken refuge in the

Convent of St. Augustine, and from thence got on board the French squadron. Murmurs were heard against Solano, as one who was disposed at heart to favour the enemy. The Count de Teba warned him that he was in danger, and advised him to give the command to D. Thomas de Morla (one of the generals whom he had called to council,) and go with him to Seville, for the avowed purpose of obtaining the fullest information how to proceed in so important a crisis. Solano saw the prudence of this advice, but a sense of honour withheld him from following it, lest he should be suspected of cowardice; and as a second reason, he alleged a fear which his blind attachment to the French alone could have occasioned, that the English might take advantage of the confusion, and endeavour to make themselves masters of Cadiz; as if England were the enemy whom the Spaniards had then cause to dread!

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On the morrow the general officers assembled for the second time, and about midday the people having collected to know their determination, they came forward in the balcony, and Solano and Morla assured the multitude that every thing which they desired should be done, and therefore they might disperse, and go each to his home in peace. One man cried out that they did not choose to see the French colours flying. Solano asked where they were to be seen? and upon being answered, on the French ships, he replied, that the naval officers and engineers were already instructed to take measures for obtaining possession of that squadron. They appeared satisfied with this, and Solano sate down to dinner. Before he had risen from table another mob arrived at the palace, with a man at their head who had formerly been a Carthusian, but had obtained leave to exchange that order for a less rigid one, in which he was now serving his noviciate. This man demanded to speak with the governor; an answer was returned, that the governor stood in need of rest,

He is murdered by the mob.

CHAP. VI. and that he had promised the people to fulfil their desires. The
 1808. ex-Carthusian was not satisfied with this, and endeavoured to
 May. push by the sentinel, who upon this fired his piece in the air,
 and fastened the door. The mob then, under the same leader,
 brought cannon against the house, shattered the doors, and
 rushed in. They were now bent upon Solano's death. He
 meantime escaped by the roof, and took shelter in the house of
 an English merchant, whose lady concealed him in a secret
 closet; and there, it is said, he would have been safe, if the
 very workman who had constructed it had not joined the mob,
 and discovered * his hiding-place. The mistress of the house,
 Mrs. Strange, in vain endeavoured to save him, by the most
 earnest intreaties, and by interposing between him and his mer-
 ciless assailants. She was wounded in the arm; and Solano, as he

* Sir John Carr adds, that immediately afterwards this man was seized with frenzy, threw himself from a window, and was killed on the spot. In an account of these transactions, given in a letter from Cadiz, and published by Llorente (under his anagram of Nellerto,) in the third volume of his *Memoirs for the History of the Revolution of Spain*, Solano is said to have taken the Carthusian by the leg and thrown him out of the window, . . . as if he had waited till the mob were actually in his apartment before he attempted to escape! The general accuracy of that letter is confirmed by another (in the same collection) by the Count de Teba, in explanation of his own conduct. Llorente (the ex-secretary of the Inquisition) has a notable note upon the subject: he says, the insurrection in Andalusia was brought about by the intrigues of the cabinet of London, carried on by the commander of the blockading squadron, and the governor at Gibraltar; that had it not been for these machinations the province would have been tranquil, there would have been no battle of Baylen, King Joseph would have remained at Madrid, Solano and the Count del Aguila would not have been murdered . . . the Spanish colonies would not have been lost . . . and at the fall of Napoleon, Joseph would have ceased to be King of Spain, as Jerome ceased to be King of Westphalia. Did Llorente himself believe, or could he think to make others believe, that Napoleon would have been overthrown, if he had made himself master of Spain without opposition? And was it in the expectation and hope that his fall would be brought about without human means, that he swore allegiance to King Joseph?

was dragged away, bade her farewell till eternity! They hauled him toward the gallows, that his death might be ignominious; others were too ferocious to wait for this, they cut and stabbed him, while he resigned himself with composure and dignity to his fate; and the mortal blow is said to have been given by one of his own soldiers, who, to save him from farther sufferings and from intended shame, ran him through the heart.

There may be reason for supposing that the fury of the populace was in this instance directed by some personal enemies of the Marquis, because it fell wholly upon him; the general officers who united in the address seem to have incurred no danger, and Morla, as second in command, was declared the next day by acclamation governor of Cadiz and captain-general of the province. He accepted the command, on condition that the people would disperse peaceably; the tumultuous election was confirmed by the Junta of Seville, who sent one of their members to concert a plan of operations with Morla; and the new governor issued a proclamation, exhorting the people to be tranquil, telling them that a set of ruffians were plundering and destroying under the mask of patriotism, protesting that the only desire of the persons in authority was to die in the cause of their beloved Ferdinand, whom a tyrant had separated from them; assuring them that measures should instantly be taken against the French ships, and that within four and twenty hours the happy effects would be seen. Meantime the French squadron took up a defensive position, in a channel leading to the Caracacas, and out of reach of the works. M. Rossilly, the commander, knew that every effort would be made to relieve him, and endeavoured therefore to gain time, being no doubt confident that the force which would be ordered to occupy Cadiz would beat down any resistance that the Spaniards could oppose. He made overtures to the governor, proposing to quit the bay, if an

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Nellerto.
Mem. t. 3,
Nos. 134,
143.

Jacob's
Travels.
Sir J. Carr's
Travels, p.
47, 48.

Morla ap-
pointed go-
vernor of
Cadiz.

CHAP. arrangement to that effect could be made with the British
 VI. squadron ; this, he said, was for the purpose of tranquillizing
 1808. the people, since his force, and the position which he had taken,
 June. appeared to occasion some uneasiness. But if the English should
 refuse their consent, he then offered to land his guns, keeping
 his men on board, and not hoisting his colours ; in that case he
 required that hostages should be exchanged, and demanded the
 protection of the Spaniards against the exterior enemy. Morla
 replied, that though these proposals were such as it became the
 French admiral to make, it was not compatible with his honour
 to accept them : his orders were positive, and he could hear of
 nothing but an unconditional surrender. Lord Collingwood
 had now arrived from before Toulon, to take the command
 upon this, which had become the more important station. He
 offered to co-operate with the Spaniards, with whom the fleet
 was now in full communication ; but being aware of their own
 strength, and sure of their prey, they declined his assistance.
 If the French commander had not relied too confidently upon
 the advance of his countrymen and the fortune of Buonaparte,
 he would now have surrendered to the English, for the certainty
 of obtaining better treatment, and the chance of exciting some
 disagreement respecting the prizes. Batteries were erected on
 the Isle of Leon, and near Fort Luiz ; and from these, and from
 their mortar and gun-boats, the attack was commenced, while
 the British sailors remained impatient spectators of a contest
 carried on at a distance, and protracted from the ninth of June
 till the fourteenth, when having in vain endeavoured to obtain
 more favourable terms, Rossilly surrendered unconditionally.
 In an address to the people which Morla then published he
 pointed out the advantage of a mode of attack which they had
 censured as dilatory and inefficient ; the victory had cost only
 four lives, and the ships which were now their own had been

*Surrender
 of the
 French
 squadron.*

taken with the least possible injury. The prisoners, he said, should be exchanged for Spanish troops. He exhorted and commanded the people to return to their accustomed habits of subordination. The convulsion which Spain has undergone, said he, has awakened us from our lethargy, and made us feel our rights, and the duty which we owe to our holy religion and our King. We wanted an electric shock to rouse us from our palsied state of inactivity; we stood in need of a hurricane to clear the heavy and unwholesome atmosphere. But if violent remedies are continued after the good which was proposed from them be obtained, they become fatal: excessive efforts bring on a debility worse than direct weakness, because the very principle of strength is exhausted. It was now necessary to return to order, and to confide in the magistrates. Able men must be armed and disciplined; they who were not fit for military service would be employed in other ways, and boys and women who excited tumults should be punished. The troops, said he, the whole city, the sword of justice, and above all God himself, who chastises those that abuse his mercies, authorize and support me.

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The man who addressed this language to his countrymen had hitherto endeavoured to frustrate the purposes of those better spirits whom the danger had awakened; and by his means this blow against the French had been delayed as long as possible, in the hope and expectation that a French force might arrive in time to prevent it, and secure Cadiz for the Intrusive King. For in this part of Spain alone, the intention of opposing Buonaparte had been conceived as soon as his designs were discovered, and measures had been taken for obtaining assistance from the English. The Spanish Commander at Algeziras, and the British Governor of Gibraltar, had always been accustomed in time of war to maintain that sort of humane and courteous

Early communications between General Castaños and Sir Hew Dalrymple.

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 intercourse which the laws of honour allow, and by which the evils of hostility may be mitigated. The opportunity thus afforded had not been overlooked by those Spaniards who were resolved to act for the deliverance of their country: and if Ferdinand, instead of overthrowing the favourite, had found it necessary to fly, it was intended that he should have taken refuge at Gibraltar, and from thence have embarked for the colonies, trusting to British honour. As early as the beginning of April, General Castaños had communicated with Sir Hew Dalrymple upon the state of affairs, and the measures which it might be necessary to adopt. After the elder branches of the Royal Family had been decoyed away, a hope of saving D. Francisco, the youngest of the Infantes, was cherished, and of conveying him to America, to secure that portion of the Spanish dominions: but in case the whole of the Bourbons should be destroyed, or carried into hopeless captivity, the Archduke Charles was regarded as the fittest person to whom the throne, thus rendered vacant, could be offered; and a request was made to Sir Hew that a frigate might be held in readiness to sail for Trieste, and bring him over. Sir Hew Dalrymple saw the whole importance of the crisis; and by the generosity with which he took upon himself the responsibility of acting in affairs of such moment, the Spanish General was induced to place just confidence in British frankness and good faith. Toward the latter end of May two French officers, one of whom was an aide-de-camp of Murat's, came to Algeziras. Castaños supposed their errand was to arrest him, and in that case had determined upon killing them, and retiring by sea to Gibraltar. He found, however, that they spake to him with apparent confidence respecting the Viceroyalty of Mexico, which had been promised him by the old government, and was now held out as a lure to him, as it also was to General Cuesta. The aide-de-camp assured him that the removal of the

Bourbons from Spain had for three years been the chief object of Buonaparte's policy ; and this having now been happily effected, the house of Austria was next to be removed . . an operation which would not require more than four months ; . . so easy at that time did any ambitious enterprise appear to the soldiers of Buonaparte ! But Castaños was neither deterred by the power of this formidable tyrant, nor seduced by any prospect of personal aggrandizement. He continued his communications with Gibraltar, and his plan was to begin by seizing the French fleet ; this he thought would be the best mode of commencing hostilities, and such a stroke at the outset would give a character of decision and vigour to the Spanish counsels. Morla had influence enough to frustrate it then ; but no evil arose from the delay ; rather it proved advantageous, by allowing time for that simultaneous manifestation of feeling which so decidedly proved the spirit of the people. Meantime, in full reliance upon England, Castaños obeyed the first summons from the Junta of Seville, and prepared to resist the French when they should enter Andalusia.

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While Asturias, Galicia, and Andalusia, had thus with one impulse taken arms against the usurpation, and opened an intercourse with England, of whose willing and efficient assistance no doubt was entertained, the city of Valencia, where the same spirit manifested itself at the same time, became the scene of a most horrible and disgraceful tragedy. There also, in the first movements of the people, the governor, D. Miguel de Saa-vedra, fell a victim to popular fury ; he was brought back from Requena, whither he had retired for safety, and murdered near the palace of the Conde de Cervellon, who had decidedly engaged in the national cause, and yet with all his efforts was unable to save him. His head was carried about the streets on a pike, and then exposed upon a pillar in the Plaza de S. Do-

*Massacre
at Valencia.*

CHAP. VI. mingo. A Junta was chosen, and order would soon have been re-established, if at this time there had not arrived from Madrid one of those monsters whose actions, we might wish, for the sake of human nature, to account for by the supposition of demoniacal possession. P. Baltasar Calvo, such was his name, was a Canon of the church of S. Isidro, in the metropolis; it was afterwards reported, that he had been deputed by Murat to secure Valencia for the intrusive government, by secretly treating with the members of the Junta; and that finding this impracticable, he determined to make himself master of the city by terror. But that he should have acted as he did with any ultimate view of delivering up the city to the French is utterly impossible; nor indeed is it likely that he had any other purpose than that of glutting at the head of a mob a devilish disposition, which, if he had lived a century earlier, would have found appropriate employment and full gratification in the service of the Holy Office.

There were many French residents in Valencia; the abominable conduct of their government toward Spain had made them objects of hatred as well as suspicion; and at the beginning of the disturbances most of them very imprudently took refuge in the citadel. Calvo denounced them to the mob as being in correspondence with Murat and the French troops, for the purpose of betraying the city. The Junta had no military force at their command; and they were too much confused or intimidated to employ that moral force which, with due exertions on the part of the magistracy, may generally be brought into action. The British Consul, Mr. Tupper, was one of their number: he went to the citadel, represented to the French the imminent danger to which they were exposed while they remained there collected as it were for slaughter, and intreated them to retire into the different convents, and name such of the

inhabitants as they supposed would be willing and able to associate for their protection. But thinking themselves safer where they were, they would not be persuaded. By this time the Canon had collected instruments enough for his bloody purpose; in a large city ruffians will never be wanting, till the police of cities, and the moral condition of the inferior classes, be very different from what they are throughout all Christendom; and that he might have sure subjects at his command, he had opened the prisons and let their inmates loose. On the 5th of June, when the evening was closing, Calvo led his rabble to the citadel, and forced some friars to accompany them. Little resistance was made by the guard; the Frenchmen were led one by one into an apartment, to be confessed by the friars, like condemned criminals, then thrust out by some of these infatuated and infuriated wretches, felled with bludgeons, and dispatched by the knife. When the Junta heard that this horrible massacre was going on, they called out the monks and friars, and sent them to the scene of slaughter, carrying the host uncovered, and with lighted tapers, chaunting as they went. At that sight the wretches ceased from their murderous work, and, smeared as they were with blood, knelt by the bodies of their dead and dying victims, in adoration. But Calvo, more obdurate than the very murderers whom he directed, called on them to complete what they had begun; he intimated to the religioners, that if they interposed in behalf of the French, they should be considered as accomplices with them, and partake their fate: and they, intimidated by the threat, and appalled by the dreadful objects before them, withdrew, . . . when that spirit of heroic devotion, which looks upon martyrdom without dismay, might surely have prevented farther bloodshed, and redeemed the Valencians from the shame of the foulest excesses by which a cause so righteous in itself was sullied.

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The massacre continued all night. A hundred and seventy-one persons were butchered; and when the day broke it was perceived that some ten or twelve of these victims were still breathing. The effect which this produced upon the murderers shows how certain it is that the religioners would have softened them, had there been one man among them with the spirit of a martyr. Struck with compassion, and without making their intention known to Calvo, as if they knew him to be immitigable, they removed these poor sufferers to the hospital, and assisted in binding up the wounds which they had made. There still remained about an hundred and fifty French in the citadel; the mob, satiated with blood, and now open to feelings of humanity, determined upon sparing them, and removing them to a place of safety. The Canon consented to this, which it might have been dangerous to oppose; but his lust for blood was still unsatiated. He ordered all the French to be confessed before they left the citadel, then fastened them two by two with ropes, and marched them out toward the place appointed. On the way he halted the mob, and holding up a paper, declared that it had been found in the pocket of one of the Frenchmen, and that it contained an engagement on the part of his countrymen in that city, to deliver it up as soon as an army should appear before it. The multitude, with whom bold assertions, if according with their passions or prejudices, always pass for proofs, believed this preposterous charge; and with renewed ferocity falling upon the remnant whom they had resolved to spare, massacred them all. Calvo then led them to the houses of the French, in search of those who had remained at home, when the greater number took shelter in the citadel; these also were dragged from their hiding places, and in the same deliberate manner confessed and butchered. One circumstance alone occurred which may relieve the horror of this dreadful narrative. M. Pierre Bergiere

had acquired a large fortune in Valencia, and was remarkable for his singular charity. It was not enough for him to assist the poor and the sick and the prisoner with continual alms, he visited them, and ministered to their wants himself in the sick room and in the dungeon. Yet his well-known virtues did not exempt him from the general proscription of his countrymen, and he too having been confessed and absolved, was thrust out to the murderers. The wretch who was about to strike him was one whom he had frequently relieved in prison, and upon recognizing him withheld his arm; calling however to mind that Bergiere was a Frenchman, he raised it again; but his heart again smote him, and saying, "Art thou a Devil or a Saint, that I cannot kill thee?" he pulled him through the crowd, and made way for his escape.

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During these atrocities the Junta seem to have been panic-stricken, making no effort to exert an authority which never was so much needed. The Canon was not satisfied with this timid and unwilling acquiescence; he wished to involve them in the responsibility for these wholesale murders, or to bring them into discredit and danger by making them act in opposition to the wishes of the multitude whom he guided. With these views he commanded five Frenchmen to be led to the door of the hall wherein they held their sittings, and sent in a messenger to ask in his name for a written order to put them to death. The intention was readily understood, but the moment was not yet come for acting decisively against this merciless demagogue, and the Conde de Cervellon replied, "You have killed many Frenchmen without an order, and none can be wanted now." Mr. Tupper went out to the assassins, and addressed them on behalf of the prisoners; he was struck at with a knife by one who called him a Frenchman himself; the blow was parried, voices were heard crying that he was an Englishman, and one

CHAP. man declared he would put to death the first person who should
VI. offer violence to the English Consul. But any interposition
1808. for the miserable French was in vain ; they were knocked down
June. and stabbed, and their bodies were left upon the steps of the
 hall. There were still several Frenchmen concealed in the city,
 who were in danger every moment of being discovered and
 massacred. Mr. Tupper, when he found that all appeals to the
 humanity of the mob were unavailing, had recourse to a dif-
 ferent method, and proposed to an assembly of ruffians, armed
 with the knives which they had already used in murder, and
 were eager to use again in the same service, that the survivors
 should be given up to him, that he might send them prisoners
 to England, promising in exchange for them a supply of arms
 and ammunition from Gibraltar. By this means their lives
 were preserved.

*Punish-
ment of the
assassins.*

The canon Calvo was now in that state of insanity which is
 sometimes produced by the possession of unlimited authority.
 He declared himself the supreme and only representative of
 King Ferdinand, and was about to issue orders for dismissing
 the Conde de Cervellon from his rank as Captain-general, dis-
 solving the Junta, and putting the Archbishop to death. A
 sense of their own imminent danger then roused the Junta.
 They invited him to join them, and assist at their deliberations.
 He came, followed by a crowd of ruffians, who filled the avenues
 when he entered the hall : he demeaned himself insolently, and
 threatened the assembly, till P. Rico, a Franciscan, one of the
 most active and intrepid in the national cause, rose and called
 their attention to a matter upon which the safety of the city de-
 pended; and then denounced the Canon as a traitor, and called
 upon the members immediately to arrest him. Calvo was con-
 founded at this attack, . . when he recovered himself he proposed
 to retire while the Junta were investigating his conduct; they

well understood his intention, and voted that he should immediately be sent in irons to Majorca ; and before the mob, who at his bidding would have massacred the Junta, knew that he had been accused, he was conducted secretly under a strong guard to the mole, put in chains, and embarked for that island. The Junta then acted with vigour and severity: they seized about two hundred of the assassins, had them strangled in prison, and exposed their bodies upon a scaffold. The Canon was afterwards brought back and suffered the same deserved fate. What confession he made was not known ; he would not permit the priest to reveal it, farther than an acknowledgement that God and his crimes had brought him to that end.

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*Sir J. Carr's
Travels, p.
255—266.*

The Valencians, as soon as they were delivered from the tyranny of this frantic demagogue, prepared vigorously for defence. They burnt the paper money which had been stamped in Murat's name, and stopped several chests of specie which were on the way to Madrid. The Catalans were not able to exert themselves with equal effect, because Barcelona, the second city of the kingdom in population, but in commercial and military importance the first, was in the hands of the French ; but where the people were not controlled by the immediate presence of the enemy they declared themselves with a spirit worthy of their ancestors. The decrees from Bayonne and the edicts of Murat were publicly burnt at Manresa. The Governor of Tortosa, D. Santiago de Guzman y Villoria, was murdered by the raging populace, and that city declared against the intrusive government. Duhesme thought to secure Lerida by sending the Spanish regiment of Estremadura to occupy the citadel ; he expected that, being Spaniards, no objection would be made to admitting them, and an order for relieving them by French troops might afterwards be obtained from the government at Madrid. But the people of Lerida refused to let them enter,

*Duhesme
fails in at-
tempting to
occupy Le-
rida.*

CHAP. VI. in wrongful, though at that time necessary distrust; and the regiment, glad to find itself at liberty, took up its quarters at 1808. Tarrega, waiting to see where it might be employed with most advantage in the service of its country. They were soon invited to Zaragoza. It was for the purpose of keeping open a communication with that city that Duhesme had wished to occupy Lerida; and if both places had been secured, the French would then have had military possession of all the Pyrenean provinces.

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Cabañas.
Hist. del
Ejército de
Cataluña.
Part i. p.
23, 24.

Palafox
escapes
from Bay-
onne to Za-
ragoza.

Among the persons who accompanied Ferdinand to Bayonne was D. Joseph Palafox y Melzi, the youngest of three brothers, of one of the most distinguished families in Aragon. He was about thirty-four years of age, and had been from boyhood in the Spanish guards without ever having seen actual service; in Madrid, where he had mostly passed his time, he was only remarkable for a certain foppishness in his appearance, and in ordinary times he might have passed through life as an ordinary man, without any pretensions to moral or intellectual rank. After the tumults at Aranjuez he was appointed second in command there, under the Marquis de Castellar, to whose custody the Prince of the Peace was committed. Not being regarded at Bayonne as a person whom it was necessary to secure, he found means to escape in the disguise of a peasant, and in that dress arrived safely at a country house belonging to his family, at Alfranca, about two miles from Zaragoza. That city was in a perturbed state, . . the people restless, indignant, and eager to act against the enemy; the magistrates, and the Captain-general of Aragon, D. Jorge Juan Guillermi, desirous of maintaining order, and ready in regular course of office to obey the instructions which they received from Madrid, not scrupulous from what authority they came, while it was through the accustomed channels. The arrival of Palafox at such a time excited the hopes and the expectations of the Zaragozans. That he was

hostile to the intended usurpation was certain, he would not otherwise have exposed himself to danger in escaping from Bayonne; that he came with the intention of serving Ferdinand was to be presumed, . . perhaps with secret instructions from him; it was even rumoured that Ferdinand himself had miraculously made his escape, and was now concealed in the house of the faithful companion of his flight. This report was too romantic to obtain belief, except among the most credulous of the ignorant. Palafox however was so popular, and the impatience of the people discovered itself so plainly, and their wishes so evidently looked to him as the man whom they would fain have for their leader, that though he used no means direct or indirect for encouraging this disposition, the Captain-general thought proper to send him an order to quit the kingdom of Aragon. Despotic as the system of administration had been throughout all Spain, such an order to a man of Palafox's rank, in his own country, would have been deemed at any time a most unfit exertion of authority. Under the present circumstances it evinced the determination of General Guillermi to support the intrusive government, and hastened the insurrection which he apprehended, but was unable to avert.

Two men of strong national feeling and great hardihood had obtained at this time an ascendancy over the populace; Tio Jorge the one was called, the other Tio Marin, . . *Tio*, or uncle, being the appellation by which men in the lower classes who have passed the middle age are familiarly addressed in that part of Spain. These persons, on the morning of the 24th of May, at the head of a multitude of peasants from the parishes of S. Madaleña and S. Pablo, proceeded to the Governor's palace, crying out, Down with Murat! Ferdinand for ever! They disarmed the guard, made their way into his apartment, and required him to accompany them to the arsenal, and give orders

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Insurrection in that city.

CHAP. VI. for distributing arms to the people ; a great quantity, they said, had been sold to the French. It was in vain that Guillermi defended himself against this absurd accusation, and pleaded his age and services and honourable wounds : his conduct towards Palafox had unequivocally shown what part he was disposed to take in this crisis of his country. But the Zaragozans, less inhuman than the populace in many other places, contented themselves with securing him in the old castle of the Aljaferia, which was used for a military prison as well as for a depot of artillery. The second in command, Lieutenant-general Mori, who was an Italian by birth, was then regarded as his successor, rather by right of seniority, than for any confidence on the part of the people ; for though his name was shouted with loud *Vivas*, ominous intimations accompanied these shouts, that if he did not demean himself to their satisfaction, the cry would be, Down with Mori, as it had been, Down with Guillermi. A Junta was formed, but though the most respectable persons were chosen, the people continued to act for themselves. Still it was with greater moderation than had been evinced elsewhere ; a cry was raised against the French inhabitants ; and they were conducted to the citadel, more for their own security than for that of the city .

*Palafox
made cap-
tain-gene-
ral.*

Tio Jorge and a party of peasants, now armed from the arsenal, went to Alfranca, and invited Palafox into Zaragoza ; he showed no disposition to accept their invitation, and they would have taken him with them against his consent, if General Mori, feeling the instability of his own power, had not written to solicit his assistance. The next morning, when he appeared in the Council, he requested that some means might be taken for delivering him from the importunities of the people, protesting that he was ready to devote all his exertions, and his life also, if that sacrifice should be required, to his country and his King. The

people who surrounded the door were now calling out that Palafox should be appointed Captain-general; they burst into the Council with this cry. Mörí gladly declared himself willing to resign the office if his services were no longer necessary, and Palafox was thus invested with the command.

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The city was in this state when Jovellanos, having been released on the accession of Ferdinand from his long and iniquitous imprisonment in Majorca, arrived there on the way from Barcelona to Asturias, his native province. The insurrection in Catalonia had not broken out when he commenced his journey, but every where the storm was gathering; travellers of his appearance were every where regarded with curiosity and suspicion; and when desirous, because of his infirm age and broken health, to avoid the noise of a tumultuous city and the inconvenience of unnecessary delay, he would have past on without entering the gates, a jealous mob surrounded the carriage. Hearing that it came from Barcelona, some were for searching the strangers, others for conducting them before the new Captain-general to be examined; presently however he was recognized, the name of Jovellanos was pronounced; He is a good man, he must stay with us, was then the cry; and he was conducted as in triumph to the palace. Palafox also intreated this eminent and irreproachable man to remain in Zaragoza and assist him with his advice; but Jovellanos pleaded infirmities brought on more by sufferings than by years, and the necessity of retirement and tranquillity for a broken constitution. Among the persons who were then with the greatest zeal assisting Palafox in his preparations for war, was the Conde de Cabarrus, a man of great reputation as a financier and political economist, remarkable alike for talents and irregularities. Jovellanos, himself the most excellent of men, had tolerated the faults of Cabarrus for the sake of the noble qualities which he

*Jovellanos
and Cabar-
rus at Za-
ragosa.*

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possessed ; and when Cabarrus, from the high favour which he enjoyed under Charles III. became in the ensuing reign an object of hatred and persecution, Jovellanos, as he had been the most disinterested of all his many friends in prosperity, was the most faithful of the few who adhered to him in his disgrace. Hitherto the love of Cabarrus for his country, his passionate desire for the improvement of its institutions, and his attachment to the principles of liberty, had never been doubted ; and now at thus meeting Jovellanos after ten years of suffering, he shed tears, less in grief for the condition of Spain, than in joy for the right old Spanish spirit which they saw reviving among the people. He promised to follow his venerable friend to Jadraque, and offered to be guided by his counsels. Jovellanos the next day proceeded on his journey, and for honour as well as protection Tio Jorge, with an escort of musqueteers, conveyed him the first stage.

Palafox declares war against France.

The situation in which Palafox was placed was equally conspicuous and perilous. To have escaped from Bayonne, and taken upon himself the command of one of the kingdoms of Spain in opposition to the usurpation, marked him in a peculiar manner for the vengeance of a tyrant who was not to be offended with impunity. The capital of Aragon was an important position, and at this time exposed to danger on all sides. The adjoining province of Navarre was in possession of the French, and it was not yet known that any resistance to them had been manifested in Catalonia. The passes of the Pyrenees, leading directly into Aragon, were open, and the main body of the French army was on the other side in and about Madrid. Thus surrounded by the enemy, and in a city which in military language would have been called defenceless, (the walls and gates of Zaragoza having for many generations been of no other use than to facilitate the collection of the customs,) Palafox declared

war against the French. The proclamation which he issued was in a style which accorded with the temper of the people. He declared that the Emperor of the French, the individuals of his family, and every French general and officer, should be held personally responsible for the safety of King Ferdinand, his brothers, and his uncle : that should the French commit any robberies, devastations, and murders, either in Madrid or any other place, no quarter should be given them : that all the acts of the existing government were illegal, and that the renunciations at Bayonne were null and void, having been extorted by oppression : that whatever might be done hereafter by the royal family in their state of duress, should for the same reason be accounted of no authority ; and that all who took an active part in these transactions should be deemed traitors to their country. And if any violence were attempted against the lives of the Royal Family, he declared that in that case the nation would make use of their elective right in favour of the Archduke Charles.

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Upon the first intelligence of the tumults at Zaragoza, the Junta of Government at Madrid, knowing how popular the name of Palafox would prove, dispatched his elder brother, the Marquis de Lazan, to inform him of the course which they were pursuing, and persuade him to use his influence for reducing the Aragonese to submission. But the Marquis, on his arrival, found that no influence could have effected this, and that Palafox had decidedly taken his part ; and he also entered heartily into the cause of his country. The Principe del Castel Franco, D. Ignacio Martinez de Villala, one of the council of Castille, and the Alcalde of the court, D. Luis Marcelino Pereyra, were sent from Bayonne upon a similar errand, with a proclamation addressed to the Zaragozans, and signed by all the Spaniards who had obeyed Buonaparte's summons as members of the Assembly of Notables. Had they reached Zaragoza the mission might

CHAP. have cost them their lives, but finding that the people of Aragon
 VI. were every where inflamed with the same hatred against the
 1808. French, they deemed it expedient to turn back.

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*Addresses
 to the peo-
 ple.*

It was believed by some of the noblest-minded Spaniards, that deeply as their countrymen resented the treachery with which the royal family had been entrapped, and the insult offered to the nation in attempting to impose upon it a foreign dynasty by force, no national opposition would have been attempted, if the slaughter at Madrid and the executions by which it was followed had not excited in the people a feeling of fiery indignation, and a desire of vengeance strong as the sense of the most intolerable private injury could have provoked. The basest creatures of the intrusive government lamented Murat's conduct in sacrificing so many victims by his military tribunal as impolitic, while they served and supported a system which began in treachery and could only be upheld by force. It was their belief that every thing must yield to force of arms, and they were incapable of estimating the moral force which was called forth in resistance. The Juntas every where appealed to public opinion, and the press every where where the French were not present, teemed with addresses to the people, in all which the massacre of Madrid was represented as a crime for which vengeance must be exacted. The Junta of Seville published one to the people of the metropolis, blessing them for the noble example they had given, and telling them that that example would be remembered in the annals of their country for their eternal honour. Seville, said they, has seen with horror that the author of your misfortunes and of ours has sent forth a proclamation in which all the facts are distorted, and he pretends that you gave the provocation when it was he who provoked you. The government had the weakness to sanction that proclamation, and give orders for circulating it, and saw

with perfect unconcern many of you put to death for a pretended violation of laws which had no existence. That proclamation said that the French blood cried for vengeance. And the Spanish blood, . . . does not it cry out for vengeance? . . . that Spanish blood shed by an army which was not ashamed to attack a disarmed and defenceless people, living under their own laws and their own King, and against whom cruelties were committed which make human nature shudder? All Spain exclaims that the Spanish blood in Madrid cries out for vengeance! Comfort yourselves! We are your brethren, we will fight like you till we perish in defence of our King and our country. Assist us with your good will, and with your prayers to that Almighty God whom we adore, and who cannot forsake us, because he never forsakes justice. And when the favourable hour arrives, exert yourselves then and throw off the ignominious yoke, which with such cruelty and such perfidiousness has been forced upon you."

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The Junta of Oviedo, in like manner, called upon the people to revenge their brethren who had been massacred; to remember their forefathers; to defend their wives and sisters and daughters; and to transmit their inheritance of independence to their children. They reminded them how Pelayo, with the mountaineers of Asturias, laid the foundation of the Spanish monarchy, and began that war against the Moors which his posterity continued for 700 years, till they had rooted out the last of the invaders. They reminded them of the Cid Campeador, Ruy Diaz de Bivar; how, when the Emperor claimed authority over Spain, and a council, where the King of Castille himself presided, discussed his pretensions, that hero refused to deliberate on such a demand, saying that the independence of Spain was established above all title; that no true Spaniard would suffer it to be brought in question; that it was to be

CHAP. VI. upheld with their lives; and that he declared himself the
VI. enemy of any man who should advise the King to derogate in
1808. one point from the honour of their free country! They re-
minded them of the baseness, the perfidy, and the cruelty which
they had already experienced from that proud and treacherous
tyrant, who arrogates (said they) to himself the title of Arbiter
of Destinies, because he has succeeded in oppressing the French
nation, without recollecting that he himself is mortal, and that
he only holds the power delegated to him for our chastisement.
Had he not, under the faith of treaties, drawn away their soldiers
to the Baltic? had he not, in the character of a friend and ally,
marched his troops into the very capital, and made himself
master of the frontier fortresses, then robbed them of their King
and the whole of their royal family, and usurped their govern-
ment? What if they perished in resisting these barbarians?
“ It is better (said they) to die in defence of your religion and
independence, and upon your own native soil, than be led bound
to slaughter, and waste your blood for the aggrandizement of
his ambition. The French conscription comprises you. If you
do not serve your country, you will be forced away to perish in
the North. We lose nothing; for, even should we fall, we shall
have freed ourselves, by a glorious death, from the intolerable
burden of a foreign yoke. What worse atrocities would the
worst savages have perpetrated, than those which the ruffians of
this tyrant have committed? They have profaned our temples,
they have massacred our brethren, they have assailed our wives;
more than 2000 of the people of Madrid, of that city where they
had been so hospitably received, they have murdered in cold
blood, for no other cause than for having defended their fa-
milies and themselves. To arms! to arms! . . . Will you bend your
necks to the yoke? Will you allow yourselves to be insulted by
injuries the most perfidious, the most wicked, the most disgrace-

ful, committed in the face of the whole world? Will you submit to the humiliating slavery which is prepared for you? To arms! to arms! . . . not like the monster who oppresses you, for the indulgence of an insatiable ambition; not, like him, to violate the law of nations and the rights of humanity, . . . not to render yourselves odious to mankind; . . . but to assist your countrymen, to rescue your King from captivity; to restore to your government liberty, energy, and vigour; to preserve your own lives and those of your children; to maintain the uncontrolled right of enjoying and disposing of your property; and to assert the independence of Spain. . . The time is come; the nation has resumed the sovereign authority, which, under such circumstances, devolves upon it. Let us be worthy of ourselves! Let us perpetuate the renown of our fathers! A whole people is more powerful than disciplined armies. Spain will inevitably conquer in a cause the most just that ever raised the deadly weapons of war; she fights, not for the concerns of a day, but for the security and happiness of ages; . . . not for an insulated privilege, but for all the rights of human nature; . . . not for temporal blessings, but for eternal happiness; . . . not for the benefit of one nation, but for all mankind, and even for France itself. Humanity does not always shudder at the sound of war, . . . the slow and interminable evils of slavery are a thousand times more to be abhorred; . . . there is a kind of peace more fatal than the field of battle, drenched with blood, and strewn with the bodies of the slain. Such is the peace in which the metropolis of Spain is held by the enemy. The most respectable citizen there is exposed to the insolence of the basest French ruffian; at every step he has to endure at least the insult of being eyed with the disdain of the conqueror towards the conquered. The inhabitants of Madrid, strangers, as it were, and by sufferance in their own houses, cannot enjoy one moment's tranquillity. The public

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CHAP. VI. festivals, established by immemorial custom, the attendance on religious ordinances, are considered as pretexts for insurrection, and threatened with being interrupted by discharges of cannon.

1808. *June.* The slightest noise makes the citizen tremble in the bosom of his family. From time to time the enemy run to arms, in order to keep up the terror impressed by the massacres of the 2d and 3d of May. Madrid is a prison, where the jailors take pleasure in terrifying the prisoners for the purpose of keeping them quiet by perpetual fear. But the Spaniards have not yet lost their country! . . . Those fields which, for so many years, have seen no steel except that of the ploughshare, are about to become the new cradle of their freedom! Life or death in such a cause, and in such times, are indifferent. You who return will be received by your country as her deliverers! and you whom Heaven has destined to secure, with your blood, the independence of our native land, . . . the honour of our women, . . . the purity of our holy faith, . . . you will not dread the anguish of the last moments. Remember what tears of grateful love will be shed over your graves, . . . what fervent prayers will be sent up for you to the Almighty Father of Mercies. Let all Spain become a camp; let her population become an armed host; let our youths fly to the defence of the state, for the son should fall before the father appears in the ranks of battle. And you, tender mothers, affectionate wives, fair maidens, do not retain within your embraces the objects of your love, until, from victory returned, they deserve your affection. They withdraw from you not to fight for a tyrant, but for their God; for a monarch worthy the veneration of his people; for yourselves, and for your companions. Instead of regretting their departure, sing ye, like Spartan women, the song of jubilee! . . . The noble matrons, the delicate maidens, even the austere religious recluse nuns, they too must take a part in this holy cause; let them send up their

prayers to Heaven for the success of our undertaking, and minister, in their domestic economy, to the necessities of their warlike sons and brethren."

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The popular faith as well as the patriotism of the Spaniards was roused. They were told to implore the aid of the Immaculate Conception; of Santiago, so often the patron and companion in victory of their ancestors; of our Lady of Battles, whose image is worshipped in the most ancient temple of Covadonga, and who had there so signally assisted Pelayo in the first great overthrow of the Moorish invaders. The fire flamed higher for this holy oil of superstition; but it was kindled and fed by noble pride, and brave shame and indignation; by the remembrance of what their forefathers had been, and the thought of what their children were to be. While the leaders thus availed themselves of popular faith, they called upon the clergy for those sacrifices which the circumstances of the country rendered necessary: "Venerable orders of religion," said they, "withhold not the supplies which are required for the common cause! If your virtue did not impel you to offer this assistance, your interest would extort it; for your political existence, . . the possession of your property, . . your individual security, . . all depend upon the issue of this war. But Spain this day receives from her favourite sons proofs of their affection and gratitude, for the riches she has bestowed, and the splendour she has conferred, for her pious generosity, and her ardent zeal, in sustaining the religion and the customs of their fathers." And to the honour of the clergy, no men exerted themselves more strenuously in the common cause; a conduct the more praiseworthy, after the submission of their Primate, and the infamous part which the Inquisition had taken.

While the other Juntas acted independently each in their province, and prepared rather for local and immediate danger than for any regular system of general defence, the Junta of

Proclamation of the Junta of Seville.

CHAP. VI. 1808. June. Seville assumed a higher authority, and took upon itself, as if by delegation, the duty of providing for the country in this extreme necessity. "The King," they said in their proclamation to the people of Spain, "to whom we all swore allegiance with emotions of joy unprecedented in history, has been decoyed from us. The fundamental laws of our monarchy are trampled under foot; our property, our customs, our wives.. all which the nation holds most dear, are threatened. Our holy religion, our only hope, is doomed to perdition, or will be reduced to mere external appearances, without support and without protection. And a foreign power has done this,.. not by dint of arms, but by deceit and treachery, by converting the very persons who call themselves the heads of our government, into instruments of these atrocious acts; persons who, either from the baseness of their sentiments, from fear, or perhaps from other motives, which time or justice will unfold, hesitate not to sacrifice their country. It therefore became necessary to break the shackles, which preyented the Spaniards from displaying that generous ardour that in all ages has covered them with glory; that noble courage, with which they have always defended their honour, their laws, their monarchs, and their religion. The people of Seville assembled accordingly on the 27th of May; and, through the medium of all their magistrates, of all their constituted authorities, and of the most respectable individuals of every rank, this Supreme Council of Government was formed, invested with all necessary powers, and charged to defend the country, the religion, the laws, and the King. We accept the heroic trust; we swear to discharge it, and we reckon on the strength and energy of the whole nation. We have again proclaimed Ferdinand VII... again sworn allegiance to him,.. sworn to die in his defence; this was the signal of happiness and union, and will prove such to all Spain.

"A Council of Government had scarce been formed, when

it violated the most sacred laws of the realm. A president was appointed without any authority whatever, and who, had he had any lawful title, hastened to forfeit it. In addition to his being a foreigner, which was a legal objection, he acted for the destruction of the very monarchy from which he received his appointment, and of the laws, which alone could sanction it. Under these circumstances we could not restrain our loyalty, much less could we violate the sacred engagements, which we had before contracted as Spaniards, as subjects, as Christians, as freemen, independent of all foreign authority and power. Nor could the interference of the first tribunal of the nation, the Council of Castille, check or control our exertions. The weakness of that Council became obvious from the wavering and contradictory proceedings which it adopted in the most momentous situation wherein the nation ever hath been placed, when the Council ought to have displayed that heroic firmness, with which numberless motives and its own honour called upon it to act. The order tamely to submit to, and circulate and obey the act of abdication in favour of a foreign prince, was the consummation of its weakness, perhaps of its infamy. That abdication was evidently void and illegal from want of authority in him who made it; the monarchy was not his, nor was Spain composed of animals subject to the absolute control of their owners; . . his accession to the throne was founded on his royal descent, and on the fundamental laws of the realm. It is void on account of the state of violence in which it was made; . . it is void, because the published act of abdication of King Ferdinand VII. and of his uncle and brother, was made in the same state of compulsion, as is expressly declared in the very act itself; . . it is void, because many royal personages, possessed of the right of inheritance to the crown, have not relinquished that right, but preserve it entire.

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“The French ruler summoned the Spanish nation : he chose such deputies as best suited his purpose, and in a despotic manner appointed them to deliberate in a foreign country on the most sacred interests of the nation, while he publicly declared that a private and respectful letter, written to him by Ferdinand VII. at the time when he was Prince of Asturias, was a criminal performance, injurious to the rights of sovereignty. It is, indeed, a heinous offence, it is rebellion, when an independent nation submits to the control of a foreign prince, and discusses in his presence, and under his decision, its most sacred rights and public welfare.

“He has resorted to many other means to deceive us. He has distributed libels to corrupt the public opinion, in which, under the strongest professions of respect for the laws, and for religion, he insults both, leaving no means untried, however infamous they may be, to bend our necks under an iron yoke, and make us his slaves. He assures the public, that the supreme pontiff and vicar of Jesus Christ approves and sanctions his proceedings ; while it is notorious, that, in sight of all Europe, he has despoiled him of his dominions, and forced him to dismiss his Cardinals, in order to prevent him from directing and governing the whole church, in the manner sanctioned by our Saviour Jesus Christ.

“Spaniards, every consideration calls on us to unite and frustrate views so atrocious. No revolution exists in Spain ; our sole object is to defend what we hold most sacred, against him, who, under the cloak of alliance, intended to wrest it from us, and who would despoil us, without fighting, of our laws, our monarchs, and our religion. Let us, therefore, sacrifice every thing to a cause so just ; and, if we are to lose our all, let us lose it fighting, and like generous men. Join, therefore, all : let us commit to the wisest among us in all the provinces the im-

portant trust of preserving the public opinion, and refuting those insolent libels which are replete with the most atrocious falsehoods. Let every one exert himself in his way; and let the church of Spain incessantly implore the assistance of the God of Hosts, whose protection is secured to us by the evident justice of our cause. Europe will applaud our efforts, and hasten to our assistance. Italy, Germany, and the whole north, suffering under the despotism of the French nation, will eagerly avail themselves of the opportunity held out to them by Spain, to shake off the yoke and recover their liberty, their laws, their monarchs, and all they have been robbed of by that nation. France herself will hasten to erase the stain of infamy which must cover the instruments of deeds so treacherous and heinous. She will not shed her blood in so vile a cause. She has already suffered too much under the idle pretext of a peace and happiness which never came, and which can never be attained but under the empire of reason, peace, religion, and laws, and in a state where the rights of other nations are respected and observed.

“Spaniards, your native country, your property, your laws, your liberty, your King, your religion, nay, your hopes in a better world, which that religion can alone devise to you and your descendants, are at stake, . . are in great and imminent danger!”

Admirable as this address is, one grievous error was committed in it, the precursor of others, and in itself of the most dangerous and fatal tendency. It was said, “that the number of the enemy’s troops was not so great as the French stated with a view of intimidating the Spaniards; and that the positions which they had taken were exactly those in which they could be conquered and defeated in the easiest manner.” Whatever momentary advantage might be hoped for by thus deceiving the people as to the extent of their danger, was sure to be counter-

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*Directions
for con-
ducting the
war.*

CHAP. VI. balanced tenfold whenever they were undeceived, as inevitably they would be. This error was the more remarkable, because they were well aware of the enemy's strength, and perceived also in what manner it was to be opposed with the greatest probability of success. For this purpose they strenuously recommended in an address concerning the conduct of the war, that all general actions should be avoided as perfectly hopeless, and in the highest degree dangerous. A war of partizans was the system which suited them; their business should be incessantly to harass the enemy; for which species of warfare the nature of the country was particularly favourable. It was indispensable, they said, that each province should have its general; but, as nothing could be done without a combined plan, it was equally indispensable that there should be three generalissimos, one commanding in Andalusia, Murcia, and Lower Estremadura; one in Galicia, Upper Estremadura, the Castilles, and Leon; one in Valencia, Aragon, and Catalonia. These generalissimos should keep up a frequent communication with each other, and with the provincial generals, that they might act by common accord, and assist each other. A particular general was required for the provinces of Madrid and La Mancha, whose only object should be to distress the enemy, to cut off their provisions, to harass them in flank and in rear, and not leave them a moment of repose. Another generalissimo was necessary for Navarre, the Biscayan provinces, Asturias, Rioja, and the north of Old Castille; this being the most important station of all. His whole business should be to prevent the entrance of French troops into Spain, and to cut off the retreat of those who were flying out of it. It was recommended that frequent proclamations should be issued, showing the people that it was better to die in defence of their liberties than to give themselves up like sheep, as their late infamous government would have done.

“ France,” said they, “ has never domineered over us, nor set foot in our territory. We have many times mastered her, not by deceit but by force of arms. We have made her kings prisoners, and we have made the nation tremble. We are the same Spaniards ; and France, and Europe, and the world, shall see that we have not degenerated from our ancestors.” They were also exhorted watchfully to confute the falsehoods which the French circulated, and particularly those which the baseness of the late government still permitted to be published in Madrid. And care was to be taken to convince the nation, that when they had freed themselves from this intestine war, the Cortes would be assembled, abuses reformed, and such laws enacted as the circumstances of the times required and experience might dictate for the public good : “ Things,” said they, “ which we Spaniards know how to do, and which we have done, as well as other nations, without any necessity that the vile French should come to instruct us, and, according to their custom, under the mask of friendship, and wishes for our happiness, contrive (for this alone they are contriving) to plunder us, to violate our women, to assassinate us, to deprive us of our liberty, our laws, and our King ; to scoff at and destroy our holy religion, as they have hitherto done, and will always continue to do, so long as that spirit of perfidy and ambition, which oppresses and tyrannizes over them, shall endure.”

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A general enrolment of men from the age of sixteen to that of forty-five was ordered by this Junta in the name of Ferdinand. They were to be divided into three classes ; the first consisted of volunteers, who were to march wherever their respective Juntas, or *Ayuntamientos*, by the direction of the Supreme Junta, might order them ; and were then either to be embodied with the regular troops, or formed into separate corps, and act with them, being in all things subject to the same duties. The

*Measures
for en-
rolling the
people.*

CHAP. VI. second class consisted of unmarried men, and those who, whether married or widowers, had no children ; these were to hold themselves ready for service in the second instance. The third class included fathers of families, persons in minor orders, and others who were employed in those offices of the church which were not indispensably necessary for public worship : this class was not to be called upon till the last extremity, when it became the duty of all to offer their lives in defence of the country. But this being the time of harvest, and it having pleased the Almighty to bless the land with an abundant one, all persons included in the second and third classes were enjoined, whatever their rank and property might be, to lend their personal service in collecting it, and this was required from those who were above the age of forty-five as well as from others : so would they deserve well of the country, and the Junta expressed their confidence that no persons would so far derogate from the generosity of the Spanish character, as to take advantage of the times, and demand an exorbitant price for day labour. There were many villages where the women reaped and performed other agricultural offices ; this they might do every where, and in so doing the Junta would consider them as rendering the greatest service to their country ; the clergy also, secular and regular, were invited to set a generous example, by taking their part in this important duty. Women, who from age, weakness, or other causes, were not capable of working in the fields, were intreated to occupy themselves in working for the hospitals, and to send their contributions to the Commissariat Office in Seville. The names of all persons who exerted themselves in this or any other manner in behalf of the general weal, should at a future time be published by the Supreme Junta, and each would then receive that praise and reward which their patriotism had deserved.

The Spaniards, confiding in the indisputable justice of their cause, and being, according to the enthusiasm of the national character, warm in their expectations of splendid success, reckoned upon a great desertion from the French armies, not only of the Netherlanders, Germans, and other foreigners, who, under various forms of compulsion, had been brought into the tyrant's service, but also of the French themselves. An outrage so unprovoked and monstrous, so flagrant a breach of faith, an act of usurpation effected with such unparalleled perfidiousness, and then with such matchless effrontery avowed, must, they thought, even among the French themselves, excite a sense of honour and of indignation which would prevent them from becoming the instruments of so infamous an injustice. In many of their proclamations therefore they distinguished between Buonaparte and the people over whom he ruled, calling the French an enlightened, a generous, and an honourable nation, and declaring a belief that they as well as the Spaniards desired the destruction of the tyrant by whom they were at once oppressed and disgraced. They expressed a hope that the success of the Spaniards might encourage the French people for their own sakes, and for the sake of universal justice, to offer him up as a victim, and by that sacrifice expiate the shame which he through his acts of treachery and blood had brought upon France. "Let it not be supposed," they said, "that all Frenchmen participate in his iniquities! Even in the armies of this barbarian we know that there are some individuals, worthy of compassion, who, amidst all the evil where-with they are surrounded, still cherish in their hearts the seeds of virtue." The Junta of Seville published an address to the French army, inviting the soldiers, whether French or of any other nation, to join with them, and promising them, at the end of the war, each an allotment of land as the reward for his services.

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*Appeal to
the French
soldiers.*

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*Movements
of the
French
against
the insur-
gents.*

As the Spaniards were too sanguine in relying upon the general enthusiasm which was displayed throughout the nation, so the French, on the other hand, more unreasonably regarded it with contempt. Having defeated and humbled the greatest military powers in Europe, they looked upon the Spanish insurgents as a rabble whom it was rather their business to punish than to contend with. It was fortunate for the Spaniards that they had no force at this time considerable enough to be called an army; the enemy knew not where to strike an effective blow, when the people were in commotion and in arms every where, but nowhere in the field. Their object therefore was to get possession of the provincial capitals, that the authority every where might be in their hands as it was in the metropolis. With this intent General Dupont with a considerable force was sent from Madrid to Andalusia, there to occupy Seville and Cadiz, and thereby crush the insurrection where it appeared to be gaining most strength. Marshal Moncey with his corps marched upon Valencia. General Lefebvre Desnouettes was sent from Pamplona against Zaragoza. Marshal Bessieres dispatched detachments against Logroño, Santander, Segovia, and Valladolid. And Duhesme in Catalonia sent General Schwartz against Manresa, and General Chabron against Tarragona, while he himself prepared to march against the armed Catalans.

*Murat
leaves
Spain.*

Murat meantime had left Spain. Before he had well recovered from a severe attack of the Madrid colic an intermittent fever supervened, and when that was removed he was ordered by his physicians to the warm baths of Bareges. The Duc de Rovigo, General Savary, who had acted so considerable a part in decoying Ferdinand to Bayonne, succeeded in the command. It happened at this time that several French soldiers, after drinking wine in the public houses at Madrid, died, some almost immediately, others after a short illness, under unequivocal

*Several
Frenchmen
poisoned by
the wine.*

symptoms of poison. Baron Larrey, who was at the head of the medical staff, acted with great prudence on this occasion. He sent for wine from different *ventas*, analyzed it, and detected narcotic ingredients in all; and he ascertained upon full inquiry that these substances, of which laurel-water was one, were as commonly used to flavour and strengthen the Spanish wines, as litharge is to correct acidity in the lighter wines of France. The natives were accustomed to it from their youth; they frequently mixed their wine with water, and moreover the practice of smoking over their liquor tended to counteract its narcotic effects by stimulating the stomach and the intestines: it was therefore not surprising that they could drink it with safety; though it proved fatal* to a few strangers. M. Larrey therefore justly concluded that there had been no intention of poisoning the French; if such a suspicion had been intimated, execrated as they knew themselves to be, the troops would readily have believed it; and a bloodier massacre than that of the 2d of May must have ensued.

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* This opinion of M. Larrey is confirmed by some cases of death produced by cordial waters which occurred, I think, at Dublin, a few years ago. An account was published in some journal, but I cannot refer to it, having met with it in the course of chance-reading, and not thinking at the time that I should ever have occasion to notice it. Except that the dose was stronger, the cases are precisely in point: and they show also, which is equally in point, that poisons of this kind which prove fatal in some instances, are taken with perfect impunity in many others.

CHAPTER VII.

ASSEMBLY OF NOTABLES AT BAYONNE. CONSTITUTION OF
BAYONNE. THE INTRUSIVE KING ENTERS SPAIN. BUONAPARTE RETURNS TO PARIS.

1808.

June.

The Notables assembled at Bayonne.

Azanza appointed president.

BUONAPARTE meantime regarded the insurrection of the Spaniards with apparent indifference: as yet he was too little acquainted with the nature of the country and the national character to apprehend any difficulty in reducing them to submission, and he proceeded to regulate the affairs of Spain as if the kingdom were completely at his disposal. Of the Notables who were ordered to Bayonne, some had been nominated by Murat, others delegated by the respective provinces, cities, or bodies, which they were to represent. The Archbishops of Burgos and Seville were summoned; several bishops, the generals of all the religious orders, and about twenty of the inferior clergy. Most of the Grandees were summoned, and some of the titular nobles to represent the nobility. Some cities were to choose representatives for the *Cavalleros*, or gentry, others for the commercial part of the people. Deputies were also named for Cuba, Mexico, Guatemala, Peru, Buenos Ayres, and the Nuevo Reyno de Granada, each being a native of the province which he was called upon to represent. Azanza had been sent for by Buonaparte to give him information concerning the royal property; he was appointed president of the assembly, and considering the sentence of the old dynasty as irrevocably passed, devoted himself to the service of the new.

Urquijo also was summoned from his retirement. Not having been implicated in the intrigues of Ferdinand's party, nor in their subsequent errors, he was more at liberty to choose his part; he had warned Ferdinand of the snare, and he had sufficient foresight to feel assured that Buonaparte's intentions could not be effected without a severer struggle than had entered into his calculations. Had it been possible, he would have chosen to keep aloof and remain in tranquillity. But of tranquillity there was now no hope; and reluctantly obeying a third order, he repaired to Bayonne, persuading himself, that as the usurpation could not be prevented, the wisest course was to profit as much as possible by the change. For it was possible, he thought, to stipulate for conditions with the new dynasty, and dictate laws, and establish institutions, which would enable Spain to resume that rank among nations, to which the position and size and natural advantages of the country entitled it. Thus he deceived himself. Urquijo had always been too confident of his own talents; he wanted that unerring principle of religion which allows of no compromise with iniquity; and having in his youth entered heartily into the cause of revolutionary France, the theoretical republican ended in becoming a prime agent of the military despot of France, for the subjugation of his own country.

On his arrival he perceived that Buonaparte was very ill acquainted with the real state of Spain and the spirit which possessed the Spaniards; but he perceived also, that, like the people whom he had provoked, he was fixed in his purposes, and resolute in going through with what he had once begun. Urquijo truly and fairly represented to him the general discontent, the activity of the clergy, and more especially the regulars, in exciting the nation to arms, the probability of an obstinate and bloody struggle, and the likelihood that Austria would take ad-

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*Urquijo
summoned
by Buona-
parte.*

*He repre-
sents the
state of
Spain to
Buonaparte.*

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vantage of it to renew the war, and that Russia would not remain inactive. These representations made no impression upon Buonaparte; he let Urquijo understand that the Emperor of Russia had given his consent to the deposition of the Bourbons, and the substitution of one of his family, when the peace of Tilsit was concluded; he spoke with severe contempt of Charles and Ferdinand and their ministers, especially Godoy, who in the last transactions at Bayonne had seemed solicitous for nothing but his own pension; he said he could have no reliance upon that family; and as to the opposition of the Spaniards, he plainly declared, that if they refused to acknowledge his brother for their King, he would dismember their country, or make an absolute conquest of it. If this language had been addressed to Urquijo from a distance, a generous indignation, an honest impulse of national feeling, might have saved him from dishonour. But he was within the magician's circle; the frankness of the Emperor made him forgive his former treachery; . . . towards him there was no duplicity or reserve; and when Buonaparte said that his brother would select the best and ablest men in Spain for his ministers, and added that he reckoned upon him, Urquijo confessed within himself, that though he desired repose, and foresaw danger, he should be compelled to accept of office.

*Nellerto.
Mem. t. 2,
Nos. 59, 67.*

*Arrival of
Joseph Buona-
naparte.*

June 6.

Mazarredo was appointed minister of the marine, Azanza minister of finance, and General Cuesta viceroy of Mexico. These appointments were made before Joseph's arrival; and when he was within a day's journey of Bayonne, Buonaparte issued a decree proclaiming him King of Spain and of the Indies, and guaranteeing to him the independence and integrity of his dominions in the four quarters of the world. Joseph Buonaparte was an inoffensive unambitious man, who, if he had been permitted to continue in a private station, would have gone

through life obscurely and not unworthily, loved and respected by his family and friends. He had made himself popular at Naples, though the people of that city were attached to their legitimate King; and being established there with little of the responsibility, and none of the cares of government, he very unwillingly obeyed Napoleon's summons to Bayonne. Lucien's advice accorded entirely with his own feelings; and he came still with an intention of refusing the crown of Spain; but Napoleon, who was sure of his obedience, cared little for his consent or inclination; and when he arrived on the evening after the proclamation, he was received as King. The Emperor went out to meet him, and brought him in great state to the Castle of Marrac. A deputation of the Grandees waited upon him, and the Duke del Infantado, at their head, assured him of the joy which they felt in presenting themselves before him. His presence, they said, was eagerly desired to fix all opinions, conciliate all interests, and re-establish that order which was necessary for the restoration of Spain. The Grandees of that country had been celebrated in all times for fidelity to their sovereign; and he would find in them the same fidelity and the same devotion. In like manner he was addressed by deputations from the Council of Castille, from the Councils of the Inquisition, the Indies, and the Treasury, and from the army. They told him, the immensity of glory which was accumulated upon the head of his imperial brother had obscured that of all the heroes of antiquity; and that the choice which Napoleon had made of his august person, announced him to be endowed with those great qualities whereby thrones are supported and sceptres * established.

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The Notables receive him as King.

* M. De Pradt says these addresses were previously submitted to Buonaparte, and he was not satisfied with that of the Grandees, which expressed wishes for the happi-

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Address of
the Notables
to the Span-
ish nation.

Buonaparte required from these deputies, as their next service, an address to their countrymen, exhorting them to acknowledge the new King, and warning them of the evils of resistance, and the impossibility of making any successful opposition. "Dear Spaniards," they said, "worthy compatriots, your families, your hearths, your fortunes, your property, your lives, are as dear and as precious to us as our own! We have been like you faithful and devoted to our former dynasty, till the term arrived which had been fixed by Providence, the absolute disposer of crowns and sceptres. The irresistible call of duty, and the desire of your welfare, has brought us to the presence of the invincible Emperor of France. We confess to you that the sight of his glory and his power might have dazzled us; yet we had determined to lay our supplications before him for the general good of our country. What was our surprise, when he prevented us, by proofs of benevolence and goodness, the more to be admired because of the greatness of his power! He has no other view than for our happiness. The sovereign whom

ness of Joseph and Spain, but contained no direct acknowledgement of him. *Une bonne reconnaissance, bien formelle, bien prononcée, était ce qu'il fallait à Napoleon.* He lost his temper, and was heard to say to Infantado, No tergiversation, Sir! acknowledge him plainly, or plainly refuse to do it. *Il faut être grand dans le crime comme dans la vertu.* Do you choose to return to Spain and place yourself at the head of the insurgents? I give you my word to send you there in safety; but I will tell you, that in eight days, . . . no, . . . in four and twenty hours, you shall be shot. The Duke excused himself upon the plea of composing in a language of which he was not master, and amended the address.

I have not such implicit reliance upon the authority of M. De Pradt as to insert this in the text. The Duque del Infantado and the other persons who had been trepanned with Ferdinand, were compelled to commit themselves in so many ways, that it would have been very useless to have equivocated in a single instance. No men were ever more justified in disclaiming as their own acts what had been done under manifest compulsion.

he gives us is his august brother Joseph, whose virtues are the admiration of his subjects." They proceeded to enumerate the blessings which he would confer upon them in the improvement of their finances, agriculture, and resources of every kind, the restoration of their military and naval strength, and the preservation of their religion in its exclusive purity. "And what," they asked, "is the recompense which the great Emperor of the French requires from you in circumstances so important to the whole nation? That you remain quiet; that you take care of your families and your own concerns; that you do not abandon yourselves blindly to the dreadful disorders which are inseparable from popular commotions; that you wait with peaceable confidence that melioration of your fortune which you may expect from a virtuous monarch. Spaniards, look to yourselves and to your innocent children! What fruit can you hope to reap from the disturbances which rashness and malevolence are exciting? Anarchy is the severest of all chastisements which the Almighty inflicts upon mankind. No one disputes your courage; but without direction, without order, without unanimity, all efforts will be vain. The most numerous forces that you can embody would disappear before disciplined soldiers like smoke before the wind. Flatter not yourselves with the thought of possible success in such a contest; it is unequal in means if not in valour; you must be overcome, and then all would be lost. There is no safety for the state but in uniting ourselves with all our hearts to the new government, and assisting it in the work of regenerating the country. We are come to a miserable situation, brought to it by the capricious, indolent, unjust government under which we have lived for the last twenty years. It remains for us all to submit, and each to co-operate in his place for the formation of a new one, upon principles which will be the security of our liberties and rights and property. This is the

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*June.**Proclamation of the intrusive King.**June 10.*

desire of the invincible Napoleon, who occupies himself for our good, who wishes to deserve well of our nation, and to be called by our descendants the regenerator of Spain."

The men who prepared this address to their countrymen, in obedience to Buonaparte's commands, must have known with what scorn and indignation it would be received. The first act of the intrusive King was not likely to diminish those feelings; it was a decree in which, premising that he had accepted the cession of the crown of Spain made in his favour by his well-beloved brother the Emperor Napoleon the First, he nominated Murat for his Lieutenant-general. If Napoleon had considered the interest of his brother he would rather have recalled Murat with some implied displeasure, as if in putting so many Spaniards to death after the insurrection, he had acted with needless and unauthorized severity: but he had determined upon reducing the people to submission by intimidation and force. Joseph announced his accession by a proclamation of the same date. In opening to him so vast a career, Providence, he said, without doubt had judged of his intentions, and would enable him to provide for the happiness of the generous people whom it confided to his care. Aided by the clergy, the nobles, and the people, he hoped to renew the time when the whole world was full of the glory of the Spanish name. Above all, he desired to establish tranquillity and happiness in the bosom of every family by a wise social organization. The spirit of his government would be to improve the public good with the least possible injury to individual interests. It was for the Spaniards that he reigned, not for himself.

The Bishop of Orense's reply to his summons.

About ninety Notables had now assembled at Bayonne, including those who had been decoyed thither with Ferdinand. A much greater number had been convoked; but some dared not undertake the journey, for fear of the people, who would

justly have regarded them as traitors for obeying the summons; and others engaged heartily in the national cause. The Bishop of Orense, D. Pedro Quevedo y Quintana, was one of the persons whom the Junta of Government had summoned; and he declined obedience in a letter of calm and dignified remonstrance, which produced as much effect upon the people as the most animated military address, and which those who hoped or affected to hope for any melioration of the state of Spain by Buonaparte's means could not have perused without a sense of shame. Impressive as this composition was, it derived additional weight from the character of the writer, for the Bishop of Orense was one of those prelates whose truly Christian virtues are the proudest boast and the truest glory of the Catholic church. During the dreadful years of the French revolution he received into his palace three hundred of the emigrant clergy; there he lodged and supported them, and lived with them at the same table, refusing to partake of any indulgence himself which could not be extended to these numerous guests. It was not possible for him, he said, infirm as he was, and at the age of seventy-three, to undertake so long a journey upon so sudden a notice. But bearing in mind the good of the nation, and the intentions of the Emperor, who desired to be as it were its angel of peace, its tutelary spirit, . . he would take the opportunity of saying to the Junta, and through them to the Emperor, what, if he were in person at Bayonne, he should there have said and protested. The business there to be treated is of remedying evils, repairing injuries, improving the condition of the nation and the monarchy : . . but upon what bases ? Is there any approved means for doing this, any authority recognized by the nation ? Will she enslave herself, and by that means expect her safety ? Are there not diseases which are aggravated by medicine, and of which it has been said, *tangant vulnera sacra*

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CHAP. *nullæ manus?* And does it not appear that those of the Royal
 VII. Family are of this kind, and have they not been so aggravated by
 1808. the treatment which they have received from their powerful protector, the Emperor Napoleon, that their case is now desperate?
 June. The Royal Family had been sent into the interior of France, . . of that country which had banished it for ever; sent back to its primitive cradle, it found a grave there by a cruel death, where its elder branch was cruelly cut off by an insane and sanguinary revolution. And this having been done, what could Spain hope for? Would her cure be more favourable? The means and the medicines did not promise it. He proceeded to say, that the abdications made at Bayonne could not be believed, and appeared to be impossible; that they could not be valid unless they were renewed and ratified by the Kings and the Infantes in their own country, and in perfect freedom from all constraint and fear. Nothing would be so glorious for Napoleon as to restore them to Spain, and to provide that in a general Cortes they might act according to their free choice; and that the nation, independent and sovereign as it was, might then proceed to recognize for its lawful King the person whom nature, right, and circumstances, should call to the Spanish throne. This indeed would be more honourable for the Emperor than all his victories and laurels. This indeed would deliver Spain from the dreadful calamities which threatened her; then might she recover from all her evils, and giving thanks to God, return also the most sincere gratitude to her saviour and true protector, *then* the greatest of all Emperors, the moderate, the magnanimous, the beneficent Napoleon the Great.

At present, said the venerable prelate, Spain cannot but behold him under a very different aspect. She sees in him the oppressor of her Princes and of herself. She looks upon herself as fettered and enslaved, when happiness is promised her, . .

and this by force even more than by artifice, . . . by armies which were received as friends, either through indiscretion and timidity, or perhaps by treason. These representations he laid before the Junta in the discharge of his duty as one of the King's counsellors, that office being attached to the episcopal order in Spain : and he desired that they might be submitted to the great Napoleon. " Hitherto," said he, " I have relied upon the rectitude of his heart, as being free from ambition and averse to deceit. And still I hope that, perceiving Spain cannot be benefited by enslaving her, he will not persist in applying remedies to her in chains, for she is not mad."

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The want of any legitimate authority in the Junta of Notables to legislate for the nation was so palpable, even to the members themselves, that their president, Azanza, represented to Buonaparte, as an advisable measure, to convoke a Cortes in the usual form, and within the kingdom. But it was too late for this; the name of a Cortes, and the appearance of free deliberation, could no longer delude the Spaniards, after the forced abdications at Bayonne and the slaughter at Madrid. Buonaparte maintained that the consent of the nation would supply the want of any formalities which could not be observed in the existing circumstances ; he delivered to Azanza the project of a constitution, and ordered him to appoint two committees, who should arrange the subject for discussion, and propose such alterations and modifications as they might deem convenient. Azanza and those who acted with him had flattered themselves that they should make terms with the new dynasty, and secure to their country a free representative government ; but they now found that they were to receive a constitution as well as a King from the will and pleasure of Buonaparte. Nevertheless Azanza congratulated the Junta at their first sitting on the delightful and glorious task to which they were called, of contributing to the

*Buonaparte
delivers a
constitution
to Azanza.*

*Speech of
Azanza at
the opening
of their sit-
tings.*

CHAP. happiness of their country in labouring for the good of the pre-
 VII. sent generation and of posterity, by the order and under the
 1808. auspices of the hero of their age, the invincible Napoleon. Thanks
 June. and immortal glory, said he, to that extraordinary man who re-
 stores to us a country which we had lost! He spoke of the long
 misgovernment by which Spain had been degraded under a suc-
 cession first of crafty then of imbecile sovereigns, till the last of
 their kings had resigned his rights to a Prince who, for their
 happiness, united in himself all the talents and resources re-
 quired for restoring her to her former prosperity. He called
 upon them to sacrifice some privileges, which for the most part
 were but imaginary, upon the altar of their country, and to
 construct a monument at once simple and grand in place of the
 Gothic and complicated structure of their former government.
 He told them that it was in their power, by their collective re-
 presentatives, and by their individual efforts, to do much towards
 appeasing the agitation which prevailed in many parts of the
 kingdom. Misguided men, without plan, without accord, with-
 out object, were acting in a manner from which nothing but
 ruin and desolation could ensue. Certain as the Junta were of
 that truth, it must be their business to convince others of it who
 were now deluded. Thus should they render their labours
 useful, and fulfil the generous designs of the hero who had con-
 voked them; Spain would recover her ancient glory, and they
 would have the sweet satisfaction hereafter of thinking that they
 had contributed to it.

*Address of
 the Notables
 to King
 Joseph.*

The first sitting was employed in forming an address to King Joseph, and the business of the second was to present it. The glorious task which had been imposed upon them, they said, was to lay the foundations of durable happiness for their beloved country; was it not then their first duty to come before the chief of the Spanish nation, the centre of all their hopes,

and devote themselves in his presence with the utmost zeal and ardour to the work? They noticed the disturbances in Spain as momentary troubles, occasioned by the error of the people, who never reflect, and who are worthy of commiseration when they return to their duty. The Intruder replied, that he wished to remain ignorant of these tumults, and to find none but Spanish hearts beyond the Pyrenees. In quitting a people who did justice to his government, he had made the greatest of sacrifices; he said; but, from his own feelings, he anticipated the love of the Spaniards. He knew the wisdom and the loyalty of the Castillian character. He would visit his provinces, bearing with him the heart of a father, and he should meet with none but his children. The enemies of the Continent (so in his brother's manner he designated the English) were endeavouring to detach the colonies from the mother country, but the agents and instruments of this crafty hatred should not be spared. He concluded by desiring them in their deliberations to regard nothing but the good of the country, and to reckon upon the blessings of the people, and upon his entire satisfaction.

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Ten other sittings completed the business of the Junta, who had little time allowed them for their discussions, and less power. Some alterations they were permitted to make in minor points, but the principle and form of the constitution were of Buonaparte's stamp. It was promulgated by the Intruder as the fundamental law of the kingdoms, and the basis of the compact whereby his people were bound to him, and he to his people. The first article declared that the Catholic Apostolic and Roman religion should be the religion of the King and of the nation in Spain and in all the Spanish possessions, and no other should be permitted. The Salic law of succession was established, as in France; in failure of legitimate male descendants to Joseph, the crown was to devolve on Napoleon, and his heirs male, whether

*The Bay-
onne consti-
tution.*

Religion.

*The succe-
sion.*

CHAP. natural and legitimate, or adopted ; in their default to Louis and
 VII. Jerome, and their heirs in succession, Lucien being tacitly ex-
 1808. cluded. In failure of all these, the son of the eldest daughter
 June. was to inherit ; and if the last King left no daughter who had issue
 male, the crown might then go to the person whom he should
 have appointed by his will, whether one of his nearest relations
 were chosen or any one whom he should deem most worthy to
 govern the Spaniards, but the appointment must be presented to
 the Cortes for their approbation. The crown of Spain and of
 the Indies was never to be united with any other in the same
 person. The King should be considered as a minor till he had
 completed his eighteenth year ; during a minority there should
 be a Regent, who must be at least twenty-four years old ; if the
 last King should not have nominated one among the Infantes,
 that Infante was to hold the office, who being of the age required
 was the last in succession to the throne. The Regent, like the
 King, was to be irresponsible ; and he was to have a fourth part
 of the revenues which were settled upon the crown. Should
 there be no Infante of age for the office, a Council of Regency
 was then to be composed of the seven senior senators. The
 minor King was not to be under the Regent's care, but under
 the guardianship of his mother, in case his predecessor should
 not have designated a guardian ; and if the last King had not
 appointed five senators for a Council of Tutelage, to provide for
 the education of the minor, and to be consulted in all things of
 importance relating to his person and establishment, that office
 devolved upon the five senior senators, or if there were a Coun-
 cil of Regency existing, on the five senators next in seniority to
 the members of that council.

*Patrimony
 of the
 crown.*

The palaces of Madrid, the Escorial, S. Ildefonso, Aranjuez,
 the Pardo, and others belonging to the crown, with all the parks,
 forests, inclosures, and property thereunto appertaining, were

the patrimony of the crown : if the rents of the whole did not amount to a million of *pesos fuertes*, other lands were to be added to them which would make up that sum. The public treasury was also charged with the payment of two millions of *pesos fuertes* per year to the crown, in monthly payments. The hereditary Prince became entitled to a revenue of 200,000 from the age of twelve, the other Infantes to 100,000, the Infantas to 50,000 each, charged upon the public treasury : the Queen Dowager was to have 400,000, charged upon the treasury of the crown.

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There were to be nine ministers for the departments of justice, ecclesiastic and foreign affairs, the interior, finance, war, the marine, the Indies, and general police ; and a secretary of state, with the rank of minister, by whom all decrees were to be signed. The King might at his pleasure unite the ecclesiastic department with that of justice, and the general police with that of the interior : the rank of these ministers depended upon the seniority of their appointment.

Ministry.

The Senate was to consist of the Infantes who had attained the age of eighteen, and of twenty-four individuals chosen by the King, from his ministers, the Captains-General of the army and navy, the Embassadors, Counsellors of state, and members of the Royal Council. No one was eligible till he had completed his fortieth year ; the office was for life, unless it were forfeited by the legal sentence of a competent tribunal, and it was never to be given in reversion. The president was to be named yearly by the King. In case of insurrection, or of disturbances which threatened the security of the state, the Senate might at the King's proposal suspend the constitution in the places specified, and for a certain time.

The Senate.

It belonged to the Senate to watch over the preservation of individual liberty, and of the liberty of the press. A Senatorial

Senatorial
Junta for
the pre-
servation
of personal
liberty.

CHAP. Junta of individual liberty, consisting of five members, was to
 VII. be chosen by the Senate from its own body, and to this com-
 1808. mittee all persons arrested for offences against the state, if they
 July. were not brought to trial in the course of a month from the day
 of their commitment, might appeal: should the Junta be of
 opinion that the interests of the state did not justify a longer
 imprisonment, it was to call upon the minister by whom the
 arrest was ordered, either to set the prisoner at liberty, or deliver
 him over without delay to a competent tribunal. If after three
 such consecutive applications within the space of another month
 the prisoner should neither have been discharged nor remitted
 to the ordinary tribunals, the Junta was then to require a meet-
 ing of the Senate; and the Senate, if it saw cause, was to pass
 a resolution in this form: There are strong presumptions that
 N. is arbitrarily imprisoned. The president was to lay this re-
 solution before the King; and the King was to refer it to a
 Junta, composed of the presidents of the Council of State and
 of five members of the Royal Council.

*Senatorial
 Junta of
 the liberty
 of the press.*

In like manner there was to be a Senatorial Junta of the
 liberty of the press, consisting of five senators. Authors,
 printers, and booksellers, who thought themselves aggrieved if
 they were prevented from printing or selling a work, might
 appeal to this Junta; and should the Junta be of opinion that
 the prohibition was not required by reasons of state, the minister
 by whom it had been imposed should be required to withdraw it.
 If after three consecutive applications in the course of a month
 the prohibition were not revoked, the Junta was then to summon
 the Senate, and the Senate, if it saw reason, to resolve there
 were strong presumptions that the liberty of the press had been
 violated; and this resolution was to be laid before the King,
 and by him, as in a matter of individual liberty, referred to a
 Junta whose decision was final. Periodical publications were

not entitled to the benefit of this provision. The members of these Senatorial Juntas were to be changed one every six months.

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The Council of State was to consist of not fewer than thirty members, nor more than sixty, divided into the six sections or departments of justice and ecclesiastical affairs, the interior, and general police, the finances, war, the marine, and the Indies, each section consisting of a president and four members at least, and the King presiding over the council. The hereditary Prince might assist at their sittings, from the age of fifteen. The ministers and the president of the Royal Council were by their office members, and might attend their meetings when they thought it convenient, but they were not part of any section, neither were they accounted in the appointed number. The projects of all laws civil and criminal, and the general regulations of the public administration, were to be examined and determined here; and the decrees of the King upon subjects falling within the province of the Cortes were to have the force of law (having been discussed in this council) till the next Cortes should be assembled.

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Council of
state.

The Cortes or National Junta was to consist of an hundred and sixty-two members, in one chamber, divided into the three Benches of the Clergy, the Nobles, and the People; that of the clergy was to be placed on the right of the throne, that of the nobles on the left, that of the people in front. The bench of the clergy was to be composed of twenty-five Archbishops and Bishops, that of the Nobles of twenty-five peers, who should be called *Grandees of the Cortes*: the bench of the People of sixty-two deputies for the provinces of Spain and the Indies, thirty deputies for the principal cities of Spain and the adjacent islands, fifteen commercial members, and fifteen deputies of the universities, men of learning, or distinguished by their proficiency in the sciences or the arts. The Ecclesiastical Deputies

CHAP. VII. were to be appointed by letters patent, under the great seal, and they were not to be deprived of their functions unless by the sentence of a competent tribunal, legally pronounced. The Nobles
1808. were to be appointed and hold their seats in the same manner; they were required to possess an income of not less than 20,000 *pesos fuertes*, or to have performed long and important services either in the civil or military line. Members for the provinces were to be chosen in the proportion of one representative for about 300,000 inhabitants; and the provinces were to be divided into departments with reference to this purpose, each containing a population sufficient to entitle it to elect one deputy. The manner in which the Juntas of Election were to be constituted would be established by the Cortes; till that time they should be composed of the Deans of the *Regidores* in every place which contained not less than an hundred inhabitants; and if in any departments there were not twenty places containing this population, the smaller hamlets were then to be united for the purpose of furnishing an elector, in the proportion of one for an hundred inhabitants, chosen by lot from the Deans of the *Regidores*. The other electors were the Deans of the *Curas*, or parochial clergy, in the principal places of the departments; but the number of clerical electors was never to exceed one-third of the whole Junta of Election. The President was to be named by the King, and the Juntas of Election were never to meet except by letters of convocation. The Deputies for the thirty principal cities were to be chosen one for each by the *Ayuntamiento*, or corporation. A deputy for a province or city must be possessed of landed property. The fifteen commercial Deputies were to be chosen from the Juntas of Commerce, and from among the richest and most respected merchants. The Tribunals and Juntas of Commerce in every city were to form a list of fifteen persons, and from these lists the King was to appoint the mem-

bers. He was in like manner to appoint the remaining fifteen from a list to that amount presented by the Royal Council, and from seven candidates presented by each of the universities.

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Members of the Bench of the People might be re-elected to a second Cortes, but not to a third, till an interval of three years should have elapsed. The Cortes should assemble once in three years at least ; it was to be convoked by the King, and neither deferred, prorogued, nor dissolved, but by his order. The President should be appointed by the King from three candidates whom the Cortes was to choose. At the opening of every session the Cortes was to choose these three candidates, two vice-presidents, and two secretaries, and four committees, . . of justice, of the interior, of finance, and of the Indies, consisting of five members each. The sittings of the Cortes were not to be public ; votes were to be taken vocally or by secret ballot ; and for every resolution a majority of the whole body was necessary. The opinions and votes were neither to be printed nor divulged ; such publication, whether by means of the press, or of written papers, if made by the Cortes, or any of its members, was to be considered as an act of rebellion. Every three years the amount of the annual receipts and expenditure was to be fixed by law ; which law was to be presented by orators of the Council of State for the deliberation and approbation of the Cortes. In like manner all alterations in the civil and penal codes, in the system of imposts, or of currency, were to be propounded ; and projects of laws were to be proposed by the sections of the Council of State to the respective committees of the Cortes. Accounts were to be presented annually to the Cortes by the Minister of Finance, and to be printed ; and the Cortes might make such representations as they deemed convenient upon any abuses in the administration. If they had any grave charges to prefer against a minister, the accusation and the proofs were to

CHAP. VII. be laid before the throne by a deputation; and the King was to refer it to a commission composed of six counsellors of state and six members of the Royal Council.

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The colonies.

The Spanish kingdoms and provinces in America and Asia were to enjoy the same rights as the mother country, and to trade freely with her; every kind of cultivation and industry was to be free there, and no monopoly of export or importation to be granted. Every kingdom and province should always have deputies at the seat of government, to promote their interests and to be their representatives in the Cortes. Two deputies each were to be sent by New Spain, Peru, the Nuevo Reyno de Granada, Buenos Ayres, and the Philippines; one each by the islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico, by Venezuela, Charcas, Quito, Chile, Cuzco, Guatemala, Yucatan, Guadalajara, the western internal provinces of New Spain and the eastern. These deputies were to be chosen by the *Ayuntamientos* of such places as the Viceroys or Captains-general should appoint in their respective territories; they must be natives of the respective provinces, and proprietors of land: they were to hold their places for a term of eight years, and after the expiration of that term, till their successors should arrive. Six of these deputies, chosen by the King, should be added to the Council of State and section of the Indies, to have a consultive voice in all matters relating to the colonies.

Judicatures

The Spains and the Indies were to be governed by one code of laws civil and criminal. The judicial order was to be independent, justice administered in the King's name by the courts and tribunals which he should appoint, and all corporate or private jurisdictions, such as the *Justicias de abadengo, ordenes y señorío*, were abolished. The King was to appoint all the judges, and no one could be removed from his office, unless in consequence of charges against him made by the president or

Procurador General of the Royal Council, at the Council's instance, and with the King's approbation. There were to be Conciliatory Judges forming a Tribunal of Pacification, Courts of the first instance, Audiencias or Tribunals of Appeal, a Tribunal of Reposition or Cassation for the whole kingdom, and a High Court Royal. The courts of first instance were to be as many as the country required; the tribunals of appeal for Spain and the adjacent islands, not fewer than nine nor more than fifteen. The Royal Council was to be the Tribunal of Reposition, and should also take cognizance of appeals in ecclesiastical cases. Criminal processes were to be public, and it was to be discussed in the first Cortes whether or not trial by jury should be established. Appeal might be made to the Tribunal of Reposition against a criminal sentence. The High Court Royal was to take cognizance of personal offences committed by individuals of the Royal Family, ministers, senators, and counsellors of state; there might be no appeal against its sentences, but they were not to be executed till the King should have signed them. It was to consist of the eight senior senators, the six presidents of the sections of the Council of State, the president and two vice-presidents of the Royal Council. The right of pardoning should belong to the King alone. There should be one commercial code for Spain and the Indies; and in every great commercial town a Tribunal and a Junta of commerce.

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The *Vales Reales*, *Juros*, and whatever loans the government had contracted, were acknowledged as the national debt. Custom-houses between different jurisdictions and provinces were abolished both in Spain and the Indies, and were only to exist upon the frontiers. Taxes were to be equalized throughout the kingdom, and all privileges, whether granted to corporations or individuals, were suppressed; but for those which had been purchased, an indemnification should be awarded. The public

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treasure was to be distinct from that of the crown, and under a director general appointed by the King; the accounts were to be rendered yearly, and examined and closed by a tribunal of general accounts, composed of persons whom the King should nominate. All nominations for all employments belonged to the King, or to the authorities to whom the laws confided them.

*Alliance
with
France.*

A perpetual alliance, offensive and defensive, by land and by sea, between France and Spain, was declared by this constitution; the contingent which each power was to furnish being to be determined by a particular treaty. Foreigners who had rendered important service to the state; or who might be useful to it by their talents, their invention, or their industry; and those who formed large establishments, or acquired lands for which they paid yearly taxes to the amount of fifty *pesos fuertes*, might be admitted to the rights of naturalization. Every man's house was an asylum, not to be entered except by day, and for a specific object, determined by the law, or by an order proceeding from the public authority. No person residing in the Spanish dominions should be arrested, except in *flagrante delictu*, without a legal and written order, issued by a competent authority, notified to the party, and explaining the grounds of the arrest, and the law in virtue of which it was granted. No Alcayde or jailer should receive or detain a prisoner, till he had entered in his register the warrant of committal: nor might the relations and friends of a prisoner be prevented from seeing him, if they came with an order from the magistrate, unless the judge should have given directions that the prisoner should have no communication with any person. The use of the torture was abolished; and any rigour beyond what the law enjoined was pronounced a crime.

*Security of
persons.*

*Limitation
of entails.*

All existing feoffments, entails, and substitutions, if the property did not amount by itself, or with other possessions held by the same owner, to the annual rent of 5000 *pesos fuertes*, were

abolished, and the owners were to hold it as free property. If it exceeded that value, the owner, at his choice, might ask the King's permission to make it free. If it exceeded the yearly value of 20,000 *pesos fuertes*, all above that sum should be free. In the course of one year the King would establish regulations upon this subject; and for the future no property might thus be tied up, except by virtue of the King's permission, granted in consideration of services rendered to the state, and for the purpose of perpetuating in their rank the families who should thus have deserved; but the property thus to be bound should in no case exceed the annual value of 20,000 *pesos fuertes*, nor fall short of 5000. The different degrees and classes of nobility were to be preserved with their respective distinctions; but all exemptions hitherto attached to it, from public burthens and duties, were abolished, and nobility was not to be required as a qualification for civil or ecclesiastical employment, nor for military rank either by sea or land. Services and talents were to be the only means of promotion. But no person might obtain public employment in the state or church, unless he had been born in Spain, or naturalized there. The endowments belonging to the different orders of knighthood were only to be bestowed according to their original destination, in recompense of public services; and no individual should hold more than one commandery.

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*Abolition of
privileges.*

The constitution was successively and gradually to be brought into use by decrees or edicts of the King, so that the whole should be in execution before the first of January, 1813. The particular charters of the provinces of Navarre, Biscay, Guipuzcoa and Alava, were to be examined in the first Cortes, that what should be deemed most convenient to the interest of those provinces and of the nation might be determined upon. Two years after the constitution should have been entirely car-

*Time for
introducing
the consti-
tution, and
for amend-
ing it.*

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ried into effect, the liberty of the press was to be established, and organized by a law made in the Cortes. All additions, modifications, and improvements, which it might be deemed expedient to make in this constitution, were to be presented by order of the King, for examination and discussion, to the first Cortes which should be held after the year 1820. And a copy of the constitution, signed by the Secretary of State, was forthwith to be communicated to the Royal Council and to the other councils and tribunals, in order that it might be published and circulated according to accustomed form.

*The Nobles
and Re-
gulars con-
tend for their
respective
orders.*

*De Pradt,
p. 152.*

*Nallerto,
t. 103.*

The Notables were not allowed much time for deliberating upon the various provisions of this constitution, which they had been convoked to sanction and not to form. The only two points which called forth any discussion were the limitation of entails, and the declaration of intolerance: the nobles who, by a wise reform of government, when their injurious privileges were taken away, would have recovered their just and legitimate influence in the state, contended in vain against the first, which was designed to cut the root of their strength; the latter was unwillingly conceded to the inveterate prejudices of the nation by men whom the enormous falsehoods, the preposterous usages, and the execrable cruelty of their own church had driven into a state of unbelief, less impious than such a superstition. The Vicar-general of the Franciscans presented a memorial signed by the Prelates of the Religious Orders in behalf of those institutions, to show that it was not expedient to abolish them, but that some suppressions, and a limitation of their numbers, would produce all the good that was desired. A memoir was also presented in behalf of the Inquisition, by one of its officers, and signed by the Council of Castille, arguing against an apprehended intention of abolishing that tribunal, and advising that it should be enjoined to follow in its pro-

ceedings the forms of the episcopal ecclesiastical courts. Both CHAP.
memorials were referred to the legislature, as not being within VII.
the scope of the constitution. 1808.

July.

Joseph appoints his ministers.

The members of the Junta, ninety-one in number, subscribed this constitution, and bound themselves to observe it, and as far as in them lay to provide for its observation, believing, they said, that under a government thus defined, and so just a Prince as the one who for their good fortune had fallen to their lot, Spain would be as happy as they desired. The ministry was now completed: Urquijo was appointed Secretary of State, Cevallos Minister for Foreign Affairs, Azanza for the Indies, Mazarredo for the Marine, O'Farril for the War Department; Jovellanos for the Interior, in his absence and against his consent, repeatedly and firmly refused. The Conde de Cabarrus was appointed Minister of Finance; the news reached him at Burgos, where he was in the midst of the French armies: Cabarrus acted always from impulse rather than principle, and fear and ambition operating upon a vain, rash, unstable temper, he yielded in an unhappy hour, and, contrary to his better mind, accepted the appointment. Pinuela was made Minister of Justice; the Duque del Parque Captain of the Body Guard, the Duque del Infantado Colonel of the Spanish, and the Prince de Castelfranco of the Walloon Guards; the Marquis of Ariza Grand Chamberlain, the Duque de Híjar Grand Master of the Ceremonies, the Conde de Fernan Nuñez Grand Huntsman, the Conde de Santa Colonna Chamberlain.

Some of these persons signed the constitution, and accepted office because they were in a state of duress; some because they were regardless of every thing except their own interest, and cared not whom they served so they might serve themselves; others attached themselves faithfully to the intrusive King, because they miscalculated the resistance which could be opposed,

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and having chosen their part, adhered to it with miserable fidelity through all the odious and dreadful consequences in which they were involved. These persons had hoped to form a social contract with the new King; and to obtain for their country that regular and constitutional freedom, the want of which had drawn on its long degradation and decline. Of that hope they were speedily undeceived. The constitution which they sanctioned, and which was published to the Spaniards as their act and deed, was intended in all its parts and provisions to establish a government not less despotic than that which it was to supersede. By the composition of the Cortes two of the three estates of the realm retained the name indeed, and the semblance of honour, but were divested of any real power, their united members forming not a third part of the chamber. Spain was indeed in no condition to be trusted with a popular assembly; but a Cortes chosen and restricted like this of the Bayonne constitution, was obviously designed for no other purpose than to delude the people with a venerable name, and carry into effect, under a show of freedom, the will and pleasure of the Monarch. The regulations which pretended to provide for the liberty of the press were in like manner deceptive. All that they did was to afford some protection against the stupid bigotry of the Inquisition; such works as Fray Gerundio would not be proscribed while the author could appeal to a senatorial Junta; but nothing which distinguishes a free press, and which constitutes its value, . . . nothing which, as it were, embodies public opinion, and gives it its due and salutary weight, could have past the double ordeal to which it was subjected. The provisions in favour of the liberty of the subject bore about the same relation to our Habeas Corpus, as this superintended freedom of the press to its actual state in England. The Napoleon Habeas Corpus of the Bayonne constitution established in reality a perpetual suspension

for interests of state; and where it was to take effect, it was not as an absolute and fundamental law, but by a reference to the sovereign's discretion.

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VII.

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July.

*Letter from
Ferdinand
to the In-
truder.*

In the last sitting of the Notables a letter from Ferdinand was produced, written from Valençay to the intrusive King, congratulating him on his accession to the throne of Spain, and expressing a hope to see that country made happy under a Sovereign who had given so many shining proofs of wisdom at Naples; this, he said, could not be indifferent to him, who looked upon himself as a member of the Napoleon family, seeing that he had requested the Emperor to grant him one of his nieces in marriage, and hoped to obtain that favour. Whether Ferdinand had been compelled to this as to his former acts of degradation, or whether his poor mind had now been subdued to his fortune, mattered little; to the world, as well as to the Notables at Bayonne, his condition appeared hopeless at that time, nor could any possible event have seemed more beyond all human probability than his restoration.

The business of the twelfth and last sitting was to receive the Constitution from the hands of King Joseph, and swear to it. For this purpose the hall in which they held their meetings was fitted up with a throne, and a rich altar on its right. The Intruder having taken his seat, addressed them in the Spanish language. Their sentiments, he told them, had been those of the Emperor Napoleon, his august brother, in pursuance of whose measures, and in consequence of one of those extraordinary events to which all nations at particular conjunctures are subject in their turn, they were there convened. The Constitution which they were about to accept was the result; it would avert from Spain those long convulsions which might else have been foreseen in the suppressed disquietude of the nation. If all the Spaniards could have been assembled with them, they also,

*Joseph pre-
sents the
Constitu-
tion to the
Notables.*

CHAP. VII.  1808. July. having all but one interest, would have had but one opinion ; “ and then,” said he, “ we should not have to bewail the misfortune of those persons who, being led astray by foreign suggestions, must be reduced by force of arms. The enemy of the Continent expects to despoil us of our colonies by taking advantage of the troubles which he excites in Spain. But every good Spaniard must open his eyes and rally round the throne. We carry with us the act which establishes the rights and reciprocal duties of the King and of the people. If they are disposed to make the same sacrifices as ourself, it will not be long before Spain will become tranquil and happy at home, just and powerful abroad. We pledge ourselves with confidence at the feet of that God who reads the hearts of men, who disposes them at his pleasure, and who never abandons him who loves his country and fears nothing but his conscience.”

*Ceremony
of accepting
it.*

The Constitutional Act was then read ; the President Azanza demanded of the Notables if they accepted it ; and they having replied affirmatively, he addressed the intrusive King, whose paternal language, he said, might have sufficed for ever to attach their hearts, if they had not already been entirely devoted to him. Every word had confirmed them in their confidence that they should see their country restored under his wise government, the evils and rooted abuses which had brought on her decay removed, and the miseries terminated which were at present caused by error, ignorance, and perfidious counsels. “ Yes, Sir,” said he, “ these miseries will cease when your subjects shall see your Majesty in the midst of them ; when they shall be acquainted with that great charter of the constitution, the immoveable basis of their future welfare, . . that charter, the precious work of the earnest and beneficent care which the hero of our age, the great Napoleon, the Emperor of the French, takes for the glory of Spain. What auspices could be so fortunate for

the commencement of a reign and of a dynasty, as the renewal of the compact which is to unite the people to the sovereign, the family to its father; which determines the duties and respective rights of him who commands, and of those who have the happiness to obey!" The Archbishop of Burgos then, assisted by two canons, took from the altar a book containing the four Gospels, and brought it before the throne, and the Intruder, laying his hand upon the book, pronounced the following oath; "I swear upon the holy Gospels to respect our holy religion, and make it be respected; to observe the Constitution, and make it be observed; to maintain the integrity and independence of Spain and its possessions; to respect the liberty and property of individuals, and make them be respected; and to govern with a single view to the interest, the welfare, and the glory of the Spanish nation." The oath of fidelity and obedience to the King, the constitution, and the laws, was then taken by the Archbishop and the other clerical members of the Junta first, next by the President and other officers of the royal household, lastly by all the remaining deputies.

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The ceremony being thus completed, the Junta attended Joseph to his carriage, then returned to the hall, and upon the motion of Azanza voted that two medals should be struck to perpetuate their gratitude to the Emperor Napoleon for the solicitude which he had bestowed upon the affairs of Spain, and to consecrate the solemn delivery of the Constitution. After this act of adulation they waited upon Buonaparte at the Palace of Marrac, to conclude their business and their servilities by expressing their gratitude for all that he had done for Spain. "Sire," said their President Azanza, "the Junta of Spain has accomplished the glorious task for which your Majesty convened it in this city. It has just accepted with as much eagerness as freedom the great charter which fixes upon a sure foundation

*Medals
voted in
honour of
this event.*

*Address of
thanks to
Buona-
parte.*

CHAP. the happiness of Spain. Happily for our country, a preserving
 VII. Providence has employed your irresistible hand to snatch it
 1808. from the abyss into which it was about to be precipitated; it
July. had need be irresistible, . . for, oh, blindness! they who ought to
 rejoice the most in this benefit are the first to misapprehend it!
 But all Spain, Sire, will open its eyes. It will see that it re-
 quired a total regeneration, and that from your Majesty alone
 it could be hoped for. This is an incontestable truth, and I
 appeal to the reflection of all those who may not yet be sincerely
 united to the authority which actually governs the kingdom: let
 them examine in their inmost conscience under ~~what~~ other rule
 they could promise themselves the inestimable benefits ~~which~~
 they will henceforth enjoy; let them examine and answer in
 good faith. The evil was at its height; the agents of a feeble
 government concentrated its arbitrary power in their hands for
 the purpose of extending its limits more and more; the autho-
 rities under them, timid and debased, never knew what course
 they were to pursue, and if they did no harm, it was impossible
 for them to effect any good. The finances were a chaos, the
 public debt an abyss: all parts of the machine were deranged
 or broken, there was not one which performed its functions:
 where was the sensible Spaniard who did not perceive the im-
 possibility of its going on, and could not fix the near term of its
 total dissolution? To what other power than that of your Im-
 perial and Royal Majesty could it be reserved, in such a state of
 things, not merely to arrest the evil, for that would not have
 sufficed, but to remove it entirely, and to substitute order for
 disorder, law for caprice, justice for oppression, security for in-
 security? Such are the wonders, Sire, which your Imperial
 and Royal Majesty has worked in a few days, and which fill
 the world with astonishment. Your Majesty alone is not asto-
 nished, because you have conceived and wrought them without

effort. We however well perceive that the means which your Majesty has used were the only ones which could have been employed for the good of Spain. To give to our country a liberal constitution which restores its ancient Cortes, secures the property and liberty of individuals, breaks the fetters which were imposed upon genius, establishes a government, and fixes the national prosperity, . . . to place upon the throne of the Spaniards a just and amiable Prince who will govern by the laws, and will have no other happiness than that of his people, . . . such is the work of consummate wisdom for which the Junta offers to your Imperial and Royal Majesty its tribute of respect and gratitude. It would perpetuate that tribute by a durable monument voted in its own name and in the name of all the Spaniards of all climates, of all the individuals of a numerous family dispersed over a great portion of the globe; who will not delay with one accord to bless their generous benefactor, and who will transmit his august name to the remotest generations with the glorious appellation of the Restorer of the Spains."

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The Deputies stood in a circle round Napoleon while their President delivered this base address. For the first, and perhaps the only time in his public life, Buonaparte was at a loss for a reply. He spoke indeed more than three-quarters of an hour, but it was vaguely and hesitatingly, in confused and broken sentences, his head bending down, and when he raised it at times, it was only again to let it fall. None of those memorable expressions came from him which the hearers bear away, none of those sparkling sentiments and pointed sentences, . . . those coruscations which at other times characterized his discourse. It seemed as if the powers both of thought and of language had forsaken him. From one subject he passed to another unconnectedly, resuming them with as little reason as he had broken them off, and frequently repeating the same flat meaning in the

Buonaparte is embarrassed in replying to it.

CHAP. VII. same cold and rapid words. His manifest embarrassment would have been ludicrous to all persons present, if the necessity of restraining themselves had not rendered it as painful to them as it was to himself. So strange and utter a destitution of his wonted talents astonished those who witnessed it. Perhaps Buonaparte was sickened with excess of adulation, and contemplating mournfully the condition to which men, once of proud intellect, patriotic hopes, and generous desires, had debased themselves in subservience to his purposes, regarded them with compassion rather than contempt. Perhaps he compared in sure anticipation the opinion which posterity would pronounce upon these transactions with the language which was now addressed to him. The cloud was not of the understanding alone, but of the heart. The work, he then believed, was done; this was the concluding scene of the drama, the plot had been fully developed, and the intended catastrophe was brought about; but in the hour of success it is scarcely possible that he should not have contrasted the reflections which then came upon him, with those emotions of proud and honourable triumph which he had felt at Lodi, at Marengo, and at Austerlitz, and that comparison may have made him stand amid the circle of his servile instruments humiliated and self-condemned.

De Pradt,
153.

Joseph
enters
Spain.

On the second morning after this memorable scene the intrusive King entered Spain, as if to take quiet possession of a throne to which he had regularly and lawfully succeeded. Two decrees were issued from Tolosa, one enjoining that his accession should be proclaimed on the 25th, being Santiago's day, and that flags should every where be hoisted, and the other customary ceremonies observed; the other required prayers to be made in all churches and convents for a blessing upon his government. At Vitoria he altered the arms of Spain, directing that the shield should be divided into the six quarterings for Castille, Leon,

July 10.

July 12.

Aragon, Navarre, Granada, and the Indies, and that in the centre of the shield the eagle which distinguished his Imperial and Royal Family should be borne. From Vitoria also he sent abroad a proclamation, in which, according to the superscription, he manifested to the Spanish nation his generous sentiments, and his desire that the kingdom should recover its pristine splendour. It spake of the security which the new constitution afforded to religion, and to liberty both civil and political; of the revival and improvement of their Cortes; of the institution of a Senate to be at once the protection of individual liberty and the support of the throne, and in which they who should have rendered distinguished services to the state would find an honourable asylum, and an appropriate reward. It promised integrity and independence for the courts of justice; and that merit and virtue should be the only titles to public employment. "If his desires did not deceive him," he said, "their agriculture and commerce would quickly flourish, being set free for ever from the fiscal trammels which had destroyed them. I come among you," he said, "with the utmost confidence, surrounded by estimable men, who have not concealed from you any thing which they believed to be useful for your interests. Blind passions, deceitful voices, and the intrigues of the common enemy of the Continent, whose only view is to separate the Indies from Spain, have precipitated some among you into the most dreadful anarchy. My heart is rent at the thought. Yet this great evil may in a moment cease. Spaniards, unite yourselves! come around my throne! and do not suffer intestine divisions to rob me of the time and consume the means which I would fain employ solely for your happiness."

The Intruder and his ministers halted at Vitoria till the French, of whose speedy and complete success no doubt was entertained, should have chastised the insurgents, and opened

CHAP.
VII.
1808.
July.

*Buonaparte
returns to
Paris.*

CHAP. for them the way to Madrid. Buonaparte meantime returned
VIL. to Paris. In every place through which he passed he was re-
1808. ceived with more than usual demonstrations of triumphant joy.
July. The population of town and country gathered together to behold
and to applaud him. Houses were hung with garlands, and the
streets through which he rode were formed into parterres of
flowers, and overbowered with shrubs. From Bayonne to Tou-
louse and Bourdeaux, and from thence to Nantes and Tours and
to the capital, it was one continued festival. It gratified the
ambition of the French to know that their great Emperor had
placed his brother upon the throne of Spain ; this was another
step toward that universal empire which they believed to be
within their reach. They had been kept in ignorance of the
nefarious artifices by which the usurpation had been brought
about, and little did they apprehend that the consequences of
this usurpation would carry tears and mourning into almost
every family in France, and bring upon it the full and over-
flowing measure of retribution.

CHAPTER VIII.

PROCEEDINGS IN ENGLAND. SUCCESSES OF THE FRENCH IN THE NORTH OF SPAIN: THEIR FAILURE IN CATALONIA. MONCEY REPULSED FROM VALENCIA. DUPONT ENTERS CORDOBA. BATTLE OF RIO SECO. THE INTRUDER ENTERS MADRID. SURRENDER OF DUPONT'S ARMY. THE FRENCH RETREAT FROM MADRID.

THE first news which reached England of the Spanish insurrection was brought by the Asturian deputies, and it was soon followed by dispatches from Coruña, Cadiz, and Gibraltar. Never was any intelligence received with more general joy. Notwithstanding the frequent hostilities in which Spain had been involved with this country, first, during the age of its power; then through its connexion with the Bourbons; and afterwards from the ascendancy which the Directory and Buonaparte had obtained over an infamous minister, an imbecile King, and a wretched government, the English had always regarded the Spaniards as the most honourable people with whom they were engaged either in commerce or in war; nor was there ever a war in which some new instance of honour and generosity on their part did not make us regret that they were our enemies. Hitherto the present contest had been carried on with little hope. No other sympathy than that of mere political interest had as yet been felt in our alliances with Austria or Russia; but, from the moment when the Spaniards called upon us for aid, we felt that we had obtained allies worthy of our own good cause, and the

1808.
Feelings of the English people concerning the transactions in Spain.

CHAP. struggle assumed a higher and holier character. It became,
 VIII. avowedly and plainly to every man's understanding, a war for
 1808. all good principles; and we looked on to the end with faith as
 June. well as hope. Never since the glorious morning of the French
 revolution, before one bloody cloud had risen to overcast the
 deceitful promise of its beauty, had the heart of England been
 affected with so generous and universal a joy. They who had
 been panic-stricken by the atrocities of the French demagogues,
 rejoiced to perceive the uniform and dignified order which the
 Spaniards observed in their proceedings, and their adherence
 to existing establishments; . . firmer minds, in whom the love of
 liberty had not been weakened by the horrors which a licentious
 and unprincipled people committed under that sacred name, were
 delighted that the Spaniards recurred with one accord to those
 legitimate forms of freedom, which a paralyzing despotism
 had so long suspended; the people universally longed to assist
 a nation who had risen in defence of their native land; and
 professional politicians, not having time to consider, nor being
 able to foresee, in what manner these great events would affect
 their own party purposes, partook of the popular feeling.

*Proceedings
 in parlia-
 ment.*

June 15.

The first parliamentary notice of these proceedings was by
 a speech of Mr. Sheridan's, made by him for the purpose of
 stimulating the ministry to a vigorous co-operation with the
 Spaniards. "There had never," he said, "existed so happy an
 opportunity for Great Britain to strike a bold stroke for the
 rescue of the world. Hitherto, Buonaparte had run a victorious
 race, because he had contended against princes without dignity,
 ministers without wisdom, and countries where the people were
 indifferent as to his success; he had yet to learn what it was to
 fight against a people who were animated with one spirit against
 him. Now was the time to stand up, fully and fairly, for the
 deliverance of Europe; and, if the ministry would co-operate

effectually with the Spanish patriots, they should receive from him as cordial and as sincere a support, as if the man whom he most loved were restored to life and power. Will not (said he) the animation of the Spanish mind be excited by the knowledge that their cause is espoused, not by ministers alone, but by the parliament and the people of England? If there be a disposition in Spain to resent the insults and injuries, too enormous to be described by language, which they have endured from the tyrant of the earth, will not that disposition be roused to the most sublime exertion by the assurance that their efforts will be cordially aided by a great and powerful nation? Never was any thing so brave, so generous, so noble, as the conduct of the Spaniards! Never was there a more important crisis than that which their patriotism had thus occasioned in the state of Europe!"

CHAP.
VIII.
1808.
June.

Mr. Canning replied, that his Majesty's ministers saw, with the most deep and lively interest, this noble struggle against the unexampled atrocity of France; and that there was the strongest disposition on the part of government to afford every practicable aid in a contest so magnanimous. In endeavouring to afford this aid, he said, it would never occur to them that a state of war existed between Spain and Great Britain. They should proceed upon the principle, that any nation who started up with a determination to oppose a power, which, whether professing insidious peace, or declaring open war, was the common enemy of all nations, . . whatever might be the existing political relations of that nation with Great Britain, became instantly our essential ally. As for what were called peculiarly British interests, he disclaimed them as any part of the considerations which influenced government. In this contest, wherein Spain had embarked, no interest could be so purely British as Spanish success; no conquest so advantageous for Great Britain as con-

CHAP.
VIII.

1808.

June.

June 4.
Mr. Whitbread proposes to negotiate with France.

July 4.
Mr. Whitbread speaks in favour of the Spaniards.

quering from France the complete integrity of the Spanish dominions in every quarter of the world. This declaration satisfied Mr. Whitbread; but that gentleman thought proper to deprecate the tone in which the Emperor Napoleon was spoken of, saying, that, when he heard him called despot, tyrant, plunderer, and common enemy of mankind, he wished from his heart England could come into the cause with clean hands.

A few days after this debate, Mr. Whitbread, in a speech upon the state of the empire, took occasion to refer to an opinion concerning peace, which he had delivered early in the session. "I then stated," said he, "that it did not appear to me degrading for this country to propose a negotiation for peace with France: at no period of the interval which has elapsed, has it appeared to me that such a proposition would be degrading; nor can I anticipate, during the recess which is about to take place, any circumstance, the occurrence of which can, by possibility, render it unexpedient or degrading to open such a negotiation." The common feeling and common sense of the country were shocked at the mention of negotiating with Buonaparte, just at the moment when his unexampled treachery towards an ally was the theme of universal execration; and when a whole nation had just arisen against his insolent aggression. Mr. Whitbread felt that he had injured himself in the opinion of the people, and therefore, on the last day of the session, took occasion to express his admiration of the Spanish patriots; and to regret that ministers had not applied for a vote of credit, which would enable them more effectually to second the wishes of all ranks of Englishmen, by aiding and assisting the Spaniards. "Had such a message," he said, "been sent down, it would have been met with unanimous concurrence; and that concurrence would have been echoed throughout the country. The Spanish nation was now committed with France: never were a people engaged in a more

arduous and honourable struggle ; and he earnestly prayed God to crown their efforts with a success as signal as those efforts were glorious. He could not help thinking, that it would have been well to have given an opportunity of manifesting to them the sympathy which glowed in every British heart, through the proper channel, the legitimate organ of the British people. For himself, from the bottom of his soul, he wished success to the patriotic efforts of the Spaniards ; and that their present struggle might be crowned with the recovery of their liberty as a people, and the assertion of their independence."

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VIII.
1808.
June.

As a farther avowal of these sentiments, Mr. Whitbread addressed a letter, on the situation of Spain, to Lord Holland ; " the subject," he said, " being peculiarly interesting to that distinguished nobleman, from the attachment he had formed to a people, the grandeur of whose character he had had the opportunity to estimate, and to which he had always done justice, even when that character was obscured by the faults of a bad government." Having repeated his professions of ardent sympathy with the Spaniards, he recurred to his proposal for negotiating. " It has been falsely and basely stated," said he, " that I advised the purchase of peace by the abandonment of the heroic Spaniards to their fate. God forbid ! A notion so detestable never entered my imagination. Perish the man who could entertain it ! Perish this country, rather than its safety should be owing to a compromise so horridly iniquitous ! My feelings, at the time I spoke, ran in a direction totally opposite to any thing so disgusting and abominable. I am not, however," he pursued, " afraid to say, that the present is a moment in which I think negotiation might be proposed to the Emperor of the French by Great Britain, with the certainty of this great advantage, that if the negotiation should be refused, we should be at least sure of being *right* in the eyes of God and man ; an

Mr. Whitbread's letter to Lord Holland.

CHAP. advantage which, in my opinion, we have never yet possessed,
 VIII. from the commencement of the contest to the present hour ; and
 1808. the value of which is far beyond all calculation."

June.

In vindicating himself from the imputation of regarding the cause of the Spaniards with indifference, Mr. Whitbread succeeded for the time ; but, in other respects, this letter lowered him in the opinion of judicious minds. The folly of wasting time in a farce of negotiation ; the certainty that such delay would injure the Spaniards, and the probability that it might induce them to regard us with a suspicion, which such conduct would render reasonable ; above all, the absurdity of proposing to treat with the tyrant at the very time when he was perpetrating the most flagrant breach of treaties ; when he had proved in the eyes of all Europe, that no treaties, no alliances, no ties of public faith, or individual honour, could restrain him, . . were so glaring to every man's understanding, that Mr. Whitbread's advice appeared like absolute infatuation. So far, indeed, from opening a negotiation at that time, and on these grounds, with the Corsican, it behoved the British Government then to have made the war a personal war against him, . . to have proclaimed loudly before God and the world, that this country never would treat with a man who had avowed his contempt for the laws of nations ; and given open proof that he made treaties only for the purpose of more securely effecting the destruction of those who were credulous enough to rely upon his faith. Then was the time to have appealed to the French people themselves. . . The Spanish war was a war of the Buonaparte family, not of France. Hitherto, Buonaparte and his immediate agents were the only persons implicated in the infamy of this unexampled treachery and usurpation. Would France appropriate that infamy to herself ? Would she, for the sake of this foreign family, entail upon herself the privations, the sacrifices, and the hazards of interminable war ?

To France we offered peace, under any other ruler ; we reclaimed none of her conquests ; we asked nothing from her, . . we were ready to restore prosperity to her merchants, her citizens, and her peasantry ; and to open her ports to the commerce of the world. But peace with Buonaparte was impossible. How could England, so long the object of his avowed and inveterate hatred, trust him, when his insatiable ambition did not spare the oldest, the most faithful, the most serviceable, the most submissive of his allies and friends ! If proclamations to this tenor had been scattered over the whole coast of France, Buonaparte might have been endangered by the British press and the force of truth, when he stood in no fear of any other force. The importance of communicating true intelligence to the French was manifested by the care with which he kept them in ignorance, and the shameless falsehoods which continually appeared in his official papers.

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June.

Arms, ammunition, and clothing were dispatched to the northern provinces, immediately upon the arrival of the Deputies : men, they said, they did not want. Colonel Sir Thomas Dyer, Major Roche, and Captain Patrick, were sent at the same time on a military mission to Asturias, and Lieut.-Colonel Doyle, Captain Carroll, and Captain Kennedy, to Galicia. The Spanish prisoners were released and sent home ; and, in the King's speech, at the close of the session, Spain was recognised as a natural friend and ally. It was there declared, " that the British government would make every exertion for the support of a people thus nobly struggling against the tyranny and usurpation of France ; that it would be guided in the choice and direction of its exertions by the wishes of those in whose behalf they were employed ; and that, in contributing to the success of this just and glorious cause, England had no other object than that of preserving unimpaired the integrity and independence of the

*Measures of
the British
Government.*

July 4.

CHAP.
VIII.1808.
July.

Spanish monarchy." An order of council appeared on the same day, announcing that hostilities against Spain had ceased. Nor was Portugal overlooked by the British government. Lieut.-Colonel Brown, Colonel Trant, and Captain Preval, were sent to obtain intelligence of the state of affairs in the northern provinces, and preparations were made for sending an expedition under Sir Arthur Wellesley, to free that kingdom from the French; and in thus delivering an old and faithful ally, to operate a powerful diversion in aid of the Spaniards.

*Movements
of the
French in
Navarre
and Old
Castile.*

The French in Spain, meantime, had acted with their wonted celerity, and, for the most part, at first, with their wonted success. General Verdier having routed the people who had assembled at Logroño, entered that town, and put the leaders of the people to death as rioters. General Frère defeated a body of 5000 men at Segovia, and reduced the city to submission. Lasalle marched from Burgos upon the little town of Torquemada, where Queen Juana, in former times, watched during so many weeks the body of her husband, as jealously as if he had been living; suffered no woman to approach the church wherein his bier was placed; and listened eagerly to the knave who flattered her insane affliction with a tale, that a certain King fourteen years after his death had been restored to life, and why might not a like miracle be vouchsafed in compassion to her grief, and in answer to her prayers? Some 6000 Spaniards had gathered together there: he dispersed them with great slaughter, and burnt the place; then marched upon Palencia, disarmed the inhabitants of that city and the vicinity, and being joined at Duenas by General Merle, proceeded against Valladolid, which had declared for the national cause.

*Torque-
mada burnt.*

*G. Cuesta
attempts at
first to quiet
the people.*

D. Gregorio de la Cuesta, whom Ferdinand had appointed Captain-General of Castille and Leon, had endeavoured to suppress the spirit of resistance when it first manifested itself in

those kingdoms. He was in correspondence with Urquijo; and the leaders of that party, who were considered as the *Liberales* of Spain before they attached themselves to the service of the Intruder, reckoned upon his co-operation, and had already nominated him to the Vice-royalty of Mexico. Cuesta was an old brave man, energetic, hasty, and headstrong: in the better ages of Spain he would have been capable of great and terrible actions; and the strong elements of the Spanish character were strongly marked in his resolute, untractable, and decided temper. Yet the national spirit was dormant within him till it was awakened by the voice of the nation. He published a proclamation at Valladolid, exhorting the people to remain tranquil, and accept the powerful protection which was offered to the kingdom, and threatening with punishment all who should attempt to raise disturbances, or take part in them. And when the *Ayuntamiento* of Leon applied to him for advice how to act upon the abdication of the Bourbons, he resented their application as implying a doubt of his own sentiments; and replied, that nothing ought to be attempted against the determination of the Supreme Junta who governed in the Emperor's name; that the nation ought peaceably to wait for the King whom Napoleon should appoint; that a struggle without arms, ammunition, or union, must needs be hopeless; and that even if any successes were obtained, the leaders would quarrel among themselves for command, and a civil war must arise, which would end in the destruction of the kingdom. But when Cuesta saw how strong the tide of popular feeling had set in, and that what he had looked upon at first merely as a seditious movement, had assumed the sacred and indubitable character of a national cause, perceiving then that the choice was not between subordination and anarchy, but between France and Spain, he chose the better part, and entered into it heartily, and exerted himself

CHAP.
VIII.

1808.

June.

Nellerto,
t. 2. p. 203.

Impugna-
cion al Ma-
nifesto del
G. Cuesta,
p. 8, 9.
He takes the
national
side.

CHAP.
VIII.

1808.

*June.**Evil of his
hesitation.**Impugna-
tion, p. 13.**He is de-
feated at
Cabazon.**The French
enter Val-
ladolid.*

to embody and discipline the impatient volunteers, who, in their honest hatred of the French, would have hurried to their own destruction.

But great evil arose from the resistance which he had opposed to the patriotic cause. Where the principal persons and constituted authorities declared themselves frankly and freely at first, the zeal of the people was easily restrained within due bounds, and no excesses were committed; but wherever the higher orders acted manifestly in deference to the multitude, and in fear of them, the mob knew that they were masters, and always abused their power. Thus it was at Valladolid. General Miguel Cevallos was imprisoned there by Cuesta, as the only means of preserving him: the ferocious rabble broke in, dragged him out, and murdered him, and paraded with his head and lacerated limbs in bloody and abominable triumph through the streets. Nor was this the only ill consequence: while he advised submission, and endeavoured to enforce it, time, which should have been employed in uniting, arming, and training the willing people, was irrecoverably lost; and when the French approached Valladolid, they found Cuesta at the head of an undisciplined assemblage numerous enough and brave enough to raise a vain and unreasonable confidence in themselves, and perhaps in him. They had taken post at Cabazon, a village surrounded with vineyards, two leagues from the city. Lasalle having reconnoitred their position, ordered General Sabatier to charge them, while Merle cut off their retreat from Valladolid. According to the French account they stood the enemy's fire half an hour, then took to flight, leaving upon the ground a thousand dead (the seventh part of their number), and 4000 muskets. Cuesta, with the remains of his army, retired to the borders of Leon, defeated, but not discouraged. Valladolid was now at the conqueror's mercy; and the Bishop, with the other heads of the clergy,

came out to intercede for it. The people were disarmed, the adjoining country was kept down by military force, and deputies from Valladolid, Segovia, and Palencia were sent to Bayonne to solicit the Emperor's clemency, and pledge themselves for the allegiance of their fellow-citizens. Two detachments under Generals Merle and Ducos were then ordered into the Montañas de Santander by different routes. The patriots, consisting almost wholly of untrained volunteers, were beaten at Lantueño, at Soncello, and at Venta del Escudo. The two detachments entered the city on the same day, and Santander also was compelled to send deputies with promises of submission to Bayonne. By these operations Marshal Bessieres kept Navarre and the three Biscayan provinces in subjection, and, for the time, reduced the Montaña and the greater part of Old Castile.

CHAP.
VIII.

1808.

June.

*They enter
Santander.*

The movements of the French had not been less successful on the side of Aragon. General Lefebvre Desnouettes was ordered to suppress the insurrection in that kingdom. He began by arresting D. Francisco Palafox in Pampluna, who having accompanied Ferdinand to Bayonne as his chief equerry, was on his way through that city with the supposed intention of joining his brother. Lefebvre then marched from Pampluna upon Tudela. Palafox had detached a body of Aragonese from Zaragoza, chiefly armed peasantry, to assist the Tudelans in defending the passage of the Ebro: they were defeated by superior discipline and superior numbers, their cannon were taken, and Lefebvre having entered Tudela, put the leaders of the insurrection to death, following, after Murat's example, the principle of the tyrant whom he served, that the Spaniards who opposed him were to be considered and treated as rebels. The French paid dearly in the end for the insolent barbarity with which they thus began the war: it called forth the revengeful

*G. Lefebvre
Desnouettes
defeats the
Aragonese.*

June 9.

CHAP. spirit of the nation, and the contest assumed a character hateful
 VIII. to humanity, the guilt and the reproach of which must lie mainly
 1808. upon those by whom the provocation was given. Lefebvre then
 June. repaired the bridge over the Ebro, which had been burnt, and
 advanced to the village of Mallen, where the Marquis de Lazan,
 June 13. at the head of ten thousand raw troops, with two hundred dra-
 goons, and eight ill-mounted cannon, had taken a position, with
 the canal of Aragon on the right, and the village on the left,
 and supported by an olive grove. A short but bloody action
 ensued: brave as the Aragonese were, they were in no con-
 dition to oppose flying artillery, well disciplined troops, and a
 powerful cavalry. They were defeated, but not disheartened;
 and on the following day sustained another action with the same
 ill success at Alagon, about four leagues from Zaragoza. The
 French then approached the city, expecting that not more re-
 sistance would be made there than at Valladolid, and that the
 submission or punishment of the capital would intimidate the
 rest of Aragon; this object was to be aided by a movement from
 the side of Catalonia.

*He marches
 against
 Zaragoza.*

*Troops sent
 from Barce-
 lona toward
 Valencia
 and Zara-
 goza.*

There were between three and four thousand Spanish troops at
 Barcelona in the beginning of June; but in a short time there re-
 mained scarcely more than as many hundreds, so rapidly they had
 deserted, some to return home, or seek their fortunes, the greater
 part to serve their country in these stormy times. The French
 secretly encouraged this desertion: so large a force in Barcelona
 would have rendered a stronger garrison necessary, and have
 increased their uneasiness and danger; but in the field they
 cared not what number of Spaniards might be collected against
 them; the more numerous they were in their present state of
 indiscipline, the more easily, and with the greater effect, they
 might be defeated. Being thus rid of their presence, Duhesme
 was able to send out more than half his force in two detachments,

June 3.

under Generals Chabran and Schwartz. The first, who had distinguished himself in Switzerland against the Austrians in the dreadful campaign of 1799, was ordered with 4200 men to enter Tarragona, garrison it with a thousand men, incorporate in his division Wimpffen's Swiss regiment of 1200 men, which was stationed in the city, and then proceed by way of Tortosa to co-operate with Marshal Moncey against Valencia. General Schwartz's orders were to march with 3800 men by Molins de Rey and Martorell upon Manresa, and raise upon that city a contribution of 750,000 francs, to be paid within eight and forty hours, and applied to the service of the division. He was instructed to take means for putting the promoters of sedition to death, but to pardon them upon the plea of the Emperor's clemency. What powder was in the magazines he was to send to Barcelona, and then to destroy the mills; next he was to proceed by way of Cervera to Lerida, and get possession of that city, if it could be done by a sudden attempt; in that case he was to garrison the castle with 500 men, incorporate with his own troops the Swiss who were there, and levy a contribution of 600,000 francs, for the use of Lefebvre's army, with which he was then to co-operate according to sealed instructions, which he was to open at Bujaraloz, on the way to Zaragoza.

The French plans were widely combined and well concerted. Here, however, they failed in execution. The people of Manresa and Igualada received timely intelligence from Barcelona of the intended movements; the Somatenes, or armed population, were called out, and posted to wait for the enemy in the strong positions of Bruch and Casa Masana: powder was served out from those mills at Manresa which Schwartz intended to destroy; and curtain rods were cut into small pieces, and distributed instead of bullets. The French lost a day by halting at Martorell because of the rain: the time which they thus lost was

CHAP.
VIII.

1808.

June.

*G Schwartz
marches
toward
Manresa.*

CHAP. well employed by the Catalans, and when Schwartz arrived at
 VIII. Bruch a fire was opened upon him by an enemy concealed
 1808. among the crags and bushes. Driven from this pass, after a
June. brave defence, some of the Somatenes retreated to Igualada, others to Casa Masana; the latter were pursued and again defeated; they fled with all speed to Manresa, and if Schwartz had pursued his success he might have reached the city without opposition; but having met with more resistance than had been looked for, and perceiving how determined a spirit had been manifested in the people, he halted, as if doubtful whether to advance or retire. Upon discovering this irresolution the Somatenes again took heart; and being reinforced by the peasantry from the plain of Bages, a hardy active race, and excellent marksmen, they attacked the vanguard of the enemy at Casa Masana, and drove them back upon the main body of the column near Bruch.

He is defeated at Bruch, and retreats to Barcelona.

An odd accident deceived the French. There was among the Somatenes a drummer, who had escaped from Barcelona: little as the knowledge was which this lad possessed of military manœuvres, it enabled him to assume authority among these armed peasants, and he performed the double duties of drummer and commander with singular good fortune. For the enemy inferred from the sound of the drum, which was regularly beaten, that the peasantry were supported by regular troops: . . there were Swiss in Lerida, and the regiment of Extremadura was at Tarrega; the apprehension therefore was not unreasonable, and, after a short stand against a brisk fire, Schwartz determined upon retreating. The Somatenes, encouraged by success, and now increasing in number, pressed upon him; and the news of his defeat raised the country behind him, to his greater danger. He had to pass through the little town of Esparraguera, consisting of one narrow street, nearly a mile in length. The

inhabitants cut down trees, and brought out tables and benches to obstruct the way, and they stored the flat roofs of their houses with beams and stones. The head of the French column, ignorant of these preparations, entered the street at twilight; but having experienced the danger, Schwartz divided them into two bodies, one of which made its way on the outside of the town by the right, the other by the left. From this time the retreat became disorderly; the enemy lost part of their artillery in crossing the Abrera; and had the people of Martorell acted upon the alert like those of Esparraguera, and broken down the bridge over the Noya, the fugitives, for such they were now become, might probably all have been cut off. They entered Barcelona in great confusion and dismay: their loss was less than might have been expected in such a route, for the Spaniards had neither horse nor cannon; they left, however, one piece of artillery in the hands of the pursuers, and about 400 dead, the greater part being Swiss.

CHAP.
VIII.
1808.
June.

June 7.

The effects of this action were of great importance. It was the first success which the Spaniards had obtained, and it had been obtained by the people, without any troops to assist them, . . without any military leader. The insurrection became general throughout Catalonia as fast as the tidings spread; the plan of co-operating with Lefebvre against Zaragoza was disconcerted; and Duhesme, perceiving that it would require all his force to repress the Catalans, recalled Chabran from his march toward Valencia. That General had reached Tarragona without opposition on the day when Schwartz's routed division re-entered Barcelona; but receiving orders to return without delay, he could neither secure that fortress, as had been intended, nor venture to incorporate the Swiss, who were more likely to take part with the Spaniards than against them. Meantime the people of the intermediate country, encouraged by the victory at

*G. Chabran
recalled
in conse-
quence of
Schwarz's
defeat.*

CHAP. Bruch, had risen : they began to harass him at Vendrell, and
 VIII. attempted to maintain a position against him at Arbos, which

1808. they brought artillery to defend. Here, however, they were

June.

*Arbos burnt
by the
French.*

totally defeated ; fire was set to the place, a neat and flourishing agricultural town, two-thirds of the houses were destroyed by the flames, and cruelties were committed upon the inhabitants which exasperated the Catalans instead of intimidating them. Even the people of Arbos themselves, who escaped the enemy, when they returned to inhabit their half-burnt habitations, or the hovels which they constructed amid the ruins, instead of repenting the part which they had taken, or bewailing the ruin of their property, prided themselves in the thought that their town should have been the first to suffer the full vengeance of the enemy in so glorious and unquestionable a cause. Duhesme came out to protect the division on its farther retreat ; they halted at S. Feliu de Llobregat, and having been reinforced, Chabran was ordered to proceed against Manresa, and punish that city, which was believed to be the centre of the revolution. The fatal pass of Bruch was upon the road, and it was now occupied with some degree of skill. The Catalan Juntas, conceiving a high opinion of the strength of this position, had used great exertions to strengthen it ; artillery had been planted there, and the Somatenes were supported by some of the soldiers who had fled from Barcelona, and by four companies of volunteers from Lerida under Colonel Baget. Chabran had a stronger detachment than that with which Schwartz had forced the pass ; but after losing some 450 men, and some of his guns, he deemed it advisable to retreat, and was harassed by the Catalans almost to the gates of Barcelona.

*Chabran
defeated at
Bruch.*

*Duhesme
endeavours
to secure
Gerona.*

Duhesme now perceived, that instead of dispatching troops to assist in the subjugation of Aragon and Valencia, there would be employment enough in Catalonia for all his force. The

French, expecting no resistance from the people after the government was subdued, had thought it sufficient to possess themselves of Figueras and Barcelona: the distance between these places is about fourscore miles, and they had neglected to secure the intermediate posts of Gerona and Hostalrich. Duhesme now learnt, not without some alarm, that Figueras was invested by the peasantry, and that though impregnable to any means which they could bring against it, it was in danger of being reduced by famine; thinking, therefore, by a prompt attack upon Gerona to repair the oversight which had been committed, he drew out a considerable force from the capital, and marched with it in person, with Generals Lecchi and Schwartz, against that city. Intelligence had been obtained of his intention; and the peasantry of Valles, and the inhabitants of the sea-shore, posted themselves to oppose his march on the heights which terminate at Mongat, a small fortress, or rather strong house, with a battery to protect that part of the coast from the Barbary corsairs. An armed vessel sailed from Barcelona to act against this place, in co-operation with the land forces; and Duhesme easily deceiving his unskilful opponents by demonstrations which drew their attention from the real point of attack, defeated them, drove them from the ground, took the strong house, and disgraced his victory by the cruelty which he exercised upon his prisoners, as well the unarmed villagers who fell into his hands as those who were taken in action. The people of Mataro, not intimidated by the enemy's success, defended the entrance of their town: the French general, in revenge for the loss which the head of his column sustained in forcing it, gave up this rich and flourishing place, containing above 25,000 inhabitants, to be sacked by his troops; and the men were not withheld from committing the foulest atrocities by the recollection, that they had recently been quartered during

CHAP.
VIII.

1808.

June.

June 17.

*Mataro
sacked by
the French.**Cabanes.
l. p. 63.*

CHAP. two months in that very town as allies and guests, among the
VIII. people who now found no mercy at their hands.

1808.

June.

*Failure of
the attempt
on Gerona.*

Duhesme proceeded plundering, burning, and destroying as he went along. On the morning of the 20th he appeared before Gerona, sacked the adjoining villages of Salt and S. Eugenia, opened a battery upon the city with the hope of intimidating the inhabitants, endeavoured to force the Puerta del Carmen without success, and was in like manner repulsed from the fort of the Capuchins. A second battery was opened with more effect in the evening, and its fire was kept up during the night, which was so dark that none of the besieger's movements could be distinguished. They attempted to scale the bulwark of S. Clara, and some succeeded in getting upon the wall; these were encountered there by part of the regiment of Ulster, and their fate deterred their comrades from following them. The people of Gerona evinced that night what might be expected from them when they were put to the proof. The clergy were present wherever the fire was hottest, encouraging the men by example as well as by exhortations; and the women, regardless of danger, carried food and ammunition to their husbands, and fathers, and brothers, and sons. Without the city the Soma-tenes collected in such force, that they prevented the French from fording the river Ter, which they repeatedly attempted, with the intention, it was supposed, of proceeding to relieve Figueras. Duhesme employed artifice as well as force: he sent proposals at various times to the Junta; and some of his messengers were seized and detained as prisoners, for endeavouring when they entered the city to distribute proclamations from Bayonne, and from the government of Madrid. Finding, however, that the place was not to be taken by a sudden assault, and not being prepared to undertake a regular siege, he deemed it expedient to return on the following day towards Barcelona,

after no inconsiderable loss in men as well as in reputation. **CHAP. VIII.**
 This repulse would have drawn after it the loss of Figueras, if
 the Catalans could have collected a regular force on that side. **1808.**
 They blockaded it with the Somatenes of Ampurdan, assisted June.
 by a few troops from Rosas: the garrison consisted of only 1000 *Figueras*
 men; had they been more, the place must have fallen; for the *relieved by*
 French had had no time to introduce provisions, and they were *the French.*
 reduced to half allowance. Not being strong enough to sally
 against the besiegers, they revenged themselves upon the town,
 and laid about two-thirds of it in ruins. At length the relief
 which their countrymen in Spain could not effect was brought
 to them from France. General Reille being made acquainted *July 3.*
 with their distress, collected 3000 men at Bellegarde, and putting
 the Somatenes to flight with that force, introduced a large convoy
 of provisions, and reinforced the garrison.

The preservation of Figueras by the French was an event of *Movements*
 more importance in reality than in appearance; but at this time *of M. Mon-*
 appearances and immediate effect were what they stood in need *cey against*
 of to maintain that opinion of their power which had been *Valencia.*
 so rudely shaken by this national resistance. It was part of
 their plans, that, while Lefebvre chastised Zaragoza, and ter-
 rified Aragon by the fate of its capital, a similar blow should be
 struck in the south by Marshal Moncey. For this purpose he
 collected a force of 12,000 men besides cavalry in the province
 of Cuenca. The Spaniards were doubtful whether his march
 would be directed against Murcia, where Count Florida Blanca
 coming at the age of fourscore from the retirement in which he
 had hoped to pass the remainder of his honourable age in piety
 and peace, had proclaimed Ferdinand, and hoisted the standard
 of independence; or against Valencia, where the inhabitants
 had reason to expect severe vengeance for the massacre which
 had been committed there. This uncertainty produced no evil

CHAP. when the Spaniards had no armies on foot, and every province
VIII. was left to its own resources. Valencia was the point of most

1808. importance; the people were more willing to meet the danger
June. than to wait for it; and with such a force as could be raised of

*Defeat of
the Spa-
niards.*

June 21. peasantry, new levies, and a few regular troops, they occupied the
entrance of a defile near Contreras, and the bridge over the river
Cabriel. They were forced from thence with the loss of four
pieces of cannon, the whole of their artillery; but they were not
pursued like a routed enemy: the French deemed it expedient
to proceed with caution in a country where the whole population
was decidedly hostile, and the Spaniards took up a second and
stronger position at Las Cabrillas, and in front of Las Siete
June 24. Aguas. There also they were unable to withstand the attack of
disciplined troops, well commanded, and well supplied with all
the means of war; yet they made a brave resistance, retreating
from one position to another; and when they fell back upon
Valencia, as they had no cause for shame, they brought with
them no feeling of despondency, and communicated no dismay,
with which the arrival of a beaten army might under other cir-
cumstances have infected the people.

*He ap-
proaches the
city.*

Moncey, on the other hand, had found a more determined
resistance than he expected, and was disappointed of the suc-
cours which should have joined him from Catalonia. He has
been censured for not advancing against the city with the utmost
expedition, before the people had time to make preparations for
resisting him; but knowing the anarchy which prevailed there,
he might not unreasonably think that an interval of delay would
either abate their ardour, or increase their confusion; if he
failed to intimidate them into submission, he had reason to
believe that the gates would be betrayed to him; and if the
traitors who had engaged to perform this service should be de-
tected, or fail in the execution, even in that case a successful

resistance could hardly have been contemplated by him as a possibility. In a military view Valencia indeed must then have appeared incapable of defence. Suburbs nearly as large as the city itself had grown up round the whole circle of its old brick walls, and the citadel was small, ill fortified, and altogether useless. In so large a city, for the population exceeded 80,000, a besieger might reckon upon the wealth, the fears, and the helplessness of a great portion of its inhabitants; and perhaps he might undervalue a people whom travellers had represented as relaxed by the effects of a delicious climate, by which, according to the proverbial reproach of their Castilian neighbours, all things were so debilitated, that in Valencia the meat was grass, the grass water, the men women, and the women nothing.

CHAP.
VIII.
1808.
June.

On the day after his second victory Moncey wrote from his head-quarters at La Venta de Bunol, six leagues from the city, to the Captain-general, saying, that he was ordered by the Junta of government at Madrid to enter and restore tranquillity there, and promising to pardon the atrocious massacre which had been committed if he were received without opposition. The Junta appealed to the people with a spirit that inspired confidence: the very women exclaimed that death was better than submission; and Padre Rico, with a sword in one hand and a crucifix in the other, went through the streets exhorting his fellow citizens to exert themselves to the utmost, and die, if they were so called, like martyrs, in the cause of their country. The public opinion having been decidedly expressed, all persons capable of bearing arms without exception were ordered to repair to the citadel, and there provide themselves with weapons. The quantity of muskets was insufficient for the number who applied, and all the swords, of which there was a large stock, were delivered out, though many were without hilts. A few twelve and sixteen-pounders, with one twenty-pounder, were planted

*Prepara-
tions for
defence.*

CHAP. at the Puerta del Quarte, where the principal attack was expected; a great quantity of timber, which had just been floated down the river, was used in part to form a breastwork at this important point, and part in blocking up the entrance of the streets within the walls. The other gates were fortified, though less formidably; and the ensuing day was employed in filling the ditches with water, and cutting trenches across the road to impede the enemy's approach.

VIII.

1808.

June.

The Spaniards defeated at Quarte.

So little were the Valencians disheartened by their preceding defeats, that even now they would not wait for the French within their vantage ground. On the evening of the 27th Moncey found some 3000 of them under D. Joseph Caro, brother of the Marquis de Romana, posted about six miles from the city, behind the canal at the village of Quarte, where they had broken down the bridge. A severe action ensued: the mulberry trees, with which that delightful country is thickly planted, afforded cover to the Valencian marksmen, and before they were dislodged and defeated, the number of slain on both sides amounted to 1500. At eleven on the following morning the advanced guard of the city came in with the expected intelligence that the enemy were close at hand; and shortly afterwards a flag of truce arrived with a summons, saying, that if the French were permitted to enter peaceably, persons and property should be respected; but otherwise they would force their way with fire and sword. A short time for farther preparations was gained by assembling the parochial authorities, under the plea of consulting them; and then, in the name of the people, it was replied, that they preferred death to any capitulation. Moncey immediately gave orders for the attack. A smuggler, who, for the purpose of better concealing his intentions, affected to put himself foremost among the patriots, had undertaken to deliver up the battery upon which the Valencians depended in great part

for their defence, and which they had placed under the patronage of St. Catharine. He had engaged a sufficient number of accomplices ; but the treason had been discovered on the preceding night : he and his associates were put to death ; and when the French approached the battery, instead of finding it manned by traitors, they were received with a brisk and well-sustained fire.

CHAP.
VIII.
1808.
June.

The approach to the Puerta del Quarte was by a broad street leading straight for the gate. The Spanish commander, by a bold stratagem, ordered the gate to be opened ; and when the French hastened forward, thinking either that their agents had done this, or that it was a mark of submission, a fire of grape was opened upon them, with effect equal to the most sanguine hopes of the defenders. The enemy drew back, leaving the ground covered with their dead. They then directed their efforts against the weakest point of the whole weak circuit of the walls, . . . so well were they always acquainted with whatever local circumstances might contribute to the success of their military operations. It was where the old gate of S. Lucia had been built up ; but the battery which they erected against it had scarcely begun to play, before a well-directed fire from the Puerta de S. Vicente dismounted the guns, and killed the men who were employed there. It was now manifest from the determined spirit of the Valencians, that if Moncey could have forced his way within the walls, his army was not numerous enough for the civic war which it would have been compelled to wage from house to house, and from street to street. After persevering in vain attempts from one till eight in the evening, he became convinced of this unwelcome truth, and withdrew for the night to his head-quarters between Mislata and Quarte, about a league from the city. To maintain his position there was impossible : he retreated, leaving part of his artillery, and suffering from

*They re-
pulse the
French
from Va-
lencia.*

CHAP. VIII. the peasantry, and the parties who harassed his retreat, that vengeance which Murat had provoked, and which the conduct of the French wherever they were successful had exasperated. An attempt was made to intercept him on his way, and inclose him between the Valencian and Murcian forces: the plan was well conceived, and he had twice to attack and defeat the enemy, who had taken post in his rear, before he could reach Almanza. He had now effected his retreat out of the kingdom of Valencia, but his position was still so insecure, that it was deemed necessary to fall back from Almanza to S. Clemente, nearer the main force of the French in the two Castilles; there while the Valencians were exulting in the deliverance which they had obtained, he collected artillery and stores, and waited for reinforcements which would enable him to renew the attack with means that might ensure success.

*Moncey retreats into
Castille.*

*Movements
of the
French in
Andalusia.*

The failure of the French in Valencia would have been amply compensated if they could have reduced Andalusia to obedience, and for this more important object greater and more commensurate efforts were made. One of the first acts of Murat after he reached Madrid had been to prepare for securing Cadiz. General Dupont was appointed governor of that city soon after the abdications at Bayonne had been effected; and he had commenced his march towards the south, when he was diverted to Toledo, to repress some tumults by which the people there had manifested their temper, before the insurrection in the capital kindled the whole kingdom. The apprehension of that insurrection, or the determined intention of provoking some such crisis, made Murat deem it expedient to keep the whole of his force within call. Dupont, therefore, was detained at Toledo; but when the disposition of the Andalusians was known, and fears were entertained for the French squadron at Cadiz, he was dispatched thither with a force esteemed fully equal

to a service which, momentous as it was, was not thought difficult to be performed. He began his march at the end of May, and crossing the Sierra Morena without opposition, arrived on the third of June at Andujar. There he obtained the unwelcome intelligence that a Junta had been formed at Seville, and that not that province alone, but Granada, Cordoba, and Jaen also had declared against the French. Proceeding, therefore, now, as in an enemy's country, he occupied Montoro, El Carpio, and Bujalance, and throwing a bridge over the Guadalquivir at El Carpio, passed some of his corps to the right bank, and proceeded with the main body along the left to the bridge of Alcolea, where the Spaniards had taken a strong position. The bridge is very long, consisting of twenty arches, constructed of black marble; and the Spaniards had erected a redoubt to command the approach. They had planted some batteries upon an eminence, and confiding in these defences, had not thought it necessary to destroy the bridge. Want of skill, rather than of courage, rendered these preparations ineffectual: the *tête-du-pont* and the village were carried after a brave resistance. The way was now open; but when the French began to pass, a fire was opened which swept the bridge, and made the bravest of the assailants for a moment hesitate. A lieutenant of grenadiers, by name Ratelot, whose courage was worthy of a better cause, advanced to the middle of the bridge alone, and placing his hat upon his sword, waved it over his head, crying *Vive l'Empereur!* and calling his comrades to follow him. His example roused a brave spirit, which was only the more excited by the sight of his death. They crossed, and attacked the Spaniards with all the advantages which discipline gives to courage; and at the same time the division which had passed the river at El Carpio came up, and falling upon their left, completed their defeat. The French without delay advanced against Cordoba. A camp

CHAP.
VIII.

1808.

June.*G. Dupont
defeats the
Spaniards
at the
bridge of
Alcolea.*

CHAP. had been formed before that city with the intention of defending
VIII. it; but the routed troops brought dismay with them; and the

1808. Cordobans, at the approach of danger, chose rather to rely
upon their walls than their lines. Among the arms which they

June.

Cordoba entered and pillaged by the French.

abandoned there were many of English manufacture, and others which, for their antiquity and unusual form, became objects of curiosity to the conquerors. Resolute men might have defended weaker walls than those of Cordoba, which were partly the work of the Romans, partly of the Moors; but stronger fortifications would not have afforded security unless they had been better defended. In two hours the gates were forced, the troops and the new levies retreated or fled towards Ecija, and the city was at Dupont's mercy.

Dupont unable to advance.

Though by this easy conquest the French were enabled to enrich themselves with pillage, they were far from feeling themselves at ease. The news from Cadiz was of the worst kind; their squadron had been captured there, and the Spaniards were in communication with the English. The only considerable body of Spanish troops in the peninsula, under D. Francisco Xavier Castaños, which had been stationed in the camp of S. Roque, had heartily entered into the national cause; and the English from Gibraltar (which in the hands of England was now more serviceable to Spain than it had ever been made injurious to her) had assisted him with money, and with arms for the new levies. The alliance with England enabled the Spaniards also to bring over troops from Ceuta, who had been sent to garrison that place early in the year, because of a rumour that the English were intending to attack it. On all sides the insurrection was spreading; and the armed peasantry had occupied the passes of the Sierra, to cut him off from retreat and from reinforcements. He had looked for co-operation from the side of Portugal. A detachment of Junot's army was to have proceeded

along the coast of Algarve, and have crossed the Guadiana ; a body of English troops from Gibraltar, sent under General Spencer to Ayamonte, had defeated this intention. Junot, therefore, was fain to send them by the circuitous way of Elvas ; but his own situation was now becoming perilous. The Spaniards under his command contributed to his danger at this time rather than to his strength. An English squadron off the Tagus kept him upon the alarm, while it encouraged the hopes of the Portuguese ; and when General Kellerman was ordered to Elvas, the insurrection at Badajoz made it doubtful whether he would be able to proceed and effect his march to Cadiz with so small a force as could be spared from Portugal, and a detachment from Madrid was sent to join with him, and quell the people of Extremadura. Dupont could not be placed in a condition to effect the object for which he entered Andalusia, unless he received strong reinforcements ; and Savary, therefore, ordered two divisions under Generals Vedel and Gobert, a force which was deemed more than sufficient to secure him against all danger, even if it should not be equal to the subjugation of the whole province.

These troops did not effect their junction without experiencing proofs of the national feeling, which might have taught them in how severe as well as hateful a contest the insatiable ambition of Buonaparte had wantonly engaged them. In passing through La Mancha they found that the sick, whom Dupont had left at Manzanares, had been killed ; and they did not enter the little town of Valdepeñas without a severe contest : the inhabitants embarrassed the invader's cavalry by chains, which they stretched across the streets, and kept up a brisk fire from the houses, from which they were not dislodged till the French set the town in flames. When the advanced guard attempted to pass the Sierra Morena, they found an irregular force well posted and

CHAP.
VIII.

1808.

June.

*He is disappointed of
succours
from Portugal.*

*Reinforcements from
Madrid
join him.*

CHAP.
VIII.

1808.

June.

entrenched in the tremendous defiles of that great line of mountains, and they were compelled to fall back upon the main body. Notwithstanding this warning the French entered upon the pass without precaution, in full confidence that even the strength of the situation would not enable the Spaniards to withstand them; and this presumption cost them many lives which might well have been spared. The first brigade and the cavalry were allowed to pass an ambush, which was laid among the trees and rocks, in advance of the entrenchment; a fire was then opened upon the second, and the French suffered three discharges before they were ready to act in return. Their *Voltigeurs* then dislodged the enemy from their vantage ground; the works were forced with a loss, according to the French account, of 900 on the part of the defendants; and the invaders leaving a detachment to secure the defiles, crossed the mountains, and entered Andalusia. Vedel, with his division, was stationed at Carolina; Gobert occupied the large and ancient village of Baylen, about four leagues farther on, nearly half way between Vedel and Dupont, who had his head-quarters at Andujar. A *tête-du-pont* was constructed to command the passage of the river there, and another at the village of Manjibar, between Baylen and Jaen.

*Cuesta and
Blaks advance
against the
French.*

While the intrusive government believed that by this junction its army in Andalusia was so strengthened, that the defeat of the Spaniards was certain if they could be brought to action, an opportunity was afforded it of striking a great blow in Castille, by which the way to the capital was laid open. A force considerable in numbers had been raised in Galicia, and arms and stores in abundance had now been supplied by Great Britain. Filangieri exerted himself in training these new levies, and gave orders for forming entrenchments at Manzanal; a position of extraordinary strength on the heights above Astorga. Whether this preparation for defensive war, when the people were too

eager to be led against the enemy, renewed the suspicions which his conduct on St. Ferdinand's day had excited; or whether private malice, as has been asserted, was at work for his destruction; he was murdered by some of his soldiers at Villa Franca, in the Bierzo, and the command of the Galician army then devolved upon D. Joaquin Blake, an officer of Irish parentage. Advancing to Benevente he formed a junction with the army of Castille and Leon, which Cuesta, with that characteristic energy which on such occasions he was capable of exerting, had collected after his defeat at Cabezon. The two generals disagreed in opinion; Blake dreaded the discipline of the French, and would therefore have avoided a general action; Cuesta relied upon the courage of his countrymen, and was eager to engage: he took the command, as being superior in rank, and they proceeded, in no good understanding with each other, in a direction which threatened Burgos. Nothing could have been more conformable to the wishes of the enemy; and Marshal Bessieres, in the expectation of sure victory, marched against them with the divisions of Generals Mouton and Merle, and General Lasalles' division of cavalry, in all 12,000 men.

He found them posted near Medina del Rio Seco, an ancient, and, in former days, a flourishing city, and containing now in its decay some 8000 inhabitants. The numbers of the Spanish army have been variously stated from 14,000 to 40,000. They attacked the enemy's infantry with such determined ardour that they forced them to give way; won four pieces of artillery, spiked them, and set up their shout of victory, . . too soon; for the French cavalry charged their left wing, and by their great superiority decided the day, but not till after a most severe contest. Few bloodier battles have ever been fought in proportion to the numbers in the field, even if the force of the Spaniards be taken at its highest estimate: upon the best authority, that of the neigh-

CHAP.
VIII.
1808.
June.

*M. Bessieres
defeats them
at Rio Seco.
July 14.*

CHAP.

VIII.

1808.

July.

*The way to
Madrid
opened by
this victory.*

bouring priests, it is affirmed that 27,000 bodies were buried. The stores and artillery were taken, but the victors were not in a condition to complete the rout of the defeated army, and take advantage of the dissention between the two generals.

When Buonaparte received intelligence of this victory, he said, "it is the battle of Villa Viciosa. Bessieres has placed Joseph upon the throne:" and calculating with contempt the farther resistance which might be expected, he added, "Spain has now some 15,000 men left, and some old blockhead to command them." Little did he know of Spain and of the Spaniards. The battle of Rio Seco did not intimidate even the men who were defeated there; but the enormities which the French committed in the city increased, if that were possible, the hatred with which the whole nation regarded them. The people of that city, unsuspecting of the future, had illuminated their houses, when the French on their entrance into the country arrived there, and some of the troops had been quartered among them. This did not save them from the worst horrors of war.

*Joseph en-
ters Madrid.*

The way to Madrid was now open, and the Intruder proceeded on his journey thither without molestation. He had been proclaimed in that city on Santiago's day, and the circumstances had been such as were little likely to encourage his partizans. The great standard-bearer and his son withdrew from the capital, rather than incur the guilt and contract the degradation of bearing part in the ceremony. Joseph and his train arrived on the evening of the 20th, . . all the troops being under arms to receive him, a most necessary part of the parade. Nothing indeed could be more striking than the contrast between the popular feeling on this day, and on that when Ferdinand, only four months before, made his entrance as king! Then the streets swarmed with the population of the whole surrounding country, and all the power and exertions of the magistrates were

required to repress the general enthusiasm ; now what few demonstrations of joy were made were procured by the direct interference of authority, the officers going from door to door to call upon the inhabitants, and even with this interference the houses were but just sufficiently decorated to save the inhabitants from vexation which they would otherwise have incurred. The money which was scattered among the populace lay in the streets where it fell for the French themselves to pick up ; and the theatres, which were thrown open to the people, were left to be filled by Frenchmen.

CHAP.
VIII.
1808.
July.

Yet every possible means had been used to prepare the metropolis for his reception, and keep down the spirit of the inhabitants by fraud and force. The publication of news from the provinces was prevented by the severest measures, and if any of the patriots' manifestos found their way to Madrid, to print, copy, read, or listen to them, was declared and punished as high treason. A paper was forged in the Bishop of Santander's name, recommending the people to receive with gratitude the King and the army, who were come to regenerate them. Revolution, they were told, was one of those indispensable remedies which must be employed when abuses had proceeded to a length which could not be restricted by the ordinary resources of public law. It was a species of war declared by the people against their own government to remove the established authority, when, either from ignorance or disinclination, it was not exercised for the general advantage. Happily for Spain, it was spared the necessity of passing through the calamities which other countries had experienced in this inevitable process ; and it had only to receive a new government under the authority of the protector of the nations of Europe. In spite of these artifices and false representations, in spite also of all the measures taken to keep the inhabitants in ignorance of what was passing

*Fears of the
intrusive
government.*

CHAP. VIII. in the provinces, the agitation of the public continued; and a new edict was issued, enacting, that all strangers arriving in the metropolis, should, within four and twenty hours, send in their names to the police, with an account of their occupations, the places from whence they came, and their motives for visiting Madrid.

1808.
July.

*The Council
of Castille
demur at
the oath of
allegiance.*

The intrusive government had hoped that the battle of Rio Seco, and the terrible slaughter which had there been made of the Spaniards, would intimidate the nation, and convince them that all opposition to the new dynasty must be unavailing. In this expectation they were soon undeceived. The battle, bloody as it was, proved that the Spaniards were not to be discouraged by any defeat, however severe; and the Intruder, on his arrival in Madrid, experienced a resistance in a quarter where he looked only for pliancy and submission. The Council of Castille, when it was called upon to swear to the constitution, demurred; and avowed that it had not circulated the constitutional act, which it had been ordered to do by an edict from Vittoria; a transfer of the succession from one family to another, it maintained, could not be made without the authority and intervention of the nation: nor would the Members of the Council swear to the new constitution, because they were not the representatives of the nation; the Cortes were, and the Cortes had not accepted it. Now it would be a manifest infraction of the most sacred rights, if in a matter of such importance, relating not to the introduction of a new law, but to the extinction of all their former codes, and the formation of new ones in their stead, they should take an oath of observance before the nation should have signified its acceptance. The Junta of Bayonne had not been convoked to form codes and laws, but to treat of the advantages which they could obtain for the respective bodies or provinces by which they were deputed.

This was the point at which the Council had determined to make their stand. Many and great concessions they had previously made, yielding to compulsion, and trusting or hoping that political considerations, if worthier motives failed, might even yet prevent Buonaparte from effecting his designs of usurpation. But all temporizing was now at an end. The oath was to supply the invalidities of the forced abdications, to cover all the injustice and villainy by which the Royal Family had been ensnared, to sanction the insolent intrusion of a stranger upon the throne, and bind the nation in honour and in conscience to support him there. It had already been ordered that no person in any public employ should receive his salary, or enjoy any of the emoluments of his office, till he had taken the oath. The Council therefore resolved now to stand forward, and give an example to those, who, like themselves, were within the power of the intrusive government, of the resistance which it was their duty to oppose. Their written memorial was laid before Joseph Buonaparte, who, upon hearing that the oath had not been taken, refused to read it, and directed Azanza to demand of them an immediate compliance with his decree; requiring that if the Council would not unanimously obey, as many as were obedient, though they should be the minority, should, without delay, subscribe the written oath. This order was twice repeated on the following day; and on the day after, the Council returned a dilatory reply, stating that it was a matter of conscience, and advising that as such it should be propounded to the chief universities, or other bodies or communities, as the Kings of Spain were wont to do in arduous points, which were to be decided not upon legal reasons alone, but upon theological considerations also; or that a Junta of the most approved Canonists and Theologians should be appointed, before whom the Council would send ministers to dispute the case. When

CHAP.
VIII.
1808.
July.

July 26.

CHAP. this demand was delivered strong measures were meditated in
 VIII. return : an example, it was said, must be made of the Council
 1808. which might operate as a warning to all minor bodies and in-
July. dividuals ; and it was generally believed that they would not
 escape death or banishment into France. But the policy of
 gaining time and trusting to events proved fortunate in this in-
 stance ; and they were delivered from danger when all further
 arts of procrastination would have failed, by the splendid success
 of their countrymen in Andalusia, which compelled the Intruder
 and his ministers to consult their own safety by immediate flight.

*G. Cassagne
 enters Jaen.*

When Vedel and Gobert had effected their junction with
 Dupont it was thought proper, for the security of his position
 at Andujar, to occupy the old city of Jaen, the Aurigi, Oringe,
 or Oningis of the ancient Spaniards, in latter ages the capital of
 a Moorish kingdom, taken from the Mahommedans by King St.
 Ferdinand, famous afterwards for its silk manufactories ; and
 still, though its trade and population had declined, containing
 some 12,000 inhabitants. It is situated on the skirts of the Sierra,
 and at the foot of Mount Jabaluez, in one of the happiest parts
 of a delightful country. The French had already made one of
 their plundering visits there ; and when General Cassagne was
 now sent with a brigade consisting of 1300 men to take possession
 of the city and maintain it, a number of armed peasants awaited
 his approach among the fields and gardens without the walls.
 Their defence was ill planned and ill conducted ; they fired their
 musquets repeatedly before the enemy were within shot, and
 took flight at the first discharge of the French artillery, many
 of them throwing away their cartridges to disencumber them-
 selves of any thing which might impede their escape. The city
 was entered without any resistance from the inhabitants ; and
 while one party of the assailants, singing the song of Roland,
 scaled the heights to attack an old castle, the others found an

easier way to it through the town: it was abandoned at their approach, and they placed a garrison there.

The French, conformably to the system upon which they began this wicked war, put to death the peasants who fell into their hands. One of these victims excited admiration even in his murderers; he asked for life in a manner not unbecoming a Spaniard in such a cause: finding that no mercy was to be expected, he wrapt his cloak around his head and began his prayers; and when the bullet cut them short, fell and expired without a cry, or groan, or struggle. These military murders were not unrevenged. On the first day after the arrival of the French, the Spaniards increased in number, regular troops came to their assistance, and some smart skirmishes took place at the outposts. Early on the ensuing morning they surprised the castle; most of the garrison chose rather to leap from a high crag, at the imminent hazard of life or limbs, than to fall into the hands of an enemy to whom they had given such provocation; the others were put to death, and some of them barbarously tortured before that relief was given. Encouraged by this success, the Spaniards entered the city; a terrible fire was kept up upon the enemy from roofs and windows; the French were driven out, they formed upon some level ground in front of the town, where the Spanish cavalry charged them, and their guns were taken and retaken. The French occupied the same ground from which they had first driven the peasantry, and which was covered with stubble and with sheaves of corn, for there had been no time to carry in the harvest when these invaders approached. The sheaves took fire during the action, the cartridges which had been left there by the Spaniards exploded, threw the French into disorder, and killed and scorched many of them; and the whole field was presently in flames, out of which the wounded in vain endeavoured to crawl upon their broken limbs.

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VIII.

1808.

July.

He is compelled to evacuate it, and returns to Baylen.

CHAP.
VIII.

1808.

July.

*Mémoires
d'un Soldat,
t. i. 145—
168.*

*Prepara-
tions of G.
Castanos.*

*Comte de
Maule, t.
xiii. p. 9.*

This action continued from an early hour in the morning till four or five in the afternoon, when the French again forced their way into the city; they pillaged it, they committed the foulest enormities upon the nuns and other women who had not taken flight in time; and in many places they set the houses and convents on fire. But the invaders had now learnt in what kind of war they were engaged; that they had provoked a national resistance, and that victory brought with it so little advantage, that when they had won the field, they were masters only of the ground on which they stood. The Spaniards were preparing for another attack, to avoid which General Cassagne ordered a retreat under cover of the night. The French families who resided in Jaen, suffering now for the crimes of their countrymen, abandoned their property and their homes to save their lives, and put themselves under the protection of the retreating troops. They had been thrown into prison on the morning when the invaders were first expelled, and that precautionary measure on the part of the magistrate might probably have failed to save them from the fury of an unreasoning multitude. As many of the wounded as could be carried by the dragoons' horses were removed, the rest were left to their fate, for the French had no other means of transport; but most of those who were removed died on the way from the heat of the ensuing day's journey and the pain of their wounds. Their whole loss, as stated by themselves, amounted to a fourth part of their number. They were not pursued, and they effected their retreat to Baylen.

Dupont's situation became now every day more insecure, for at this time neither men nor means were wanting to the Spaniards in Andalusia, nor prudence to direct their efforts in the wisest way. The city of Cadiz alone supplied a donative of more than a million dollars and 5000 men; and as the men were mostly employed in filling up old regiments, the army was not weakened

by having great part of its ostensible force consisting in raw levies. The general, Castaños, acted steadily upon the principles which the Junta of Seville had laid down; he harassed the enemy by detachments on all sides, cut them off from supplies, and allowed them no opportunity of coming to a regular engagement; and thus, while the difficulties and distresses of the French were continually increasing, the Spaniards acquired habits of discipline, and obtained confidence in themselves and in their officers. Castaños even attempted to reform the Spanish army, and introduce among them that moral and religious discipline by which Cromwell, and the great Gustavus before him, made their soldiers invincible. He issued an order for banishing all strumpets from the camp and sending them to a place of correction and penitence; he called upon the officers to set their men an example, by putting away the plague from themselves, and dismissing all suspicious persons; he charged the chaplains to do their duty zealously, and threatened condign punishment to any person of what rank soever, who should act in contempt of these orders. Such irregularities, he said, would draw down the divine anger, and make the soldiers resemble in licentiousness the French, who for their foul abominations were justly hated by God and man; and it would be in vain to gather together armies, if at the same time they gathered together sins, and thereby averted from themselves the protection of the Almighty, which alone could ensure them the victory over their enemies. Happy would it have been for Spain if this principle had been steadily pursued; the foundations of that moral reformation might then have been laid, without which neither the strength nor the prosperity of any country can be stable.

Dupont might have secured his retreat across the Sierra Morena, if he had not relied too confidently upon his actual

CHAP.
VIII.
1808.
July.

*Dupont's
despatches
intercepted.*

CHAP.
VIII.

1808.

July.

strength and the reputation of the French arms, and if he had not still hoped for succours from Junot. His force, though reduced by sickness, and the harassing service in which it was engaged, amounted to 16,000 effective men, enough to have defeated the Spaniards if they had been rash enough to engage in a general action, and more than he could well provide for. A large convoy from Toledo, together with all his hospital stores, was intercepted in the mountains. His men were fain to reap the standing corn, and make it into bread for themselves; the peasantry, whom they would otherwise have compelled to perform this work, having left the harvest to take arms against them, and bear a part in the defence of their country. He wrote pressingly for reinforcements; it was now, he said, nearly a month that he had occupied the position at Andujar; the country was exhausted, it was with extreme difficulty that he could obtain the scantiest subsistence for his army; the enemy were acquiring strength and courage to act upon the offensive; the anniversary of their great victory at the Navas de Tolosa was at hand, and to this the Spaniards, from religious, national, and local feelings, attached great importance. Every moment which he was compelled to waste in inaction increased the evil. Surely at such a crisis it would be prudent to neglect all partial movements of the insurgents for the purpose of enabling him to act in Andalusia with a sufficient force; if the enemy were permitted to acquire strength so as to keep the field, their example would be followed by all the provinces, and by all the Spanish troops throughout the kingdom; whereas one victory obtained over them here would go far towards the subjugation of Spain. These letters fell into the hands of the Spaniards; but if they had reached their destination, it was not in Savary's power to have reinforced him.

*Plan for
attacking
the French.*

On the 11th of July a council of war was held by Castaños, and it was determined that a division of 9000 good troops, under

General Reding, should proceed by way of Menjibar to attack the enemy at Baylen, where Gobert was stationed for the purpose of guarding the road to Carolina, and maintaining a communication with Madrid. The Marqués de Coupigny, with 5000, was to proceed by La Higuereta and Villanueva, toward the same point, and co-operate with Reding; and Lieut.-Colonel D. Juan de la Cruz Mourgeon, with a corps of 2000, was to go by Marmolejo, and act against the enemy if they attempted to escape by the Sierra. Castaños himself occupied the Visos de Andujar, a strong and advantageous position of which he thought it necessary to retain possession, though the troops were without tents, there was a want of water, and the heat excessive. But this position enabled him to keep Dupont upon the alarm, and prevent him from acting against Reding and Coupigny, while they interposed between him and the two other divisions of his army. Reding succeeded in driving the enemy from their *tête-du-pont* at Menjibar, and from the positions which they took up one after another between that place and Baylen, disputing their ground skilfully and well. Gobert was killed, one cannon and the baggage in the encampment taken. During these operations some of the Spaniards died from excessive heat and exertion; and in the afternoon Reding retired to Menjibar, and crossing the Guadalquiver again on the following day, effected a junction, on the third morning, with Coupigny, who had beaten the French from a strong post near Villanueva. Their intention was to have attacked Baylen; but Dufour, who succeeded to the command of Gobert's division, had evacuated that place, finding himself unable to maintain it, and fallen back to unite with Vedel, at Carolina.

One part of the Spanish commander's plan had thus been accomplished, and, in pursuance of his arrangements, Reding and Coupigny prepared to march from Baylen upon Andujar, and

CHAP.
VIII.

1808.

July.

July 16.

*Battle of
Baylen.*

CHAP. there attack the main body of the French on one side, while the
VIII. reserve of the Spanish army was ready to act against it from
1808. the Visos. Dupont meantime had formed the same intention
July. of placing a part of the enemy's force between two fires ; and on
the night of the 18th, as soon as darkness had closed, the French
marched from Andujar, after plundering the inhabitants of
whatever was portable, and took the road toward Baylen.
Reding was preparing to begin his march when the enemy
July 19. arrived at three in the morning, and fell upon him, thinking to
take him by surprise. The attack was made vigorously, and
might probably have been successful, had not the Spaniards,
because of their intended movement, been in some degree of
readiness. The foremost companies both of horse and foot were
engaged hand to hand ; but the Spaniards rapidly took their
stations, and repelled the assailants at all points. When day
broke they were in possession of the high ground, and the French
were forming their columns to renew the attack in a situation
which was not exposed to the Spanish artillery. In this re-
newed attack both parties conducted themselves with the greatest
intrepidity. Several times the assailants broke the enemy's lines,
and fighting with the resolution of men who had never known
what it was to be defeated, they once made way to the batteries.
But the Spaniards stood firm, they knew that reinforcements were
at hand, and that if they kept their ground, the situation of the
French was desperate ; they had confidence in their leaders and
in their own strength, and, above all, that thorough assurance of
the justice of their cause, which, when other points are equal, will
inevitably turn the scale. The action was long and bloody ; it
continued till noon without any other interruption than what
arose from occasional recession and the formation of new
columns. Dupont then, and the other generals, putting them-
selves at the head of their men, made a last charge with the most

determined bravery ; they were, however, once more repulsed. By this time they had lost 2000 men, besides those who were wounded. Dufour, who was with this part of the army, was killed, and Dupont himself wounded. No hope of victory remained, and no possibility of escape, the French therefore proposed to capitulate ; and the arrival of the Spanish reserve, under D. Manuel de la Peña, at this point of time, enabled the victors to dictate their own terms.

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July.

Dupont's intention of marching from Andujar had been so well concealed till the moment of its execution, that though that city contained some 14,000 inhabitants, no information was conveyed to the Spaniards on the adjacent heights, nor were they apprized of his movements till two in the ensuing morning, when he had been five hours on his march. Castaños immediately ordered La Peña to pursue him with the reserve and some corps of the third division. Upon his arrival he learnt that a capitulation had been proposed, upon which he referred the French negotiators to the commander-in-chief, and took such a position as effectually to surround the defeated army. The answer which Castaños returned was, that the French must surrender themselves prisoners of war, and no other terms would be granted ; that because of the manner in which they had sacked the towns which they had entered, he would allow the general and officers to retain nothing more than their swords, and each a single portmanteau with apparel for his use ; but that in other respects they should be treated like their squadron at Cadiz, in a manner conformable to Spanish generosity. And he required that Dupont should capitulate not only for the troops who had been actually engaged, but for the two other divisions also. The next day was spent in adjusting the terms ; and on the 21st Castaños and the Conde de Tilly, as the representative of the Supreme Junta of Spain and the Indies, a title which the

*Surrender
of the
French
army.*

CHAP. Junta of Seville at this time arrogated, advised the Junta that
 VIII. Dupont and his division were made prisoners of war, and that
 1808. all the other French between the summit of the Sierra Morena
 July. and Baylen were to evacuate the peninsula by sea.

*Terms of
the sur-
render.*

These, however, though thus officially announced to the Junta, and by them made known to Lord Collingwood, were not the terms which had been signed, and the cause of this misstatement has never been explained. There could have been no motive for deceiving the French by promising them better conditions than it was intended to observe, for the enemy were absolutely at their mercy; so confessedly indeed, that when La Peña made a threatening movement to accelerate the treaty, Dupont sent him word that if he thought proper to attack them no defence would be made. The most probable conjecture which can be offered seems to be, that the French negotiators, Generals Chavert and Marescot, had sufficient address not only to make the Spaniards relax the tone of severe justice which was at first assumed, but also in the course of drawing up the capitulation, to obtain modifications in the latter articles, by which the intention of the former was set aside; that Tilly and Castaños had been thus led to make greater concessions than they were themselves aware of, and had no suspicion when they communicated to the Junta the result of the treaty, that one part of it, and that the most important, was actually annulled by the other. The capitulation began by stating that their excellencies the Conde de Tilly and Castaños had agreed with the French plenipotentiaries upon these conditions, as desiring to give proofs of their high esteem for his excellency General Dupont, and the army under his command, for the brilliant and glorious defence which they had made when completely surrounded by a very superior force. The troops under General Dupont were to remain prisoners of war, except the division of Vedel; that

division, and all the other French troops in Andalusia who were not included in the former article, should evacuate Andalusia, and take with them the whole of their baggage; but to prevent all cause of uneasiness while they were passing through the country, they should leave their artillery and other arms in charge of the Spanish army, to be delivered to them at the time of their embarkation; their horses, in order to save the trouble of transporting them, should be purchased by the Spaniards at a price agreed upon by two commissioners, one of each nation. The other troops, who were made prisoners, were to march out of the camp with the honours of war, with two guns at the head of each battalion, and the soldiers with their muskets, which they were to surrender to the Spaniards at the distance of four hundred toises from the camp. All the French troops in Andalusia were to proceed by stated journies, not exceeding four leagues a day, and with proper intervals of rest, to Sanlucar and Rota, there to be embarked in Spanish vessels and transported to Rochefort; the Spanish army guaranteeing the safety of their march. The generals and officers were to retain their arms, and the soldiers their knapsacks. The generals should retain a coach and a baggage cart each, the officers of the staff a coach only, free from examination, but without breaking the regulations and laws of the kingdom: all carriages which they had taken in Andalusia were excepted, and the observance of this exception was left to the French General Chavert. Whereas many of the soldiers in different places, and especially at the taking of Cordoba, notwithstanding the orders of the generals and the care of the officers, had committed excesses which were usual and inevitable when cities resisted at the time that they were taken (thus carefully was the article worded by the able French negotiators), the generals and officers were to take proper measures for delivering up any church vessels which might have

CHAP.
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CHAP. been carried away as booty, if any there were. Any thing omitted
 VIII. in this capitulation which might add to the accommodation of
 1808. the French during their passage through the country and their
July. tarriance in it, should be added as supplementary to these
 articles.

*Difficulty
 of executing
 their terms.*

The French displayed more address in the management of this capitulation than they had shown in the campaign. During the battle of Baylen, Vedel was near enough with his division to hear the firing, but he had received no intelligence of Dupont's movements, and did not move toward the scene of action till the firing had ceased. The French soldiers endeavoured to account for their defeat by vague accusations of treachery, by the want of a good understanding between the two generals, and by the alleged misconduct of Dupont, in making his corps attack one after another, instead of charging with his whole force, and in leaving too strong a detachment to guard the spoils with which he and the superior officers had enriched themselves. The more than likely supposition, that his messengers had been intercepted, would explain the want of co-operation, and the other charges may safely be dismissed. That when they were at the enemy's mercy they should have obtained such favourable terms may indeed appear surprising, even though the French have exceeded all other people in the art of obtaining good terms under the most unfavourable circumstances. It is more easy to perceive why the conditions were not observed; for in fact it was impossible to observe them. Nothing could be done at that time in opposition to the will of the people; and an universal cry had gone forth against invaders who had set towns and villages on fire, pillaging wherever they went, plundering churches and convents, violating women, and putting to death the people whom they took in arms. The Andalusians were exasperated against the French because of these atrocities, as

well as by that general feeling of indignation which the cause of the quarrel, the murders at Madrid, and the whole course of transactions at Bayonne, so justly excited. The Junta had issued a regular declaration of war against France, but the people knew and felt that this was not an ordinary war, and that no formalities could make it so; that the invaders had entered their country not in open hostility as fair and honourable enemies, but perfidiously and basely in the character of allies; and that by the complicated wickedness of their cause and their conduct they had forfeited all claim to the courtesies and observances of civilized war. They regarded Dupont's army rather as criminals than as soldiers, . . . men who had laid down their arms, but who could not lay down their crimes; and in that state of general feeling, if the Junta of Seville, or any other persons in authority, had attempted to perform the conditions of the capitulation, they would have been suspected of treachery, and might probably have fallen victims, like Solano, to the fury of the populace.

Aware of this, and yet withheld from breaking the capitulation by that national sense of honour which the revolution had not continued long enough to destroy, the Junta hesitated how to act, like men who, under the pretext of necessity, would willingly have done what, as an avowed and voluntary act, they were ashamed to do. They were deliberating whether to observe the treaty when Castaños and Morla arrived at Seville. The former felt that his country's honour and his own would be wounded by the breach of faith which was meditated, and he opposed it with the frankness of an upright mind. Morla, on the contrary, supported the popular opinion; and the Junta, deferring to it in fear, or in inclination, circulated a paper, wherein it was affirmed that both Vedel and Dupont had broken the capitulation, that it was impossible to fulfil it, and that even if possible, it ought not

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*The Junta
apply to
Lord Col-
lingwood
and Sir
Hew Dal-
rymple.*

CHAP. to be fulfilled. This paper, composed by an officer of high rank;
VIII. who was probably envious of Castaños, was sent by the Junta to
1808. Lord Collingwood and to Sir Hew Dalrymple, in the hope of
July. obtaining their sanction for a mode of conduct which they themselves secretly felt to be unworthy.

Lord Collingwood had not been satisfied with the terms granted to Vedel: he was not sufficiently acquainted with the circumstances to understand why an inferior *division should have been allowed to capitulate after the principal force had been defeated; and he perceived that these troops might again reach the frontiers of Spain in a week after they were landed at Rochefort. But although these were his feelings, nevertheless, when he was applied to from Cadiz for assistance in transporting Vedel's men to France, he replied, that he would order seamen to fit out Spanish merchant vessels for that purpose, as there were not more English transports in those parts than were required for the conveyance of our own troops. It proved, however, that Spanish vessels were not to be found; and the answer of Lord Collingwood, when his opinion upon the fulfilment of the terms was directly called for, was, that although he was sorry such a treaty, or indeed any treaty, should have been made with the French General, it was his opinion that all treaties, when once

* Vedel had surrounded and made prisoners one battalion of Reding's corps before he knew of Dupont's surrender. He was in full retreat, two or three leagues on his way; and, had it not been for the capitulation, might probably have recrossed the Sierra Morena with as little opposition as he had passed it.

Castaños had with him only 10,000 regular troops, and 15,000 peasants, who were incorporated at Utrera. This was the whole Spanish force. The French lost 4000 in killed and wounded, and 17,000 laid down their arms. The success at Baylen, therefore, was as extraordinary as any of those victories for which Santiago obtained credit in the heroic age of Spain.

solemnly ratified, should be held sacred, and the conditions observed as far as possible. The present engagement was one which it was not possible to perform, and therefore annulled itself. Sir Hew Dalrymple's answer was still less satisfactory to those persons who sought a British sanction for breaking the terms. His opinion, he said, exactly coincided with what must have been that of the Spanish and French Generals by whom the capitulation was sanctioned, namely, that it was binding on the contracting parties, as far as the means of carrying it into execution were in the power of each. He hoped that the laws of honour, and not the rules of political expediency, continued still to govern the conduct of soldiers in solemn stipulations of this kind; and certainly the surrender of General Vedel's corps could only be justified by the confidence he placed in that honour which characterized the Spanish nation. The reputation of a government, particularly one newly-formed, is, said he, a valuable part of its property, and ought not to be lightly squandered. And perhaps the question might be argued even on grounds of expediency.

Disappointed in these applications, but yielding to the real difficulty of the case, the Junta made no preparations for transporting the French troops; and Dupont at length addressed a letter to Morla, as Captain-general of the province, complaining of this, and of orders which had been given to examine the baggage of the general and other officers at Lebrixa. Morla beginning, as he usually did, with a declaration of his own honour and veracity, replied, that neither the capitulation, nor the approbation of the Junta, nor an express order from their beloved King himself, could make that possible which was not so. There were neither transports for his army, nor means of procuring them; and what greater proof of this could there be than that the prisoners taken in the squadron were detained at a great expense, because the Spaniards were unable to remove them?

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Correspondence between Dupont and Morla.

CHAP. General Castaños, when he promised to obtain a passport from
VIII. the English for this army, could promise no more than that he
1808. would earnestly ask for it; and this he had done: but how
August. could the French commander believe that the English would
let an army pass which would certainly carry on the war in some
other point, or perhaps in the very same? I am persuaded, he
pursued, that neither the general nor your excellency supposed
such a capitulation would be executed; his object was to relieve
himself from embarrassment, yours to obtain conditions, which,
impossible as they were, would render your inevitable surrender
honourable. Each effected his desire, and now the imperious
law of necessity must be obeyed. The national character per-
mits no other law than this with the French; it will not allow us
to use the law of retaliation. Your excellency compels me to
speak bitter truths. . . What right has such an army to require
the impossible fulfilment of a capitulation? . . . an army which
has entered Spain professing friendship and alliance, imprisoned
our King and his Royal Family, sacked his palaces, murdered
and robbed his subjects, ravaged his country, and despoiled him
of his crown! If you do not wish to draw upon yourself more
and more the just indignation of the people, which I am exerting
myself to restrain; you will cease to advance such intolerable
pretensions, and endeavour by your conduct to abate the strong
sense of the horrors so recently committed at Cordoba. He
added, that the orders for examining the baggage came from the
Supreme Junta, and were indispensable.

A large sum of money had been found in possession of a private
soldier, and Morla reminded the French general how greatly such
a fact would provoke the rage of the populace. The discovery
of some church plate, which was brought to light by the fall of a
package at Santa Maria, roused the popular feeling beyond all
farther endurance, and they immediately seized upon the whole
baggage. Dupont upon this wrote angrily to Morla, demanding

the restoration of the equipage, money, and effects of every kind belonging to himself and the other superior officers; invoking the principle of honour and probity, and saying, that jealous as he was for the glory of the Spaniards, the horrible excesses of the Spanish mob had made him groan. Undoubtedly, replied Morla, the conduct of the people has grieved me greatly; not that the act itself was wrong, but because it manifested a distrust of their government; because they took the administration of justice into their own hands; because it might have happened that in their fury they might have performed the vile and horrid office of the executioner, and have stained themselves and their compatriots by shedding that blood which had been spared on the field of battle. This is the cause of my concern, and on this account I proposed, as a thing expedient for the safety of your excellency and of those who accompanied you, that your equipages should undergo a prudent examination before they left Lebrixa, and advised you that nothing but submission and a discreet demeanour could save you from the indignation of the people. But it never was my intention, and still less the Supreme Junta's, that your excellency and your army should carry out of Spain the fruit of your rapacity, cruelty, and impiety. How could you conceive this possible? How could you suppose us to be so stupid and insensible? Could a capitulation which speaks only of your equipage, give you the property of the treasures which your army has accumulated by means of murders, profanation of all sacred things, cruelties and violence of every kind, in Cordoba and in other cities? Is there any reason, law, or principle which enjoins that faith, or even humanity should be observed towards an army which entered an allied and friendly kingdom under false pretences, seized its innocent and beloved King with all his family by fraud and treachery; extorted from him a renunciation in favour of their

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own sovereign, . . a renunciation impossible in itself, . . and because the nation would not submit to this forced and invalid transfer, proceeded to plunder palaces and towns, to profane and sack the churches, murdering the ministers of the altar, violating nuns, carrying rape every where, seizing every thing of value which they could transport, and destroying what they were not able to bring away ! Is it possible that such persons as these, when deprived of a booty, the very sight of which ought to fill them with compunction and horror, should have the effrontery to appeal to the principles of honour and probity ! My natural moderation has made me hitherto write to your excellency with a certain degree of respect ; but I could not refrain from tracing a slight sketch of your conduct, in reply to your extraordinary demands, . . demands which amount to this, . . do you plunder the temples and houses of Cadiz to reimburse me for what the people of the Puerto have taken from me, and what I took from Cordoba, with every circumstance of atrocity, violence, and brutality. Let your excellency lay aside such expectations, and be contented that the noble character of the Spanish nation withholds it from performing the vile office of the executioner. He concluded by saying, that every attention should be paid to the personal safety and convenience of the French general ; and that he would use all endeavours in his power to have him sent to France with the least possible delay.

*Treatment
of the pri-
soners.*

Dupont, when the first danger from the populace was over, had reason for his own sake to rejoice that the capitulation was not carried into effect. Enraged as Buonaparte was at the first signal defeat which his armies had sustained, he well knew that no opportunity of vindicating himself would be allowed him, and Admiral Villeneuve's example was before his eyes. Most of the Swiss in his army, the officers excepted, entered the Spanish service ; the more willingly, because General Reding,

who had borne so conspicuous a part in the victory, was their countryman. But, in truth, it was to them a matter of indifference on which side they were engaged, and in whatever action they were present the victor was sure to find recruits. Many, however, as well as many of the Germans who were taken at the same time, were allowed to engage as agricultural labourers. But toward the French the vindictive feeling of the people was never mitigated. The troops who escorted them with difficulty saved them from being torn to pieces by the peasantry; the murder of a Frenchman, so strong a hatred had their atrocities excited, was regarded as a meritorious act; untold numbers disappeared in consequence of this persuasion; and at Lebrixa a whole detachment, eighty in number, were massacred at one time, upon a cry of danger, absurd indeed, but sufficient to give the cowardly rabble a plea for gratifying that cruelty which is every where the characteristic of depraved and brutalized man. Letters were addressed to Morla from Madrid and various parts of Spain, some requiring that Dupont and the other French generals should be put to death, others that the whole of the prisoners should suffer, as an example which the public good demanded, and which justice called for. Some of these letters, by their ill writing and incorrect language, indicated from what base hands they came; others were the elaborate composition of men whom the very hatred of cruelty had made cruel, and who pleaded for a massacre in the same spirit of perverted zeal which had produced the Inquisition and the horrors of St. Bartholomew's day. These letters were so numerous that Morla thought proper publicly to reply to them, representing that such an act would not only bring on reprisals, but would fix a lasting stain upon the Spaniards. He took that opportunity of excusing himself from any concern in the breach of the capitulation, desiring it might be understood that he neither executed, nor

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CHAP. desired to execute the supreme power ; but that it was the Junta
 VIII. of Seville, which, for weighty reasons, not fit to be made public,
 1808. had delayed the transportation of Dupont and the other French
August. generals. “ I,” said he, “ had only to obey ; for it is not in my
 character or manner of thinking ever to resist a constituted
 authority ; such resistance can only occasion civil dissensions,
 which are the greatest evil a nation can suffer, and which I shall
 never spare any sacrifice to avoid.”

*Rejoicings
 for the
 victory at
 Baylen.*

By the battle of Baylen Andalusia was left in peace. Castaños had made a vow to dedicate the victory to King St. Ferdinand, who won Seville from the Moors, and lying inshrined in the magnificent mosque of that city, which he converted to a Christian church, is venerated there with especial devotion. The ceremony was performed with great pomp, and the French eagles were offered at the shrine of the canonized King and conqueror, as trophies of the most signal victory which had been achieved in Andalusia since his time.

*Movements
 of Bessieres
 after the
 battle of Rio
 Seco.*

Among the papers which fell into the hands of the Spaniards were despatches from Madrid, recalling Dupont to protect the capital against the army of Galicia and Castille and Leon, then advancing against it. These despatches were written before the battle of Rio Seco, where Cuesta’s fatal rashness exposed that army to destruction. The Spanish generals separated after their defeat, and Cuesta complained that he was abandoned by the Galician force. He retired with his part of the army to Leon, and knowing that that city could not be defended, instructed the Leonese Junta to remove to Astorga ; but Astorga itself was not more secure, and they withdrew across the mountains to Ponferrada. Cuesta then dispersed his infantry on the frontiers of Asturias, and retreated with the cavalry into Castille, cutting his way through the enemy’s rear guard. Marshal Bessieres meantime reaped the fruits of his victory by seizing arms and stores which,

in consequence of this rash action, were only brought from England to fall into the enemy's hands. He found large depôts at Villalpando and Benevente; then turning southward to Zamora, was informed there that Cuesta had ordered his troops to rendezvous at Mayorga. Deceived by this information, to Mayorga he went, and there a deputation from Leon waited upon him to solicit his clemency. At Leon also he found arms and ammunition to a great amount, which, if not imprudently accumulated there, were carelessly abandoned.

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Blake was thought to have given proof of great military talents both in the action and in the retreat; and Marshal Bessières, hoping that so severe a defeat would convince him all farther resistance must be ineffectual, endeavoured to win him over to the Intruder's service. For this purpose he wrote to him, under the pretext of assuring him that the prisoners should be well treated; and he took that opportunity for urging him to obey the act of abdication, and acknowledge King Joseph Napoleon. The Spanish general made answer, he acknowledged no other sovereign than Ferdinand of Bourbon, or his legitimate heirs; and if that unfortunate family should be altogether extinguished, his allegiance would then be due to the people of Spain, lawfully represented in a general Cortes. These, he said, were the sentiments of the whole army and of the whole nation; and he warned Bessières against the error of mistaking the forced submission of towns which were occupied by French troops, for a real change of opinion in the inhabitants. "Un-deceive therefore," said he, "your Emperor; and if it be true that he has a philanthropic mind, he will renounce the project of subduing Spain. Whatever partial successes he may obtain, it is evident that his brother never can reign in this country; unless he reign over a desert, covered with the blood of the Spaniards, and of the troops employed on this unjust enterprise."

Correspondence between Bessières and Blake.

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This answer did not satisfy the Frenchman, who, in a second letter, told Blake it was his duty to avoid the effusion of blood ; for while France, and the greatest part of Europe, continued in their present state, it was impossible that the Bourbons could reign. He accompanied this reasoning by proposing a conference with him upon the subject, . . . a proposal which, Blake replied, it was not fitting that he should address to a man of honour. Bessieres had set at liberty four or five hundred prisoners, under the title of peasants ; this title the Spanish general disclaimed for them, maintaining that they were regular soldiers, incorporated with the troops of the line, though not wearing the uniform. In explaining this, he said, " his intention was not to release himself from acknowledging the generous conduct of the Marshal towards them, . . . but to prevent the possibility of their receiving, upon any occasion, in consequence of any misconception, a treatment which they did not deserve ; and which, he was sure, from the sentiments that his excellency had manifested, could not but be painful to his own feelings." This answer was in a lower tone than the occasion required ; it admitted a distinction between the peasant and the soldier : but it became him to have proclaimed, that Spain was in circumstances when, by the first principles of law in all countries, every man is called upon to defend his country, and, becoming a soldier by necessity and duty, is to be accounted such in virtue of the cause for which he is in arms.

*The French
leave
Madrid and
retire to
Vitoria.*

Bessieres might now have sent a reinforcement to Junot, who had to contend against a spreading insurrection, while he was threatened with the more serious danger of an English expedition ; but as that danger had prevented Junot from succouring Dupont, so the destruction of Dupont's army cut off his hopes of assistance from Bessieres, who was then summoned in all haste to protect the flight of the Intruder from Madrid. There

is some reason to believe that the news of the battle of Baylen reached the capital some days before it was known to Joseph and his ministers, that this knowledge emboldened the Council of Castille to make their resolute stand against taking the oath of fidelity, and that it was concealed as long as possible in the hope of preventing or intercepting the Intruder's retreat. He was not apprised of it till eight or nine days after the event; and no time was then lost in providing for his safety by retiring to Vitoria, with the intention of concentrating the French force in that part of the country, and remaining there under their protection till reinforcements from France should arrive, numerous enough to effect the subjugation of Spain. Till this time, hope had been entertained by his adherents, that the opposition of the Spaniards, unexpected and violent as it was, would soon be quelled: but now it was apparent that what had hitherto been regarded as an insurrection, had assumed the serious form of war; and it is said that Joseph, considering that this extremity had not been contemplated by the Spaniards who had entered into his service, left them now at liberty to choose their part, for or against him, in the ensuing contest. In so doing he may have acted from a generous feeling, of which he was not incapable when master of his own actions; but in reality it was not in his power to withhold the liberty which he offered. The Duke del Infantado had already escaped from Madrid, and travelling in the dress of a peasant, had joined one of the Spanish armies. The Duke del Parque also had taken the first opportunity to withdraw. Two of the Intruder's ministers, Cevallos and Pinuela, availed themselves of the liberty which was now within their choice, and remained at Madrid. Jovelanos, always true to himself and his country, had refused to obey his summons. The other five, Urquijo, Azanza, Mazarredo, O'Farrill, and Cabarrus, adhered to what they still believed to be the stronger part, and accompanied Joseph in his retreat.

CHAP.
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*Azanza y
O'Farrill,
p. 101.
De Pradt,
192.*

CHAPTER IX.

SIEGE OF ZARAGOZA.

1808. June. IMPORTANT as the battle of Baylen was in its direct and immediate consequences to the Spaniards, their cause derived greater celebrity and more permanent strength from the defence of Zaragoza.

*Prepara-
tions at
Zaragoza.*

Order had been restored in that city from the hour when Palafox assumed the command. Implicit confidence in the commander produced implicit and alert obedience, and preparations were made with zeal and activity proportioned to the danger. When the new Captain-General declared war against the French, the troops which he mustered amounted only to 220 men, and the public treasury could furnish him with no more than an hundred dollars; sixteen ill-mounted guns were all the artillery in the place, and the arsenal contained but few muskets. Fowling-pieces were put in requisition, pikes were forged, powder was supplied from the mills at Villafeliche, which were some of the most considerable in Spain, . . for every thing else Palafox trusted to his country and his cause. And his trust was not in vain; the Zaragozans were ready to endure any suffering and make any sacrifice in the discharge of their duty; the same spirit possessed the whole country, and from all those parts of Spain which were under the yoke of the enemy officers and soldiers repaired to Zaragoza as soon as it was seen that an army was collecting there; many came from Madrid and from Pampluna, and some officers of engineers from the

military academy at Alcala. And the spirits of the people were encouraged by the discovery of a depôt of fire arms walled up in the Aljafaria; they had probably been secreted there in the succession war, when one party resigned that city to its enemies, and their discovery in this time of need was regarded by the Zaragozans as a manifestation of divine Providence in their favour. The defeats which their undisciplined levies sustained at Tudela, Mallen, and Alagon abated not their resolution; and in the last of these actions a handful of regular troops protected their retreat with great steadiness. The French general, Lefebvre Desnouettes, pursuing his hitherto uninterrupted success, advanced, and took up a position very near the city, and covered by a rising ground planted with olive trees.

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Zaragoza was not a *fortified town; the brick wall which surrounded it was from ten to twelve feet high, and three feet thick, and in many places it was interrupted by houses, which formed part of the inclosure. The city had no advantages of situation for its defence, and would not have been considered capable of resistance by any men but those whose courage was sustained by a virtuous and holy principle of duty. It stands in an open plain, which was then covered with olive grounds, and is bounded on either hand by high and distant mountains; but it is commanded by some high ground called the Torrero, about a mile to the south-west, upon which there was a convent, with some smaller buildings. The canal of Aragon divides this elevation from another rising ground, where the Spaniards had erected a battery. The Ebro bathes the walls of the city, and

*Description
of the city.*

* “ Elle est sans defense et sans fortification,” said Colmenar, writing a century ago, “ fermée d’une simple muraille; *mais ce défaut est réparé par la bravoure des habitants.*” After the proofs which the inhabitants have given of their patriotism, this praise appears like prophecy.

CHAP. separates it from the suburbs ; it has two bridges, within musket-
IX. shot of each other ; one of wood, said to be more beautiful than

1808. any other of the like materials in Europe ; the other, of free-
June. stone, consisting of seven arches, the largest of which is 122
feet in diameter ; the river is fordable above the city. Two
smaller rivers, the Galego and the Guerva, flow at a little
distance from the city, the one on the east, the other on the
west ; the latter being separated from the walls only by the
breadth of the common road : both are received into the Ebro.
Unlike most other places of the peninsula, Zaragoza has neither
aqueduct nor fountains, but derives its water wholly from the
river. The people of Tortosa, (and probably of the other towns
upon its course,) drink also of the Ebro, preferring it to the
finest spring ; the water is of a dirty red colour, but, having
stood a few hours, it becomes perfectly clear, and has a softness
and pleasantness of taste, which soon induces strangers to agree
with the natives in their preference of it. The population was
stated in the census of 1787 at 42,600 ; that of 1797, excellent
as it is in all other respects, has the fault of not specifying the
places in each district ; later accounts computed its inhabitants
at 60,000, and it was certainly one of the largest cities in the
peninsula. It had twelve gates, four of them in the old wall of
Augustus, by whom the older town of Salduba upon the same
site was enlarged, beautified, and called Cæsarea-Augusta, or
Cæsaraugusta ; a word easily corrupted into its * present name.

The whole city is built of brick ; even the convents and
churches were of this coarse material, which was bad of its
kind, so that there were cracks in most of these edifices from

* The Spaniards, by a more curious corruption, call Syracuse, Zaragoza de Sicilia.

top to bottom. The houses are not so high as they usually are in old Spanish towns, their general height being only three stories; the streets are, as usual, very narrow and crooked; there are, however, open market-places; and one very wide, long, and regularly built street, formerly called the Calle Santa, having been the scene of many martyrdoms, but now more commonly known by the name of the Cozo. The people, like the rest of the Aragonese, and their neighbours, the Catalans, have been always honourably distinguished in Spanish history for their love of liberty; and the many unavailing struggles which they have made during the last four centuries, had not abated their attachment to the good principles of their forefathers. Within the peninsula, (and once indeed throughout the whole of Catholic Europe,) Zaragoza was famous as the city of our Lady of the Pillar, whose legend is still so firmly believed by the people, and most of the clergy in Spain, that it was frequently appealed to in the proclamations of the different generals and Juntas, as one of the most popular articles of the national faith. The legend is this: when the apostles, after the resurrection, separated and went to preach the gospel in different parts of the world, St. James the elder, (or Santiago, as he may more properly be called in his mythological history,) departed for Spain, which province Christ himself had previously commended to his care. When he went to kiss the hand of the Virgin, and request her leave to set off, and her blessing, she commanded him, in the name of her Son, to build a church to her honour in that city of Spain wherein he should make the greatest number of converts, adding, that she would give him farther instructions concerning the edifice upon the spot. Santiago set sail, landed in Galicia, and, having preached with little success through the northern provinces, reached Cæsarea-Augusta, where he made eight disciples. One night, after he had been con-

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June.*Our Lady
of the
Pillar.*

CHAP. versing and praying with them as usual on the banks of the river,
 IX. they fell asleep, and just at midnight the apostle heard heavenly
 1808. voices sing, *Ave Maria gratia plena!* He fell on his knees, and
 June. instantly beheld the Virgin upon a marble pillar in the midst
 of a choir of angels, who went through the whole of her matin
 service. When this was ended, she bade him build her church
 around that pillar, which his Lord, her blessed Son, had sent
 him by the hands of his angels; there, she told him, that pillar
 was to remain till the end of the world, and great mercies would
 be vouchsafed there to those who supplicated for them in her
 name. Having said this, the angels transported her back to her
 house at Jerusalem, (for this was before the Assumption) and
 Santiago, in obedience, erected upon that spot the first church
 which was ever dedicated to the Virgin*. Cathedral service was
 performed both in this church and in the see, and the meetings

* *Hist. Apparitionis Deiparæ supra Columnam, Beato Jacobo apud Cæsaragustam prædicante. Ex cod. membraneo, qui in Archivo Sanctæ-Maria de Pilari asservatur. Espana Sagrada, t. xxx. p. 426.* Risco adds to this account, the Collect, which, from time immemorial, has been used in the Church of the Pillar. It may be added here as a curiosity for those who are not accustomed to such things. *Omnipotens æterne Deus, qui Sacratissimam Virginem matrem tuam inter choros Angelorum super columna marmorea a te ab alto emissa venire, dum adhuc viveret, dignatus est, ut Basilica de Pilari in ejus honorem a Protomartyre apostolorum Jacobo suisque sanctissimis discipulis edificaretur; præsta quæsumus ut ejus meritis et intercessione fiat impetrabile quod fida mente poscimus. Qui vivas et regnas, &c.*

The French, as may be supposed, ridicule this fable; but, it is worthy of remark, that, in the early part of the last century, the Spanish annalist, Ferreras, represented the story as of doubtful authority; his book passed through the hands of the usual censors, and was printed; and then Philip V. the first of the Bourbon dynasty in Spain, a Frenchman by birth and education, personally interfered, commanded Ferreras to cancel the heretical leaf, and sent the edict in which this was decreed to Zaragoza, there to be deposited among the archives of the Virgin's church, in proof of his especial devotion to our Lady of the Pillar.

of the chapter were held alternately in each. The interior of each was of the most imposing* kind. When the elder of these joint cathedrals was erected, Pope Gelasius granted indulgencies to all persons who would contribute toward the work, and thus introduced a practice which contributed as much to the grandeur and magnificence of ecclesiastical architecture, as to laxity of morals and the prevalence of superstition.

CHAP.
IX.
1808.
June.

Many mournful scenes of bigotry and superstition have been exhibited in Zaragoza; but, in these fiery trials which Buonaparte's tyranny was preparing for the inhabitants, the dross and tinsel of their faith disappeared, and its pure gold remained. The French, accustomed as they were to undervalue the Spanish character, had spoken with peculiar contempt of the Zaragozans. "Few persons," they said, "are to be seen among them who distinguish themselves by their dress; there is little of that elegant attire so observable in large cities. All is serious and regular, . . . dull and monotonous. The place seems without any kind of resource, because the inhabitants use no effort to obtain any; . . . accustomed to a state of apathy and languor, they have not an idea of the possibility of shaking it off†." With this feeling, equally despising the strength of the place, and the character of the people, the French proceeded to besiege the capital of Aragon. A party of their cavalry entered the town

*Contempt
of the
French for
the Zارا-
gozans.*

* "Here," says Mr. Townsend, "I forgot all the hardships and fatigues which we had suffered in this long journey: nay, had I travelled all the way on foot, I would have freely done it to enjoy the sight of these cathedrals. That which is called *El Aseu* is vast, gloomy, and magnificent; it excites devotion, inspires awe, and inclines the worshipper to fall prostrate, and to adore in silence the God who seems to veil his glory. The other, called *El Pilar*, spacious, lofty, light, elegant, and cheerful, inspires hope, confidence, complacency, and makes the soul impatient to express its gratitude for benefits received."

† Laborde.

CHAP. on the 14h, perhaps in pursuit of the retreating patriots ; they
 -IX. thought to scour the streets, but they were soon made to feel,
 1808. that the superiority of disciplined soldiers to citizens exists
 June. only in the field.

June 15.

*The French
 attempt to
 storm the
 city.*

On the following morning, the French, with part of their force, attacked the outposts upon the canal, and, with their main body, attempted to storm the city by the gate called Portillo. A desperate conflict ensued. The Aragonese fought with a spirit worthy of their cause. They had neither time, nor room, nor necessity for order. Their cannon, which they had hastily planted before the gates, and in the best situations without the town, were served by any persons who happened to be near them ; any one gave orders who felt himself competent to take the command. A party of the enemy entered the city, and were all slain. Lefebvre perceived that it was hopeless to persist in the attack with his present force, and drew off his troops, having suffered great loss. The patriots lost about 2000 men killed, and as many wounded. In such a conflict the circumstances are so materially in favour of the defendants, that the carnage made among the French must have been much greater. Some part of their baggage and plunder was abandoned in their retreat. The conquerors would have exposed themselves by a rash pursuit, but Palafox exhorted them not to be impatient, telling them, that the enemy would give them frequent opportunities to display their courage. While he thus restrained their impetuosity, he continued to excite their zeal. This victory, he said, was but the commencement of the triumphs which they were to expect under the powerful assistance of their divine patrons. The precious blood of their brethren had been shed in the field of glory, . . on their own soil. Those blessed martyrs required new victims ; let us, he added, prepare for the sacrifice !

The Zaragozans had obtained only a respite ; defeated as he

was, Lefebvre had only removed beyond the reach of their guns ; his troops were far superior to any which they could bring against him ; and it was not to be doubted that he would soon return in greater force, to take vengeance for the repulse and the disgrace which he had suffered. A regular siege was to be expected ; how were the citizens to sustain it with their brick walls, without heavy artillery, and without troops who could sally to interrupt the besiegers in their works ? In spite of all these discouraging circumstances, confiding in God and their own courage, they determined to defend the streets to the last extremity. Palafox, immediately after the repulse of the enemy, set out to muster reinforcements, to provide such resources for the siege as he could, and to place the rest of Aragon in a state of defence, if the capital should fall. He was accompanied by Col. Butron, his friend and aide-de-camp ; Lieut.-Colonel Beillan, of the engineers ; Padre Basilio, and Tio Jorge. With these companions and a small escort he left the city by the suburbs, crossed the Ebro at Pina, and collecting on the way about 1400 soldiers who had escaped from Madrid, formed a junction at Belchite with Baron Versage and some newly raised troops from Calatayud. Their united numbers amounted to some 7000 men, with 100 horse and four pieces of artillery. Small as this force was, and still more inefficient for want of discipline than of numerical strength, Palafox resolved upon making an attempt with it to succour the city. The prudence of this determination was justly questioned by some ; others proposed the strange measure of marching to Valencia ; this probably originated with some of the stray soldiers who were at liberty to seek their fortune where they pleased, and the proposal was so well received that a considerable party prepared to set off in that direction, without orders. But Palafox called them together, exhorted them to do their duty, and offered passports to as many

CHAP.
IX.

1808.

June.*Palafox goes out to collect reinforcements.*

CHAP. as chose to leave him in the moment of danger. The conse-
 IX. quence of this offer was, that not a man departed. From Al-
 1808. munia, where he had rested a day, he then marched towards
 June. Epila, thinking to advance to the village of La Muela, and thus
 place the invaders between his little army and the city, in the
 hope of cutting them off from their reinforcements. Lefebvre
 prevented this, by suddenly attacking him at Epila, on the night
 of the 23d : after a most obstinate resistance, the superior arms
 and discipline of the French were successful. The wreck of
 this gallant band retreated to Calatayud, and afterwards, with
 great difficulty, threw themselves into Zaragoza.

*G Verdier
 joins Le-
 febvre with
 reinforce-
 ment.*

The besiegers' army was soon reinforced by General Verdier, with 2500 men, besides some battalions of Portugueze, who, according to the devilish system of Buonaparte's tyranny, had been forced out of their own country, to be pushed on in the foremost ranks, wherever the first fire of a battery was to be received, a line of bayonets clogged, or a ditch filled, with bodies. They occupied the best positions in the surrounding plain, and, on the 27th, attacked the city and the Torrero; but they were repulsed with the loss of 800 men, six pieces of artillery, and five carts of ammunition. By this time, they had invested nearly half the town. The next morning they renewed the attack at both places; from the city they were again repulsed, losing almost all the cavalry who were engaged. But the Torrero was lost through the alleged misconduct of an artillery officer, who was charged with having made his men abandon the batteries at the most critical moment. For this he was condemned to run the gauntlet six times, the soldiers beating him with their ram-rods, and after this cruelty he was shot.

*The Torrero
 taken.*

*The French
 bombard the
 city.*

The French, having now received a train of mortars, howitzers, and twelve-pounders, which were of sufficient calibre against mud walls, kept up a constant fire, and showered down

shells and grenades from the Torrero. About twelve hundred were thrown into the town, and there was not one building that was bomb proof within the walls. After a time, the inhabitants placed beams of timber together, endways, against the houses, in a sloping direction, behind which those who were near when a shell fell, might shelter themselves. The enemy continued also to invest the city more closely, while the Aragonese made every effort to strengthen their means of defence. They tore down the awnings from their windows, and formed them into sacks, which they filled with sand, and piled up before the gates, in the form of a battery, digging round it a deep trench. They broke holes for musketry in the walls and intermediate buildings, and stationed cannon where the position was favourable for it. The houses in the environs were destroyed. "Gardens and olive grounds," says an eye-witness, "that in better times had been the recreation and support of their owners, were cheerfully rooted up by the proprietors themselves, wherever they impeded the defence of the city, or covered the approach of the enemy." Women of all ranks assisted; they formed themselves into companies, some to relieve the wounded, some to carry water, wine, and provisions, to those who defended the gates. The Countess Burita instituted a corps for this service; she was young, delicate, and beautiful. In the midst of the most tremendous fire of shot and shells, she was seen coolly attending to those occupations which were now become her duty; nor throughout the whole of a two months' siege did the imminent danger, to which she incessantly exposed herself, produce the slightest apparent effect upon her, or in the slightest degree bend her from her heroic purpose. Some of the monks bore arms; others exercised their spiritual offices to the dying: others, with the nuns, were busied in making cartridges which the children distributed.

CHAP
IX.

1808.

June.*Exertions
of the
women.**Countess
Burita.*

CHAP.

IX.

1808.

June.*Augustina
Zaragoza.*

Among threescore thousand persons there will always be found some wicked enough for any employment, and the art of corrupting has constituted great part of the French system of war. During the night of the 28th the powder magazine, in the area where the bull-fights were performed, which was in the very heart of the city, was blown up, by which fourteen houses were destroyed, and about 200 persons killed. This was the signal for the enemy to appear before three gates which had been sold to them. And while the inhabitants were digging out their fellow-citizens from the ruins, a fire was opened upon them with mortars, howitzers, and cannons, which had now been received for battering the town. Their attack seemed chiefly to be directed against the gate called Portillo, and a large square building near it, without the walls, and surrounded by a deep ditch; though called a castle, it served only for a prison. The sand-bag battery before this gate was frequently destroyed, and as often reconstructed under the fire of the enemy. The carnage here throughout the day was dreadful. Augustina Zaragoza, a handsome woman of the lower class, about twenty-two years of age, arrived at this battery with refreshments, at the time when not a man who defended it was left alive, so tremendous was the fire which the French kept up against it. For a moment the citizens hesitated to re-man the guns. Augustina sprung forward over the dead and dying, snatched a match from the hand of a dead artilleryman, and fired off a six-and-twenty-pounder; then, jumping upon the gun, made a solemn vow never to quit it alive during the siege. Such a sight could not but animate with fresh courage all who beheld it. The Zaragozans rushed into the battery, and renewed their fire with greater vigour than ever, and the French were repulsed here, and at all other points, with great slaughter. On the morning of this day a fellow was detected going out of the city with letters

to Murat. It was not till after these repeated proofs of treasonable practices, that the French residents in Zaragoza, with other suspected persons, were taken into custody.

CHAP.
IX.

1808.

July.

The French again repulsed in an attempt to take the city by storm.

Lefebvre now supposing that his destructive bombardment must have dismayed the people, and convinced them how impossible it was for so defenceless a city to persist in withstanding him, again attempted to force his way into the town, thinking that, as soon as his troops could effect a lodgement within the gates, the Zaragozans would submit. On the 2d of July, a column of his army marched out of their battery, which was almost within musket-shot of the Portillo, and advanced towards it with fixed bayonets, and without firing a shot. But when they reached the castle, such a discharge of grape and musketry was opened upon their flank, that, notwithstanding the most spirited exertions of their officers, the column immediately dispersed. The remainder of their force had been drawn up to support their attack, and follow them into the city; but it was impossible to bring them a second time to the charge. The general, however, ordered another column instantly to advance against the gate of the Carmen, on the left of the Portillo. This entrance was defended by a sand-bag battery, and by musketeers, who lined the walls on each side, and commanded two out of three approaches to it; and here also the French suffered great loss, and were repulsed.

The military men in Zaragoza considered these attacks as extremely injudicious. Lefebvre probably was so indignant at meeting with any opposition from a people whom he despised, and a place which, according to the rules and pedantry of war, was not tenable, that he lost his temper, and thought to subdue them the shortest way, by mere violence and superior force. Having found his mistake, he proceeded to invest the city still more closely. In the beginning of the siege, the besieged re-

They invest the city.

CHAP. ceived some scanty succours; yet, however scanty, they were of
 IX. importance. Four hundred soldiers from the regiment of Estre-
 1808. madura, small parties from other corps, and a few artillerymen
 July. got in. Two hundred of the militia of Logroño were added to
 these artillerymen, and soon learnt their new service, being in
 the presence of an enemy whom they had such righteous reason
 to abhor. Two four-and-twenty-pounders and a few shells,
 which were much wanted, were procured from Lerida. The
 enemy, meantime, were amply supplied with stores from the
 magazine in the citadel of Pamplona, which they had so per-
 fidiously seized on their first entrance, as allies, into Spain.
 Hitherto they had remained on the right* bank of the Ebro.
 On the 11th of July they forced the passage of the ford, and
 posted troops enough on the opposite side to protect their work-
 men while forming a floating bridge. In spite of all the efforts
 of the Aragonese, this bridge was completed on the 14th; a way
 was thus made for their cavalry, to their superiority in which
 the French were mostly indebted for all their victories in Spain.
 This gave them the command of the surrounding country;
 they destroyed the mills, levied contributions on the villages,
 and cut off every communication by which the besieged had
 hitherto received supplies. These new difficulties called out
 new resources in this admirable people and their general, . . . a
 man worthy of commanding such a people in such times. Corn
 mills, worked by horses, were erected in various parts of the
 city; the monks were employed in manufacturing gunpowder,
 materials for which were obtained by immediately collecting all

*They form
 a bridge
 over the
 Ebro.*

* In military language, you always describe the country by the current of water, and speak as if you were looking down the stream. It was requisite to explain this to the court upon Whitelocke's trial, and therefore the explanation cannot be thought unnecessary here.

the sulphur in the place, by washing the soil of the streets to extract its nitre, and making charcoal from the stalks of hemp, which in that part of Spain grows to a magnitude that would elsewhere be thought very unusual*.

CHAP.
IX.
1808.
July.

By the end of July the city was completely invested, the supply of food was scanty, and the inhabitants had no reason to expect succour. Their exertions had now been unremitted for forty-six days, and nothing but the sense of duty could have supported their bodily strength and their spirit under such trials. They were in hourly expectation of another general attack, or another bombardment. They had not a single place of security for the sick and the children, and the number of wounded was daily increased by repeated skirmishes, in which they engaged for the purpose of opening a communication with the country. At this juncture they made one desperate effort to recover the Torrero. It was in vain; and convinced by repeated losses, and especially by this last repulse, that it was hopeless to make any effectual sally, they resolved to abide the issue of the contest within the walls, and conquer or perish there.

*Distress of
the inhabit-
ants.*

On the night of the second of August, and on the following day, the French bombarded the city from their batteries opposite the gate of the Carmen. A foundling hospital, which was now filled with the sick and wounded, took fire, and was rapidly consumed. During this scene of horror, the most intrepid exertions were made to rescue these helpless sufferers from the flames. No person thought of his own property or individual concerns, . . . every one hastened thither. The women were emi-

*Foundling
Hospital
burnt.*

* "On this simple foundation," says Mr. Vaughan, "a regular manufactory of gunpowder was formed after the siege, which produced 13 arrobas of Castille per day; that is, 325 lb. of 12 ounces."

CHAP. nently conspicuous in their exertions, regardless of the shot and
 IX. shells which fell about them, and braving the flames of the
 1808. building. It has often been remarked, that the wickedness of
 August. women exceeds that of the other sex;..for the same reason,
 when circumstances, forcing them out of the sphere of their
 ordinary nature, compel them to exercise manly virtues, they
 display them in the highest degree, and, when they are once
 awakened to a sense of patriotism, they carry the principle to
 its most heroic pitch. The loss of women and boys, during this
 siege, was very great, fully proportionate to that of men; they
 were always the most forward, and the difficulty was to teach
 them a prudent and proper sense of their danger.

*Convent
 of St. En-
 gracia.
 August 5.*

On the following day, the French completed their batteries
 upon the right bank of the Guerva, within pistol-shot of the gate
 of St. Engracia, so called from a splendid church and convent
 of Jeronimites, situated on one side of it. This convent was, on
 many accounts, a remarkable place. Men of letters beheld it
 with reverence, because the excellent historian Zurita spent the
 last years of his life there, observing the rules of the community,
 though he had not entered into the order; and because he was
 buried there, and his countryman and fellow-labourer, Geronymo
 de Blancas, after him. Devotees revered it, even in the neigh-
 bourhood of our Lady of the Pillar, for its relics and the saint
 to whom it was dedicated. According to the legend, she was
 the daughter of Ont Comerus, a barbarian chief, in the pay of
 the Romans, by whom the city of Norba Cæsarea, (situated
 near the Tagus, between the present towns of Portalegre and
 Alcantara) was given him, together with its district, for his
 service in recovering it from Cathelius, a chief of the Alemanni.
 His daughter, Encratis, or Encratide, (for from one of these
 names Engracia has been formed) was brought up a Christian,
 and espoused to a governor on the Gallic side of the Pyrenees,

to whom she was sent with a suitable escort. Their way lay through Cæsarea-Augusta, where the Præses, or Governor of Spain, Publius Dacianus, the bloodiest minister of the tenth persecution, was at that time endeavouring to extirpate Christianity. Engracia, either preferring martyrdom to her unknown spouse, or imagining that her rank would be her safeguard, visited the governor for the purpose of interceding in behalf of the Christians, and remonstrating against his cruelty. Thus much of the legend is probably fabulous ; but certain it is, that a virgin of that name was tortured under that persecution ; and, though she survived, was venerated as a * martyr in that city, before the close of the century in which she suffered. Just, however, as her claim is to pious remembrance, her church, and the

CHAP.
IX.
1808.
August.

* Martyrum nulli, remanente vitâ,
Contigit terris habitare nostris ;
Sola tu morti propriæ superstes,
 Vivis in orbe,
Vivis ac pœnæ seriem retexis,
Carnis et cæsæ spoliū retentans,
Tetra quam sulcos habeant amarus,
 Vulnera narras.

Prudentius *Περὶ Στυφάνων*. Hym. 4.

The poet goes on describing her torments with his usual love of live-anatomy... I know not whether it be possible that any person should have survived them ; but that some may be found wicked enough to inflict equal tortures under the pretext, and others conscientious enough to endure them for the sake of religion, has been too often proved, and in few places more frequently than in Zaragoza itself, from which city many an inquisitor has gone to keep company with Dacianus. St. Engracia is invoked in diseases of the heart and the liver, in consequence of the circumstances of her martyrdom.

Vidimus partem jecoris revulsam,
Ungulis longe jacuisse pressis ;
Mors habet pallens aliquid tuorum,
 Te quoque vivâ.

CHAP. IX. divine honours which have been paid to her, were procured by fraud. Angels are said to have descended at her death, and to have officiated at her funeral, bearing tapers and thuribules, and singing hymns of triumph. During the Moorish captivity, her relics disappeared; they were discovered towards the close of the fourteenth century, which was the great age for inventions of this kind. There stood at that time, upon the site of this memorable convent, an old church, dedicated to the Zaragozaan martyrs, of the tenth persecution, and called the *Iglesia de las Masas*, in memory of an early specimen of Catholic ingenuity. Dacianus, holding relic-worship in as much contempt as the Christians did his idolatry, in order to prevent them from indulging in it, burnt the bodies of the martyrs, together with those of some malefactors, thinking that their ashes would be undistinguishable; nevertheless, the Christians found their own, which had collected together in white balls or masses, separate from the rest. In 1389, the regular canons, to whom the church belonged, resolved to rebuild a part of it: in digging the foundation, two marble chests were discovered. The lid of the smaller was fastened down very firmly with a sort of pitch; when this was taken off, two sets of human bones were found in different compartments; over the one were the words *Lupercii Martyris*, sculptured in the marble; over the other, *Engratie Virginis*: these latter were of rose colour, which was admitted as proof of their authenticity. The larger chest contained a great assortment of anonymous bones, ashes, and the white masses, which had disappeared for so many centuries. The mine was very rich; the workmen went on till they had invented thirteen chests, and at last, a whole pit full of relics, not the less efficacious because it could not be ascertained to whom they had belonged. Seventy years afterwards, Juan II. of Aragon, one of the wickedest and most perfidious of men,

fancied or feigned, that, by St. Engracia's intercession, he was cured of a complaint in his eyes ; in consequence of which, he resolved to enlarge this church, and build a monastery adjoining it for the Jeronimites, . . an order which, during that and the succeeding age, was in great favour at the three courts of the Peninsula. He began his work, but died without completing it, leaving that charge by will to his son, Ferdinand, the Catholic king. He continued the building, but it was not finished till the reign of Charles the Fifth.

CHAP.
XL
1808.
August.

Both the church and convent were splendidly adorned, but the most remarkable part of the whole edifice was a subterranean church, formed in the place where the relics were discovered, and having the pit, or well, as it was called, in the middle. It was divided by a beautiful iron grating, which excluded laymen from the interior of the sanctuary. There were three descents ; the widest flight of steps was that which was for public use, the two others were for the religioners, and met in one behind the three chief altars, within the grating. Over the midst of these altars were two tombs, placed one upon the other in a niche ; the under one containing the relics of Engracia's companions and fellows in martyrdom ; the upper, those of the saint herself, her head excepted, which was kept in a silver shrine, having a collar of precious stones, and enclosed in crystal. The altars on either side had their respective relics ; and several others, equally rich in such treasures, were ranged along the walls, without the grating. The roof was of an azure colour, studded with stars to represent the sky. The breadth of the vault considerably exceeded its length ; it was sixty feet wide, and only forty long. Thirty little columns, of different marbles, supported the roof. On the stone brink of the well, the history of the Zaragozan martyrs was represented in bas-relief ; and an iron grating, reaching to the roof, secured it from being profaned by idle curiosity, and from the pious

CHAP. larcenies which it might otherwise have tempted. Within this
 IX. cage-work, a silver lamp was suspended. Thirty such lamps
 1808. were burning there day and night; and, though the roof was
August. little more than twelve feet high, it was never in the slightest
 degree sullied with smoke. The fact is certain*; but the useful
 and important secret, by which oil was made to burn without
 producing smoke, was carefully concealed; and the Jeronimites
 continued till this time to exhibit a miracle, which puzzled all
 who did not believe it to be miraculous.

*The hospi-
 tal set on
 fire.*

On the 4th of August, the French opened batteries within
 pistol-shot of this church and convent. The mud walls were
 levelled at the first discharge; and the besiegers rushing through
 the opening, took the batteries before the adjacent gates in re-
 verse. Here General Mori, who had distinguished himself on
 many former occasions, was made prisoner. The street of St.
 Engracia, which they had thus entered, leads into the Cozo, and
 the corner buildings where it thus terminated, were on the one
 hand the convent of St. Francisco, and on the other the General
 Hospital. Both were stormed and set on fire; the sick and
 the wounded threw themselves from the windows to escape the

* The Bollandists relate this miracle with a candid admission of doubt, because the writer, in whom they found it related, spoke upon the testimony of others, instead of boldly asserting it on his own authority. There are, however, testimonies in abundance, and that of M. Bourgoing will be admitted to be decisive. "The roof," he says, "though very low, is certainly not smoked. They invite those who are doubtful of it, to put a piece of white paper over one of these lamps. I tried this experiment, and I must confess, I saw, or thought I saw, that my paper was not blackened. I had still my doubts, but I took care to conceal them from my bigoted conductors. I was, however, tempted to say to them, God has not thought proper to work any striking miracle to accelerate the end of the French revolution, or to calm the passions which it has roused; and, do you think that he would condescend to perform here a miracle as obscure as your cavern, and as useless as your own existence?"

flames, and the horror of the scene was aggravated by the maniacs, whose voices raving or singing in paroxysms of wilder madness, or crying in vain to be set free, were heard amid the confusion of dreadful sounds. Many fell victims to the fire, and some to the indiscriminating fury of the assailants. Those who escaped were conducted as prisoners to the Torrero; but when their condition had been discovered, they were sent back on the morrow, to take their chance in the siege. After a severe contest and dreadful carnage, the French forced their way into the Cozo, in the very centre of the city, and, before the day closed, were in possession of one half of Zaragoza. Lefebvre now believed that he had effected his purpose, and required Palafox to surrender, in a note containing only these words: "Head-quarters, St. Engracia. Capitulation*!" The heroic Spaniard immediately returned this reply: "Head-quarters, Zaragoza. War at the knife's point†!"

CHAP.
IX.
1808.
August.

The contest which was now carried on is unexampled in history. One side of the Cozo, a street about as wide as Pall-mall, was possessed by the French; and, in the centre of it, their general, Verdier, gave his orders from the Franciscan convent. The opposite side was maintained by the Aragonese, who threw up batteries at the openings of the cross streets, within a few paces of those which the French erected against them. The intervening space was presently heaped with dead, either slain upon the spot, or thrown out from the windows. Next day the ammunition of the citizens began to fail; . . . the French were expected every moment to renew their efforts for completing the conquest, and even this circumstance occasioned no dismay, nor did any

War in the
streets.

August 5.

* *Quartel-general, Santa Engracia. La capitulation.*

† *Quartel-general, Zaragoza. Guerra al cuchillo.*

CHAP. IX. push them forward amid the dead and dying, to remove the bodies, and bring them away for interment. Even for this necessary office there was no truce, and it would have been certain death to the Aragonese who should have attempted to perform it; but the prisoners were in general secured by the pity of their own soldiers, and in this manner the evil was, in some degree, diminished.

1808.
August.

*Retreat of
the enemy.*

A council of war was held by the Spaniards on the 8th, not for the purpose which is too usual in such councils, but that their heroic resolution might be communicated with authority to the people. It was, that in those quarters of the city where the Aragonese still maintained their ground, they should continue to defend themselves with the same firmness; should the enemy at last prevail, they were then to retire over the Ebro into the suburbs, break down the bridge, and defend the suburbs till they perished. When this resolution was made public, it was received with the loudest acclamations. But in every conflict the citizens now gained ground upon the soldiers, winning it inch by inch, till the space occupied by the enemy, which on the day of their entrance was nearly half the city, was gradually reduced to about an eighth part. Meantime, intelligence of the events in other parts of Spain was received by the French, . . all tending to dishearten them; the surrender of Dupont, the failure of Moncey before Valencia, and the news that the Junta of that province had dispatched six thousand men to join the levies in Aragon, which were destined to relieve Zaragoza. During the night of the 13th, their fire was particularly fierce and destructive; after their batteries had ceased, flames burst out in many parts of the buildings which they had won; their last act was to blow up the church of St. Engracia; the powder was placed in the subterranean church, . . and this remarkable place, . . this monument of fraud and of credulity, . . the splendid theatre wherein

so many feelings of deep devotion had been excited, . . which so many thousands had visited in faith, and from which unquestionably many had departed with their imaginations elevated, their principles ennobled, and their hearts strengthened, was laid in ruins. In the morning the French columns, to the great surprise of the Spaniards, were seen at a distance, retreating over the plain, on the road to Pamplona.

CHAP.
IX.
1808.
August.

The history of a battle, however skilfully narrated, is necessarily uninteresting to all except military men ; but in the detail of a siege, when time has destroyed those considerations, which prejudice or pervert our natural sense of right and wrong, every reader sympathizes with the besieged, and nothing, even in fictitious narratives, excites so deep and animating an interest. There is not, either in the annals of ancient or of modern times, a single event recorded more worthy to be held in admiration, now and for evermore, than the siege of Zaragoza. Will it be said that this devoted people obtained for themselves, by all this heroism and all these sacrifices, nothing more than a short respite from their fate ? Woe be to the slavish heart that conceives the thought, and shame to the base tongue that gives it utterance ! They purchased for themselves an everlasting remembrance upon earth, . . a place in the memory and love of all good men in all ages that are yet to come. They performed their duty ; they redeemed their souls from the yoke ; they left an example to their country, never to be forgotten, never to be out of mind, and sure to contribute to and hasten its deliverance.

One of the first cares of Palafox, after the delivery of the city, was, to establish a board of health to provide against the effects of putrefaction, . . such was the number of French who were left dead in the houses and in the streets. Pamplona, whither the wreck of their army retreated, was for many days filled with carts full and horse-loads of wounded, who arrived

CHAP. faster and in greater number than they could be lodged in the
IX. hospitals and convents. It was equally shocking to humanity
1808. to behold their sufferings, and the cruel regardlessness of their
August. comrades, who, while these wretches were fainting for want of
assistance and of food, and literally dying in the streets, were
exposing their booty to sale, and courting purchasers for church
plate, watches, jewels, linen, and apparel, the plunder which they
had collected in Navarre and Aragon ; and which, in their eager-
ness to convert into money, they were offering at a small part
of their value. There were, however, scarcely any purchasers
except for the church-plate, which was bought for the purpose
of restoring it, at the same cost, to the churches and monasteries
from whence it had been stolen.

The temper of the Zaragozans after their victory was not less
heroic than their conduct during the struggle. It might have
been expected that some degree of exhaustion would have suc-
ceeded the state of excitement to which they had been wrought ;
and that the widowed, the childless, and they who were left desti-
tute, would now have lamented what they had lost, or, at least,
that they themselves had not perished also. This, however, was
not so. Mr. Vaughan visited Zaragoza a little while after the
siege, and remained there during several weeks : he saw (they
are his own impressive words) “ many a parent who had lost
his children, and many a man reduced from competence to po-
verty, but he literally did not meet with one human being who
uttered the slightest complaint : every feeling seemed to be
swallowed up in the memory of what they had recently done,
and in a just hatred of the French.” These are the effects of
patriotism, aided and strengthened by religion : its influence,
thus elevated and confirmed, made women and boys efficient
in the time of action, and the streets of a city not less for-
midable to an invader, than the best constructed works of

défence. Let not the faith which animated the Aragonese be called superstition, because our Lady of the Pillar, Santiago, and St. Engracia, were its symbols. It was virtually and essentially religion in its inward life and spirit; it was the sense of what they owed equally to their forefathers and their children; the knowledge that their cause was as righteous as any for which an injured and insulted people ever rose in arms; the hope that by the blessing of God upon that cause they might succeed; the certain faith that if they fell, it was with the feeling, the motive, and the merit of martyrdom. Life or death therefore became to the Zaragozans only not indifferent, because life was useful to the cause for which they held it in trust, and were ready to lay it down: they who fell expired in triumph, and the survivors rather envied than regretted them. The living had no fears for themselves, and for the same reason they could have no sorrows for the dead. The whole greatness of our nature was called forth, . . . a power which had lain dormant, and of which the possessors themselves had not suspected the existence, till it manifested itself in the hour of trial.

When the dead were removed, and the ruins sufficiently cleared, Ferdinand was proclaimed with all the usual solemnities; a ceremony, at other times attended with no other feeling than such as sports and festivity occasion, now made affecting by the situation of Ferdinand himself, and the scene which surrounded the spectators; walls blackened with fire, shattered with artillery, and stained with blood. The obsequies of the Spaniards who had fallen were next performed with military honours, and their funeral oration pronounced from the pulpit. The brave priest Santiago Sass was made chaplain to the commander in chief, and Palafox gave him a captain's commission. These were times when the religion of Mattathias and the Maccabees was required; and the priest of the altar was in the

CHAP.
IX.
1808.
August.

August 20.

August 25.

CHAP. exercise of his duty, when defending it, sword in hand, in the field.

IX.

1808. A pension was settled upon Augustina, and the daily pay of an
August. artilleryman. She was also to wear a small shield of honour

embroidered upon the sleeve of her gown, with Zaragoza inscribed upon it. Tio Jorge was killed during the siege. Other persons, who had distinguished themselves, were rewarded; and the general reward which Palafox conferred upon the Zaragozan people, is strongly characteristic of Spanish feeling. By his
Sept. 20. own authority, and in the name of Ferdinand, he conferred upon all the inhabitants of the city and its districts, of both sexes and of all ranks, the perpetual and irrevocable privilege of never being adjudged to any disgraceful punishment by any tribunal for any offence, except for treason or blasphemy.

CHAPTER X.

INSURRECTION IN PORTUGAL.

WHILE these events were passing in Spain, Portugal also 1808.
 was convulsed by this political earthquake. The first insurrec-
 tion in Madrid had been no sooner known at Badajoz, than an
 anonymous proclamation from that city was circulated on the
 Portuguese border; and a lieutenant of the Walloon Guards,
 by name Moretti, was sent to consult at Lisbon with General
 Carraffa upon the means of withdrawing the Spanish troops.
 Carraffa thought it too hazardous to declare himself at that
 time; but though in other respect acting altogether in sub-
 servience to Junot, he did not make him acquainted with the
 transaction, and Moretti returned in safety.

May.
An agent
sent from
Badajoz to
the Spani-
ards at
Lisbon.

Neves, l. iii.
7.

Junot was now disturbed from his dreams of royalty; yet
 his head lay as uneasily as if it had worn a crown. Like the
 other French commanders, when the insurrectionary movement
 became general throughout Spain, he thought it impossible that
 any continued or formidable resistance could be opposed to the
 power of France: but his own situation was exposed to peculiar
 danger; he was farther removed from assistance than any of
 the other commanders in the Peninsula; there was an English
 squadron in sight, watching the course of events, and in defiance
 of all his vigilance, well informed of whatever was going on;
 and it was not to be doubted, that if a favourable opportunity
 offered, Great Britain would make an effort for the deliverance
 of Portugal. Pursuant to his instructions from Madrid, he had

Difficulties
of Junot's
situation.

CHAP. sent into Galicia the remains of Taranco's division, so that Car-
 X. raffa's was now the only one which remained; some 4000 of
 1808. these were at Porto, the rest were in detachments at Lisbon,
 May. Mafra, Santarem, and on the other side the Tagus at Setu-
 bal, Cezimbra, and other places. In the hope of exciting a
 national feeling against them, and thereby counteracting that
 sympathy which their common language, manners, and religion,
 and now a sense of their common interest, were producing
 between them and the Portuguese, rumours were spread, that
 by an arrangement made with Buonaparte, Portugal was to be
 governed by Spain till its fate should be determined at a general
 peace. But this artifice failed. The Spaniards were not to be
 deceived; from the time when they knew that Ferdinand had
 been inveigled to Bayonne, there was an end of all good under-
 standing between them and the French; and they were so ready
 to engage in personal quarrels, from the national indignation
 which possessed them, that it was found necessary to confine
 them to their quarters at an early hour in the evening. Care
 was taken to divide them into small detachments, and station
 every where with them a superior number of French. Many
 deserted, especially of those who were quartered beyond the
 Tagus. Some made their way to the Spanish frontiers in strong
 parties. The regiment of Murcia marched for Spain in a body,
 in defiance of its colonel; a detachment of 600 French was sent
 from Lisbon to intercept them; they met at Os Pegoens; this
 was a case in which individual strength and determination were
 of more avail than military discipline; the Spaniards were vic-
 torious, and proceeded on their way, receiving the utmost kind-
 ness from the people, and nearly two hundred wounded French
 were landed at Lisbon.

*Neves, iii.
67.
Observador
Portuguez,
287.*

*Kellermann
takes the
command
in Alem-
Tejo.*

Badajoz was the point to which the Spaniards repaired from
 Alem-Tejo and the south of Portugal, and the numbers who were

collected there made such an addition to the strength of the gar- CHAP.
X.
1808.
May.
 rison, that General Kellermann, who was then at Elvas, felt him-
 self ill at ease in the neighbourhood. That general had taken
 the command in Alem-Tejo upon Solano's departure, and so
 different was the spirit of his administration, that one of his first
 measures was by his own authority to impose an extraordinary
 contribution upon the exhausted province. Evora was to pay
 10,000 *cruzados novos*, Elvas and Portalegre 8000 each, Villa
 Viçosa 6000, and other places in proportion. The sum was
 exacted within six hours after the demand: but it was restored
 without delay, in consequence of peremptory orders from Junot,
 when complaint was made to him of this unauthorized exaction.
 He was displeased with Kellermann for presuming to levy money
 at his own pleasure, and this was no time for exasperating the
 people by farther acts of oppression. Already they were in so
 perturbed a state, that it was deemed expedient to order all ab-
 sent bishops and beneficed priests to return to their dioceses and
 cures, and there exert themselves in preserving order, and ex-
 horting the people to submission. Buonaparte had reckoned
 upon the good services of the clergy; experience, he said, had
 shown him that countries where there were many friars were easily
 conquered;.. he was undeceived of both errors in the Peninsula.

*Observador
Portuguez,
p. 277.*

May 22.

In the hope of reviving old animosities, and exciting the
 Portuguese to act against the Spaniards, Kellermann called out
 the *Ordenanças*, and required the people of Elvas to take arms
 for the defence of their city, which, he said, the Spaniards,
 eternal enemies to the name and independence of Portugal,
 were preparing to attack from Badajoz. At the same time
 he sent a letter to the Spaniards of that place, exhorting them
 to return to their duty, and promising intercession, and par-
 don and protection. No answer was returned; he then put
 forth an argumentative address to the Commandant and the

*He attempts
to conciliate
the Spani-
ards at
Badajoz.*

June 1.

CHAP. Representatives of Extremadura, asking them what end they
 X. could propose to themselves from the revolt in which they had

1808. blindly engaged? The House of Bourbon had renounced all its
 June. rights to Spain; Ferdinand was in France, and the right of ap-
 pointing a king for the Spaniards had been transferred to the

Emperor. Did they wish to draw upon themselves the evils by which France had been ravaged during so many years? If that country had come with glory out of a struggle which would for ever be celebrated, it was owing to her internal strength, her valour, and above all the talents of that extraordinary man whom Heaven had sent to reign over her, for her happiness, and for the happiness of the Spaniards also, if they chose it. Could they expect a like issue? Would valour alone suffice to effect it? What was their position? Half Spain had declared for the new order of things. Their own countrymen would take the field against them. The French armies were in the midst of the land, under the greatest generals, without enemies, and abundantly supplied with all the means of war. On their part they had only some soldiers who had murdered their chiefs; a populace vain of their own strength, because they had met with no resistance; and a few miserable English, the eternal artists of discord, active in stirring up enemies to the French, and always ready, like cowards, to abandon the victims of their infernal policy. Nor was there any thing in the change which had taken place to provoke their opposition. At the commencement of the preceding century Spain had called Philip V. to the throne, for the purpose of establishing an invariable union with France. The establishment upon that throne of a prince of the new French dynasty was nothing more than a consequence of the system which Spain had then adopted, and which was now confirmed. There was yet time to choose. The sword was not yet drawn, the door was still open for reconciliation, ..and he requested

that they would not close the gate of their city against his communications. To this also no answer was vouchsafed. He made a third effort, telling them that he would suspend hostilities till they should be better informed, and desiring the Junta to meet him at the Caya, the little stream which there divides the kingdoms. No persons were there to meet him; and he then began to store the forts of Elvas, and to devise plans for attacking Badajoz, expecting, no doubt, that some of the troops in Spain would be ordered upon that service. Believing too that fêtes and rejoicings would have as much effect in Portugal as in France, he appointed a day of public thanksgiving for the benefits which Napoleon had promised to confer upon the Portuguese. They were not a people to be thus deceived. Their hearts were with the Spaniards, and so many repaired to Badajoz, where D. Joseph Galluzo, with great activity, was forming a camp, that they were incorporated in a legion of foreign volunteers, the command of which was given to Moretti. Many artillerymen escaped thither from Elvas; some hundred of the Portuguese troops whom the French had ordered away for foreign consumption, had been collected there; promotion was offered to all officers of that nation who should join them, and Kellermann's vigilance could not prevent the emigration which took place in consequence.

A considerable garrison was required in Elvas, as being the strongest fortress in the kingdom, and now of more importance because of the hostile attitude which the Spaniards at Badajoz had assumed. Strong garrisons were placed at Peniche and Setubal, for fear of the English. Almeida also had been occupied by the French. Except the troops in that place there were no other French in the whole north of Portugal than the small parties stationed upon the military road, a weak detachment at Figueira, and some fifty men at Coimbra. The great body

CHAP.

X.

1808.

June.*Neves, iii.
75.**Distribu-
tion of the
French
troops in
Portugal.**Neves, iii.
77.*

CHAP. of the French was collected at Lisbon, and in the adjacent
 X. country, where, in case of sudden danger, they might be brought
 1808. to act promptly and with effect. Porto was in possession of the
 June. Spaniards, who had occupied it by virtue of the secret treaty of
 Fontainebleau. General Bellesta, however, upon whom the
 The Spaniards at Porto declare against the Intruder, and march into Spain.
 command had devolved, had been placed under the orders of
 the French General Quesnel, when the abortive kingdom of
 Northern Lusitania was no longer held out as a lure to the
 court of Spain. Quesnel had with him about seventy dragoons,
 and a few other French holding military or civil situations.
 When news arrived of the movements in Gallicia, Bellesta, obey-
 ing without hesitation the voice of his country, arrested the
 June 6. French and their general, and convoking the military, judicial,
 and civil authorities, explained to them briefly the situation of
 affairs, expressed a hope that Junot would by that time have been
 seized in Lisbon, as Quesnel was in Porto, and asked of them
 what course they would pursue, . . whether they would restore the
 national government, choose a Spanish one, or remain in sub-
 mission to the French? The *Vereador*, Thomas da Silva Ferras,
 replied, that he, and the chamber, and the city, desired nothing
 more than to be under the government of their lawful sovereign,
 and required that the royal arms might immediately be re-esta-
 blished. A *Desembargador* ventured to observe, that they had
 no authority to determine such things, not being representatives
 of the people; that they were without arms, . . that they had no
 means of resisting so terrible an enemy as the French; and that
 it was better to wait till they knew what had happened at Lisbon.
 Reasonable as the fear was which this speaker expressed, a more
 generous feeling prevailed, and by Bellesta's orders the *Sargento*
Mor, Raymundo José Pinheiro, went from the meeting to take
 the command of the fortress of S. Joam da Foz, at the mouth of
 the Douro.

It was late at night when the meeting broke up. Raymundo called together his officers; they bound themselves by a formal deed and solemn oath to act for the service of their lawful Prince against the French, and invoking the aid of Our Lady of the Rosary, to whom that castle was dedicated, vowed in the Prince's name to solemnize the anniversary of that day by a festival to her honour. At daybreak the Quinas were once more seen flying upon the fortress, a royal salute was fired, and returned from the castles of Queijo and Matozinhos, the bells were rung, rockets were discharged, and the people gave themselves up to joy. The Spaniards without delay marched for Coruña, taking with them their prisoners. An English brig of war, which was cruising off the river, hearing an unusual stir in the city, drew near in hopes of ascertaining the cause; Raymundo went on board, he was received with due honours, and an officer returned to shore with him, and was sent to Luiz de Oliveira da Costa, who commanded at Porto during the absence of General Bernardim Freire de Andrada.

CHAP.
X.

1808.

June.

The lawful government restored at Porto.

Neves, iii. 85—91.

Luiz de Oliveira had been present at the meeting which Bel-lesta convened, and assented to the resolution which had there been taken. Whether his heart was with his voice on that occasion, or whether he had submitted to the prevailing opinion only while it was dangerous to oppose it, the fear of the French returned upon him, now that the Spaniards had left Porto to its own means of defence; and instead of receiving the English officer with open arms, he wrote to Raymundo, calling him to account for having opened a communication with the English brig, and saying that he knew nothing of the business. Raymundo replied with great spirit, that if the governor had forgotten what passed when the government of the Prince Regent was re-established, he had not; he and his officers had proclaimed their beloved Sovereign, he had invited the English

The governor adheres to the French, and suppresses the insurrection

CHAP. commander, in the Prince's name, to assist him; and if any
 X. person disputed the propriety of what he had done, he would
 1808. make that person know what the power of the royal name was,
June. and that that port was open for the English. Raymundo's
 means, however, were not commensurate with his will; the
 people of Porto were disheartened by the departure of the
 Spaniards, and the city remained to all appearance in perfect
 submission to the French government, while the Portuguese flag
 was flying at S. Joam da Foz. A lieutenant-colonel, by name
 Manoel Ribeiro de Araujo, now presented himself in that
 fortress with an order from Oliveira to take the command.
 Raymundo told him, that if it were taken for the service of the
 Prince, he was ready to resign it into his hands; but if it were
 his intention to follow the French part, he might return to the
 place from whence he came, for within those walls no other
 name should be acknowledged than that of the lawful sovereign,
 and not a shot should be fired from them against the English.
 Araujo returned in the evening with fair words, and invited
 Raymundo to the governor's house, there to confer with him
 upon the best mode of proceeding in the present critical cir-
 cumstances. The treacherous invitation was accepted, and he
 had no sooner set foot within Oliveira's apartment than he was
 arrested as a disturber of the people. The next step would
 have been to deliver him up to the French, and to certain death;
 but though he had with strange want of circumspection walked
 into the snare, neither his courage nor his presence of mind
 forsook him. Oliveira, with Araujo and another officer, went
 out into the varanda to give directions concerning him; Ray-
 mundo, who was left alone in the apartment, quietly locked the
 varanda door, and lost no time in gaining a place of conceal-
 ment.

News, iii.
 91—97.

Bellesta had left a letter for Junot, which the Chamber of

Porto, as soon as his departure left them to the sense of their own weakness, dispatched to Lisbon, with assurance of their continued submission to the French. The news reached him at the close of an entertainment given by the French officers at the theatre, where, though the Russian admiral and his officers were present, the portrait of Buonaparte was displayed, with the Russian flag lying among other trophies at his feet. A sense of insecurity was manifested amid their festivities; the avenues to the theatre were occupied by armed troops, fire engines were made ready, and all the watermen were ordered to be at hand with their barrels full. The entertainment continued till four in the morning, and immediately afterward movements were observed which indicated that some important intelligence had arrived; couriers were sent off, troops crossed the Tagus, and detachments marched to Mafra, Santarem, and other places. A body of Spaniards who were stationed in the Campo de Ourique were ordered to the Convent of S. Francisco da Cidade, an unfinished pile of enormous magnitude, which the French occupied as barracks, and where a thousand men were waiting to disarm them as soon as they should enter. The Spaniards, when they drew nigh, suspected some ill design, and fixing their bayonets, declared they would not be quartered there. They were allowed to return without interruption; and in the evening they and their countrymen at Val de Pereiro, being in all 1200, were ordered to assemble at two in the morning, in the Terreiro do Paço, there to embark and cross the river on their way to Spain. Thither they repaired joyfully, and found 3000 troops awaiting them, with cannon placed under the arcades of that great square, and at the mouths of the streets which open into it; and they were summoned to lay down their arms and baggage, and surrender. In the course of that and the succeeding day, the Spaniards from Mafra and other parts were brought in as prisoners, in a

CHAP.
X.

1808.

June.*Junot dis-
arms and
seizes the
Spaniards
at Lisbon.**Observador
Portuguez,
292.**Observador
Portuguez,
295.*

CHAP. condition which excited the compassion of the people, their
 X. women exhausted with the fatigue of marching in the burning
 1808. heat of summer, some carrying children at the breast, and some,
June. who were unable to walk, tied upon the baggage carts, lest they
 should be thrown off. The whole number of Spaniards thus
 arrested was somewhat above 4500; they were confined in hulks
 upon the Tagus. The officers were left at liberty upon their
 parole; but after a few days, when several had broken an en-
 gagement, which, considering the manner in which they had
 been seized, they did not think themselves bound in honour to
 observe, they were placed under the same confinement as the
 men. Junot then informed his army, in public orders, that the
 infamous conduct of the Spanish General Bellesta, the revolt of
 two regiments, the arrest of some of his officers at Badajoz and
 at Ciudad Rodrigo, and the inability of the Spanish commanders
 to control their men, had compelled him to this severe measure.
 Happily it had been executed without shedding blood. These
 Spaniards were not enemies; they should receive pay and pro-
 visions as heretofore, and their actual situation in no degree
 altered his good disposition toward them. He expressed his
 satisfaction at the conduct of his soldiers; and said, that if the
 English thought proper to make an attack, they were now fully
 at leisure to receive them.

*Neves, iii.
 99—109.
 Observador
 Portuguez,
 300.*

*Junot's pro-
 clamations
 to the Por-
 tuguese.
 June 11.*

He addressed a proclamation also to the Portuguese, wherein
 with incautious effrontery he avowed the double treachery which
 had been practised upon them and upon the Spaniards. After six
 months of tranquillity, he said, the peace of the kingdom had
 been in danger of being disturbed by the Spanish troops, who
 entered the country apparently as allies, but in reality with the
 intention of dismembering it. No sooner had he in the Em-
 peror's name taken possession of the whole government, than
 they had begun to show their dissent: and at length their con-

duct at Porto, and in other places, had compelled him to disarm all who were within his reach. "Portuguese," he continued, "I have hitherto been satisfied with your good disposition. You have known how to appreciate the advantages which must result to you from the protection of Napoleon the Great. You have had confidence in me. Continue it, and I will guarantee your country from all invasion, from all dismemberment. If the English, who know not how to do any thing except fomenting discord, choose to seek us, they will find us ready to defend you. Some of your militia and your remaining troops shall make part of my army to cover your frontiers; they will be instructed in the art of war, and if I may be fortunate enough to put in practice the lessons which I learnt from Napoleon, I will teach you how to conquer." Junot seems at this time to have aimed at conciliating the Portuguese soldiers, and making them act with his army. For this purpose he announced certain new regulations by which they were placed upon the same footing with the French as to their pay and provisions. Hitherto four-fifths of their pay had been in paper money, which was at a great discount; the proportion was now reduced to two-thirds. A promise was made that the first item in the monthly military expenses should be for the allowance of the Portuguese prisoners in Algiers. The manner in which it was notified that the troops were to be under French command, was not in the imperious tone which the Duke of Abrantes, as he styled himself, heretofore had used; they were to form part of the divisions, it was said, within whose districts they were stationed; consequently the French commanders were to include them in their reports, and inspect and review them, to see that they received what was their due, and to perfect and accelerate their instruction. The artillery, cavalry, engineers, and marine, were to be immediately under the orders of the respective French generals, who by this means would

CHAP.
X.

1808.

June.*Observador
Portuguez,*
297.

June 14.

*Observador
Portuguez,*
303.

CHAP. know their force, watch over their instruction, and see to their
 X. welfare : the intention of his majesty being, that the Portuguese
 1808. troops should be treated in the same manner as his own in all
 June. respects.

*Festival of
 the Corpo
 de Deos at
 Lisbon.
 June 16.*

But it was too late for conciliation and flattery, after so many acts of insolent oppression : and an accident at this time occurred to manifest with what suspicious apprehensions the French and the inhabitants of Lisbon mutually regarded each other. The day arrived for the annual procession of the Corpo de Deos. In the days of Joam V. this had been the most splendid display which the Catholic religion exhibited in Europe ; and though in latter years the management had been less perfect, and there had been some diminution of its splendour, it was still a spectacle of unrivalled magnificence and riches. The streets of the capital on that occasion, and that only, were cleaned and strewn with fine gravel ; the houses were hung with damask ; the troops in their new uniforms, the various companies and brotherhoods, civil and religious, each with their banners, the knights of the military orders, and all the monks and friars of Lisbon, moved in the procession ; which was closed by the dignitaries of the patriarchal church, the Prince in person, and the chief persons of his court, following the great object of Catholic adoration, which on that day, and that day only, was actually carried abroad. The most remarkable object in this pompous display used to be an image of St. George in complete armour, upon a beautiful horse, led by a squire and supported by pages on each side, and accompanied by the finest horses from the royal stables, with rich housings, and escutcheons thrown across their saddles. These horses and the saint had formed part of the procession from the year 1387, with one interruption only, early in the seventeenth century, when, at the instigation of a certain Mordomo, the Archbishop of Lisbon excluded the horses, as

thinking it irreverent that the Real Presence should be preceded by unreasonable creatures. St. George's charger alone was excepted from the prohibition ; but in the midst of the procession that charger suddenly stopped, and could neither be induced nor compelled to proceed ; it was not doubted that the rider had chosen this means to manifest his displeasure at the privation of his accustomed train ; the Archbishop revoked his order upon the spot, and when the horses were introduced as usual, St. George consented to move forward, and the ceremony of the day was concluded with more than wonted satisfaction. The profane Mordomo, however, was not forgiven : on the following Sunday, when he was saying mass at the saint's altar, St. George let the spear drop from his hand upon the offender's head.

CHAP.
X.
1808.
June.

*Mapa de
Portugal,
t. ii. 257.*

The image which performed this miracle, after appearing annually in the procession during more than 350 years, was destroyed by fire at the time of the great earthquake. A new one, however, had been substituted, which succeeded to all the honours and miraculous properties of its predecessor. One of the finest horses which could be found in Portugal was selected to bear the saint in the great procession, and reserved for that single purpose, as if any other would have desecrated it. Junot, however, had taken St. George's horse for himself, and rode it every Sunday when he reviewed his troops. And this year, for the first time, St. George was not to bear a part in the pageant : the reason which the French assigned for excluding him was, that he could not appear with his usual splendour, because the jewels of the Cadaval family, which he always wore in his hat on that day, had been taken to Brazil when the court emigrated. Other motives were imagined by the Portuguese : when the saint returned, after the fatigues of the day, a royal present had always been allotted him ; it was thought that the French wished to spare themselves this expense. They were carrying on works

CHAP. within the circuit of the castle which were designed to command
 X. the city, and render the place defensible against the English and
 1808. the Portugeze themselves ; these works were carried on secretly,
 June. but it was part of the ceremony that St. George should enter the
 castle, and in that case his retinue would have observed what
 was going on. Lastly, the people said that the French did not
 choose to let St. George go into public because he was an
 English saint.

*Neves, iii.
257.*

*The proces-
sion inter-
rupted by a
panic fear.*

In all other things Junot wished the Lisboners to see that the spectacle had lost nothing of its wonted splendour. The procession had performed half its course when a sudden alarm arose, occasioned, it is said, by a thief, who being detected in some petty larceny, cried out, in the hope of exciting confusion and effecting his escape, that the English were crossing the bar. A general tumult ensued ; some of the French formed as if expecting immediately to be attacked, . . others hurried to their posts with a celerity which was absurdly attributed to fear instead of promptitude ; a crowd rushed into the church of S. Domingos for sanctuary, from whence the chapter of the patriarchal church were just about to proceed with the pix, in which the Romish mystery of impanation, the object of that day's superstition, was contained. Some of the insignia which were to form a part of the show were thrown down and broken in the rush, and the clergy hastened to secure themselves each where he could. Not the mob alone, but the persons who were to form the procession, priests, monks, ministers, and knights in the habiliments of their orders, took to flight ; communities and brotherhoods forsook their banners and their crosses ; here and there only an aged friar, or sacristan was seen in whom the sense of devotion was stronger than fear, and who remained in his place, thinking that if he were now to die, it were best to perish at his station and in his duty. Wherever a door was open, the ter-

rified people ran in, as if flying from an actual massacre; the great streets and the Rocio were presently deserted, and the pavement was strewn with hats, cloaks, and shoes, lost in the confusion. Fewer accidents occurred than might have been expected in such a scene; the alarm abated when it was ascertained that the British fleet was not entering; and when the cause of the * disturbance was discovered, the broken parts of the procession were brought together as soon as possible, and Junot with his generals closed it, in place of the Prince Regent and his court.

CHAP.
X.
1808.
June.

*Observador
Portuguez,*
306.
Neves, iii.
256—262.
Thiebault,
122—124.

Though the tidings of the insurrection at Porto had soon been followed by news that submission had been restored in that city, intelligence of insurrectionary movements or designs was now arriving every day, and Junot thought it necessary to take farther precautions for holding Lisbon in subjection. The water-

*Junot for
tifies the
castle.*

* General Thiebault says, "*On attribua d'abord ce mouvement, si brusque et si general, à des causes peu significantes, à des terreurs paniques, &c.; mais on apprit depuis qu'il tenoit à des grands projets, et on en eut la preuve, quand on sut que dans presque toutes les provinces il avoit été tenté ce même jour avec plus ou moins d'audace ou de succès; et que, s'il avoit manqué à Lisbonne, il avoit (et toujours par le moyen des prêtres) eu tout son succès à Oporto, Braga, Chaves, ou ce jour même, une insurrection générale avoit éclaté, fait prendre les armes contre nous à tous les habitans des provinces d'Oporto, du Tras-os-Montes, d'une partie du Beira, et fait arrêter ou assassiner tous les Français isolés qui s'y trouvoient.*"—*Relation de l'Expedition du Portugal*, p. 124.

General Thiebault is certainly wrong. Had there been any combination against the common enemy, the persons by whom it was concerted would eagerly have pleaded it afterwards as a claim to honour if not to reward. The Portuguese have preserved the most minute details of a national insurrection so honourable to the nation, and the merit of priority has been contested by different places: but from all that has been published it appears, in direct contradiction to the French general's statement, that no combination existed, (indeed it was impossible that it should exist,) and that no tumult broke out on the day which he has specified as the commencement of a general and concerted movement, except at a village of fishermen in Algarve.

CHAP. carriers were employed to fill the cisterns in the Castle, which
 X. was now strongly fortified; stores and fodder were laid in there,
 1808. it was garrisoned with 800 men, and all the swords and small
 June. arms from the arsenal were removed thither. An edict was
 June 24. issued, commanding all persons to deliver up their fire-arms,
 Edict for swords, and hunting-spears, those Portuguese alone whose legal
 the people. privilege it was to wear a sword being allowed still to retain one.
 If within forty-eight hours after the publication of that edict arms
 should be found in the possession of a Portuguese, he was to be
 imprisoned, and fined according to his means from 100 franks
 to 1000 cruzados; if the offender were a native of Great Britain,
 and delayed obedience half the time, his fine was to be from 100
 cruzados to 10,000, and greater punishment inflicted if the case
 required it: for other foreigners the same time was appointed
 as for the natives, and the extent of their fine was to be 2000
 cruzados, but, like the English, they were liable to any farther
 punishment which the French might think proper to inflict.
 It was the custom in Portugal, as formerly in England, to cele-
 brate the eve of certain festivals, and especially those of St.
 John the Baptist and St. Peter, with bonfires: the custom of
 kindling festal fires at that season of the year is as old as
 the worship of the Kelts, even perhaps before their entrance
 into Europe; and it is one of the many pagan rites which
 Romish Christianity adopted. The use of gunpowder made it
 a dangerous custom even among a people so little addicted to
 mischief as the Portuguese: and at the pretended desire of
 certain pious persons, who deemed such rejoicings incompatible
 with that calm and collected state of mind which the church re-
 quired at such times, all these demonstrations of festivity were
 prohibited. Any person letting off fire-works or fire-arms, as
 had been usual, making any use of gunpowder, or kindling a
 bonfire, was to be imprisoned eight days, and pay a fine pro-

*Observador
 Portuguez,
 514.*

portioned to his means : parents were made answerable for their children, schoolmasters for their boys, masters for their servants, tradesmen for those in their employ ; the public walk was not to be open in the evening, and any concourse of people in the streets was forbidden. Orders were given to clear the Campo de Ourique immediately, though the crops were not ripe, that troops might be encamped there, from whence, and from the Castle, the city would be completely under their command. Detachments were sent north and south to keep down a people, who were now every where beginning to manifest their long suppressed indignation. The men marched out of Lisbon with provisions and kettles upon their backs, and each with a loaf fixed upon his bayonet.

CHAP.
X.

1808.

June.

*Observador
Portuguez,*
311.

*Observador
Portuguez,*
317.

The news of the first insurrection at Porto produced considerable effect in the north of Portugal before it was known that that city, through the treachery or timidity of the persons in power, had again submitted to the intrusive government. At Braga the Archbishop gave orders for taking the cover from the royal arms upon his palace, and reciting in the service the collect for the Prince Regent and Royal Family. The restoration of the legitimate government was proclaimed by the better part of the people ; but the public performance of that duty was prevented by some of those persons who are to be found in all countries, whose sole object is to advance themselves, they care not by what means. They, putting their trust in Buonaparte and his fortune, drew up formal charges against the primate, and dispatched them to Junot. Had the French remained masters of Portugal, this process would have terminated in his deposition, perhaps in his death ; . . but the fire was now spreading on all sides, and breaking out, as in Spain, every where, simultaneously. A Galician gentleman, by name Mosqueira de Lira, having concerted measures at the house of his brother-in-

*Movements
at Braga.*

*Noves, iii.
121—6.*

*Insurrec-
tion at Mel-
gaço.*

CHAP. law, who was an inhabitant of Melgaço, with the Corregedor of
 X. that place, and with a retired magistrate, entered the town with
 1808. some other Galicians of the border and their armed followers,
 June. on a day when the people from the adjacent country were as-
 assembled there at a fair. Encouraged by their appearance, the
 Portuguese broke out into execrations against Napoleon and his
 instruments, and proclaimed their lawful Prince. The Quinas,
 which, during the usurpation, had been covered upon all public
 buildings and monuments where they had not been destroyed,
 were presently exposed again to the eyes of a people whose
 belief it was that Christ himself had in person commanded the
 founder of their monarchy to bear upon his shield those symbols
 of his passion. The next day the acclamation was performed
 with the same formalities as at the commencement of a new
 reign, the magistrates and persons in office taking the lead; and
 the joyful inhabitants sallied out to indulge their overflowing
 loyalty by repeating the scene in the neighbouring villages.
 Their hilarity was interrupted by a sudden report that a French
 army had landed on the coast of Galicia, and that a corps of
 that army had already arrived at Caniza, meaning to cross the
 Minho, and attack Melgaço. That town had been founded by
 the first King of Portugal, and refortified by King Diniz: his
 works had long since fallen to decay, and the place was open to
 an enemy. The bells rang the alarm, and the people, resolving
 rather to meet the danger than to wait for it, set off with two
 pieces of cannon, tumultuously, and in that state of heated spirits
 and insubordination which such calamitous times produce. The
 falsehood of the report was soon ascertained; a fellow then
 boldly proposed that they should nevertheless march forward
 and collect forces, and because the *Capitam Mor* ordered the
 countrymen to return peaceably to their homes, this man at-
 tempted to pistol him; the mischief was prevented by a resolute

June 9.

and right-minded peasant, who seized the ruffian and threw him to the ground. Other indications of the disposition in the populace to abuse their power as soon as they feel it, soon appeared. A rumour went about that the *Juiz de fora* had struck the red flag which had been planted in the town; a tumultuous sentence of death was passed upon him, and a party set out to execute it. But when they approached the town they saw the flag still flying: it was however true that the Juiz had been advised to strike it, because, if the French arrived, the sight of the bloody flag might provoke them to put all to the sword. The advice was given by an officer, and with no ill intention, for no man exerted himself more actively; but his military prudence on this occasion had well nigh cost him his life, and he only escaped by the swiftness of his horse. Warned by these indications how dangerous any act would be which the people could interpret into an intention of intimidating them or checking their ardour, the Juiz, when he received Junot's proclamation, communicated it to none but those on whom he could rely; he prepared for action as well as the means of the place would afford, and applied to the Junta of Orense for assistance in men, arms, and ammunition. Some troops accordingly were sent by them to Milmanda and Cellanova, whence they might enter Portugal to assist Melgaço, whenever their assistance was required.

CHAP.
X.

1808.

June.*Neves, iii.*
126—135.

While the national feeling was thus displayed in one of the remotest corners of the kingdom, similar scenes occurred in places of more importance, and more exposed to the vengeance of the enemy. The post-office in the city of Braganza was at the house of the Abbot of Carrazedo. A letter brought him news of the insurrection at Porto; he read it aloud to the persons who happened to be present; their letters confirmed the welcome tidings, and added the flattering expectation that by that time Junot would have been made prisoner at Lisbon. Readily be-

*The Prince
Regent pro-
claimed at
Braganza.*

June 11.

CHAP. lieving what they wished, they set up a shout of rejoicing; the news

X.

1808.

June.

spread; the multitude joined in exulting acclamations, and the parties from the post-office hastened to a church, where the governor of the province, General Manoel Jorge Gomes de Sepulveda, was attending a service in honour of St. Antonio. This general, though oppressed with age and infirmities, hesitated not as to the course which he should pursue. He left the church to issue such orders as were expedient without delay. The bells of the cathedral were ordered to strike up, and those of all the churches joined presently in expressing and heightening the public joy. There were, however, men in authority who had no generous hopes or feelings to mislead their judgement on this occasion; and they, like others of the same stamp at Braga, thinking to obtain favour with the intrusive government, hastened to the general, and asked him what was the meaning of all this stir. Sepulveda took them to the window, and showed them the streets swarming with people, who were crying out, The Prince and the Royal House of Braganza for ever! the General for ever! Down with the French! "There," said he, "you hear what is the meaning; . . and you may quiet that multitude if you dare." He illuminated his house, which was the signal for a general illumination: he ordered such arms as were in the city to be made ready for service, sent to Chaves for more, offered pardon to deserters upon their repairing to Braganza, called upon all reduced officers to come forward, and issued orders to all the governors and *Capitaens mores* within his jurisdiction to proclaim their lawful Prince, and enrol the peasantry for the service of their country. A solemn mass was celebrated the next day in the cathedral as a thanksgiving service, a sermon was preached upon the occasion, and all who were present mounted the national cockade, the clergy wearing it upon the breast.

These festive days were of short duration. The next post, which was expected to confirm the promises of the last, and bring news of Junot's overthrow and capture, arrived with intelligence that all was tranquil at Lisbon, and that Porto had returned to subjection. It brought also circular letters from the French government, requiring the Portuguese to continue in obedience, and threatening severe vengeance to all who should disturb the public tranquillity. The danger was now deemed as imminent as the triumph had before seemed certain. Loison would hasten from Almeida to punish Braganza for its revolt; and Marshal Bessieres also, they thought, was about to descend upon them from Castille. The time-servers now obtained an ascendancy, and were about to draw up a formal accusation against Sepulveda, and the persons who had taken the lead in this precipitate insurrection. They proposed to him, however, that he should join with them in a representation soliciting pardon for the city, saying that all which had been done, had been submitted to by him because it was not possible at that moment to oppose the populace, and that the illuminations and other demonstrations of joy were only in honour of St. Antonio. Letters were accordingly written to this effect. Sepulveda's object was to gain time by dissimulation, while he took measures for securing a retreat into Spain, unless affairs in Portugal should take a fortunate turn; and while he let the promoters of this submission send his letter with their own to the post-office, he secretly instructed the post-master not to forward it.

As the first declaration of the people at Porto had occasioned these movements in the north of Portugal, so these secondary movements, reported and exaggerated in like manner, re-acted upon the public spirit in that city. Oliveira, who had acted under fear of the French, was now in fear of his own countrymen, and soon found himself in such a situation, that he was in

CHAP.
X.

1808.

June.

*The Braganzans intimidated by the news from Porto.**News, &c.
141-146.**Second insurrection at Porto.*

CHAP. danger of being regarded as an enemy by both. On the day of
 X. the Corpo de Deos he wished the soldiers to carry the French
 1808. eagles in the procession instead of the national banner, and this
 June. they resolutely refused to do ; the end was, that only a few com-
 panies, without any colours, appeared in the train. The temper
 of the people was shown at this time by the groups which collected
 in the streets, and the agitation which every countenance ex-
 pressed. Raymundo, consulting at once his own safety, and the
 furtherance of his country's cause, had conveyed letters to the
 city, dated from Vianna and from Valença, saying that he was
 on his way to Spain, there to solicit succours, with which he
 should presently return : and the ignorant people, ready to
 believe any thing, were fully persuaded that he would soon
 appear at the head of a Spanish army. A report, with more
 appearance but as little reality of truth, accelerated the success
 of his stratagem, though it was intended to intimidate the people.
 The *Juiz de fora* at Oliveira de Azemeis received orders to
 provide rations for a French detachment on the way from Coim-
 bra to Porto. It was part of Junot's policy to alarm the people
 by such reports, for the purpose of keeping them in submission.
 The means of that place were not equal to the sudden demand ;
 the Juiz represented this to the governor of Porto, and bread
 was ordered from that city, in obedience to the requisition. A
 few Frenchmen, who had concealed themselves during the first
 insurrection, and re-appeared when Oliveira restored the usurped
 authority, imprudently assisted in loading the carts with loaves
 for this purpose ; a crowd collected at the sight, burning with
 indignation ; a native Portuguese artilleryman remarked, that
 bread enough could be found for the French, though not for the
 Portuguese ; one of the Frenchmen returned an answer which
 provoked a blow ; the mob immediately took part, seized the
 French, and delivered them to a guard of soldiers, who took

Neves, iii.
97.

Neves, iii.
163—168.

charge of them, without knowing for what end, or inquiring by whose authority. CHAP.
X.

This second insurrection had been prepared, though the occasion upon which it broke out was accidental. The Portuguese flag was displayed, Joam Manoel de Mariz brought out from the barracks at Santo Ovidio four field-pieces ready for service, with thirty artillerymen to serve them; the arsenal was opened, and arms and cartridges distributed to all who applied for them. And Raymundo, who had concealed himself in a country-house only two miles from Porto, made his appearance by the convent of S. Domingos, with nineteen Spaniards, armed with blunderbusses like himself, and covered with dust, and with their cloaks upon their backs, like men arriving from a long march. They declared that a Spanish army was on the way, and the people, in full expectation of this support, prepared to defend the city against the French. Some guns were placed upon the bridge, others on the heights of Villa-nova. There was some difficulty in conveying them to the latter position; a Dominican, who had sallied from his convent sword in hand, and with his sleeves tucked up, laid hold of the ropes; friars, priests, and women, followed his example, and the work was presently accomplished. While they were thus exerting themselves to provide for the defence of the city, the rabble exercised their authority in the usual way, discharging fire-arms in the streets, beating drums, blowing trumpets, ordering the bells to be rung in all the churches and convents, breaking open houses to search for Frenchmen and suspected persons. They threw Oliveira and many others into prison, but happily no murders were committed. The mob were restrained in their ferocity by the expectation that traitors would be brought to condign punishment as soon as the lawful authority was re-established, which it soon

1808.

June.

Formation
of a Junta
in that city.

CHAP. would be. Till that time it was resolved that a local and pro-
 X. visional government should be formed after the manner of the
 1808. Spaniards. The authors of the movement had concerted this,
 June. and fixed upon persons to constitute the Junta; but while they
 were engaged in the ceremony of nominating and appointing
 them, a report arrived that the French were actually at Grijó,
 within twelve miles of Porto. The question then was, should
 they wait upon the defensive on the heights of Villa-nova, or
 hasten to attack them, in the hope of surprising them by night,
 and finding them exhausted by a long march? The bolder
 opinion prevailed; and a volunteer party set off for Grijó, and
 hurried there so fast, that they would have been in worse con-
 dition, as well as worse order, than the enemy, if any enemy
 had been there. But instead of the French they found a few
 travellers on the way from Coimbra, who assured them that
 there was no rumour of the advance of any troops along the
 road. Even a victory would hardly have elevated their spirits
 more. This was about daybreak; they hastened back to the
 city. The soldiers in the Campo de S. Ovidio swore upon their
 swords to defend the independence of Portugal, their religion,
 and their King. A public meeting was convoked, the bells of
 the chamber rung, the soldiers led the way in military order,
 with two field-pieces; the people followed to the episcopal
 palace; the Bishop came forth into the varanda, and gave the
 assembled multitude his blessing; then he descended among
 them, kissed their banner, and led the way to the cathedral, there
 to implore the divine assistance in their meritorious undertaking.
 This done, they returned to the palace, and proceeded to ap-
 point what they called the Provisional Junta of Supreme Go-
 vernment; the list which had been prepared was shortened, as
 being inconveniently numerous; eight members were appointed,

June 19.

Novas, iii.
 169—176.

in equal numbers, from the clergy, the magistracy, the military, and the citizens, and the Bishop was placed at their head with the title of President Governor.

CHAP.
X.

1808.

June.

Measures of
the Junta.

The Bishop, D. Antonio de S. José e Castro, immediately published a manifesto, in the name of the Prince Regent, declaring that the French Government was abolished and exterminated in that country, and the royal authority restored and to be exercised plenarily and independently by the Provisional Junta of Porto, till the government instituted by his Royal Highness should be re-established. The Junta therefore gave orders, that in all places the Prince should be proclaimed, and the royal arms uncovered and respected as heretofore they always had been, and now again hereafter were to be; and they called upon all constituted authorities to act accordingly. His next business was to dispatch a messenger to General Sepulveda at Braganza, requesting succours, especially in cavalry, and an officer capable of taking the command, whether for attack or defence. The Visconde de Balsamam was sent to the British brig, which was still hovering off the bar, and a communication was thus opened with England. Voluntary contributions were liberally made, the pay of the soldiers was raised, and as a measure not less popular, a *Tribunal de Inconfidencia* was instituted, to take cognizance of causes in which treason was suspected. The prevalence of suspicion is indeed one of the many dreadful evils in such calamitous times. An example of this occurred before the close of the day. Colonel José Cardoso de Menezes Souto-maior had been that day appointed to the chief command, as being the senior officer. Happening to send a messenger that evening with letters upon public business to the *Juizes de fora* at Oliveira de Azemeis and Recardaens, he forgot to provide him with the passport which was now necessary for crossing the bridge. The messenger was therefore stopped by the guards,

Arrest of
Cardoso.

CHAP. and either from the confusion occasioned by fear, or from a con-
X. fidence of protection, refused to declare whither he was going,
1808. or by whom he was sent. Upon this the guards searched him, and
June. found the two letters. These would have explained the matter and
cleared him; but perceiving that a third letter which he carried
more secretly about his person was in danger of being found, he
drew it out, tore it in pieces with his teeth, and threw it over the
bridge. A few fragments were saved, but not enough to give any
indication of its contents. The messenger was immediately ar-
rested as a traitor, and carried before José Cardoso, who thought
at first to end the business by desiring that the man might be
left with him, and saying that he would answer for him. The
people (for a crowd had collected on the way) transferred at
this their suspicions upon Cardoso himself; and to satisfy them,
he found it necessary to open the two letters, and thus acquaint
the mob with arrangements which it had not been intended that
they should know. But he could give no account of the paper
which had been torn; and therefore the mob, having thrown
his messenger into prison, returned to arrest him and carry him
before the Bishop. Protestations of innocence were vain, and
it was evident that his life would be in danger on the way;
some of his friends, however, bethought themselves of a happy
stratagem; they rung the alarm bells, and raised a cry that the
enemy was approaching. Evening was now closing; the po-
pulace left their intended victim to go in quest of the invaders,
and passed the night in hurrying here and there upon the false
report. Cardoso meantime got in safety to the Bishop's palace,
and related all that had passed. As far as he was concerned his
justification was clear, but of the third letter he could give no
account. The messenger, however, gave a plain and credible
one; he had not long since been at Lisbon, where a Frenchman
had given him this letter for one of his countrymen in Porto; on

his arrival in that city he found that the person to whom it was addressed had been carried away prisoner by the Spaniards; and his intention was, when he returned to Lisbon, to deliver it again to the writer. He had torn it in a moment of fear, lest he should be considered a partizan and agent of the French, if it were found upon him. The Bishop was satisfied; but he advised Cardoso not to appear in public till this unlucky accident should be forgotten.

CHAP.
X.

1808.

June.

Notes, iii.
186—192.

About noon, on the ensuing day, the alarm bells were rung again, drums beat, trumpets sounded, and preparations were again made for an immediate engagement with the enemy. They were at Os Carvalhos, it was said, eight miles off. There was some foundation for this report. The Juiz at Oliveira de Azemeis was in expectation and fear of the French, and not having received the bread from Porto which he had been ordered to have in readiness for them, had sent to this town and to the adjacent villages, to embargo all that could be found. Troops and volunteers now hurried forward with the utmost alacrity, and in the utmost disorder. This was a critical moment for Cardoso: if he went abroad, to put himself at the head of the forces, as his duty required, there was the risk of being again accused and endangered as a traitor: if, on the other hand, he forbore to appear, the very forbearance would be interpreted as a proof of disaffection to his country. After some hours of indecision, he could not bear to remain inactive, and incur the reproach to which it must needs subject him at such a time, and forth he went. He had not gone far before a poor fellow, whom a party of *Ordenanças* upon some suspicion had seized, met him, and implored his protection. Cardoso inquired into the case, and finding the man innocent, gave orders to release him. His authority was disputed, and presently he himself was reproached and seized as a traitor. Some were for putting him to death upon the spot;

CHAP. and though others insisted upon carrying him before the Bishop,
 X. it appeared very doubtful whether he would reach the palace
 1808. alive. When they met a priest upon the way, the mob called
 June. upon him to confess this traitor, who was about to die, and Car-
 doso himself cried out for absolution, seeing nothing but death
 before his eyes. The Bishop was convinced of his innocence,
 but could neither persuade the populace, nor command them;
 nor could he save Cardoso's life by any other expedient than
 that of allowing him to be thrown into one of the worst dungeons
 of a Portuguese prison. In that miserable confinement he re-
 mained till the heat of these tumults had abated; he was then
 released, and honourably distinguished himself afterwards.

Neves, iii.
 192—196.

*Disturbed
 state of the
 people.*

Meantime Porto was in a frightful state of insubordination. The people readily enrolled themselves, but, as if intoxicated with joy, they celebrated their deliverance instead of labouring to secure it: and men who ought to have been practising the drill, or erecting batteries and throwing up trenches, were beating drums, ringing the bells, and wasting powder in empty demonstrations of bravery. The city was illuminated during three successive nights, and they seemed so little aware of the tremendous conflict in which they were engaged, that they were about to march to war as to a festival. From this delusion the Bishop roused them by an appeal well adapted to those for whom it was intended. "Portuguese," he said, "in the name of Heaven and of Jesus Christ, listen to a government which loves you, which desires your happiness, and is labouring for it! Their turbulence, he told them, their insubordination, their waste of powder, only exposed them to the enemy, who would come upon them by surprise, and surely destroy them, if they would not listen to their rulers and obey orders. Strength without order was like the bull, who, strong as he is, is brought to the ground by a weak hand, with the aid of dexterity and a cloak. Their

endeavour should be to be unseen and unheard, that they might the more fatally be felt ; . . to conceal their movements, that they might strike when the blow was not expected. The government conjured them, by every thing which was most sacred in heaven and earth, to subject themselves to discipline, and obey their officers. Where they were posted there they were adjured to remain till the time for action arrived : they who were first in the field would diminish the number of the enemy when they engaged them ; the second body, when they arrived, would weaken the French still farther ; the third would complete their destruction. But if all hurried on tumultuously, all would be lost." The populace by this time had fired away so much powder, and spent so much of their animal spirits in rioting, and hurrying here and there upon so many false alarms, that they were disposed to listen to this advice. Tranquillity was produced by exhaustion ; and to preserve it, order was given that the alarm bells should not be rung till the cathedral began, and that whenever that was necessary, a flag should be hoisted on the tower by day, and a torch by night, to distinguish it from the fire-bell.

Subordination being now in some degree restored, the Junta entered with alacrity upon their arduous duties. They raised a loan, and imposed new taxes, as the exigencies of the time required ; among others a duty of four *mil reis* upon every pipe of wine which was exported. Two deputies were sent to England ; and an alliance was concluded with the Supreme Junta of Galicia, the nearest of the newly constituted authorities in Spain ; Galicia engaging first to assist in liberating Portugal, and Portugal promising, after her own deliverance should be accomplished, to co-operate in expelling the French from every part of the Peninsula. Wild as this promise appeared to the French, and to those shallow statesmen by whom the French were regarded as invincible, and the power of Buonaparte not to be resisted, it was faithfully performed by the Portuguese, and ful-

CHAP.
X.
1808.
June.

*Neves, iii.
196—198.*

*The Junta
conclude an
alliance
with the
Junta of
Galicia.*

*Neves, iii.
199.*

CHAP. filled to the letter of the bond. The Junta of Porto had another
 X. object to accomplish, more difficult, and at that time not less
 1808. important, than an alliance with Spain. Other Juntas were
 June. now springing up in the north of Portugal at the first hope of
 deliverance, and unless these were induced to acknowledge that
 at Porto as supreme, all plans of defence would be frustrated by
 the jealousy of contending authorities. One had been formed
 at Viana on the same day; others at Torre de Moncorvo, Mi-
 randa, and other places of less note; all these submitted readily
 to the superiority which was claimed. Braganza was not so will-
 ing to resign its pretensions. The intrusive government had not
 been re-established in that city, notwithstanding the efforts of
 its adherents, and the apparent assent of General Sepulveda.
 Their penitent letters to the French ministry were stopped at
 Villa Real, where the people proclaimed their lawful Prince;
 and when the Braganzans, upon tidings of the second insur-
 rection at Porto, formed a Junta, and required obedience to its
 edicts, its authority was disowned there. Sepulveda was so
 offended at this, that he sent Brigadier Manoel Pinto Bacellar
 to arrest Francisco da Silveira Pinto da Fonseca, then a lieu-
 tenant-colonel of cavalry, who had taken the lead at Villa Real.
 Bacellar acted with more prudence than the general who sent
 him, and endeavoured by amicable means to bring about a good
 understanding; and Silveira, disregarding the orders of one
 who had so far been found wanting, that he had at least pro-
 fessed submission to the French after having once thrown off
 their yoke, crossed the Douro, to spread the revolution in the
 province of Beira. Sepulveda found as little obedience in
 Torre de Moncorvo and some other Juntas in that district, when
 he issued a circular order requiring that every town which was
 entitled to a voice in the Cortes should send a deputy to assist
 at the provincial Junta of Tras os Montes, the title which that

*Its author-
 ity is ac-
 knowledged
 throughout
 the north of
 Portugal.*

of Braganza had assumed. Opposed in their pretensions on that side, after contesting the authority of the Porto Junta, concluding a treaty with it, and then again disputing with it, and arraigning its measures, the Junta of Braganza ended at length in obeying the advice of the Bishop of Porto, which was repeated in strong terms by Sepulveda, and dissolving itself.

CHAP.
X.

1808.

June.

*Neves, iii.
151—162.
180—185.*

The whole of Tras os Montes and of the province between the rivers had now declared against the intrusive government, and acknowledged the Junta of Porto. The same spirit was spreading in Beira. Aveiro declared itself, and a plan was formed for surprising the French in Coimbra, an undertaking of more importance than danger. The details are curious, as showing the disposition of the people, the insignificance of their means, and the disorderly manner of their proceedings. A patrol of armed peasants had been sent out from Porto upon the Coimbra road, to obtain intelligence of the enemy, concerning whom nothing certain was known. Dr. José Bernardo de Azevedo, of the order of Avis, hearing upon what service these persons had been sent, represented to the Junta how little likely it was that such a set of men should act with discretion; upon the first news of the enemy they would hurry back without ascertaining their numbers, position, and probable movements; or if they ventured to approach them, would most probably fall into their hands. He offered to obtain the desired information himself, knowing the country well, and accordingly laying aside his habit, set off with one servant on horseback. When he arrived at Oliveira de Azemeis, he met the greater part of the patrol on their return in triumph; they had failed to arrest the Juiz as they intended, but they had caught a lawyer, and were dragging him to Porto as a suspected person. They had however sent four of their party forward on the Coimbra road, in pursuance of their original object, and José Bernardo proceeding

*The insur-
rection ex-
tends to-
wards Co-
imbra.*

June 22.

CHAP. on his journey, overtook them at Mealhada, a village about
 X. twelve miles from Coimbra. Exulting that they had advanced
 1808. so far without meeting the French, and encouraged by what they
 June. heard from the people of Mealhada, that the enemy had only a
 handful of men in Coimbra, and most of them invalided, they
 resolved to fall upon them, by surprise if possible, that very day.
 A reformed colonel of militia at Ois undertook to bring thirty
 armed men; the people of Mealhada volunteered their services,
 and the two parties were to meet at Carquejo, half way on their
 march.

News, iii.
 200—205.

*Scheme for
 surprising
 the enemy
 in Coimbra.*

When the men of Mealhada began to prepare for their expedition, there were some whose hearts failed them, and the contagion spread. José Bernardo, however, by reproaching and threatening some, encouraging and praising others, with the seasonable administration of fruit and wine, and the zealous help of a serjeant of the *Ordenança*, mustered some thirty peasants, with about twenty muskets, the rest were armed with pikes and sickles and other such instruments; and when they set off many of the others followed, ashamed to be left behind. The party from Ois not having arrived when they reached Carquejo, José Bernardo ordered his people to halt for them there, and suffer no person to pass toward Coimbra, while he and two others went on to reconnoitre and form the plan of attack. He found no difficulty in entering the city and obtaining all the information he desired. The French soldiers in Coimbra did not amount to an hundred men, and of these not more than forty were capable of service. There was a rumour that 1200 Spaniards were on the way against them. This the inhabitants were more likely to believe than the French, who, relying upon their Emperor's fortune, the terror of the French name, and the submission of the Portuguese, were living to all appearance in full confidence of security. Satisfied with this intelligence, and without ven-

turing to concert any co-operation in the city, José Bernardo returned as far as the Bridge of Agua de Maias, and sent to hasten the march of his motley volunteers.

CHAP.
X.

1808.

June.

*The French
in that city
are made
prisoners.*

When they were not far from this bridge, they were seen by a patrol of four horsemen, two French and two Portuguese, who clapped spurs to their horses, in order to cross the bridge before them and give the alarm. The insurgents, however, equally on the alert, got between them and the bridge, and addressed them with the *quem vive?* Napoleon, was the answer, and two pistols were fired upon them without effect. A general discharge was returned, which killed two of the patrol and mortally wounded another. The fourth, who escaped unhurt, was a Portuguese; he threw himself off his horse, cried out, *Viva o Principe de Portugal!* and joined his countrymen. The wounded man was a Frenchman: the insurgents, with a humanity not to have been expected at such a moment, left one of their number to assist him, and he was afterwards removed into the city, and there humanely and carefully attended; but to his latest breath he reviled the Portuguese, and the last hope which he expressed was, that ample vengeance would be taken for his blood. The French guard at the gate of S. Sophia hearing the guns, and seeing a number of men approach, fired among them, and fled to their quarters in the College of S. Thomas. The Portuguese followed close; they were fired upon from the windows without effect, for the French were too sensible of their own weakness to make any regular defence; the doors were forced, and they quietly laid down their arms, and suffered themselves to be bound, happy to receive no worse treatment from such an assemblage, . . . for by this time the whole rabble of Coimbra had collected.

*Neves, iii.
207—212.*

Having thus easily succeeded, the first thought of José Bernardo and his comrades was to obtain the sanction and assistance

*The Juiz
do Povo
takes the
command.*

CHAP. of some legal authority for their future proceedings. The courage,
 X. and perhaps the disposition, of the magistrates was doubted; but
 1808. the *Juiz do Povo* was an officer whom tumultuous times had here-
June. tofore forced into importance, and the *Juiz do Povo* was now called
 for. José Pedro de Jesus, a cooper by trade, who held the
 office, happened to possess a rare union of upright character,
 activity, and good sense. He came forward, assumed a power
 which was willingly recognized, and exercised it in a manner
 which at once gratified the populace and satisfied the wishes of
 cooler minds. First he lodged the French safely in prison, then
 distributed among the people the arms of those cavalry regiments
 belonging to the northern provinces, which Junot had disbanded.
 In the dépôt with these weapons a flag was found with the royal
 arms. It was carried in triumph through the streets, while the
 exulting people hastened to uncover the shield of Portugal upon
 the public buildings. The bells from all the colleges and con-
 vents and churches of that populous city pealed in with the ac-
 clamations of the people, and heightened the excitement and
 agitation of their spirits. Bonfires were kindled, as in old times,
 in defiance of Junot's prohibition: the night of St. John's had
 always been a festival in Coimbra, but never before had it been
 celebrated with such uproar and overflowing joy. Some barks
 on the river, laden with provisions for the French in Figueira,
 were seized during the night; and in the morning it was deemed
 prudent to march off the prisoners to Porto, under a strong
 escort, lest the magistracy, in their fear, should release them,
 and again reduce the city to submission.

News, iii.
 214—217.

*Order re-
 st red in
 Coimbra*

This apprehension, however, was ill founded. The *Juiz de fora*
 came forward to act in the national cause; the students and lec-
 turers formed themselves into an academical corps; and the Vice-
 Rector of the university, Manoel Paes de Aragam Trigoso, took
 upon himself the civil authority, in compliance with the wish of

the inhabitants. They would have vested the military command in General Bernardim Freire de Andrade, whom the Prince, before his departure for Brazil, had appointed to the command at Porto. Not choosing to exercise it under the intrusive government, he was living privately at Coimbra ; but being now summoned by the Bishop and Junta of Porto to his proper station, he declined for that reason the present nomination. The people next thought of D. Miguel Pereira Forjas, but he chose rather to follow Bernardim as his quarter-master general. They then chose Bernardim's brother, Nuno Freire de Andrade, making him, however, subordinate to Trigoso. The men who thus accepted offices of authority discharged a most perilous duty to their country. They were not, like their countrymen in *Tras os Montes* and between the rivers, secured in some degree by distance from the French, and within reach of assistance from Spain, or, if need were, of an asylum in that kingdom. Nor would Coimbra belike some of the smaller towns, overlooked as unworthy of vengeance. Next to the capital itself there was no place in Portugal where a terrible example would so deeply impress and intimidate the nation : it was within easy reach of the enemy, from Almeida as well as from Lisbon, and all military means of defence were wanting : a few pounds of powder were all that could be found in the city, and not one piece of cannon.

CHAP.
X.

1808.

June.*Notes, iii.*
219—223.

On the other hand, more talents and enterprise, such as the times required, might reasonably be expected in Coimbra than in any other of the Portuguese towns. It was a populous and flourishing university, the only one in the kingdom : here therefore the flower of the Portuguese youth would be found, just at that age when they would be most willing and fit for service ; and of that rank, and in that place, where national and generous feelings would have their strongest influence. If any where heads to plan and hands to execute might be found, it would be

Preparations for defence.

CHAP. here. Accordingly no exertions were wanting. - Chemists made
 X. gunpowder, geometers directed works of defence, old sol-
 1808. diers were employed, some in making cartridges, others in train-
 June. ing volunteers; mechanics were set to work in whatever manner
 they might be most useful; bridges were broken down, roads
 broken up, means made ready for defending the streets, if the
 enemy should enter the city, and a strict police established.

*Neves, iii.
223-225.*

*Successful
expedition
against Fi-
gueira.*

June 25.

When one day had been passed in these arrangements and preparations an expedition was planned against Figueira da Foz, a small town and fort at the mouth of the Mondego, on the right bank, seven leagues from Coimbra. The French had a garrison of an hundred men there. Forty volunteers, who were almost all students, under the command of Bernardo Antonio Zagalo, a student also, set out at evening, in hope of capturing this important point: they relied upon increasing their numbers on the way, and they took with them authority from the governor to raise the country as they went. Zagalo, with four horsemen, took the right bank, the rest of the party the left: they met at Monte-mor o Velho, and marching all night, appeared with the reinforcements which they had gathered, now some 5000 in number, before Figueira, at seven in the morning. The enemy were taken by surprise; they were dispersed about the town, when they saw this multitude approach; but immediately retiring into the fort, they prepared for defence. The place might have been easily defended against a crowd of peasants, more of whom were armed with pikes and reaping-hooks than with fowling-pieces, and who were likely, upon the slightest loss or disgust, to abandon their enterprise as precipitately as they had engaged in it. But the French, relying too confidently upon the submission of the Portuguese, had neglected to store the fort with provisions; and Zagalo summoned them, saying he knew they had not food for more than four-and-twenty hours,

and that if they did not surrender they should all be put to the sword. Contrary to his usual policy, Junot had given the command of this fort to a Portuguese lieutenant of engineers; this person demurred at surrendering, because his family were at Peniche, in the power of the French. But, wanting either the will or the ability to exert himself in the enemy's service, he remained inactive and confounded, till the following day, when Zagalo received positive orders from Coimbra to return immediately with all his people. This enabled the commander to obtain terms which might be pleaded to save his credit; and he capitulated on condition that the garrison should be allowed to cross the river with their arms and knapsacks, but without powder and ball; and to march unmolested to Peniche, the nearest strong place in possession of the French. Upon these terms the fort was given up; but the peasantry searched the men when they were embarking, and finding that some of them had concealed a few cartridges, declared that the conditions were broken: they themselves were desirous of breaking them, and therefore gladly found this pretext; and the French would have been massacred if the students had not exerted themselves to protect them, and lodged them safely as prisoners at Coimbra.

A report of Loison's sudden approach had occasioned the order for recalling Zagalo. General Count Loison had been sent in the latter end of May, with 4000 troops, to Almeida, in pursuance of positive and repeated instructions from Murat when exercising the command in Madrid. He was to concert his movements with Bessieres, and, if necessary, to join him; he was to observe Salamanca, and secure Ciudad Rodrigo, if that were practicable. But the Spaniards were too much awakened to be again deceived or surprised by the French; and Loison having remained at Almeida from the 5th of June till the 16th, received orders from Junot to march upon Porto, take the command in

CHAP.
X.

1808.
June.

*Naves, iii.
226—233.*

Loison ordered to march from Almeida to Porto.

CHAP. that city, and keep the northern provinces in subjection. He
 X. had previously got possession of Fort Conceiçam. Each party
 1808. seems at this time to have been strangely ignorant of the move-
 June. ments and means of the other; Loison apprehended that an
 enemy's force might render it impossible for the French to
 maintain this fort; he therefore directed General Charlot, whom
 he left with the command at Almeida, to remove thither the guns
 from Conceiçam, keep it as long as he could, and destroy the
 June 17. works if he should be forced to evacuate it. He then began his
 march with two regiments of light infantry, fifty dragoons, and
 six pieces of artillery. A battalion of light infantry was to set
 out from Torres Vedras, and reach Porto at the same time.

*Thiebault,
148—150.*

*He turns
back from
Mezam-frio*

On the fourth day he reached Lamego without the slightest
 resistance, and on the following morning crossed the Douro by
 the ferry at Regoa, and reached Mezam-frio, meaning to sleep
 there. His advanced guard was on the way to Amarante, which
 is only forty miles from Porto, when news was brought him while
 he was at dinner that the mountaineers were defending the pass
 at Os Padroens da Teixeira; and presently a second ill mes-
 senger arrived with intelligence that his baggage was attacked
 at Regoa. These operations had been ably planned by Silveira,
 and were well executed. In so strong a country he deemed it
 better to turn back than to proceed at the risk of being sur-
 rounded by an armed population. An ambuscade among the
 vineyards at Santinho annoyed him greatly on his way toward
 the Douro, and he himself was slightly hurt. The Portuguese,
 when they were dislodged, retreated to the heights; the French
 took up a position for the night, and in the morning sacked the
 villages of Pezo and Regoa, where neither age, nor infirmity,
 nor sex, nor childhood, were spared by them; for Loison was one
 of those men after Buonaparte's own heart, who, being equally
 devoid of honour and humanity, carried on war in the worst

spirit of the worst ages, plundering and massacring without shame and without remorse. He now understood that Porto, which he had expected to find discontented indeed, but passive and in subjection, had thrown off the yoke; that a Portuguese officer, with whom he maintained a secret correspondence, had been fain to abscond from that city; that the disbanded soldiers had reassembled; and that the insurgent peasantry, in such numbers as to be truly formidable, were moving against him from all parts of the two northern provinces. The news of his retreat was presently known throughout the whole country between the Tua and the Cavado; expresses and telegraphs could not have communicated it more rapidly than it was spread by the voluntary bearers of good tidings. One column came from Villa Real, one from Amarante, a third from Guimaraens; a motlier assemblage had never taken the field; . . the commonest weapons were pikes and long poles armed with reaping-hooks at the end; and there were as many abbots, monks, friars, and parochial clergy in command, as officers. The three columns united at Regoa, too late to impede or molest the French in their passage of the river. The enemy halted for part of the night at Lamego, and resumed their retreat at two in the morning. The Portuguese came up with them that day at Juvantes, and harassed them during three days. The total want of discipline, order, and authority, rendered their great superiority of numbers unavailing; and after they had reached Castro d'Airo, dispersing as irregularly as they had collected, they gave up the pursuit, less in consequence of the loss which they sustained in a few brisk encounters, than because they were too numerous to find sustenance, and every man was eager to report the retreat of the enemy and the share he had borne in the success. F. José Joaquim de Assumpçam, a friar of orders gray, distinguished him-

CHAP.

X.

1808.

June.

The peasantry harass his retreat.

*Noves, iii.
235—248.
Thiebault,
150-1.*

CHAP. self in this expedition, by his activity, his strength, and his un-
 X. erring aim.

1808.

June.

*He goes to
Viseu.*

*Alarm at
Coimbra in
consequence
of his move-
ments.*

*Thiebault,
152.*

*Neves, iii.
217.*

The loss on either side, in this pursuit, appears not to have been great; the pursuers were too disorderly and too ill armed to make any serious impression upon the enemy, and the French were not strong enough to act upon the offensive with effect. They lost two pieces of artillery, and some of their ammunition and baggage; and a few rich uniforms which fell into the hands of the Portuguese, were suspended as trophies in the churches of N. Senhora da Oliveira at Guimaraens, and of S. Gonçalo de Amarante, in the town which was under his peculiar patronage. Being freed from his pursuers, Loison, sending part of his force by the road of Moimenta da Beira, which was the shorter but rougher line to Almeida, took himself the way of Viseu. This was the movement which alarmed the people at Coimbra, and induced them to recall Zagalo from Figueira. It was not improbable that his intention was to march upon that important city, and there place himself in communication with Lisbon: his own judgement would dispose him to this, and indeed no fewer than five-and-twenty dispatches, instructing him so to do, had been sent, not one of which had reached him. But he had received an exaggerated report of the proceedings in Coimbra, brought by some partizans of the French, who had fled to save their lives, on the night of the insurrection, when their houses were broken open, during the suspension of all order and authority. Their testimony concerning the temper and unanimity of the inhabitants could not be doubted; it was added, that they were busy in constructing formidable works of defence, and that an auxiliary force of 12,000 Spaniards was expected there. Such strange events were now every day occurring, that nothing seemed too extraordinary to be believed;

and Loison, it is thought, in consequence of these rumours, judged it best to change his purpose, and return to Almeida. The Portuguese general who commanded in Beira resided at Viseu; upon the approach of the French he summoned the magistrates and members of the *Camara*, and they determined not to oppose a premature and unavailing resistance. Loison, though notorious for rapacity, in the most rapacious army that ever disgraced its profession and its country, was at this time sensible how desirable it was, if possible, to obtain a character for moderation and equity. He encamped his troops for the night without the city, in the open space where the fairs were held, took up his own lodging in the general's house, and on his departure the next day, paid for every thing with which the men had been supplied. He also released three or four prisoners, who, in the late skirmishes, had fallen into his hands. At Celorico, where an insurrectionary movement had commenced, it was suspended by the prudence of the magistrates and the just fears of the people, till the enemy had passed by. The peasantry of the adjacent country were less cautious; they appeared in arms upon the heights, and Loison therefore sent two companies to burn the village of Souropires. Being now within easy reach of Almeida, and knowing that the country about Trancoso and Guarda was in a state of insurrection, his intention was to employ himself in reducing it to submission; but here the only one of the numerous dispatches from Lisbon which reached its destination found him, and, in pursuance of its orders to draw nearer the capital, he hastened to Almeida, to make the necessary arrangements for his march. On the way he began to sack the city of Pinhel, which the inhabitants had deserted at his coming; but upon the tidings that a corps from Tras os Montes had arrived at Trancoso, and that Viseu was

CHAP.
X.

1808.

June.

He returns
to Almeida.

Thiebault,
152.

Neves, *iii.*
249—253.

CHAP. now in arms, he hastened forward, and on the 1st of July
 X. re-entered Almeida.

1808.

June.

*Insurrec-
 tion at Ol-
 ham.*

When Loison, upon the first apprehension of danger, was sent to occupy Porto, General Avril was instructed, at the same time, to take possession of Estremoz and Evora, for the purpose of holding Alem-Tejo in subjection, and to give orders for securing Algarve. General Maurin commanded for the French in this kingdom, as it is designated, the smallest but richest province in Portugal: owing to his illness the command had devolved upon Col. Maransin, who received instructions to occupy Mertola as well as Alcoutim, for guarding the Guadiana against the Spaniards; and to protect the coast from Faro, the greatest port in that province, to Villa Real, the frontier town, at the mouth of the river. Maransin, however, was not left at leisure to do this. Junot's proclamation, announcing the seizure of the Spanish troops, expressing his satisfaction with the Portuguese for their peaceable deportment, and promising to instruct them in the art of war, had been fixed upon the church door at Olham, a small fishing village about four miles from the city of Faro. The governor of Villa Real, Col. José Lopes de Sousa, happening to be in that village on the day of the Corpo de Deos, as he was going into the church stopped to see what the people were reading. The language of that proclamation proved how little Junot understood the character of the nation to which it was addressed; it wounded that high sense of national honour for which the Portuguese are remarkable, and Lopes, giving way to an honourable feeling of indignation, tore the paper down, and trampled upon it; then turning to the bystanders, exclaimed, "Ah, Portuguese, we no longer deserve that name . . we are nothing now!" But they answered, that they were still Portuguese, and swore that they were ready to lay down their lives for their

religion, their Prince, and their country. Though the impulse had thus been given, and the determination of the parties formed, they did not neglect the religious duties of the day, but entered the church peaceably, and attended mass. That done, they proclaimed the Queen and Prince Regent in the porch, and called upon Lopes to be their general. He without delay prepared an address to the people, and sent for two pieces of artillery and some powder from an island at the bar of Armona, and from Fort Lorenzo on the bar of Faro. These were secured before the French in Faro could hear of the projected insurrection. Two agents also went off to the English squadron; the means which were at the commandant's disposal had probably been all disposed of to the Spaniards; they proceeded therefore to Ayamonte, and performed their errand with such good speed, that on the following night they returned to Olham with 130 muskets from the Junta of that city.

CHAP.
X.

1808.

June.

News, iii.
270—275.

The greater part of Maransin's force was stationed at Mertola, the rest was at Tavira and Villa Real, except 200 men at Faro. But before the news reached Faro a larger body of fishermen and peasantry had collected than 200 men could with any prudence have attacked. The French therefore sent for reinforcements from Villa Real and Tavira. From the latter place fourscore men embarked for Faro in three caics. The fishermen of Olham, confident in their skill upon the water, set out to intercept them under Captain Sebastiam Martins Mestre, one of those persons who had opened a communication with the English fleet and with Ayamonte. So little were the French prepared for such an encounter, that they surrendered without resistance, and thus the insurgents obtained a seasonable supply of arms. They were not long allowed to enjoy their victory; about 200 French arrived from Villa Real to assist their countrymen at Faro, and they marched against Olham. The Portu-

*Success of
the insur-
gents.*

CHAP. gueze met them half way, and disposed an ambuscade to receive
 X. them: their own eagerness prevented its success; but they be-

1808. haved so well in a skirmish which ensued, that the enemy
 June. thought it not prudent to advance. This was the third day of

*The Cham-
 ber of Faro
 issue an e-
 dict against
 them.*

the insurrection, and the people of Faro had as yet made no
 manifestation in its favour. The chamber of that city had, on
 the contrary, issued an edict against the insurgents, for what
 it denominated a riotous and scandalous attempt against the
 security of the nation, saying that their conduct would brand
 the Portuguese with the infamous stain of ingratitude, and warn-
 ing them against the severe punishment which awaited them if
 they persisted in their frantic and desperate attempt. This
 edict was posted up in Olham; and it so evidently affected the
 people, in whom great excitement and fatigue had now pro-
 duced proportionate exhaustion, that Lopes and Mestre, who
 had been hurt in the skirmish, thought it prudent to carry their
 prisoners to Spain, and go themselves to solicit aid from the
 Juntas at Ayamonte and at Seville.

*News, iii.
 275—281.
 Observador
 Portuguez,
 332, 333.*

*Insurrec-
 tion at Faro*

Maransin, not aware of their departure, and anxious to lose
 no time in suppressing a spirit the consequences of which he had
 so much reason to dread, sent out three pieces of cannon to his
 detachment, and for want of French troops, a party of fifty Por-
 tuguese artillerymen, under Lieutenant Belchior Drago, an
 officer much more inclined to act against the enemies of his
 country than with them. Meantime the commander of the
 French, having learnt that the people of Olham were wavering,
 succeeded in obtaining a conference with some of them, and
 proposed terms. He promised them a free pardon, if they
 would return to their obedience; said that they should be pro-
 tected in their fishery, and that even Lopes himself should be no
 otherwise punished than by forbidding him to appear in that
 place. The persons to whom these conditions were propounded

listened to them willingly, and expressed an opinion that the people would probably assent, if the Portuguese authorities in Faro gave their sanction to the proposals. Some of the magistrates accordingly went to conclude this agreement with the Prior of Olham, a zealous Portuguese, to whom, in the absence of Lopes and Mestre, the insurgents looked as their proper counsellor and ruler. But at this moment, when the French by mere authority had nearly quelled the insurrection, the spell was broken, and they were made sensible that they had relied too confidently upon the terror of their name. A few Faro-men met in the shop of one Bento Alvares da Silva Canedo, and determined, while the French troops were absent, to raise the city against them. They hired a fellow for a few moidores to give the signal, by chiming the bells of the Carmo church at a certain hour, in the manner usual in that country when prayers are solicited for a woman in labour. They who had concerted the scheme sallied into the streets, and proclaimed their native Prince; the populace gathered together at that welcome acclamation; a colonel of artillery joined them, and sent advice to Belchior Drago, who immediately returned to the city with his detachment; two of his brothers, both in the Portuguese service, appeared in the same cause, and the rest of the native troops without hesitation did the same. The French, when they would have re-entered the city to restore order, found cannon planted against them by men who knew how to use them; and, being repulsed in two attempts, retreated towards Tavira. Their magazines, their military chest, and all their papers, were taken*.

CHAP.
X.
1808.
June.

*The French
excluded
from that
city.*

* Baron Thiebault ascribes the success of the insurgents, and the loss of Faro, to the news of Dupont's surrender, and to the landing of troops, arms, ammunition, and money, at Faro, from the English squadron. Not a man nor a musket had been

CHAP.

X.

1808.

June.

*Observador
Portuguez,
333—335.
Neves, iii.
282—289.*

*A Junta
formed at
Faro.*

General Maurin, sick in bed, was necessarily left to his fate; and the populace would have killed him in their first use and abuse of power, if some humaner spirits had not interfered to preserve him. The Bishop also exerted himself to prevent this inhumanity, and had him transferred to the episcopal palace for security.

On the following morning an assembly of the people was held in the Alto da Esperança. The magistrates, the Bishop and his chapter, the clergy, the monks and friars, (who had all taken arms), the troops and the nobles, met and solemnly proclaimed their lawful Prince; the *Quinas* were hoisted, and an oath was taken that they would each to the last drop of his blood defend the rights of the house of Braganza. Circular letters were dispatched to all the towns and villages in Algarve. The next day some instances of insubordination, and the reasonable apprehension of an attack, induced one of the canons to propose, and the people to consent, to the appointment of a Junta. The Chamber nominated seven electors for the nobles, and as many for the people, the chapter seven for the clergy, and the army seven for themselves. By these electors eight members were chosen, two for each of the four orders, and the Conde de Castro-Marim was appointed president. This nobleman had been governor and captain-general of Algarve at the time of the invasion; under the intrusive government he resided as a private individual at Tavira, and the popular desire of re-establishing the order of things to which they had been accustomed, was shown in nominating him to the presidency,

landed from that squadron, and the surrender of Dupont did not take place till a month afterwards! With so little accuracy do the French relate the circumstances of their ill success, even where no military misconduct is imputable.

as it was indeed in all the circumstances of the insurrection throughout Portugal. Emissaries were now sent to the east and west: in the west there were no enemies, and within eight-and-forty hours the acclamation was effected in Loule, Sylves, Lagos, at the fort of Sagres, and in the little towns to the north of Cape St. Vincent. From the east there was reason to apprehend an attack; the enemy, who had been compelled to retire from Faro, had retreated to Tavira, and had been joined there by a detachment from Mertola. But the English squadron was in sight; and the French commander, knowing how inadequate his whole force was to the dangers which menaced it, knew also that Algarve might, with little inconvenience, be left to itself, and that his business was to place himself in communication with the troops in Alem-Tejo. He therefore withdrew to Mertola, and the people of Tavira, rising as soon as the enemy retired, harassed them on the way. Juntas, subordinate to that of Faro, were now formed in Tavira, and in other smaller places; a red riband upon the right arm was assumed as the badge of patriotism, and they who ventured to appear without it were in no small danger from the people; but though many persons were insulted and menaced, and some imprisoned as partizans of the French, the better orders exerted their influence with such effect, that no blood was shed. Preparations were made for defending the passes of the mountains which divide Algarve from Alem-Tejo; and accredited agents were sent to Ayamonte, Seville, and Gibraltar. Arms were without delay supplied from all these places, and from Gibraltar a considerable quantity of ammunition. A circumstance, however, occurred, which seemed likely at first to occasion a misunderstanding with the Spaniards; for the Portugueze, upon the retreat of the French, having thrown up some works at Castro-Marim, the Spaniards crossed the river and destroyed them. This measure, so rash, and in ap-

CHAP.
X.

1808.

June.

*The insurrection spreads through Algarve.**The French retreat to Mertola.*

CHAP. X. appearance so hostile, was occasioned by an apprehension that the French might return there, which they had made a demonstration of doing before they abandoned Tavira. It was soon explained, when each people had so strong an interest in being upon the best terms with each other, and a formal treaty was concluded with the Junta of Seville.

1808.
June.

The people of Algarve form a treaty with Seville.

Neves, iii. 290—303.

Insurrection at Villa Viçosa.

Before the insurrection in Algarve had succeeded, and even before it was known beyond the mountains, the same national feeling had manifested itself in Alem-Tejo at Villa-Viçosa, the place of all others where the national and loyal feelings of a Portugueze would be most elevated by local associations, having been the residence of the Braganzan family during the Spanish usurpation. Early in the month the inhabitants had been exasperated by the passage of a French escort through the town, with the contributions that had been levied in that *Comarca* and the plate of the churches. They were farther irritated by an order for the militia to repair to Elvas at a time when Kellermann hoped to employ them against the Spaniards at Badajoz. But Elvas, where the main body of the French in Alem-Tejo were stationed, was only four leagues distant; there was a strong detachment still nearer, at Estremoz, and a French company was quartered among them, in the castle: they knew not that any movement for the recovery of their country's independence had been made; nor, owing to their peculiar situation, were there any people in Portugal by whom it could be made with so little hope or possibility of success. Thus they had borne oppression, and might have continued to bear it, if their oppressors, in the wantonness of power, had not added insult to wrong. There was an image of N. Senhora dos Remedios, which, after having by a supernatural declaration of its own pleasure, changed its name, made sundry voyages to and from India, and travelled from one place to another in Portugal during more than fourscore years,

Santuario Mariano, t. vii. 571, 579.

had at length obtained a settlement at Villa Viçosa, in a chapel of its own, where, being in high odour for its miraculous powers, it was visited with peculiar devotion on its own holyday, the 19th of June, by the people of that town, and of the adjacent country. The history of this idol might excite a mournful smile for human weakness, not without indignation at the systematic frauds which have been practised upon a religious people. The French were too irreligious to see any thing in it but matter of mockery; and some of the soldiers, placing themselves in a gateway near the chapel, amused themselves with deriding the Portuguese, who were going there to worship, in ignorance indeed, and in delusion, but in simplicity and sincerity of heart. Some of the peasants resented this insult by manual force; more Frenchmen came to help their comrades, more Portuguese to support their countrymen; the scuffle became serious, for life or death, . . the bell of the *Camara* was rung, the French retired into the Castle, and succeeded in closing the gate, which had been so well secured with iron in old times, that the people were neither able to break it open, nor to hew it in pieces. This was towards evening, and the riot continued all night.

CHAP.
X.
1808.
June.

News, iii.
305—309.

The town was now in open insurrection. Messengers set off to solicit succour from Badajoz, and General Francisco de Paula Leite, who had lately governed the province, was called upon to take the command, which he absolutely refused, knowing that this tumult must inevitably end in the destruction of those who engaged in it. Antonio Lobo Infante de Lacerda, an old officer, and then Sargento-Mor of the militia, regarding consequences less, set his life fairly upon the die; he took the lead, and stationed marksmen upon the top of the Conceiçam church, and in other points which commanded the Castle. Owing to these dispositions several of the French fell. Meantime the news reached Estremoz, where Kellermann and Avril both hap-

*The French
enter the
town.*

CHAP. X.
 1808.
June.

pened to be : fifty dragoons, with half a battalion of infantry, and two pieces of cannon, were immediately dispatched to rescue their fellows. A poor countryman, by name Ignacio da Silva, was in Estremoz at the time ; seeing their movements, he easily divined their intention ; good will gave him good speed, and running the ten miles, he brought intelligence of their march to Villa Viçosa in time for Antonio Lobo to make preparations for receiving them. He stationed some forty men, all for whom fire-arms could be found, upon the walls, and towers, and houses, at the entrance from the Borba road ; the enemy, informed of, or divining this design, took another entrance. The way was soon cleared by their field-pieces. General Avril and Colonel Lacroix entered the town in pursuit of the routed multitude, the bayonet was used, with little mercy or discrimination, 200 persons were killed in the streets, many more in the country, twelve prisoners were put to death as ring-leaders in what the French called rebellion, and the place was given up to pillage for one hour.

*Observador
Portuguez,
335.
Naves, iii.
309—315.*

*Lobo gets
possession of
Jurumenha*

The messengers from this unfortunate town had been joyfully received at Badajoz ; and Moretti, the officer who had performed the perilous service of conferring with General Carraffa in Lisbon, was dispatched with a corps of Portugeze refugees which had been formed under protection of the Spanish fortress. They had arrived at Olivença on their way, when Antonio Lobo arrived there also, escaping with about a score companions from the carnage. Instead of returning with ill news, as a man of ordinary spirit would have done, Moretti inquired whether some useful enterprise might not be attempted ; and they determined upon getting possession of Jurumenha, knowing how important it was that the Portugeze loyalists should possess a place within their own border, which had the name of being fortified, when the French were in no condition to attack it. It was occupied

by a Portuguese garrison, but the governor partook so little in the honourable feelings of his nation, that he had that day seized some fugitives from Villa Viçosa, and sent them prisoners to Elvas, requesting at the same time a French garrison for his security and that of the place. He understood the temper of his own people; but Moretti and Lobo knew it also, and calculated upon it. Sixteen Portuguese, concealing their arms, entered as if upon ordinary business; eight proceeded to seize the governor, the others took their station in the gates, and admitted their party just in time to point the artillery of the place against the French, who had been ordered from Elvas to occupy it without delay. Moretti now obtained farther assistance from Badajoz, and discretionary powers: on the other hand, Kellermann sent a second party to recover Jurumenha; but supposing the force which defended it to be much stronger than in reality it was, they returned without venturing to attack it. This greatly encouraged the Portuguese, and more than counterbalanced the effect of their slaughter at Villa-Viçosa. Emissaries and proclamations were sent from hence throughout the province; and the people, exaggerating the importance of the place, looked to it with confidence as a strong point of support in their own country.

CHAP.
X.
1808.
June.

Neves, iii.
316—320.

The news from Algarve, spreading at the same time, elevated their spirits; and the state of the country soon became such, that the French couriers were every where intercepted. Col. Maransin, with his troops, had now effected his retreat to Mertola, from whence, for the purpose of restoring a communication with Estremoz and with Lisbon, he sent a detachment of 100 foot and thirty dragoons to Beja. That city was originally a settlement of the Kelts, possessed next by the Carthaginians, afterwards the Pax Julia of the Romans, a Moorish corruption of which name has been euphonized to its present form. It was

*A French
detachment
sent from
Mertola to
Beja.*

CHAP. taken from the Moors by the first King of Portugal, restored
 X. from its ruins and fortified in the thirteenth century by Affonso

1808. III. and beautified by his son, King Diniz, with his charac-

June. teristic magnificence, of which the walls with their forty towers,
 and the fine castle, bore testimony in their ruins. Here, as in
 all the other cities of Alem-Tejo, there was a melancholy air of
 decay, less owing to the long and destructive struggle with
 Spain, in which that province had been the great scene of action,
 than to the peculiar circumstances which depressed its agricul-
 ture, and that inhuman persecution of the New-Christians, by
 which the largest part of the commercial capital in Portugal had
 either been annihilated by confiscations, or driven out of the
 kingdom. Still, however, it contained some ten or twelve thou-
 sand inhabitants, and was a place of considerable importance in
 that thinly peopled province. It stood on the highest part of an
 elevated and extensive plain, conspicuous from a distance, and
 commanding a wide prospect on all sides, the heights of Pal-
 mella and even of Cintra being distinctly visible. The imme-
 diate country, where it is cultivated, is fertile, and the situation
 in high repute for its salubrity. Eventful as the history of Beja
 had been, it was now to undergo as severe a calamity as any
 with which it had been visited in the unhappiest ages of Spain.

*June 23.
 The people
 rise against
 them.*

The French detachment entered the city without opposition,
 passed the night there, and on the next day ordered quarters
 and provisions to be made ready for the whole body of troops
 in Mertola, who, they said, were about to follow them. Their
 demand was received in such a manner by the people of Beja,
 who were now acquainted not only with the state of Spain, but
 with the nearer events in Algarve and at Jurumenha, that the
 French deemed it prudent to march out, and take a position in
 the open country, not far from the walls. This encouraged the
 populace; and, like all mobs, becoming cruel as they felt them-

selves strong, they murdered two soldiers whom the French indiscreetly sent into the city for provisions. Ignorant of their fate, the commander supposed they had been imprisoned, and threatened, if they were not immediately set free, to release them by force. The people then riotously demanded arms, that they might rush out and attack the enemy. The magistrates remonstrated with them in vain, and on the following morning the Corregedor, finding that farther delay would only endanger his own life, distributed among them such weapons as could be collected, and taking the safest course for himself, set off to solicit aid from the Junta of Ayamonte, the nearest authority by which it could be supplied. The Provedor and the Juiz de Fora thought it their duty to avert, if possible, the immediate danger: they went out to the French, intreated them not to attack the town, and promised them supplies; the enemy were easily intreated, because they were not strong enough in reality for any such attempt; the magistrates then endeavoured to make the people ratify what they had undertaken for them; all reasoning was in vain, and to save their own lives they left the city. But here also private malice availed itself of public troubles to effect its own ends; a messenger recalled them, upon the plea that they were wanted to give orders for collecting provisions, in fulfilment of their agreement; for the Corregedor having departed, there was no person to take upon himself that business. Deceived by this treacherous message, they returned, and were butchered by a ferocious mob, who knew not that they were made the brutal instruments of individual revenge.

By this time, however, the ardour of the people had so far cooled, that they no longer talked of sallying against the French, they contented themselves with keeping a tumultuous watch through the night; and when the morning dawned, and there appeared no enemy, they fancied themselves secure.

CHAP.

X.

1808.

June.

June 25.

Notes, iii.
323—327.

*Beja sacked
by the
French,
and set on
fire.*

CHAP. X. The French commander had merely retired out of sight: his dispatches reached Mertola at eleven on the preceding night; at midnight Maransin, with 950 men, began his march, and at four the next evening the united force arrived before Beja. They were opposed by a mere multitude without order, leader, or plan of defence, every man acting for himself as he thought best. Yet the victory was not gained without a brave resistance, and some loss to the assailants. According to the French account they lost eighty in killed and wounded, while 1200 of the Portuguese were slain in the action, and all who were taken in arms were put to death. The worst excesses followed by which humanity can be disgraced and outraged, and the * city was sacked and set on fire.

Observador
Portuguez,
541.
Neves, iii.
327—332.

In this whole merciless proceeding Maransin acted upon his

* Baron Thiebault represents this as a great exploit on the part of his fellow-soldiers. He says, *Le Colonel Maransin auroit pu éviter Beja, mais il crut devoir ramener, par un grand exemple, ce pays à l'obéissance. Il forme ses colonnes en marchant, et sans artillerie attaque cette ville, enceinte de hautes murailles, dont toutes les portes étoient barricadées, dont les murs, les tours, étoient défendus par des forces quintuples des siennes, et par des hommes qui, dans leur fureur, défioient nos bataillons.* Who would suppose, from this description, that these high walls and towers were in ruins, and that they were defended by a mob of three or four thousand men, not a third part of whom were armed with firelocks! After killing 1200 men in action, and all who were found in arms after it, sacking the city, and setting it on fire, it seems difficult to understand what the mercy was which the surviving inhabitants are said to have sent to Lisbon to solicit. According to Baron Thiebault, *un brave religieux*, after the assault, moved all his auditors to tears, by representing to them how much they had provoked their own misfortunes; he was consequently deputed unanimously to implore Junot's clemency. Junot received him graciously, and rewarded him with a canonry; LA RECONNOISSANCE FUT EXTREME, . . . *et Beja n'en reprit pas moins les armes peu de jours après.* In the bulletin published at Lisbon upon this occasion, and signed by this same General Thiebault, it is said, the inhabitants expressed their contrition by their deputy, acknowledged that they had been justly punished, and confessed that they had been seduced by the English!

own judgement, well knowing that such was the system which Napoleon had laid down, and which his generals felt no reluctance in executing. He proceeded to Evora, and Kellermann, approving of his conduct, held out the fate of Beja in a proclamation, as a warning to the province. "Inhabitants of Alem-Tejo," he said, "Beja had revolted, and Beja exists no longer. Its guilty inhabitants have been put to the edge of the sword, and its houses delivered up to pillage and to the flames. Thus shall all those be treated who listen to the counsels of a perfidious rebellion, and with a senseless hatred take arms against us. Thus shall those bands of smugglers and criminals be treated, who have collected in Badajoz, and put arms into the hands of the unhappy Lusitanians, but dare not themselves march against us. Who, indeed, can resist our invincible troops? Ye who have precipitated yourselves into rebellion, prevent, by prompt submission, the inevitable chastisement that awaits you! And ye who have hitherto been happy or prudent enough to continue in your duty, profit by this terrible example! Our general in chief has not told you in vain that clouds of rebels shall be dispersed before us like the sands of the desert before the impetuous breath of the south wind."

CHAP.
X.

1808.

June.

Kellermann's proclamation to the people of Alem-Tejo.

Observador Portuguez, 347.

The bombastic sentence which Kellermann thus quoted, was from a proclamation that Junot had just sent forth, in that spirit of shameless falsehood and remorseless tyranny which characterised the intrusive government. He asked the Portuguese what madness possessed them? What reason they could have, after seven months of the most perfect tranquillity, of the best understanding, to take arms; . . . and against whom? against an army which was to secure their independence and maintain the integrity of their country! Was it their wish, then, that ancient Lusitania should become a province of Spain? Could they regret a dynasty which had abandoned them, and under

Junot's proclamation to the Portuguese.

CHAP. which they were no longer counted among the nations of Europe?
 X. What more could they desire than to be Portugueze, and in-
 1808. dependent? and this Napoleon had promised them. They had
 June. asked him for a king, who, under his all-powerful protection,
 might restore their country to its rank. At this moment their
 new monarch was expecting to approach them. "I hoped," said
 Junot, "to place him in a peaceable and flourishing kingdom;
 am I to show him nothing but ruins and graves? Will he reign
 in a desert? assuredly not; and you will not be any thing but
 a wretched province of Spain. Your customs and laws have
 been maintained; your holy religion, which is ours also, has not
 suffered the least insult; it is you who violate it, suffering it to
 be influenced by heretics, who only wish for its destruction.
 Ask the unhappy Roman-catholics of Ireland under what op-
 pression they are groaning! If these perfidious islanders in-
 vade your territory, leave me to fight them; . . your part is to
 remain peaceably in your fields." He then attempted to soothe
 them, saying, that if any abuses in the administration still existed,
 every day's experience would diminish them. The Emperor, sa-
 tisfied with the reports which he had received of the public
 spirit, had graciously remitted half the contribution. He was ful-
 filling all their wishes. And would they let themselves be dragged
 on by the influence of a banditti, at the very moment when they
 should be happy? "Portugueze," said he, "you have but one
 moment to implore the clemency of the Emperor, and disarm
 his wrath. Already the armies of Spain touch your frontiers at
 every point; . . you are lost if you hesitate. Merit your pardon
 by quick submission, or behold the punishment that awaits you!
 Every village or town in which the people have taken arms, and
 fired upon my troops, shall be delivered up to pillage, and de-
 stroyed, and the inhabitants shall be put to the sword. Every
 individual found in arms shall instantly be shot."

The French had dealt largely in false promises; they were sincere in their threats, and on the very day when this proclamation was issued at Lisbon, that sincerity was proved at Beja. But as the Portuguese had not been deceived, neither were they now to be intimidated. Their character had been totally mistaken by their insolent oppressors. They, like the Spaniards, had a deep and ever-present remembrance of their former greatness. It was sometimes expressed with a vanity which excited the contempt of those who judge hastily upon that imperfect knowledge which is worse than ignorance; more generally it produced a feeling of dignified and melancholy pride. The kingdom had decayed, but the degeneracy of the people was confined to the higher ranks, whom every possible cause, physical and moral, combined to degrade. Generation after generation, they had intermarried, not merely within the narrow circle of a few privileged families, but oftentimes in their own; uncles with their nieces, nephews with their aunts. The canonical law was dispensed with for these alliances; but no dispensing power could set aside the law of nature, which rendered degeneracy the sure consequence. Thus was the breed deteriorated; and education completed the mischief. The young fidalgo was never regarded as a boy: as soon as the robes, or rather bandages of infancy were laid aside, he appeared in the dress of manhood, was initiated in its forms and follies, and it was rather his misfortune than his fault, if, at an early age, he became familiar with its vices. When he arrived at manhood, no field for exertion was open to him, even if he were qualified or disposed to exert himself. The private concerns of embellishing and improving an estate were as little known in Portugal as those public affairs in which the nobility of Great Britain are so actively engaged: if not in office, he was in idleness, and his idleness was passed in the capital. A wasteful expenditure made him a bad landlord,

CHAP.
X.

1808.

June.

*National
feeling of
the Portu-
guese.*

CHAP. and a bad paymaster; a deficient education made him a bad
 X. statesman; and well was it if the lax morality which the casuists
 1808. had introduced into a corrupt religion, did not make him a bad
 man. Exceptions there were, because there are some dispositions

June.

so happily tempered, that their original goodness can never be wholly depraved, however unpropitious the circumstances in which they are placed; but men, for the most part, are what circumstances make them, and these causes of degeneracy were common to all of the higher class. On the other hand, the middle classes were improved, and the peasantry uncorrupted. Their occupations were the same as those of their forefathers; nor did they differ from them in any respect, except what was a most important one at this time, that a long interval of peace, and their frequent intercourse with the Spaniards, had effaced the old enmity between the two nations, so that along the border the languages were intermingled, and intermarriages so common, as to have produced a natural and moral union. They were a fine, hospitable, noble-minded race, respected most by those who knew them best. The upper boughs were scathed, but the trunk and the root were sound.

Their hatred of the French.

Their ignorance as well as their superstition, contributed at this time to excite and sustain a national resistance. They expected miracles in their favour; the people of Coimbra actually believed that a miracle had been wrought, because when the French fired upon them from the windows of their quarters, no person was hurt. Of the relative strength of nations they knew nothing, nor of the arrangements which are necessary for carrying on war, nor of the resources by which it must be maintained. Spain filled a larger space in their imagination than France, and Portugal than either; and they were not erroneous in believing that Spain and Portugal together possessed a strength which might defy the world. The threats of the intrusive government

*Neves, iii.
210.*

therefore excited indignation instead of dismay ; such language addressed to minds in their state of exaltation, was like water cast upon a fire intense enough to decompose it, and convert its elements into fuel for the flames. The fate of Beja excited hatred and the thirst of vengeance instead of fear, and the insurrection continued to spread in the very province where the experiment had been made upon so large a scale of putting an end to it by fire and sword.

CHAP.
X.
1808.
June.

A Portugueze of the old stamp, by name Antonio Leite de Araujo Ferreira Bravo, held the office of Juiz de Fora at Marvam, a small town about eight miles from Portalegre, surrounded with old walls. Of the many weak places upon that frontier it was the only one which, in the short campaign of 1801, resisted the Spaniards in their unjust and impolitic invasion, and was not taken by them ; and this was in great measure owing to his exertions. When the French usurped the government, a verbal order came from the Marquez d'Alorna, at that time general of the province, to admit either French or Spanish troops as friends, and give them possession of the place. Antonio Leite protested against this, maintaining that no governor ought to deliver up a place entrusted to his keeping without a formal and authentic order ; proceedings were instituted against him for his opposition, and he was severely reprehended, this being thought punishment enough at that time, and in a town where no commotion was dreamt of. When the decree arrived at Marvam, by which it was announced that the house of Braganza had ceased to reign, Antonio Leite sent for the public notaries of the town, and resigned his office, stating, in a formal instrument, that he did this because he would not be compelled to render that obedience to a foreign power which was due to his lawful and beloved Sovereign, and to him alone. Then taking with him these witnesses to the church of the Misericordia, he de-

*The Juiz
de Fora at
Marvam.*

CHAP. X. posited his wand of office in the hands of an image of N. Senhor dos Passos, and in the highest feeling of old times called upon the sacred image to keep it till it should one day be restored to its rightful possessor. He then returned to his house, and put himself in deep mourning. The order arrived for taking down the royal arms. He entreated the *Vereador* not to execute it, upon the plea that the escutcheon here was not that of the Braganza family, but of the kingdom, put up in the reign of Emanuel, and distinguished by his device; and when this plea was rejected, he took the shield into his own keeping, and laid it carefully by, to be preserved for better days.

*Neves, ii.
109—122.*

He flies the town.

The Juiz seems to have been a man who had read the chronicles of his own country till he had thoroughly imbibed their spirit. These actions were so little in accord with the feelings and manners of the present age, that they were in all likelihood ascribed to insanity, and that imputation saved him from the persecution which he would otherwise have incurred. But when the national feeling began to manifest itself, such madness was then considered dangerous, and the Corregedor of Portalegre received orders from Lisbon to arrest him. Before these orders arrived he had begun to stir for the deliverance of his country, and had sent a confidential person with a letter to Galluzo, the Spanish commander at Badajoz, requesting aid from thence to occupy Marvam; men could not be spared; and the messenger returned with the unwelcome intelligence that before he left Badajoz the business on which he went had transpired, and was publicly talked of. Perceiving now that his life was in danger, his first care was that no person might suffer but himself, and therefore he laid upon his table a copy of the letter which he had written, from which it might be seen that the invitation was his single act and deed; having done this, he seemed rather to trust to Providence than to take any

means for securing himself. It was not long before, looking out at the window, he saw the Corregedor with an adjutant of Kellermann's and a party of horse coming to his house. He had just time to bid the servant say he was not within, and slip into the street by a garden door. He had got some distance, when the Corregedor saw him, and called after him, saying he wanted to settle with him concerning the quartering of some troops. Antonio Leite knew what his real business was too well to be thus deceived, and quickened his pace. The town has two gates, one of which was fastened, because the garrison was small; toward that however he ran, well knowing that if he were not intercepted at the other, he should be pursued and surely overtaken. Joaquim José de Matos, a Coimbra student, then at home for the vacation, met him, and offered to conceal him in his house; but the Juiz continued to run, seeing that the soldiers were in pursuit, dropt from the wall, escaped with little hurt, and then scrambled down the high and steep crag upon which it stands. Matos, thinking that he had now involved himself, ran also, and being of diminutive stature, squeezed himself through a hole in the gate; they then fled together toward Valencia de Alcantara, and had the satisfaction, at safe distance, of seeing a Swiss escort come round the walls to the place where the Juiz had dropt.

CHAP.
X.
1808.
June.

Neves, iti.
333—337.

The Spanish frontier being so near, their escape was easy; but when they had been a few days at Valencia de Alcantara, Matos determined upon returning to his family, knowing that there was no previous charge against him, and thinking that the act of having spoken to the Juiz could not be punished as a crime. In this he was mistaken. The governor of Marvám was a worthy instrument of the French. He not only arrested Matos, but his father also, an old man who was dragged from his bed, where he lay in a fit of the gout, to be thrown into a

*He returns,
and seizes
the town.*

CHAP. Portuguese prison; and a physician, whom he suspected of
 X. being concerned in the scheme of an insurrection. This news
 1808. reached the Juiz; it was added, that his own property had been
 June. sequestered, he himself outlawed, and all persons forbidden to
 harbour him, and that a French escort had arrived to carry the
 three prisoners to Elvas. He could not endure to think that
 he should be, however innocently, the occasion of their death,
 and therefore determined to attempt at least their deliverance
 at any hazard. It was not difficult to find companions at a
 time when all usual occupations were at a stand, and every man
 eager to be in action against an odious enemy. With a few
 Spanish volunteers he crossed the frontier, and there raised the
 peasantry, who knew and respected him: with this force he pro-
 ceeded to a point upon the road between Marvam and Elvas;
 the escort had passed, . . but he had the satisfaction to learn that
 it had not gone for the prisoners, only to bring away the am-
 munition and spike the guns. This raised their spirits; they
 directed their course to Marvam, climbed the walls during the
 night, opened the prison, seized the governor, and without the
 slightest opposition from two hundred Portuguese troops, whom
 he had just obtained from Elvas to secure the place, and who,
 if they knew what was passing, did not choose to notice it, the
 adventurers returned to Valencia in triumph with their friends,
 and with the governor prisoner. The Junta of Valencia did
 not now hesitate, in conformity to an order from Badajoz, to
 June 26. give the Juiz regular assistance; he entered Marvam in triumph
 with this auxiliary force, and the Prince Regent was proclaimed
 there by the rejoicing inhabitants, at the very time when Beja
 was in flames. A few days afterwards a Spanish detachment
 from Albuquerque entered Campo Mayor with the same facility.
 Insurrec- Some jealousies which arose there, as well as at Marvam, from
 tion at the inconsiderate conduct of the Spanish officers in issuing
 Campo Mayor. July 2.

orders as if they were in their own territories, were put an end to by the formation of a Junta, of which the Spanish commander at Campo-Mayor was made president. The example of these places was immediately followed at Ouguela, Castello de Vide, Arronches, and Portalegre; and the insurrection thus extended throughout all that part of the province which is to the north of Elvas.

CHAP.
X.

1808.

June.

Neves, iii.
337—360.

Junot meantime was in a state of great anxiety at Lisbon. It was not known what was become of Maransin and the troops in Algarve; there was no news of Loison; the insurrection in the north had reached Coimbra, and was spreading in Estremadura, and there was a report, probable enough to obtain credit, that an expedition of 10,000 English was off the bar. He called a council, at which the generals of division, Comte de Laborde and Travot, were present, the chief of the staff, General Thiebault, Baron de Margaron, and other officers. The result of their conference was, that the army should be collected in and near Lisbon, leaving garrisons in only the three important places of Almeida, Elvas, and Peniche; that Setubal and the left bank of the Tagus should be maintained as long as possible; that when the English appeared they should occupy in succession three positions; one from Leiria to Ourem and Thomar; a second from Santarem to Rio-Mayor, Obidos, and Peniche; lastly, one from Saccavem to Cintra: finally, that they should defend Lisbon till the utmost extremity, and only leave it to retire upon Elvas, rest the troops there, and then force their way either to Madrid, Segovia, or Valladolid. In pursuance of this resolution, Kellermann was summoned from Alem-Tejo, and courier after courier dispatched to recall Loison from Beira. Junot's next measure was to put the church plate which he had secured in a portable form, and for this purpose what there was no time for coining was melted into ingots. To counteract the rumours, true and

*Measures of
the French.*

June 28.

*Thiebault,
Relation,
128.*

*Observador
Portuguez,
321.*

CHAP. false, by which the Portugueze were encouraged, it was affirmed
 X. that Napoleon had entered Spain, and that 20,000 men had
 1808. reached the frontiers of Portugal to reinforce the French.

Alarmed and harassed by contradictory rumours, and dreading from the temper of the people an insurrection, which would be punished by a massacre, many families removed from Lisbon; those who had country estates to their *Quintas*, the greater number to the different places on the opposite side of the river, particularly Almada and Casilhas. They were however ordered to return; every head of a family who did not within four days obey this order was to be arrested, and all persons were prohibited from leaving Lisbon, unless they were provided with a passport from the police, . . an institution to which the Portugueze at this time applied the name of the Inquisition. It was of importance, the decree said, that good citizens should be secured against the ridiculous rumours which were promulgated, and that all notions of danger to the city of Lisbon should be put an end to; the French army would know how to maintain tranquillity there. This, however, was less a measure of policy than of extortion; those families who had retired were made to pay, in proportion to their means, for permission to remain where they were. They who had nothing to give suffered the whole inconvenience of this oppressive law.

*Observador
Portuguez,
343. n.
July 1.*

*Observador
Portuguez,
345.*

*They en-
deavour to
avail them-
selves of the
clergy's in-
fluence.*

The French commander tried to suppress the national feeling by the influence of religion. In the village of Varatojo, near Torres Vedras, there was a famous seminary for itinerant preachers of the Franciscan order, instituted by Fr. Antonio das Chagas, a man remarkable alike for his genius, for the profligacy of his youth, and the active, austere, enthusiastic piety of his after life. Junot sent for the guardian of this seminary, requiring his immediate attendance; the old man, in strict adherence to the rule of his order, which forbade him to travel by

any other means, obeyed the summons on foot, and arrived four-and-twenty hours later than the time appointed. He was then ordered to dispatch some of his preachers, as men who possessed great authority over the people, to Leiria and into Alem-Tejo, to preach the duty of submission and tranquil obedience. The Guardian excused himself by representing that his brethren who were qualified for such a mission were already on their circuits, and that there were then in the seminary none but youths engaged in preparing for the ministry, and old men, who being past all service, rested there from their labours, in expectation of their release. The dignitaries of the patriarchal church could not so well evade his commands; a pastoral letter was obtained from them denouncing excommunication against all persons who should directly or indirectly, either by writing, speaking, or acting, encourage the spirit of insurrection which had gone abroad. This was sent into the provinces, with a letter from the French intendant of police, Lagarde, in which the clergy and the heads of convents were informed, that wherever public tranquillity might be disturbed, they would be held responsible, because no disturbance would break out if they exerted themselves to prevent it, as the true spirit of religion required. The fate of Beja, he said, should be that of every city in Portugal which should have the guilty imprudence to revolt against the Emperor, now the sole sovereign of that country. And he asked the Portugeze, wherefore they would bring upon themselves the heavy weight of power at a moment when the Almighty authority, (such was the blasphemous expression,) thought only of putting in oblivion the rights of conquest, and of governing with mildness? Is it, said he, before a few handfuls of factious men in Portugal that the star of the great Napoleon is to be obscured, or the arm of one of his most valiant and skilful captains to be deadened? Deeply as the baneful superstition of the Romish church has

CHAP.
X.

1808.

July.

News, iv.
61—63.

July 2.

July 4.

*Observador
Portuguez,*
348—353.

CHAP. rooted itself in that country, the threat of excommunication excited nothing but contempt. The French could not derive any assistance from ecclesiastical interference while it was remembered that they had robbed the churches.

X.
1808.
July.

Insurrection at Thomar.

It is not extraordinary that the intrusive government should have failed to deceive the people by its addresses; but that it should have attempted so to do; that it should have talked of benefits intended and conferred upon a nation on whom it had brought such wide and general misery, and inflicted injuries as unprovoked as they were enormous, indicated indeed an effrontery of which none but the agents of Buonaparte were capable. Their insolent language exasperated the Portuguese. One of these papers was lying upon a tradesman's counter in Thomar, and one of their very few partizans vindicated the manner in which the Prince was there spoken of, saying, that the country was now rid of him and of the Inquisition. A Franciscan who was present immediately took a knife from his sleeve, and struck it through the paper into the board, saying, that in that manner he would serve any one who dared speak against his Prince and his religion: and producing a pistol, he was only withheld by force from giving murderous proof of his sincerity. An information was laid against him, and a party of Portuguese soldiers sent from Abrantes to arrest him; he absconded in time, and the guardian of the convent, who was suspected of favouring his escape, was taken in his stead. Before they could carry him out of the town, the people rose and rescued him, and the restoration of the legitimate government was proclaimed with the same ceremonies as in other places.

*Neves, iv.
3—8.*

Insurrection at Leiria.

About the same time a handful of students from Coimbra, collecting volunteers as they went, spread the insurrection at Condeixa, Ega, and Pombal, and approached Leiria, from which

city a small party of the French retired before them. This place was within easy reach of the enemy, and troops, arms, and ammunition were wanting to defend it. The people sent to Coimbra for all, as if Coimbra could supply either; the Bishop exerted himself to forward the preparations; and the people mustered tumultuously with that confidence which an ignorant multitude always feels of its own untried strength. The French had some small garrisons upon the coast, about twenty miles off, in the little forts of Nazareth, S. Giam, and S. Martinho, which communicated with each other by telegraphs, and drew rations every day from the adjoining country. The Juiz of Pederneira was compelled to furnish these; in this time of alarm he was called upon to store them with a convenient stock beforehand, and because this was not, and could not be done in a few hours, they began to pillage the neighbourhood. Provoked at this, the fishermen fell upon a Frenchman, who was going with dispatches from S. Martinho to Nazareth, and murdered him, crying, Down with the French! The sentinel at the signal-post had the same fate . . the signal-post was broken, and the country round about was presently in insurrection. The enemy withdrew from S. Giam and S. Martinho, having hastily spiked two guns at the former place, and buried two barrels of powder. They fell back upon a detachment under General Thomieres, which watched the country between the Caldas, Obidos, and Peniche. Nazareth was blockaded by the insurgents; the report was, that a considerable Spanish army had arrived at Leiria, and incredible as this was, it was believed, and gave full confidence to these ignorant and zealous people. They sent thither for assistance, and the Coimbra students came with a party of peasants, those who could muster the best arms. The cannon were brought from S. Giam, and rendered service-

CHAP.
X.
1808.
July.

*Success of
the insur-
gents at
Nazareth.*

CHAP. X.
 1808. able ; the two barrels of powder were discovered ; a Portuguese artilleryman escaped from the fort to join his countrymen, and direct their operations ; and the French, finding themselves now in serious danger, capitulated to save their lives. The victorious students and their party were far advanced on their return to Leiria, when they heard news of that miserable city, which rendered it necessary for them to strike into the pine forest, and conduct their prisoners by unfrequented ways to Figueira.

July.
July 5.
Neves, iv.
14—30.

Margaron
approaches
Leiria.

General Margaron had been sent from Lisbon with between 4000 and 5000 men, to check the progress of the insurrection in Estremadura, and learn some intelligence of Loíson, from whom nothing had been heard for a considerable time. Though the disposition of the people was every where the same, they were kept down by the presence or by the neighbourhood of the enemy, every where within reach of the capital ; and he met with no opposition till he approached Leiria. That city, which is the most considerable place on the road to Coimbra, is built upon the little rivers Liz and Lena, in a beautiful country, an hundred miles from Lisbon. It is believed to have been built from the ruins of Colippo, a Lusitanian city which the Romans destroyed ; and it has been asserted, that Sertorius planted a colony there whom he brought from Liria in Spain. Affonso Henriquez fortified it as a strong hold against the Moors, who then possessed Santarem, and recovered it after they had captured it. Some of his successors occasionally resided there, and its fine castle was enlarged and beautified by Queen St. Isabel, wife of the magnificent King Diniz. At the beginning of the last century it contained 900 houses and 2150 communicants. Its population had increased, and might at this time have been estimated at about 5000. The adjacent country has been made the scene of pastoral romance by Francisco Rodriguez Lobo,

for which it is precisely adapted by its wild yet beautiful and peaceful character. CHAP.
X.

The people of Leiria and the peasantry who had collected there had had little time for preparation when they heard that the French were approaching. They had paraded through their streets the banner of the city, bearing for its device a crow upon a pine tree; in memory of one which, when Affonso Henriquez attacked the city, perched there in the midst of his camp, and clapped its wings and croaked in a manner that was accepted as a good omen. They had proclaimed the Prince, restored and repainted the royal arms, and assisted at the performance of *Te Deum* in the cathedral; but school-boys in a rebellion could not have been more unprepared with any plan of defence, or unprovided with means for it. They were in an open city. They had not a single piece of cannon. Of some 800 men who were stationed at outposts and other points of danger, scarcely a fourth part were armed with muskets, and for these three or four round of cartridges were all that could be found. To persons unacquainted with the character and condition of the Portuguese it might appear almost incredible that resistance should have been attempted under circumstances thus absolutely hopeless. But the people were goaded by insult, and stung by the feeling of insupportable wrong. They had been wantonly invaded, . . . grievously, inhumanly, and remorselessly oppressed. They knew that the nation was rising against its oppressors: they felt instinctively what the strength of a nation is; and were too much exasperated to consider, or too little informed to understand, that without order and discipline numbers are of little avail, and even courage not to be relied on. 1808.
July.
Preparation
for defence.

The higher orders were perfectly sensible of their imminent danger, but they would have exposed themselves to certain de- Notes, iv.
31—36.
The French
enter the
city.

CHAP. X.struction if they had attempted to reason with the infuriated
 1808. multitude. The magistrates therefore, and the person who had
 July. been appointed to the command, withdrew secretly from the city
 during the night, and fled. In the morning five Frenchmen,
 who had been surprised upon a marauding party, were brought
 in prisoners. A short-lived and senseless exultation was excited
 at their appearance. At noon it was known that the enemy
 were close at hand ; they sent forward a peasant who had fallen
 into their hands, and whom, contrary to their custom, they had
 spared, to offer pardon to the people if they would return to their
 obedience ; that offer being refused, they attacked the insurgents.
 By their own account the resistance was so momentary, that
 there was no time for the artillery, nor for half the troops to
 take part in the action. The insurgents threw away their arms,
 like terrified villagers imploring the clemency of an irritated
 conqueror. From 800 to 900 were left upon the field. The city
 was entered on all sides. But, by their own account, the moment
 the action was over, General Margaron restrained the indigna-
 tion of his troops, their moderation was equal to their valour,
 and victory was immediately followed by order. Margaron,
 in a proclamation to the inhabitants, dwelt upon his clemency.
 “ A decree had been issued,” he said, “ commanding that every
 town where the French were fired upon should be burnt, and its
 inhabitants put to the sword. They had incurred that penalty,
 and his duty required him to inflict it. Nevertheless he had
 prevented the massacre and the conflagration ; not a house, not a
 cottage had been burnt ; he had protected their persons and their
 property, as far as was possible under such circumstances ; and
 instead of seeking for the guilty, he repeated to them his offers
 of peace and union. He called upon them to learn who were
 their real friends, and lay aside their arms. “ Leave,” said he,

3d Bulletin.
 Observador
 Portuguez,
 357.
 Thiébault,
 143.

" the noble task of protecting and defending you to the soldiers of the great nation. Submit yourselves to the power which Heaven supports, and obey our holy church as I do, . . you in renouncing your projects of exterminating the French, I in forgiving all that you have done against them."

CHAP.
X.

1808.

July.

*Thiebault,
Pièces Jus-
tificatives,
No. 10.*

*Massacre
of the pri-
soners.*

*Neves, iv.
48.*

This is what the French relate of their conduct at Leiria. "Sepulchres of Leiria," exclaims the Portuguese historian of these events, "prove ye the falsehood with which these robbers, as cruel as they are perfidious, have deceived the world!" What they have not related is now to be recorded. It is not dissembled by the Portuguese that the defence was as feeble and as momentary as the enemy describe it. They entered the city on all sides, and began an indiscriminate butchery; old and young, women and babes, were butchered, in the streets, in the houses, in the churches, in the fields. The most atrocious acts of cruelty were committed, and not by the common soldiers only. One of the superior officers related of himself, that a feeling of pity came over him when upon entering the town he met a woman with an infant at her breast, but calling to mind that he was a soldier, he pierced mother and child with one thrust! Free scope was given to every abominable passion; and in the general pillage the very graves were opened, upon the supposition that treasure might have been hidden there, as in a place where no plunderer would look to find it. When the slaughter in the streets had ceased, they began to hunt for prisoners, and all who were found were taken to an open space before the Chapel of S. Bartholomew, there to be put to death like the prisoners at Jaffa. The greater number of these poor wretches fell on their knees, some stretching their hands in unavailing agony toward their murderers for mercy; others, lifting them to heaven, directed their last prayers where mercy would be found. The murderers, as if they delighted in the act of butchery, began their work with the sword

*Memoir of
the early
Campaigns
of the Duke
of Wellington,
vol. 1, p. 8.*

*Neves, iv.
37—42.*

CHAP. and bayonet and the but-end of the musket, and finished it by
 X. firing upon their * victims.

1808. On the same day actions of the same devilish character were
 July. committed by Loison's division on their way from Almeida.

*Loison's
 march from
 Almeida to
 Abrantes.*

Leaving a garrison of 1250 men in that place, and having blown up the works at Fort Conception, he set out towards Lisbon, in pursuance to the orders which he had received, with between 3000 and 4000 troops. The next day he approached the city of Guarda; it happened to be Sunday, and also the annual festival of Queen St. Isabel, whose name, stripped of all fable and idolatrous observances, deserves always to be held in dear and respectful remembrance by the Portuguese. The assemblage of people was therefore much greater than at other times; but they were assembled to keep holyday, not to provide for their defence. A Junta had been constituted there two days before; and with that miscalculation of strength, or ignorance of the state of things, which prevailed so generally among their countrymen, they seem not to have considered themselves as in danger of an attack till Loison was within two miles of the city. An old iron gun, rusty and dismantled, and lying useless in the ruins of the castle, was their whole artillery; . . a few peasants

* Two persons were left alive when the French thought their accursed work was done. One of them lingered three days before he was relieved by death. Feliz Lourenço, the surveyor of the high road, was the other. "He," says Neves, (writing in 1811,) "still lives . . but in what a condition! With his body and face disfigured by the marks of powder, and the scars of eight and twenty bayonet wounds; . . with his left eye struck out by a ball, the bones of his right shoulder broken, the tendons rendered useless, and the hand paralyzed. It is from himself that I have received the details of this frightful transaction, of which there exists no other witness, except the murderers themselves."

Historia Geral da Invasam dos Francezes em Portugal, t. iv. p. 42.

mounted it upon a cart, and so carried it to a rising ground near the road, as if the sight of it would deter the French from advancing. According to the French official account, the rebels, as they insolently styled the Portugueze, drew up in two lines, having their flanks well supported, and two pieces of cannon to protect their centre; their lines were forced at all points, their guns taken, themselves surrounded as well as routed; the disorder was general, the slaughter dreadful; more than a thousand dead were left upon the field, and Loison in pursuit of the fugitives entered the city. The truth is, that a disorderly multitude fled as soon as they were attacked; and that, as all who could not escape were cut down, the number of the slain has not perhaps been much exaggerated. A night of licentiousness and pillage followed, and Loison then proceeded. The ancient and flourishing town of Covilham escaped a similar visitation, because it lay somewhat out of the line of his march, and he had no time to spare. Alpedrinha, a place containing between two and three thousand inhabitants, was not so fortunate. On the same day that Margaron entered Leiria, and with as little resistance, General Charlot entered this unhappy town; that General was one of the few commanders who had hitherto obtained a character for honour and humanity, . . . here, however, all horrible crimes and cruelties were committed; one inoffensive old man was taken out of the town, and burnt alive within sight and hearing of the fugitives upon the mountains; and the French, having carried off every thing that was portable, set the place on fire. They proceeded, plundering as they went, by Sarzedas, Cortiçada, and Sardoa to Abrantes.

The French stated in their bulletin that they had lost upon their march twenty killed, and from thirty to forty wounded, whereas the rebels had left at least three thousand upon the

CHAP.
X.

1808.

July.

*Bulletin 4.
Observador
Portuguez,
366.
Thiebault,
153.*

July 5.

*Neves, to.
77.*

*Language
of the
French
bulletins.*

CHAP. different fields of battle*. The character of the intrusive government would be imperfectly understood hereafter, if its language as well as its acts were not faithfully recorded. The
X.
1808. bulletin which announced this statement to the Portuguese, and
July. to that great portion of the civilized world in which the events of the war were anxiously observed, proceeded to say, "this is the mournful result of a frenzy which nothing can justify, which nothing can excuse, and which obliges us to multiply the number of victims who excite sorrow and compassion, but upon whom a terrible necessity compels us to inflict the strokes of just vengeance. Thus it is that the Portuguese people, blind instruments of the unfeeling calculations of the British cabinet, destroy with their own hands the happiness which we with all our power were endeavouring to make them enjoy! Thus it is that from the bosom of tranquillity, of good order, and of repose, they draw upon themselves the destructive scourge of war, and bring devastation even upon the very fields where God had given abundance! Thus it is that deluded men, ungrateful children as well as guilty citizens, change all the claims which they had to the benevolence and protection of government, for deserved misfortune and wretchedness, ruin their families, carry desolation, flames, and death, into their dwellings, transform flourishing cities into heaps of ashes and vast tombs, and by their fatal union draw upon the whole country the calamities which they provoke, which they deserve, and from which (weak victims as they are) they cannot escape, covering themselves with shame,

* General Thiebault, by whom the bulletin was signed, gives a different statement in his book, (p. 155). The French loss is there given at sixty men killed, and from 130 to 140 wounded; that of the Portuguese as at least 4000 left upon the field.

and completing her destruction. Thus it is that no other resource remains to them than the clemency of those whom they sought to assassinate, . . a clemency which they do not implore in vain, when, acknowledging their crime, they ask pardon from the French, who, incapable of belying their noble character, are always as full of generosity as of valour." This was the *language of Buonaparte's governor in Portugal! "To be the victim," says Mr. Wordsworth, commenting upon these things and words at the time, in that strain of profoundest feeling and philosophy by which his higher compositions are so eminently distinguished, "to be the victim of such bloody-mindedness, is a doleful lot for a nation; and the anguish must have been rendered still more poignant by the scoffs and insults, and by that heinous contempt of the most awful truths, with which the perpetrator

CHAP.

X.

1808.

*July.**Bulletin 4.
Observador
Portuguez,
368.*

* As another example of the arts used to impose upon the Portuguese people by the intrusive government, the following extract from the fifth bulletin of the army of Portugal may be read with feelings very different from what the detail in the text must excite. "On the 10th of July forty English disembarked at the foot of the village of the Costa, to take in water and provisions. That point was defended by only five carabineers of the thirty-first regiment of light infantry. Notwithstanding this disproportion of numbers, these five men, in sight of all the inhabitants, attacked the forty English, repulsed them, forced them to abandon upon the beach all that they had purchased, and pursued them to the sea." Yet even this is outdone in the same bulletin. "Three conscript lads, (it is farther said), of the sixty-sixth regiment, occupied a small post on the sea-shore, in front of Cascaes, when they saw a boat put off from the English squadron, and make towards them. Immediately these three lads placed themselves in ambush, to wait till the boat should draw near: as soon as it reached the shore they rose from their ambush, fired upon the boat, killed the pilot (who was the master of Admiral Cotton's ship), obliged two English officers, and six seamen or soldiers, who were in the said boat, to come on shore, and lay down their arms upon the beach, and then conducted them as prisoners of war to the quarters-general of General Solignac at Cascaes. This fact discovers a presence of mind, a degree of intelligence, and a vigour, which do honour to the three lads." To complete the story, it should have been added, that the three lads ate the eight Englishmen.

CHAP. of those cruelties has proclaimed them. Merciless ferocity is
 X. an evil familiar to our thoughts; but these combinations of
 1808. malevolence historians have not yet been called upon to record;
 July. and writers of fiction, if they have ever ventured to create pas-
 sions resembling them, have confined, out of reverence for the
 acknowledged constitution of human nature, those passions to
 reprobate spirits. Such tyranny is, in the strictest sense, in-
 tolerable; not because it aims at the extinction of life, but of
 every thing which gives life its value, . . of virtue, of reason, of
 repose in God, or in truth."

*Loison
 ordered
 towards
 Coimbra.*

Loison, for the sake of intimidating the country, and thereby preventing the danger of such resistance as he had experienced in Tras os Montes, had sent before him a report that he had been reinforced by 16,000 men from the army of Marshal Bessieres; and this news was officially transmitted to Junot by the Corregedor of Abrantes. At first the French received the tidings with entire belief, and with a joy proportionate to the danger from which they now thought themselves delivered. A comparison of dates and distances occasioned some uncomfortable doubts, and the next day advices came that Loison had arrived at Abrantes with no other force than his own. But even this was of no inconsiderable importance: it relieved them from their anxiety concerning him, it brought the whole of their disposable force within reach and within command, for Kellermann had now arrived with the troops from Alem-Tejo; and Junot determined upon striking a great blow before the English should appear. Kellermann had been sent to Alcobaça, where the troops under General Thomières, who covered Peniche, and those of Margaron (who had received the submission of the people of Thomar, and exacted from them 20,000 cruzados) were to be under his orders. Loison was now instructed to form a junction with them and take the command; crush the insurgents in that

*Neves, iv.
 64.*

part of the country, march against Coimbra, subdue and chastise that city, thus quenching one great furnace of the insurrection, and return to Lisbon. Before he reached Alcobaça part of these instructions had been fulfilled by Thomières.

That General had advanced with a few hundred men to Obidos, with the intention of relieving the fort at Nazareth; but a reconnoitring party which he sent forward to Barquinha was driven back, four of his scouts were made prisoners and sent on board an English vessel, and a report that a considerable body of English had landed there to assist the insurgents deterred him from proceeding in time. The Portuguese themselves raised this report; in reality they had applied for aid to the English, who, some time before, had taken possession of the Berlengas; a few pieces of cannon were given them, but the garrison was so scanty that no men could be spared; and the short respite which they obtained by deceiving the enemy would have been better employed in providing for escape, than for a feeble and disorderly resistance. Nine days after their triumph Thomières proceeded against them with 3000 men, in the belief that some English had joined them. One column, under cover of the darkness, got under the ill-served guns of the insurgents before they were perceived; the Portuguese fired in haste without aim and without effect, and then took to flight. A few drunken fellows, who had undertaken to serve the guns, remained by them, with a woman and a few old men, and these were put to death. The town of Nazareth was sacked, and set on fire. The jewels which they took from the church of N. Senhora de Nazareth were estimated at more than £20,000; for of the innumerable and many-named idols of Our Lady in Portugal, this was the most celebrated. It is the very image which, according to the legend, St. Jerome sent from Bethlehem to St. Augustine,

CHAP.
X.

1808.

July.

Thiebault,
146.

Nazareth
sacked and
burnt by
the French.

July 14.

CHAP. and St. Augustine to his monks at the Caulian monastery, from
 X. whence, at the destruction of the Goths, it was brought by King
 1808. Roderick and Romano to this spot. It is said, that during the
 July. last century the idol has sometimes been visited by not less than
 20,000 devotees on the day of its festival. The enemy then de-
 scending to the beach, burnt the lower town, consisting of some
 300 houses, of which only four escaped the flames; they burnt
 also the nets and vessels, upon which the inhabitants, being
 fishermen, depended for their subsistence: they then plundered
 Pederneira, and set it on fire, and returned with their booty to
 Alcobaça*.

*Neves, iv.
84—87.*

*A Junta
established
at Beja.*

Loison having taken the command, proceeded, in pursuance of his instructions, towards Coimbra; but he had hardly got beyond Leiria when he was recalled, in consequence of an alteration in Junot's plans, which the events in Alem-Tejo had rendered necessary. In the north of that province the insurrection was spreading far and wide, while Beja was in flames; and when Kellermann marched for Lisbon, leaving only a garrison in Elvas, it spread with equal rapidity in the south. Beja had not been destroyed by the fire; houses with little furniture and little wood-work are not easily burnt. The Corregedor returned there from Ayamonte with a supply of arms; a Junta was formed, which assumed great authority, and acted with

* Neves relates that Kellermann demanded for his own use 50,000 cruzados from the prior of Alcobaça at this time, letting him know, without circumlocution, that what the French generals wanted was money. He accepted a hundred moidores after hard bargaining. Loison heard of this on his arrival, and, being on bad terms with Kellermann, made him refund the money, charging the prior, if any such extortion were practised upon him in future, to complain to him, wherever he might be. Kellermann, however, coming there again when Loison had marched to the south, redemanded the money, and laid on ten per cent. for interest. T. iv. p. 82, 88.

unusual promptitude and vigour. Men were raised, the regular taxes claimed in the name of the rightful government, and a detachment under Sebastiam Martins Mestre, who had taken an active part in Algarve, was sent to guard against the French at Setubal, by forming a cordon to guard the river Sadam. Having raised a few men for this purpose in the districts of Grandolo and Santiago de Cacem, he proceeded to Alcacer do Sal, established a Junta there, and brought four iron guns from Melides for the defence of this town, a point of great importance to the province while there was an enemy's force at Setubal: Setubal and Palmella were the only places which they now occupied on that side the Tagus.

CHAP.
X.
1808.
July.

*Neves, iv.
92—95.*

Lobo meantime, leaving Moretti in Jurumenha, formed Juntas at Borba and at Villa-Viçosa, where he placed the palace and park upon their former establishment. These Juntas readily acknowledged the supremacy of Estremoz, where one was at this time formed, which endeavoured to make its authority recognized as supreme in Alem-Tejo, and was supported in its pretensions by the Spanish government at Badajoz. The claim was admitted by all the smaller places in the surrounding country, but not at Beja nor at Campo-Mayor, in which latter place considerable activity had been displayed. Instead of doubling the soldiers' pay, which had been rashly done at Porto, the officers who assembled at Campo-Mayor resolved that those whose means rendered it possible should serve for half-pay, or without pay; they raised loans and donatives, levied a third of the rent upon the entailed estates, and took from the property of the church contributions in kind; and having thus acquired considerable funds, they undertook, and for a time sustained, the improvident expense of paying their Spanish allies. The ready obedience shown to its authority, when these imposts were demanded, and the power which it derived from the distribution

*Junta of
Estremoz.*

CHAP. of the money thus raised, gave the Junta of Campo-Mayor
 X. exaggerated notions of its own importance, and when tidings
 1808. arrived that a Junta of higher or equal pretensions had been
July. formed at Estremoz, that of Campo-Mayor sent to propose a
 reciprocal alliance, as if one sovereign power were treating with
 another. But in reply a paper in the form of a decree was sent,
 declaring, that the primacy of the Junta of Estremoz should be
 acknowledged by all others in the province, because of the
 position of that place, and because it was a fortified town ; that
 the members of that Junta should have the title of Highness,
 because they represented the august person of the Sovereign ;
 and that there should be a subordinate Junta in every town, and
 one deputy from each sent as a representative to assist in the
 Supreme Junta of Estremoz. Obedience to this decree was
 required from Campo-Mayor, till a Supreme Junta should be
 established, as it was about to be, at Evora, whither head-
 quarters were to be removed.

Neves, iv.
 92—116.

*A Supreme
 Junta
 formed at
 Evora.*

The transfer of the supreme provincial authority to Evora was concerted by Moretti and by the Portuguese General Francisco de Paula Leite, who had refused to concur in the first hasty tumult at Villa-Viçosa, but who now, when the insurrection had become general throughout the province, felt himself bound to resume the charge with which the Prince Regent had entrusted him. The object of this transfer seems to have been a persuasion, that as Evora was the most populous city in the province, and the seat of the Archbishop, its authority would at once be acknowledged, and all disputes for precedence, which might otherwise prove so prejudicial to the common cause, would thus be terminated. This object was effected: in other respects the measure was incautious, and contrary to the judgment of the most judicious inhabitants ; for when Moretti had by letter proposed it to them, they replied, that the richest city

of Alem-Tejo, lying as it did so near Elvas, ought not to declare itself, unless it could reckon upon a force of 8000 men for its defence. It was not that the will was wanting; this General Leite knew; and without farther demur, he and Moretti and Lobo, with 200 foot soldiers and 100 cavalry, entered Evora. They were received with enthusiasm; a Junta was formed under two presidents, Leite being one, and the Archbishop, D. Fr. Manoel do Cenaculo Villas Boas, the other, a man then in extreme old age, distinguished for his erudition and his exemplary virtues. Circular letters were dispatched to all the other Juntas in Alem-Tejo, requiring a recognition, and the troops which had been embodied were ordered to Evora. Before the new machine of government could be put in motion, Loison had crossed the Tagus on his way to destroy it.

CHAP.
X.
1808.
July.
July 20.

Naves, iv.
118—126.

Notwithstanding the contempt with which the French government, and its agents in Portugal, regarded the Portuguese, Junot knew how easily brave men might be made good soldiers, under due instruction; and he seems to have apprehended, that better officers would be found to train and command them than either Portugal or Spain at that time could supply. He apprehended that the force in Alem-Tejo would soon become strong enough not only to seize Setubal, but to occupy the heights of Almada, and render useless all the batteries on the left bank of the Tagus; while at the same time another division of their troops, acting higher up the river, would co-operate with the insurgents from Coimbra. To prevent this combination, he resolved to attack the weaker and nearer body first. For this purpose Loison had been recalled from Leiria, Solignac and Margaron were placed under his command, with 5000 men, and it was thought, that after quelling the insurgents in Alem-Tejo, he might send a supply of food to Lisbon, especially of meat, . . victual Elvas, strike a blow against the Spaniards at Badajoz, and then, recross-

*Loison sent
into Alem-
Tejo.*

CHAP. X. ing the Tagus at Santarem or Abrantes, proceed against Coimbra; operations from which, at any time, in case of need, he could speedily turn back to join the main body of the French at Lisbon. There was, in fact, so little combination among the Portuguese at this time, that the insurgents in the northern provinces, and those in Alem-Tejo, knew nothing whatever of each other's proceedings, and the first news which reached the latter of the insurrection at Porto was communicated to the people of Sines by an English frigate.

Thiebault,
156.

He advances
against
Evora.

The first tidings of Loison's movement which reached Evora were, that he had crossed the Tagus, and was in full march towards that city. No time was lost in transmitting this from Aldea Gallega; any previous intelligence had been rendered impossible by the secrecy with which the French prepared their measures. Moretti applied for reinforcements to Badajoz; orders were sent for the forces from Campo-Mayor and the other places in the north of the province, to hasten to Evora, and General Galluzo was requested to occupy the posts which would be left unprotected by their absence; but no assistance came from Badajoz, and Galluzo, instead of acting as was expected, forbade the Portuguese to leave Campo-Mayor. An advanced guard of 700 men had been stationed at Montemor o Novo, twenty miles from the city. General Leite ordered 400 men to reinforce this post. They met the corps which they had been sent to support in full retreat, the commander, not knowing that succours were on the way to him, having thought himself too weak to await * an attack. Instead of deriving confidence or hope from

* General Thiebault says, there was an action at Montemor, in which the Portuguese lost fifty men, and that Loison also took prisoners there some hundred peasants, *que les lois de la guerre condamnoient à la mort, mais qu'il se borna à les désarmer et renvoya chez eux.*

the meeting, they hastened to Evora, and entered the city in alarm, exclaiming that they were betrayed. That cry, in such miserable times, is sure to be eagerly taken up. The people had been assured that the French who were coming against them did not exceed 800 men ; this had been said either in a most erroneous policy, to keep up the spirits of the inhabitants, by deceiving them as to the extent of their danger ; or more probably in good faith, all ranks being credulous in believing what they wished ; the natural effect, when the truth now became known, was to give the populace apparent ground for believing the vague charge of treason ; their tumultuous movements were with difficulty suppressed, and the Corregedor found himself so marked an object of suspicion, that, in the hope of securing himself, he secretly left the city. Order being in some degree restored, piquets of cavalry and patrols were stationed for the night. In the morning a company of Miquelets arrived from Villa-Viçosa, (that term having been borrowed from the Catalans), and the legion of Foreign Volunteers in the Spanish service, under Sargento-Mor D. Antonio Maria Gallego : both came by forced marches ; the latter had left Jurumenha the preceding evening, a distance of four-and-forty miles. With these succours the whole force collected then amounted to 1770 men, of whom about half were regular troops, the others being volunteers newly-raised and undisciplined.

CHAP.
X.
1808.
July.

News, iv.
126—131.

The city of Evora is so ancient, that fabulous history has laid its foundation more than two thousand years before the Christian era. Certain it is, that it was a flourishing city in the days of Viriatus. Sertorius chose it for his residence ; some of the buildings with which he adorned it are still remaining, and the inhabitants are still supplied with water by his aqueduct, which Joam III. repaired. Cæsar made it a municipal town, and from

Evora.

CHAP. him it was called Liberalitas Julia. Under the Visigoths it
 X. continued to flourish, and Sisebut coined money there. It was
 1808. recovered from the Moors in the reign of Affonso Henriquez,
July. the first king, by the romantic enterprise of Giraldo the Fearless,
 then an outlaw. King Fernando rebuilt or repaired its walls;
 and Cardinal Henrique founded an university and established
 an Inquisition there; but the university had been suppressed.
 In the war of the Restoration it was besieged and taken by D.
 Juan de Austria, but it was soon recovered, and the Spaniards
 in retreating toward their own frontier suffered one of the most
 signal defeats which they sustained during that long contest.
 Its population, once amounting to 40,000, had declined to about
 half that number at the beginning of the eighteenth century;
 since which time it had varied so little, that there had neither
 been any apparent diminution nor increase. The city was po-
 pulous enough to have defeated the force which was now march-
 ing against it, if it had been prepared for a Zaragozan defence.
 There is courage enough for any thing in the Portuguese cha-
 racter; but that individual and commanding genius was wanting
 by which alone the inhabitants of a large city can be made to
 act steadily with one will, and thereby capable of heroic valour.
 They prepared for a military defence in the field, which was ex-
 posing peasantry and half-disciplined troops to certain defeat.

*Action be-
 fore the city
 July 29.*

About seven in the morning the vedettes announced that the
 enemy were in sight, and the Portuguese took their ground in
 better order than might have been expected, considering the
 alarm and insubordination which had lately prevailed, and the
 real inequality of the contest. Their right rested upon the Mill
 of S. Bento, about a mile from the city, the centre was posted
 upon the Hill of S. Caetano, the left rested upon the Quinta dos
 Cucos. Having reconnoitred this position, Loison directed Ge-

neral Solignac to attack the enemy's right, and Margaron to break the centre with one part of his brigade, while the other attacked the left; they were to unite behind the city, occupy the roads to Arrayolos and Estremoz, and thus cut off the fugitives from all retreat, the cavalry being ready for pursuit upon the right and left, . . so sure and easy a victory was anticipated. The action began about eleven. The Portuguese had four four-pounders in their right wing, one three-pounder in the centre, and two howitzers in the left; there was no want of artillerymen, and if the other troops had understood their business and performed their duty like these, the event might have been doubtful; but the cavalry could not by any exertion of their commanders be brought into action; they hung back and retired, while the infantry stood their ground. When the latter were defeated, instead of flying, as the French had expected, in all directions, they retreated into the town. The defeat, however, was thought so irreparable, that General Leite and his staff made the best of their way to Olivença, and Moretti hastened to the Archbishop, to bid him provide for saving his own life without delay, in the imminent danger which threatened it. The venerable prelate calmly told him in reply, to think of preserving his own, which might yet be useful and honourable to his country; for himself, he said, the remainder of his days, few and useless as they needs must be, did not deserve a thought. The city had five gates, three of which had been walled up; the breaches which time had made in the walls had also been closed, but the walls were old and ruinous, and the French forced their entrance at many points, and then most of the defendants took flight; . . Moretti and the Spaniards to Jurumenha, the company from Villa-Viçosa to their own town; others dispersed; time was gained for them by the resistance which Lieutenant-Colonel Franco made at one of the gates, and the brave conduct of the foreign volun-

CHAP.
X.
1808.
July.

Neves, in.
132—138.
Observador
Portuguez,
382—387.
Thiebault,
158—165.

CHAP. **teers under * Gallego, who fought desperately in the streets, and**
 X. **suffered great loss.**

1808.

July.

*The city
taken.*

*Inhumanity
of the con-
querors.*

The horrors which ensued will be remembered in Portugal while any record of past times shall be preserved there. Though even a military pretext was wanting for delivering up the city and the inhabitants to the will of the soldiers, the whole proceedings of the Portuguese and their Spanish allies having been those of regular war, to them it was abandoned. A resolution had been taken in the Junta that those persons who feared the event should provide for their safety by retiring in time ; . . from some unexplained cause, most probably from a well-grounded fear that any persons who attempted to remove would be regarded as traitors by the furious populace, few or none availed themselves of this ominous warning ; when it was too late great numbers got over the walls, but the French horse surrounded the city, and showed as little mercy to the fugitives without, as the infantry did to the inhabitants within. The convents and churches afforded no asylum ; not those who had borne arms alone, but children and old men, were massacred, and women were violated and slaughtered. The lowest computation makes the number of these victims amount to 900. The clergy and religioners were especial objects of vengeance : they were literally hunted from their hiding-places like wild beasts : eight-and-thirty were butchered ; among them was the Bishop of Maranhão.

* General Thiebault says, that after their defeat in the field the Portuguese wished to capitulate, but that the Spaniards shot those persons who by timely submission would have saved the town : whereas the fact is, that immediately after the defeat the Spaniards made the best of their way towards their own country. During the action, he says that several men dropt down dead, owing to the excessive heat, the blood gushing from their ears, nose, and mouth. He is mistaken in saying that General Leite (whom he calls Loti) fell in this action.

The Archbishop's intercession with Loison obtained only a promise that a stop should be put to these enormities; no attempt was made to restrain them that day, nor during the whole night, nor till eleven on the following morning, and then by an order of the General, what he called the lawful pillage was declared to be at an end; but he contented himself with issuing the order; no means for enforcing it were taken, and the soldiers continued their abominations till every place had been ransacked, and their worst passions had been *glutted.

CHAP.
X.

1808.

July.

Observador
Portuguez,
387.
Naves, iv.
138—142.

* These facts are notorious in Portugal, and circumstantial accounts, too horrible to be repeated, are published of them. General Thiebault only says in his text, that there was a desperate conflict in the streets, and that "all who were found in arms were exterminated." He annexes the following note: "*Si l'on ne put de suite arrêter ces terribles représailles, si l'on ne put éviter le pillage de beaucoup de maisons, les officiers-généraux, supérieurs, et d'état-major, parvinrent du moins à faire respecter les églises, où les femmes, les vieillards, et les habitans paisibles s'étoient retirés, avec ce qu'ils avoient de plus précieux; ils firent plus; ils allèrent rassurer eux-mêmes tous ceux qui s'y trouvoient, et dès que l'ordre commença à se rétablir, ils firent escorter les femmes jusques chez elles, afin de les préserver de toute insulte.*" P. 164.

That there were some men of honour and humanity, who protected the inhabitants as far as they could, must be believed for the sake of human nature. But the Revolution and the school of Buonaparte had done all that was possible for eradicating both humanity and honour; and I affirm, on the testimony of the Portuguese, and of those British officers who have had full opportunities of ascertaining the truth, that the conduct of the French in Evora was marked with deliberate and sportive cruelty of the most flagitious kind. Concerning the conduct of the general officers, as respects their sense of honour, I happen to possess some rather curious information. Loison promised the Archbishop that his property should not be touched. After this promise, Loison himself, with some of his officers, entered the Archbishop's library, which was one of the finest in Portugal; they took down all the books, in the hope of discovering valuables behind them, they broke off the gold and silver clasps from the magnificent bindings of the rarest part of the collection, and in their disappointment at finding so little plunder, tore in pieces a whole pile of manuscripts. They took every gold and silver coin from his cabinet of medals, and every jewel and bit of the precious metals

CHAP.
X.

1808.

July.

*Alarm at
Estremoz.*

According to the statement of the French, 8000 of the allies were killed or wounded in the battle and in the capture of the city, and 4000 made prisoners, the latter being chiefly peasants. Their own loss they stated at 90 killed, and more than 200 wounded. The intimidation of that part of the country which was within the immediate reach of the victors was such as might be expected after such a blow. At the first rumour that reached Estremoz, the populace became ungovernable; their first impulse was that of rage, which would willingly have found any victim on which to sate itself. An officer had just arrived from Portalegre; they fancied that he had prevented the coming of some regular troops, which they had looked for; an attempt was made to murder him in the hall of the Junta, whither he fled for refuge, and in the presence of the members; and there was no other means of saving him but by concealing him from the ferocious rabble. Presently a dispatch came, announcing the total defeat at Evora, the capture of the city, and the loss of every thing. Such was the temper of the people, that it was a service of the utmost danger to communicate this news; and the member who attempted to read the dispatch to them from a varanda found his life in danger, and drew back. But it was not possible either to conceal the fatal intelligence or to delay it. Estremoz would assuredly be the next object of the enemy, and Evora was only six leagues distant; if they had hitherto dreamt of defending the town, the fate of Evora was now before their eyes: they knew that even the unreasonable multitude would feel this near and imminent danger, though they would not endure to be told of it;

with which the relics were adorned, or which decorated any thing in his oratory. Loison was even seen in noon-day to take the Archbishop's episcopal ring from the table and pocket it. These circumstances are stated on the authority of the Archbishop himself.

and the members of the Junta determined to take measures for immediate submission. The melancholy manner with which they passed through the crowd confirmed the worst apprehensions of the people; and as they went along they spake each to those persons on whose prudence he could rely, telling them what had occurred, and what must now of necessity be done; thus they thought the news might pass from one to another with the least danger, and every one take such measures for himself as he deemed best. There was a cry of treason at first, when it was seen that of the three guns which had been mounted to defend the walls, one was cast into the ditch, and the other two sent off to Olivença. The Juiz de Fora became the object of suspicion, and could he have been found at that moment, would have been murdered; ∴ so fickle is popular feeling, that this very man was presently sought for as the fittest person to give counsel. A meeting was held, and a messenger deputed to solicit Loison's clemency.

CHAP.
X.

1808.

July.

*Neves, iv.
145—149.*

Loison received the messenger well, thinking that severity enough had been shown to secure the submission of Alem-Tejo. He constituted a provisional government in Evora, at the head of which the Archbishop was compelled to act, and he set off for Estremoz on the fourth day after the action. He raised no contributions there, permitted no pillage, and paid for every thing which the troops consumed; he also set at liberty some of his prisoners. But when he proceeded to Elvas he ordered two Swiss prisoners to be shot, condemned four others to work in chains for five years, threw the Spanish commander Gallego into a dungeon, and condemned the Portuguese Lieutenant-Colonel Franco to death, for bearing arms against the French. The Bishop of Elvas interceded earnestly for this officer, and finding all intercession vain, concluded by saying, if this favour were refused him, he had still one to ask, which was, that the

*Loison proceeds to
Elvas.*

August 2.

CHAP. X. General would sentence him to the same fate, seeing life would be hateful to him if he could not save his countryman under such circumstances. Loison was touched at this, and revoked the order for execution. That General has left a name in Portugal which will be execrated to the latest generations; here, however, is an instance which evinces some sense of generosity; as if his heart had not been naturally bad; but it was the tendency of the Revolution, and of Buonaparte's system, to make men wicked whom it did not find so.

*Neves, in-
149, 156—
158.
Observador
Portuguez,
597.*

*Loison en-
ters Por-
talegre.*

The less portable part of the plunder of Evora was sold at Elvas, a sort of fair being held for the purpose; and many persons purchased church vessels for the sake of restoring them to the altars from whence they had been taken. Loison made a movement upon Badajoz, and believing that the troops in that city had been called off to the Spanish armies, and that his recent success had occasioned great consternation there, endeavoured to introduce officers under a flag of truce, for the purpose of observing the state of the place; but they were refused admittance. The commandant of Elvas, Colonel Miquel, had made himself odious in that city, especially for executing a German as an emissary of the Spaniards, the main proof against him being some thirty pieces of gold which were found in his possession. Some fugitives from Elvas, with a few comrades from Campo-Mayor, waylaid this commandant as he went from the city, intending to sleep in Fort La Lippe, for greater security; they fired upon him and an officer in his company; the officer escaped, but Miquel lay all night upon the ground, the soldiers not venturing to seek him in the darkness, and being removed to Lisbon, he died there of his wounds.

*He is re-
called to the
neighbour-
hood of Lis-
bon.*

This was some days before Loison's arrival. That General appointed M. Girod de Novilard of the engineers to succeed him, and marched upon Portalegre. The Spaniards had already

retired from thence, and the Bishop, with most of the principal persons, withdrew also in time. The city was plundered, and a contribution of 100,000 cruzados demanded from the district; about 40,000 were raised, and six persons were carried away as pledges for the remainder. He then marched for Abrantes, having received dispatches which ordered him to hasten his return toward Lisbon by that route, it being now certain that an expedition from England was off the coast.

CHAP.
X.

1808.

August.

*Neves, iv.
156—164.
Thiebault,
168—172.*

Those provinces, meantime, which had not felt the vengeance of the French were in a state of anarchy. The temporary dissolution of order, even though no revolutionary opinions were at work, produced evils little less alarming than the actual presence of the enemy. The cry of an inflamed multitude is always for blood. The Intendant of Police at Porto addressed a manly proclamation to the people, reproving them for eagerly demanding the death of a few suspected persons, who were already in the hands of justice, and from whom they had nothing to fear. In the processes against them, he said, there ought to be nothing precipitate, nothing that could be accused of inhumanity; he must see that all the proofs of their guilt were brought forward, that his own honour might suffer no stain. If they were dissatisfied with him, he would gladly lay down an office which he had never solicited; more willingly would he accompany his son to the army, than occupy a station for which, even in quiet times, he should have thought himself unqualified; and though life was dear to him, he would rather lose it in the service of his country than in a tumult. But mobs are as seldom capable of reason as of compunction. It was necessary, for the sake of preventing wider evils, to accelerate the processes, and to promise blood. No person, however innocent of any connexion with the French, however distinguished for his exertions against them, was safe from suspicion; no place, however sacred, was

*Insurrection of
the people
at Porto.*

CHAP. X. secure from search. Upon a report that a suspected person had concealed himself in a burial-vault, it was proposed to open all the vaults in the church till he was found. Upon another rumour that he was concealed in a nun's habit in a Carmelite nunnery, the mob proposed to break in and examine the sisterhood. Raymundo exerted himself to prevent this scandalous outrage. Some one charged him also with treason, and his life was for a moment in danger. But Raymundo, who knew how little in such times any popularity, however deserved, was to be trusted, had provided himself with a crucifix in case of need. He displayed it in this emergency, and by an exclamation according with the display, induced the rabble to join with him in a shout of loyalty, and succeeded in dissuading them from entering the convent.

*News, iv.
209—224.*

*Design of
a military
usurpation
in that city.*

Even in this early stage of popular commotions a military usurpation is said to have been projected by Luiz Candido Cordeiro Pinheiro Furtado, in conjunction with Joam Manoel de Mariz. Both were esteemed good officers; the latter was a member of the Junta, the former offended that he had not been nominated, and still more so that another person had been made commander-in-chief. They designed to erect a military Junta under their own direction, and they proposed to raise a corps under the name of the Loyal Porto Legion, of which Candido was to have the command; the officers were named, the uniform designed, and worn by Candido with some of his associates; he took to himself also a guard of honour, which, from a small beginning, was gradually increased, till at length the armed attendance with which he always appeared in public was such as to excite reasonable apprehension. The city was in this state when Bernardim Freire arrived from Coimbra to take upon himself the command. He was received with great joy by the people; but Luiz Candido was evidently displeased at his coming, and Bernardim was soon apprised that a conspiracy was formed against

him and against the Junta. He was careful therefore to keep Candido and Mariz as much about his person as possible. Among other precautions for preserving tranquillity in the city, he ordered the guns to be unloaded ; persons were not wanting to represent this as being done with a treacherous design ; and a priest, notorious for irregularities, at the head of a mob seized his bridle, and exclaimed that the people would have no such General. A dangerous stir had already begun, when some men of better mind came resolutely forward ; one of them felled the priest to the ground ; Bernardim spake to the crowd in a manner which conciliated their good will, the priest was thrown into prison, and the day was closed with an illumination in honour of the General.

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X.
1808.
August.

News, iv.
225—229.

Upon the arrival of D. Miguel Pereira Forjaz to assist his brother-in-law Bernardim, an attempt was made to establish a military Junta, in aid of the provisional government, and as a check upon the designs of Candido and his associates. This, however, proved ineffectual ; and they proceeded so rapidly in organizing an armed party, that it was deemed necessary to secure Candido and Mariz without delay, lest the city should become a scene of bloodshed. They were accordingly summoned to a consultation at the Bishop's palace, and there arrested. Their escort, which, as usual, had accompanied them, began to express displeasure at this ; and three of the men entering the palace, demanded insolently that their commander should be delivered to them ; if he were innocent, they said, they would set him at liberty ; if he were a traitor, they would blow him to pieces from the mouth of a cannon. These men were secured, and Raymundo, with some other officers to whom this service had been assigned, disarmed their fellows. The agitation, however, continued the whole day, though this was at an early hour ; and it was not till after midnight that the prisoners could be

*The conspirators
are seized.*

CHAP. conducted without danger of a rescue to the jail. They were
 X. immediately proceeded against according to the forms of Por-
 1808. tugueze law, and the evidence against them appeared so con-
August. clusive, that Candido was condemned to death, and Mariz to be
 degraded to Angola. The gallows accordingly was erected, Can-
 dido was led into the oratory to perform the last religious duties,
 the brethren of the Misericordia went out to attend the exe-
 cution, and the crowd collected to witness it; when, after a while,
 it was announced that the two prisoners were removed to the
 fortress of S. Joam da Foz, to be embarked for Brazil, and there
 placed at the Prince's disposal. So fickle is a multitude, that
 the crowd, which a few days before had almost mutinied because
 of the arrest of this man, became riotous now because he was
 not put to death. They were pacified by the personal exertions
 of the Bishop and two of his dignitaries, and by an official noti-
 fication that the Junta having pronounced sentence of death
 against Luiz Candido upon full proof of a most atrocious crime,
 had thought it proper to lay the proceedings before the Prince,
 and remit the criminal to his mercy.

News, iv.
 229—237.

*Disturb-
 ances at
 Braganza.*

The populace at Porto were kept in some degree of submission
 by the vigorous measures of the provisional government, the
 respect which was paid to the episcopal character, and by the
 influence which men of property possess in a flourishing com-
 mercial town. In remoter parts the local authorities were
 weaker, and tumults of the most disgraceful nature occurred.
 After the provinces beyond the mountains and between the
 rivers had been delivered from their first danger, by the failure
 of Loison's expedition from Almeida, they were more seriously
 alarmed from the side of Castille and Leon; and indeed had it
 not been for the success of the Spaniards in Andalusia, Junot
 would probably have received powerful reinforcements from
 Marshal Bessieres after the battle of Rio Seco. The first dis-

turbances arose at Braganza upon a rumour that this army was approaching. The people gathered together tumultuously, and when they learnt that no enemies were near, directed their vengeance against all whom they suspected; and in such times it is in the power of any wretch, however vile and worthless, to throw suspicion upon the object of his envy or resentment. The Junta, in hope of appeasing them, convoked a popular meeting;... the readiest means of showing them their power, and teaching them how to abuse it; and the result was, that most of the members of the Junta were turned out, and such as the mob thought fit elected in their places. A shoemaker, and the keeper of a wine-house, who, because he was maimed in one arm, called himself *o Loion Portuguez*, were the kings of the rabble. The latter took upon himself the office of general, and was actually obeyed by the troops. Their chief vengeance was directed against the New-Christians, for Pombal's law (the redeeming act of that tyrannical statesman) had not even in half a century produced a feeling of toleration in the populace. Any accusation, however preposterous, was believed; they gutted the house of one man, and threw him into prison, upon a charge of witchcraft, for having, it was said, made an image of General Sepulveda, and placed it over the fire in a frying-pan. When the city had thus continued three days under mob-rule, the magistrates took courage from despair, arrested the ruling demagogues during the night, and sent them prisoners to Chaves. Troops came from Villa-Real, where Sepulveda at that time was, and tranquillity was restored; but it was necessary to gratify the people by making useless preparations for defence; and the popular opinion was, that nothing but what was right had been done, that the persons whose property had been destroyed, and their lives endangered, deserved the usage they had suffered, and that the magistrates were bribed by the Jews.

CHAP.
X.

1808.

July.*Notes, iv.*
238—245.

CHAP. More serious disturbances occurred at Villa Nova de Foz-
 X. Coa, arising from the same popular intolerance, and love of
 1808. rapine. That town, one of the most flourishing in Beira Alta,
 July. owed in great part its prosperity to its position at the confluence
 of the Coa with the Douro. A considerable trade in silk,
 and in rice, salt-fish, and other articles of foreign importation,
 brought thither by the river from Porto, was carried on with the
 adjacent country, and with the Spaniards of the border. This
 trade was mostly in the hands of persons who, because they
 were of Jewish extraction, were believed by the vulgar to be
 still attached in heart to the Mosaic law. The cry of Down
 with the French, was coupled here with Kill the Jews; . . . their
 houses were attacked, their goods plundered, their persons
 abused, their lives threatened and seriously endangered, and
 more than twenty of the wealthiest families in that country re-
 duced to utter ruin by the complete destruction of their property.
 Some of these unhappy persons effected their escape to Mon-
 corvo; and, because they were protected there, and the Junta of
 that town endeavoured to restore order at Villa Nova, hostilities
 ensued between the two townships. The evil spread; and if
 the Junta of Moncorvo had not arrested during the night some
 movers of sedition in their town, and seized also some of the
 ringleaders from Villa Nova, who had crossed the Douro, the
 province of Tras os Montes would soon have suffered all the
 evils of civil war, exasperated by a spirit of fanaticism, such as
 existed in the worst ages of superstition and ignorance. The
 New-Christians were accused of assisting the French with money,
 blaspheming God, cursing the Prince, defiling the crucifix, and
 finally, of Manicheism! When a judicial inquiry was afterwards
 instituted concerning the riots, depositions to this effect were
 made against them upon oath!

Neves, iv.
 245—263.

Troubles at
Viseu.

The troubles at Viseu, though less destructive in their con-

sequences, assumed a more revolutionary character. The mob insisted upon having a Juiz do Povo, and elected a demagogue to that office, which had not before been known among them, which in quiet times is useless, and in turbulent ones dangerous. Florencio José Correa de Mello, the general of the province, and the Bishop, a good but timid man, instead of refusing to acknowledge this tumultuous and illegal appointment, ratified it by administering an oath to the chosen favourite of the mob, who from that moment became a person of more authority than either Bishop or General. The latter offended the military by refusing to double their pay, as had been so imprudently done at Porto; on this account they became mutinous, and a riot broke out in the city upon an absurd report that Loison was come to visit him. The demagogue, who was lord of the day, obtained from the intimidated Bishop an order for his arrest, his house was sacked, and he and the Juiz de Fora were thrown into prison amid the insults of a multitude who knew not what they did. A meeting of the people was then held, at which the magistrates were deposed, new ones appointed, and the Bishop was declared Generalissimo, with Silveira, who happened to be passing through Viseu, for his adjutant-general.

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X.
1808.
July.

Neves, iv.
263—273.

Proceedings equally outrageous, and of more perilous tendency, occurred in the town of Arcos de Val de Vez. The bells in that town and in the surrounding villages rung the alarm upon a report that 20,000 French had landed at Espozende, and were entering Ponte de Lima. A disorderly multitude collected, and set out in search of the enemy; their courage was easily roused, and soon spent; for when they had ascertained that the report was without foundation, and were returning home, they learnt that a body of men from the north were in possession of their town, and instead of hastening thither to protect their property, and restore order, they took to flight, each seeking a place

*Riotous
proceedings
at Arcos de
Val de Vez.*

CHAP. of refuge where he thought best. The people in fear of whom
 X. they fled were peasantry, who, like themselves, had set out to
 1808. fight the French, in utter disorder; hurrying along in scattered
July. parties, some with a soldier for their leader, some with an abbot,
 provided neither with ammunition nor bread, increasing their
 numbers as they went along, and expecting that the magistrates
 were to issue orders for supplying them wherever they came.
 The *Vereadores* exerted themselves to feed this rabble, and be
 rid of them; the Juiz de Fora, dismayed at such a visitation,
 and in despair of satisfying such visitors, absconded, and his
 disappearance was imputed to a consciousness of treason. While
 they were seeking him every where, an unlucky messenger en-
 tered the town with dispatches from the Corregedor of Barcellos,
 and as he happened to have lost an arm, the senseless multitude
 took him for Loison; and even when they had examined his
 papers were still so possessed with this preposterous notion, that
 they placed him in confinement. Another messenger with letters
 fell into their hands, and was seized in like manner; and they
 were demanding a warrant for the apprehension of the Juiz de
 Fora, when he was brought in from the country, by an in-
 human rabble, in a condition which would have excited pity in
 the poor unthinking wretches themselves who were his tor-
 mentors, if they had beheld him separately, and if men did not
 seem to be divested of all compassion when they act in mobs.
 With great difficulty they were prevailed upon not to finish kill-
 ing him, but to lodge him in prison. Presently the thirst for
 blood returned, and they ordered a young priest to go and pre-
 pare him for death. The priest objected that he had not yet re-
 ceived that order in the church which empowered him to officiate
 in the sacrament of confession; upon which they replied, that
 they conferred the order. The young man then entered the
 prison, and with great presence of mind advised the Juiz to feign

himself dead ; then going out, he asked the mob, with a tone of anger, why they had sent him to confess a man whom they had already killed ? They made no farther inquiry ; . . the bells tolled for his death, and by this artifice his life was saved.

CHAP.
X.
1808.
July.

The rabble now took upon themselves to reform the state ; they began by turning out the members of the Camara, throwing the chairs out of window, demolishing the seat of the Judge, and burning the public papers. They displaced officers, deposed two or three abbots, and nominated a Capuchin friar to be their General. They appointed a Junta, and made laws whereby they abolished the recruiting system, fixed the prices of milk, meat, and wine, prohibited the exportation of bread, forbade all processes for debt, suspended all law-suits during the war, abolished the fees of the parochial priests, and were hardly persuaded to spare the tithes, and, finally, exempted all tenants from payment of manorial rights ; and these laws were enacted not for their own district alone, but for the whole kingdom. This was the only indication of a revolutionary disposition which manifested itself during these unhappy times. By good hap the persons whom they had chosen to form their Junta were prudent and well-intentioned men, who temporized with them, and accepted an illegal authority in the hope of restoring order. The anniversary of a religious procession occurred at this time, and they took advantage of it. The Host was borne through the streets, a sermon adapted to the circumstances was preached with good effect, and the reformers, tired of their work, and willing to secure what they had gained by pillage, broke up, and returned to their own part of the country. The people of the land then enrolled themselves, established patrols, and subjected themselves to good discipline ; so that when a second visit of the same kind was attempted, they seized the ringleaders.

*The rabble
enact laws.*

*Notes, iv.
207—209.*

CHAP. X. Troops at length came from Viana, and many of the criminals were apprehended and sent prisoners to Porto.

1808.

July.

*Communi-
cation be-
tween Alem-
Tejo and the
northern
provinces.*

July 18.

The authority of the provisional government at Porto would not have been generally acknowledged, and with so little reluctance, throughout these provinces, if that city had not been looked to as a capital, because of its great commercial importance. But so little intercourse was there between the north and south of Portugal, that both had been in insurrection against the French more than a month, before it was known in one part that any resistance had commenced in the other. Vague reports indeed were in circulation, which could be traced to no authentic source; but no intelligence upon which any reliance was placed arrived in Alem-Tejo, till a student from Coimbra, who had enlisted in the academic corps, came to Campo-Mayor on his own concerns, and gave a clear account of the transactions in which he had borne a part. The news was immediately dispatched to Badajoz; tidings of the battle of Baylen reached that city at the same time; and messengers, accredited by the governors of Badajoz and Campo-Mayor, were sent to Coimbra, to communicate the joyful accounts from Spain. They were received not merely with transports of exultation, but with as much surprise, says the Portuguese historian of these events, as if they had come from another world, . . in such utter ignorance were the people of Beira of what had been going on in Alem-Tejo, though the two provinces, along an extent of some forty miles, are only separated by the Tagus. The messengers on their part with equal surprise learnt that the legitimate government was restored in Tras os Montes, and Entre Douro e Minho. Being thus referred to Porto, thither they proceeded; and returned from thence with letters from the Bishop and the General to the Archbishop of Evora and the Junta of Badajoz, recommending

the establishment of a provisional government under the Archbishop, similar to that at Porto, that the same system might be pursued in the south as in the north. When they reached Coimbra on their way, they learnt the fate of Evora, that news having been circulated by the French without delay. Proceeding on their journey, when they drew near Castello-Branco they found the roads full of fugitives, removing with their children and families, and such goods as they could carry away, in fear of Loison, so far had the terror of his name extended. It was not then known that he had marched toward Abrantes; and the messengers, to avoid the danger of falling in with his troops, entered Spain by Zebreira, and so proceeded to Badajoz and Campo-Mayor.

CHAP.
X.

1808.

July.

Notes, iv.
197—205.

Things were in this state when a British expedition arrived upon the north coast. General Leite was collecting at Olivença the troops which had escaped from Evora. The Conde de Castro-Marim was raising and embodying forces in Algarve; and the Junta of Porto were hardly less perplexed by the perilous spirit of insubordination which prevailed both in the city and in the remoter parts of the provinces, than by the deficiency of money and means for the men who willingly came forward to serve against the invaders. There were numbers, and courage, and good will, but every thing else was wanting.

CHAPTER XI.

FIRST CAMPAIGN OF THE BRITISH ARMY IN PORTUGAL.
CONVENTION OF CINTRA.

1808. *State of public feeling in England.* THESE transactions in Spain and Portugal excited the deepest interest in the English people; not so much for the hope, which had thus unexpectedly arisen, of advantages to England, and to the general welfare of Europe, as for the nature of the contest, their detestation of the unequalled iniquity by which it had been provoked, and their sympathy in the instinct and principle by which it was carried on. Every day seemed lost till an army of our own should be co-operating with men engaged in a cause so sacred, so congenial to the feelings of a Briton. Such was the eagerness to participate in the glorious struggle, that the militia almost universally offered themselves for foreign service, and the country with one voice called for an effort equal to the occasion. But the Government was not prepared for such exertions. Our military operations had never yet been carried on upon a scale such as was now required, and since the peace of Amiens they had been almost wholly suspended. Though great and most essential improvements in the army had been steadily and unostentatiously carried into effect by the Duke of York, much remained to be done; and it wanted that efficiency which nothing but experience could give it. That our troops were able to beat the enemy wherever they should meet on equal terms, or even with considerable advantage of numbers on the

enemy's side, no Englishman doubted, unless he wished the enemy success; but the public confidence went no farther. The war had on our part so long been almost exclusively maritime, that the army had suffered something in reality and more in reputation. The French, always fond of war, had become a military people; their military establishment was supposed to be perfect in all its branches, their troops experienced, their officers excellent, their commanders of the highest celebrity: to oppose them we had generals very few of whom had ever been tried in command, and officers of whom the far greater number, like their men, had never seen an enemy in the field. A great effort, however, was now called for by our new allies. The Spanish Juntas with which the British Government had hitherto communicated, preferred assistance in money and supplies to an auxiliary force; they had a brave but undue confidence in their own strength, and perhaps they foresaw that mutual ill will might probably arise between combined armies whose habits and prejudices were widely dissimilar. What they desired was, that a British expedition should be employed against the French in Portugal; this would act as a powerful diversion in favour of Spain; thither we were called by the wishes and groans of the Portuguese people; and it was believed, that when the deliverance of that kingdom should have been effected, a plan of co-operation with the Spaniards might be arranged.

When the insurrection of the Spaniards began, an armament was preparing at Cork, which, as different prospects opened upon us, had been supposed to be intended at one time against Ceuta, at another for South America. Its destination was now fixed for the Peninsula, and the command was given to Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Wellesley. His instructions were, while the fleet proceeded off Cape Finisterre, to make for Coruña himself, and consult there with the Provisional Government of

CHAP.
XI.
1808.

An expedition ordered to the coast of Portugal.

CHAP. Galicia. He was authorized to give the most distinct assurances
 XI. to the Spanish and Portuguese people, that his Majesty, in send-
 1808. ing a force to their assistance, had no other object in view than
 to afford them his most unqualified and disinterested support. In all questions respecting their provisional government, should any such arise, he was as far as possible to avoid taking any part; maintaining only these principles, that no act done by Charles or Ferdinand could be considered valid, unless they returned to their own country, and were absolutely free agents there; and that the entire evacuation of the Peninsula by the French was the only basis upon which the Spaniards should be induced to treat. In any arrangements he was directed to act with the utmost liberality and confidence, the object of Great Britain being to assist the people of Spain and Portugal in restoring and maintaining against France the independence and integrity of their respective monarchies.

*Former ser-
 vices of Sir
 A. Wellesley*

Arthur Wellesley, fourth son of Viscount Wellesley, Earl of Mornington, was born in the year 1769, at Dangan Castle, in Ireland, the seat of his ancestors. After having been a short time at Eton, he was removed, while very young, to the military academy at Angers; for there was not at that time any institution in Great Britain wherein tactics were taught, and the youth who meant to follow the military profession was obliged to go to France if he wished to learn the elements of war. He obtained his first commission about the age of eighteen, in the 41st regiment; and after a series of exchanges and promotions, his elder brother, afterwards Marquis Wellesley, purchased for him the lieutenant-colonelcy of the 33rd, in 1793. He conducted himself in the disastrous retreat from Holland so as to obtain much praise from military men. In 1795 he embarked for service in the West Indies, but being providentially driven back by storms, his destination was altered. In 1797 he went

out to India with his brother Lord Mornington, then Governor General; there he distinguished himself in the war against Tippoo, and being appointed Governor of Seringapatam after the capture of that city, and one of the commissioners for disposing of the conquered territories, he discharged his arduous duties in such manner as to deserve and obtain the gratitude of the conquered people. In the subsequent war against the Mah-rattas he commanded at the battle of Assye, against an army exceeding his own number in the proportion of ten to one; and whose disciplined troops, under French officers, more than doubled the British force. The action was severe beyond all former example in India: having won the enemy's artillery, consisting of an hundred pieces, which were served with perfect skill, he had to take them a second time with the bayonet, when men who had feigned death rose from the ground and turned them upon the conquerors as they pressed forward in pursuit. The victory was decisive; the success was followed up, and at the close of that triumphant war a monument in honour of the battle was erected at Calcutta; the inhabitants of that city presented him with a sword, and his own officers with a golden vase; the thanks of parliament were voted him, and he was made a Knight Companion of the Bath. He returned to England in 1805; took his seat in the House of Commons the ensuing year, as member for Newport in the Isle of Wight, and in 1807 was appointed Chief Secretary in Ireland. But his military services were soon required; he accompanied Lord Cathcart in the expedition against Copenhagen, and commanded in the only affair of importance which took place. He was now to be tried in more arduous undertakings; and such was the repute in which his talents were held, that when the armament for the Peninsula was placed under his command, the opinion both of the army and of the public entirely accorded with the choice which Government had made.

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1808.

*July.**Sir Arthur
lands at Co-
ruña.*

Sir Arthur Wellesley, having about ten thousand men under his command, sailed from Cork on the 12th of July, and leaving the fleet as soon as he had seen it clear of the coast, made sail in a frigate for Coruña, and arrived there on the 20th. There the Junta of Galicia informed him of the battle of Rio Seco; and that the French, being, in consequence, masters of the course of the Douro, were enabled to cut off the communication between that province and the country to the south and east. The French in Portugal they estimated at 15,000, of whom 12,000 were supposed to be at Lisbon; and he was told that the Portuguese troops at Porto amounted to 10,000, and that a Spanish corps of 2000 had begun their march for that city on the 15th, and were expected to arrive there about the 25th. Sir Arthur consulted with them concerning the immediate employment of his army. They explicitly stated that they were in no need of men, but wanted arms, ammunition, and money: . . this latter want was relieved by the arrival of £200,000 from England that very day. They strongly recommended him to employ his forces against the enemy in Portugal, because while that army remained unbroken the Spaniards could never make any simultaneous effort to drive the French out of the Peninsula; and they advised him to land in the north, that he might bring forward and avail himself of the Portuguese troops in that quarter.

*He proceeds
to Porto.*

. Accordingly Sir Arthur sailed for Porto, ordering the fleet to follow him. He arrived there the 24th, and had a conference that night with the Bishop and the general officers. From them, and from Lieutenant-colonel Brown, who had previously joined them, he learnt that the regular Portuguese troops who had been collected amounted to 5000 men, and were posted at Coimbra; that there were about 1200 peasants in advance, and a corps of 2500 Portuguese and 300 Spanish infantry at Porto, besides volunteers and peasants; but all were badly equipped

and armed, the peasantry having only pikes. It was concerted that the 5000 should co-operate with him, and the remainder with the Spanish corps, then, so the Spaniards had informed him, on its way from Galicia; and that the peasantry should be employed, part in the blockade of Almeida, part in the defence of Tras os Montes, which province was supposed to be threatened by Bessieres, in consequence of his victory at Rio Seco. Sir Arthur stated, that he should want cattle for draught, and for the supply of his army; the Bishop took pen and ink, wrote down the number which would be required, and replied immediately that they were ready.

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July.

Here Sir Arthur received a letter from Sir Charles Cotton, advising him to leave the troops either at Porto or at the mouth of the Mondego, and proceed to communicate with him off Lisbon. The fleet accordingly was ordered to Mondego Bay, and the general proceeded to confer with Sir Charles. There he found dispatches from General Spencer, stating that he had landed his corps in Andalusia, at the request of the Junta of Seville; but that he had resisted the applications made to him to join Castaños, thinking it advisable to preserve his force unbroken, for the purpose of acting with Sir Arthur. He had, however, consented to take up a position at Xeres, where he might serve as a point of support for Castaños, in case of defeat, and from whence he could re-embark in eight-and-forty hours: and he supposed that Sir Arthur would begin his campaign at Cadiz, implying an opinion that Dupont could not be defeated without English assistance. Sir Arthur, however, being convinced by the Junta of Galicia that his army would be employed with more advantage to the common cause against Junot, ordered General Spencer to join him off the coast of Portugal, unless he should be actually engaged in operations which he could not relinquish without injury to the Spaniards.

He goes to the Tagus to confer with Sir C. Cotton.

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1808.

July.

The Mondego the only place where a landing could be effected.

General Spencer represented Junot's force as exceeding 20,000 men : the admiral, according to the reports of the Portuguese, estimated them at less : Sir Arthur concluded that they were from 16,000 to 18,000, of whom about 12,000 were at Lisbon, and in its vicinity, and 2400 at Alcobaça. Any attempt at landing in the Tagus was considered impracticable : it would be equally so at Cascaes : it was at all times difficult to land an army in the small bays near the rock, and would be now especially dangerous because of the neighbourhood of the enemy : Peniche was garrisoned by the French. There was therefore no choice but to disembark in the Mondego. Thither Sir Arthur returned. He rejoined the fleet there on the 30th, and there he found intelligence of the defeat of Dupont, and advice from his own government, that he would be reinforced immediately with 5000 men, under Brigadier-General Acland, and afterwards with 10,000 who had been under Sir John Moore in Sweden, the command being vested in Sir Hew Dalrymple ; but he was directed to carry into execution without delay the instructions which he had received, if he thought himself sufficiently strong. He also received accounts that Loison had been detached from Lisbon, to open the communication with Elvas, the patriots in Alem-Tejo having been joined by about a thousand men from the Spanish army of Estremadura, and being now formidable.

Troops landed in the Mondego.

This latter account made him conclude that there was no danger of being attacked by superior numbers before his reinforcements reached him ; and he determined to land, both for the sake of the troops, and because he knew that the Portuguese, who were much discouraged at seeing the men remain so long on board after their arrival in Mondego Bay, would suspect either the inclination of the English to contend with the French, or their ability, if the landing were still deferred. It was now

found that the Coimbra students had performed a service of real importance in winning Figueira from the enemy; the landing in the Mondego being so difficult, that with all the zeal and ability of the navy, it would have been impossible to effect it without the cordial assistance of the Portuguese. They began to disembark on the first of August. The weather was so little favourable, and the surf so high, that the whole of the troops were not landed till the 5th, and on that day General Spencer arrived, his corps following him the next. He had embarked immediately upon learning the surrender of Dupont, not waiting for instructions. This corps was disembarked on the 7th and 8th, on which night the whole army were in readiness to advance; the march of the main body was, however, delayed till the 10th, at the desire of the Portuguese general officers. Sir Arthur conferred with them at Montemor o Velho, and arranged the plan of operations: he armed and inspected their troops, recommended and superintended their organization, and offered as large a sum as his military funds could afford, to defray the expenses of their equipment: this, however, was declined by their officers. While the troops were landing, a party of the police cavalry arrived at Coimbra, having effected their escape from Lisbon. This hazardous attempt was planned and conducted by Eliziario de Carvalho. A serjeant, by name Gamboa, as soon as their flight was discovered, was dispatched to the French commander at Santarem, with orders to intercept and make an example of them, according to the system of the French tyranny. Gamboa, however, with the party under his command, followed and joined his countrymen; and they accomplished their dangerous march in safety.

Sir Arthur determined to march along the road nearest the sea, for the sake of communicating with the store-ships; but as this communication must needs be very precarious, both as de-

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XI.
1808.
August.

They advance to Leiria.

CHAP. XI. pending upon the state of the surf, and also because the army might find it expedient to strike more into the country, arrangements were made for taking with them sufficient stores to last till they should reach the Tagus. The advanced guard marched on the 9th, supported by the brigades under Generals Hill and Ferguson. Laborde and Thomieres had collected their corps, to the amount of from 5000 to 6000 men, in the neighbourhood of Leiria; they threatened the magazines formed in that city for the Portuguese army; and Sir Arthur was urged to advance as speedily as possible, for the sake of preserving them. The main body followed on the 10th: on that day Sir Arthur received advices from Coruña, informing him that neither Blake nor Cuesta was in a condition to act offensively against Bessieres, nor to follow him, if he should enter Portugal. But at the same time news arrived of the flight of the Intruder from Madrid; and Sir Arthur perceived that Bessieres would be more solicitous to cover his retreat towards the French frontier, than to attempt a diversion in favour of Junot. At all events, there was time enough for his operations against the latter before Bessieres could arrive; and it was to be expected that General Acland, or Sir John Moore, would land before he could come up. These advices, therefore, only determined him to follow up with the utmost celerity the plan which he had concerted. On the 11th the main body joined the advanced guard at Leiria, and the next day the Portuguese force, consisting of 6000 men, including 600 cavalry, arrived, the whole force being now collected there. When the English advanced guard entered that city, they found in one of the convents the dead bodies of several monks who had been murdered by the French; the murderers had amused themselves with dipping their hands in the blood of these victims, and printing the red mark upon the wall.

Early Campaigns of the Duke of Wellington, p. 8.

The arrival of the British troops in Portugal had the imme-

diate effect of putting an end to that anarchy which had already produced so much evil in the northern provinces. Meantime the wildest reports were afloat at Lisbon. The miserable people looking every where for deliverance, believed that an army from Morocco was coming to their aid. The trick of the egg was repeated, not as before, with mysterious initials, referring to King Sebastian, but with a distinct annunciation that the French were speedily to be destroyed. The egg thus inscribed was found upon the high altars of the Patriarchal Church: but the former instance had led the French to discover the easy process by which an inscription in relief may be produced, and on the following morning eggs with a counter prophecy, in the same fashion, were to be seen upon the high altar in every church in Lisbon: at the same time a paper was fixed up, explaining the trick. This was fair matter of mirth for the day; but Junot and his officers well knew that the hostile prediction was not made now without a reasonable and near prospect of its fulfilment; and very soon intelligence came that the only foe of which he stood in fear had actually disembarked. The Portuguese commanders at Coimbra and Pombal used their utmost endeavours that no information of the British movements might reach the enemy, and in this they were assisted by the disposition of the people. But entire concealment was not possible; . . the news came to Lisbon at the same time from General Thomieres, from the agents of the police, by private letters, and by public report; and if Junot could have doubted the accuracy of his dispatches, all doubt would have been removed by the altered appearance of the Lisbonians, who now knew that of a truth their deliverance was at hand.

CHAP.
XI.

1808.

August.

*Joy of the
Portuguese
in Lisbon.*

*Neves, v.
67.*

*Thiebault,
170.*

*Neves, v.
62, 65.*

*Thiebault,
172.*

Loison was immediately recalled from Alem-Tejo, and Laborde, who was supposed to be the ablest of the French generals, was sent with the two brigades of Generals Brenier and Tho-

*Measures of
the French.*

CHAP. mieres to manœuvre and delay the enemy till Loison could
 XI. arrive, Travot being appointed to the command at Lisbon in
 1808. Laborde's stead; . . this general was chosen because having
 August. demeaned himself as a man of honour and humanity, he had
 Thiebault, deserved and obtained the respect and good opinion of the Por-
 175. tugueze. The castle at Lisbon, which had now been strongly
 fortified, was supplied with more ammunition and stores. The
 fowling-pieces and other weapons, which had been delivered up
 in obedience to a former edict, were broken, or rendered useless,
 . . the bars of silver into which the church plate had been cast,
 and the other portable plunder, packed for removal, and de-
 posited on board one of the Portugueze ships of war. Whole
 piles of rich hangings and vestments, the spoils of palaces and
 churches, were burnt in a building erected for the purpose near
 head-quarters, and in the sight of the people, for the sake of the
 gold and silver wherewith they were embroidered. In order to
 counteract the excitement of hope in the citizens, it was con-
 fidently asserted that 20,000 French had entered Portugal on
 the side of Braganza; and for the chance, vain as it was, of
 provoking their bigotry, they were reproached as having brought
 a stain upon their country by inviting heretics and Mahometans
 to fight against the French, who, like themselves, professed the
 true religion. It was indeed actually believed by the Portugueze
 that the British had brought with them a Moorish force: the
 Portugueze Consul in Barbary had in fact obtained from the
 Emperor of Morocco a promise of 200,000 *cruzados* for the
 service of Portugal; and this may have given occasion to a
 belief which was confirmed by the appearance of the High-
 landers: . . their dress was immediately pronounced not to be
 Christian, and for a time no doubt was entertained but that
 these were the Moorish auxiliaries.

*Observador
 Portuguez,
 402.
 Neves, v.
 65, 118.*

The French apprehended that Sir Arthur would move upon

the Zezere and the Tagus, for the purpose of interposing between Loison's detachment and their main force. Laborde therefore proceeded by Villa Franca and Rio-Maior to Candieiros, where he encamped; from Rio-Maior he might either take the direction of Alcobaça, Leiria, or Thomar, and, it was hoped, co-operate with Loison, in case any attempt were made to prevent their junction. Learning, however, that the British army kept the line of the coast, and that Loison had crossed the Tagus without opposition, and was in no danger of being impeded in his march, he proceeded to Alcobaça, where he found Thomieres. Junot had instructed him to reconnoitre the position of Batalha; . . the last ground, it might have been thought, on which an invader would have risked a battle; for there it was where Portugal, (and then also with English aid,) had achieved her own deliverance in the battle of Aljubarrota, one of the most signal and important victories in the age of chivalry. The country was too open for his force, and he therefore remained at Alcobaça, watching the movements of the enemy, and hoping to be joined by Loison. That general, meantime, had suffered much on his march through Alem-Tejo, from the excessive heat and the want of water. Though there were none to oppose them in the field or harass them, the French felt what it was to be in a country where every inhabitant regarded them with a deadly hatred. Wherever they went the towns and villages were deserted; . . meat, wine, and even bread, were wanting; and the persons who fell into their hands, or perhaps remained in their line for the purpose of deceiving them, sent them out of their way in search of springs or rivulets, which when they reached them were dry; . . or of stagnant waters, wherein hemp was steeped, and of which, nauseous and noisome as it was, the men could not be prevented from drinking greedily. Many died of heat

CHAP.
XI.

1808.

*August.**Movements
of Laborde
and Loison.**Thiebault,
175.**Thiebault,
172.*

CHAP. and exhaustion on the way; and they who from fatigue or sick-
 XI. ness fell behind, were killed by the peasantry.

1808.

August.

*G. Freire
 separates
 from the
 English.*

Loison reached Abrantes on the 9th, crossing the Tagus by the bridge of boats at that city. He rested there one day, and, leaving 200 men in garrison, proceeded on the next across the Zezere to Thomar, where he arrived on the same day that the main body of the English reached Leiria, the two cities being about thirty miles from each other. Laborde was at Alcobaça, six leagues from the latter city, on the road to Lisbon. Their object had been to join at Leiria, but in this the British army had anticipated them; and as there was no practicable road for carriages between Thomar and Alcobaça, Loison could only effect a junction with Laborde by a circuitous route to the southward, and thus the latter general was exposed to be attacked alone. Bernardim de Freire, the Portuguese commander, in his former conferences with Sir Arthur, had expressed a wish that the British commissariat would supply his troops with British stores during the campaign. The impossibility of complying with so unreasonable a demand was pointed out; and Sir Arthur observed, that it was a new thing to require any army landing from its ships to supply not only its own consumption of meal, but also that of the native army which it was come to assist. He added, however, that he did not expect to have occasion to call upon the country for bread during his march towards Lisbon; but that beef, wine, and forage would be required, all of which the Bishop of Porto had engaged should be supplied. Notwithstanding this explanation, General Freire renewed the subject on his arrival at Leiria; and, instead of pursuing his march, the following morning, at the hour appointed, he sent a message to the British commander, saying, that unless the Portuguese were to be fed by the English commissariat, he would separate them

from the English army, and march for Santarem by way of Thomar; urging as his reason, that supplies would be scarce on the straight road, but here there was great plenty, and he should also be in a situation to cut off the retreat of the French from Lisbon. Freire had voluntarily placed himself and his troops under Sir Arthur's command only the day preceding.

CHAP.
XI.
1808.
August.

There was another reason for this conduct, which he did not communicate to the British General. A fear had come upon the Portuguese officers during the night, that Loison, whose arrival at Abrantes they knew, would turn upon the northern provinces; the fate of Beja and Evora was before their eyes, and they trembled for Coimbra. Their apprehensions were confirmed by the arrival that night of dispatches from the Governor of Coimbra, communicating to General Freire, as information of the utmost importance, that Laborde's orders were to amuse the Portuguese army, in order that Loison might pass in their rear and destroy that city; thus, the Governor added, it had been determined in a council of war at Lisbon, and the advice was sent to him by a person upon whom he had entire reliance. It is very possible that the advice came from the French themselves, for the purpose of deceiving him. General Freire began now to fear not only for his own retreat, but even that the English, if they met with a repulse, would be cut off from the Mondego, and unable to retire to their ships. The truth is, that he was unequal to his situation, and having persons about him of as little experience as himself, they confused one another. Concealing from Sir Arthur this, which was the real cause of his vacillation, he chose to separate upon the question of supplies. The danger of the plan was pointed out to him, but in vain: Sir Arthur urged him, equally in vain, to co-operate with the British army in the deliverance of Portugal, if he had any regard to his own honour, to the honour of his country, or of his

*Motives for
his separation.*

*Neves, v.
79—81.*

CHAP. Prince : he then requested him to send him 1000 infantry, with
 XI. his cavalry, 250 in number, and his 400 light troops, engaging
 1808. to feed them ; and this was done. He advised him, at all events,
August. to remain at Leiria, or Alcobaça, or any where in the rear of the
 English, that his troops might not be unnecessarily exposed to
 destruction ; but notwithstanding he was now assured that the
 English General had found resources in the country fully adequate
 to their subsistence, he said he should persist in his plan. Sir
 Arthur, considering it of importance, on political grounds, that
 the Portuguese troops should accompany his march, would have
 undertaken to feed them, if he could have relied upon his com-
 missariat ; but this, he complained, was so ill * composed, as to
 be incapable of distributing, even to the British troops, the
 ample supplies which had been procured for them. Freire's
 conduct was imputed to an opinion that the English were too
 weak for the service upon which they were advancing ; it was
 not suspected that he had received intelligence which alarmed
 him, and which he had withheld from the British commander.
 He was, however, wise enough to follow the advice which he
 had at first refused, and remained at Leiria.

*Skirmish
 near Caldas*

On the 14th, Sir Arthur reached Alcobaça, from which the

* Sir Arthur, upon the court of inquiry, begged leave, in justice to the individuals composing this commissariat, to state, that he did not intend to complain of want of zeal, nor of any deficiency of exertion on their part. " The fact is," said he, " that I wished to draw the attention of the government to this important branch of the service, which is but little understood in this country. The evils of which I complained are probably to be attributed to the nature of our political situation, which prevents us from undertaking great military operations, in which the subsistence of armies becomes a subject of serious consideration and difficulty, and these evils consisted in the inexperience of almost every individual belonging to the commissariat, of the mode of procuring, conveying, and distributing supplies." He requested that this explanation might stand upon the minutes.

French fell back the preceding night: the next day he arrived at Caldas. Laborde and Thomieres were now at Roliça, about ten miles off, and their advanced posts were within a league of the Caldas. Four companies of riflemen were ordered to drive them back; they were tempted to an incautious pursuit; a superior body of the enemy endeavoured to cut them off, and would have succeeded, had not General Spencer come to their support. A trifling loss was sustained in this affair, but the village was won, and the French retired entirely from the neighbourhood; their picquets having been driven from Obidos.

CHAP.
XI.
1808.
August.

The country between the Caldas and Obidos is a sandy level, with an open pine wood. Obidos itself stands finely upon an insulated hill, and a little beyond a mountainous or hilly region begins, the ascent from the low country being abrupt and difficult. Laborde had retired thither, knowing the strength of the ground, and expecting to be joined there by Loison, who, he knew, would make every exertion to effect his junction in time. That junction had once already been prevented by the timely arrival of the British at Leiria, and Sir Arthur now advanced for the purpose of a second time preventing it. The enemy were drawn up at the foot of the hill, in front of their position; they retired to the heights, and Sir Arthur, having reconnoitred the ground, and seen how difficult the attack in front would be, determined to attack both flanks. He therefore directed Major-General Ferguson, with 3000 men, to turn the enemy's right, and Major-General Hill to attack the left, while the Portuguese troops, under Colonel Trant, by a wider movement on that side, were to penetrate to his rear. Meanwhile columns under Major-Generals Crawford, Nightingale, and Fane, were to assemble in the plain, ready to force their way up the passes as soon as it should be seen that the enemy were shaken. This plan, which would have ensured success with the least possible loss, was

*Laborde
takes a po-
sition at
Roliça.*

August 17.

CHAP. frustrated by some mistake in the delivery of an order. Fergu-
XI. son's brigade was, in consequence of this error, brought into the
1808. plain to support the central movement; and the attack was
August. made in front, upon the strength of the position, before the
enemy apprehended any danger on the flanks or in the rear,
and consequently while they were able to apply their whole
force and undivided attention where they were strongest.

Roliça was at that time a large and beautiful village, with more appearance of comfort and welfare about it than was usual in Portuguese villages. The place, with its five dependent hamlets, contained about three hundred families, the larger half of the population being in Roliça itself. Most of the houses had an inclosed garden or orchard, and the country is full of olive grounds, vineyards, and gardens, with stone inclosures. A little beyond Roliça is the hamlet of N. Senhora de Misericordia, a place of fewer houses, but of the same description: just without this village the British artillery was well placed, on a rising ground, where there stood some of those strong and well-built wind-mills which are common in Portugal; below were olive grounds, and an open grove of ilex or cork, under cover of which our troops were enabled to approach and deploy with little loss, though the French kept up a constant fire from the heights. Laborde had planted his eagle on the highest point of Monte S. Anna, near a wooden cross, which marked the spot of some murder or accidental death. The view from those heights is singularly beautiful, presenting just such objects as Gaspar Poussin delighted in painting, and in such combination as he would have placed them; rocks and hills rising in the valley, open groves, churches with their old galilees, and houses with all the picturesque varandas and porticos which bespeak a genial climate; Obidos with its walls and towers upon an eminence in middle distance, and its aqueduct stretching across the country

as far as the eye could follow it; Monte Junto far to the east, and on the west the Atlantic. And till the iniquitous invasion of the country by France, there had been something in the condition of the people here which accorded with the loveliness of the scene wherein they were placed. Such as their lot was, they were contented with it; three and even four generations were found under the same roof: like plants, they grew, and seeded, and decayed, and returned to earth upon the spot where they had sprung up. If this state of things be not favourable to commercial prosperity and the wealth of nations, it is far more conducive to individual virtue and happiness than the stage by which it is succeeded.

CHAP.
XI.
1808.
August.

Upon this beautiful ground it was that the British troops were first to be tried against the soldiers of Buonaparte in the Peninsula. The strength of the enemy's position fully compensated for their inferiority in numbers. The way by which the assailants had to ascend was up ravines, rather than paths, more practicable for goats than men, so steep, that in many parts a slip of the foot would have been fatal, in some parts overgrown with briars, and in others impeded by fragments of rock. Three of these dry water-courses, which appeared the least difficult, were attempted; that in the centre was the most promising, and this the 9th and 29th regiments attacked. They were protected in their advance by the fire of our artillery. The way would not admit more than three or our men abreast, in no place more than six. Near the top there was a small opening, in the form of a wedge, overgrown at the point with a thick coppice of myrtle, arbutus, arborescent heath, and those other shrubs which in this part of Portugal render the wild country so beautiful. An ambush of riflemen had been posted here, and here Colonel Lake, of the 29th, fell, with many of his men. When they had reached the summit, they were exposed to a fire

*Battle of
Roliça.*

CHAP. from the vineyards, while they could not form a front to return
 XI. it. The grenadier company, by a brave charge upon that part
 1808. of the enemy who were in the open ground, won for them time
August. to form ; and though Laborde, with great promptitude, rallied
 the French as soon as they gave way, and brought them thrice
 to the charge, they kept their ground. This severe contention
 had continued two hours, when Brigadier-General Fane, with
 the light troops, appeared on the right, and Major-General Hill
 on the left. Laborde then deemed it necessary to abandon his
 first line and retire into the hamlet of Azambugeira, which was
 in the rear. Throughout the action this General had shown that
 the high military reputation which he enjoyed was well founded ;
 all his movements were judiciously planned, and rapidly and
 well executed, men and officers giving good proof of skill and
 courage. The superiority of the British troops was therefore
 finely shown ; for, from the nature of the ground, and from un-
 avoidable circumstances, the force which on our side was actually
 engaged was by no means equal to that of the enemy. A gallant
 charge, under Major-General Spencer, drove them from this last
 position in the hamlet ; the advantage could not be followed up
 for want of cavalry, and also because of the difficulty of bring-
 ing up cannon and more troops in time. Laborde therefore,
 making his last stand upon a height beyond Azambugeira, col-
 lected his troops on the plain ground behind, formed them into
 lines, and then retired toward Torres Vedras, leaving his guns
 upon the field.

*Abrantes
 occupied
 by the Por-
 tuguese.*

The loss of the British, in killed, wounded, and missing, was
 nearly 500. The French * acknowledge to have lost nearly 600.

* General Thiebault affirms, that they had only 1900 in the field. An officer who
 was dying of his wounds informed Sir Arthur Wellesley that their numbers were 6000.
 General Thiebault asserts also, that in a charge made by General Brenier with two

Laborde was slightly wounded at the beginning of the action. Even during the action he was in hopes that Loison might arrive; but Loison, finding that the English were before him at Leiria, found it necessary to take the line of Torres Novas and Santarem, and so for Torres Vedras. The Portuguese had anxiously watched his movements, and no sooner was it ascertained that he had left Thomar, than they prepared to cut off the small garrison which he had left in Abrantes. Freire had ordered Bacellar to get possession of that city, with the aid of some Spanish troops under the Marques de Valadares, who had arrived at Castello Branco. Captain Manoel de Castro Correa de Lacerda had been sent forward to obtain certain intelligence of the enemy; and he finding circumstances favourable, and adventurers enough to join him, determined, with three priests militant, by name Captain-Father P. Manoel Domingos Crespo, Lieutenant-Father Lourenço Pires, and Ensign-Father José Nicolao Beja, to make the attempt without waiting for the Spaniards. They collected at Villa de Rei some three hundred men, armed with hunting-spears, and a few with firelocks; a considerable number of the *Ordenanças* joined them during the night on the heights of Abrançalha, which was the place appointed for their meeting; and early on the morning of that day on which the battle of Roliça was fought, they entered Abrantes, leaving Ensign-Father Beja with a party of spearmen in ambush

CHAP.
XI.
1808.
August.

companies in front of Azambugeira, the 29th regiment having lost its colonel, and many of its officers and men, surrendered *tout entier*: but that *par-malheur* the firing did not cease, and the wreck of the regiment saved itself by a spontaneous movement, leaving a major, eight officers, and fifty men, in the hands of the French. There is an official test by which the accuracy of this statement may be tried; and thereby it appears, that only four officers were missing in this action, and that there was no major among them. The loss of the English he states at more than 2000. The accuracy of our official lists of the killed and wounded is among those things relating to Great Britain which a Frenchman cannot understand.

CHAP. to cut off the enemy if they should attempt to fly. The French,
 XI. upon the first appearance of danger, retired into the old castle,
 1808. and fired from the windows, . . for there was no artillery there.
August. Upon this Father Crespo stationed some sharp-shooters upon
 the roof of S. Vicente's church, which was opposite. The enemy,
 then knowing how impossible it was to hold out in their unpro-
 vided state, resolved to sally, and make for the river side, where
 they had four vessels laden with stores, about to fall down the
 stream for Lisbon ; but before they could reach the shore, they
 were surrounded by such numbers, and lost so many men, that
 they laid down their arms. They who were on board the vessels,
 seeing their danger, leaped into the river ; some perished in
 attempting to cross it, they who reached the opposite shore were
 pursued and hunted down like wild beasts ; fifty-two were killed
 that day, and 117 taken prisoners : the few who escaped for the
 time had no place of safety near, and fell into the hands of
 the peasantry. The Corregedor-Mor at this time met with a
 miserable fate. Because of the office which he unfortunately
 held, the French had made him the instrument of their exactions :
 the same constitutional timidity which prevented him from re-
 signing his post rather than obey their tyrannical orders, induced
 him now to fly, in the unworthy hope of securing himself under
 their protection. He therefore forded the river, and hid him-
 self in a vineyard ; there a peasant discovered him, to whom he
 immediately offered 200 milreis if he would conduct him to the
 French army ; the villain took the money, led him to a solitary
 place, stabbed him in five places, then robbed him, and left him
 to expire. On the third day he was found by some women, still
 alive, and was carried to Abrantes ; no care availed to save his
 life, and he died rather of inanition and loss of blood, than from
 the nature of his wounds ; but he was able to relate what had
 passed, so that the murderer was apprehended and brought to
 justice.

Among the French effects which were taken at Abrantes were about 200 hides and 1000 bags of cotton, which the state of the intermediate country had prevented them from sending into France: they had carried on a gainful trade while the communication was open. But now they began to feel that the amount of their gains and of their plunder was in danger. In spite of all prohibitions and precautions, some intelligence still found its way to Lisbon. The British squadron and the transports had been seen from the heights, and though the French abated nothing of their high tone, the inhabitants were now well assured that their deliverance was at hand. As the only course which offered any hope of extricating himself, Junot resolved to collect the whole of his disposable force, and give the English battle before their reinforcements arrived, and before they should be ready to act on the offensive. The only places in which he left garrisons were Elvas, Almeida, and Peniche. Setubal had hitherto been occupied by a force under General Graindorge, who had succeeded Kellermann in the command there. His situation had not been tranquil, while Mestre had taken possession of Alcacere do Sal, and an English frigate was off the port. But Mestre was recalled in all haste to Beja, when that city, after the fate of Evora, apprehended a second visitation with fire and sword. The men whom he commanded gave on this occasion proof of that patient and uncomplaining spirit with which the Spaniards and Portuguese endure privations. They started fasting and without provisions, and after a long day's march reached the little town of Odivella, where no rations had been provided for them. Mestre and his adjutant then went from door to door, to beg bread, and with the bread which was thus obtained they were contented and cheerful. Aware of the alarm which Loison's operations had excited, Graindorge resolved to clear the neighbourhood, and the Juntas

CHAP.

IX.

1808.

*August.**Movements
in Alem-
Tejo and
Algarve.*

CHAP. of Alcacere, Santiago de Cacem, and Grandola, fled at his ap-
 XI. proach. But when Beja was relieved from danger by Loison's
 1808. movements to the north, Mestre, who had been dispatched
 August. toward Evora, was ordered to return upon Alcacere, and the
 Alcacere do same direction was taken by one body of men from Algarve, and
 Sal and Se- by another under Lopes from Beja. Graindorge had now re-
 tubal aban- ceived orders to retire with his troops to Almada; Alcacere
 doned by the therefore was abandoned when the Portugueze arrived there,
 French. and Setubal also. Setubal had been singularly fortunate during
 a time of general rapacity. Perfect order had been maintained
 there while Solano and the Spaniards possessed it; and when
 Graindorge succeeded Kellermann, a Portugueze woman, who
 lived with him as his mistress, had influence enough to prevent
 him from delivering up that beautiful town to pillage, which his
 men required, and which, it is said, they had been promised.
 The Portugueze writers ought not to have passed over in silence
 the name of one who averted so much evil, and who, it may well
 be believed, was more to be pitied than condemned for her frailty.

*Neves, iv.
 173—179.
 Observador
 Portuguez,
 291.*

*Measures at
 Lisbon.*

About 300 men were left at Palmella. Graindorge had two
 regiments under his command at Almada and other places on
 the left bank of the Tagus. The forts at the Bugio, Trafaria,
 and St. Julien, were occupied by the French, and they had
 troops also at Cascaes and Ericeyra. Sufficient force was to be
 left in and near Lisbon, to keep down the inhabitants, by the
 presumed aid of the Russian squadron, whose presence in the
 river was of great importance to Junot at this time. The enemy
 had recourse also to their usual policy of circulating fabricated
 intelligence. They affirmed, that 20,000 French had arrived
 at Braganza, and they produced Badajoz Gazettes which must
 have been forged for the purpose, relating the defeat and con-
 sternation of the Spaniards, and the rejoicings with which Joseph
 had been received on his triumphant entrance into Madrid. Few

persons were deceived by these artifices. On the 15th the Emperor Napoleon's birthday was celebrated; the guns from the ships and fortresses were fired, Junot gave a grand entertainment to his officers, and appeared afterwards at the Opera in state; but meantime every thing was made ready for his departure. The night was passed in giving orders, and at day-break the reserve was in motion, with the staff, the military chest, containing a million francs, and the most precious and portable part of their plunder. The Comte de Bourmont, and some other French emigrant officers who had found an asylum in Lisbon during the horrors of the Revolution, on this occasion joined the French army, the Count at his own solicitation being placed upon the staff, to fight against a government by whose bounty they had been supported, and a people who had hospitably received them in their distress: and for this moral treason they have been extolled in their own country, with that perversion of principle and utter insensibility to honour, which equally characterise the schools of the Revolution, and of Buonaparte.

It had been proposed to form a national guard at Lisbon at this time, composed of all who had any property to protect; but this was rejected, less as being impracticable than as dangerous. The Lisbonians had too much reason to execrate their oppressors. Their sufferings, though not of that kind which give a splendour to history, and consecrate the memory of the sufferers, had been more pitiable, for they had been long continued and obscure. The French themselves confessed, that they knew not how the people of Lisbon subsisted during the three months preceding the harvest; for it was known that the consumption of food in that great city was only one-third of what it used to be, and the numbers who had been expelled, who had emigrated with the court, or had found means of following it, were not greater than

CHAP.
XI.

1808.

August.

*Observador
Portuguez,
406.
Thiebault,
187-8.*

*Proclama-
tion to the
people of
Lisbon.*

*Thiebault,
95.*

CHAP. that of the foreign troops who had been introduced. Impossible
XI. as it was to conciliate a people upon whom they had inflicted
1808. such deep and irreparable injuries, the French deemed it politic
August. at this time to take the most conciliatory measures in their power;
if the popular feeling could be repressed or allayed only for a
few days, by that time they should either have obtained a victory
over the English, or have placed themselves by treaty under the
safeguard of British honour. With these views Junot left a
decree, that the heads of the tribunals, and the chief persons
among the nobility and clergy, should be invited to assist at the
council of government during his absence. He left also a pro-
clamation to the inhabitants of Lisbon, saying, that he was de-
parting from them for three or four days, to give battle to the
English, and whatever might be the event, he should return.
“ I leave,” said he, “ to govern Lisbon, a general who, by the
mildness and firmness of his character, has obtained the friend-
ship of the Portuguese at Cascaes and Oeyras ; General Travot
will, by these same virtues, obtain that of the inhabitants of
Lisbon. Hitherto you have been tranquil ; it is your interest
to continue so ! do not stain yourselves with a horrible crime at
the moment when, without any danger of your own, the lot of
arms is about to determine by what power you are to be governed.
Reflect for an instant upon the interests of the three nations who
are contending for the possession of Lisbon. What the French
desire is the glory and the prosperity of the city and of the king-
dom, for this is the interest and the policy of France. Spain
wishes to invade Portugal and reduce it to a province, that she
may again make herself mistress of the Peninsula. And England
would domineer over you for the purpose of destroying your
port and your navy, and impeding the progress of industry
among you. The English regard the magnificence of your port
with envy ; they will not suffer it to exist so near them, and

they have no hope of preserving it. They know that a new French army has already passed your frontiers, and that if this should not be sufficient, another will come after it; but they will have destroyed your naval establishments, they will have caused the destruction of Lisbon, and this is what they aim at, and what they desire: they know that they cannot maintain themselves upon the Continent; but if they can destroy the ports and the navy of any other power, they are content. I depart full of confidence in you. I reckon upon all the citizens who are interested in the preservation of public order; and I am persuaded that it will be preserved. Call to mind the miseries which must necessarily follow, if this beautiful city should compel my troops to enter it by force! The exasperated soldiers would not be then to be controlled; . . fire, sword, all the horrors of war which are practised in a city taken by assault, . . pillage, . . death, . . behold what you would draw upon yourselves! The thought alone makes me shudder. Inhabitants of Lisbon, avert from yourselves these terrible calamities!"

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*Observador
Portuguez,*
408.

The tone of the French was somewhat altered in their menaces. There had been no shuddering when the fate of Beja and Evora was announced to the people of Lisbon, nor when the massacre at Leiria was perpetrated. Care was taken to manifest that the French were prepared to execute their threats if needful. The Russian squadron, which lay at anchor in a line from Junqueira to Boa Vista, was made ready for action, the men being stationed at their quarters with lighted matches; they, no doubt, apprehended an attack from the English fleet, but La Garde intimated that they would fire upon the city in case an insurrection were attempted. Justly apprehensive, however, for his personal safety, this Intendant, whom, because perhaps of his office, the people regarded with peculiar hatred, went sometimes to pass the night on board the Vasco da Gama, and

*Prepara-
tions on
board the
Russian
squadron.*

*Observador
Portuguez,*
410.

CHAP. XI. General Travot, though he was evidently esteemed by the people for his mild and honourable conduct (so much is a good name worth even in the worst times) thought it prudent not to sleep out of the Castle.

*Junction of
Loison, La-
borde, and
Junot.*

Junot went by water to Villa Franca, and leaving Thiebault there to command the reserve, joined Loison at Alcoentre. That General had reached Santarem on the 13th, in a deplorable condition. The weather was intensely hot, without a cloud in the sky, or a breath of air stirring. Whole companies lay down upon the way; many died of thirst, and more would have perished if the officers of the staff, as soon as they arrived at that city, had not gone out with a great number of the inhabitants carrying water to meet them; brandy also was sent out, and carts to convey those who were unable to proceed farther on foot. Each of Loison's long marches at this time is said to have cost him not less than an hundred men. The troops were so dreadfully exhausted, that he was compelled to remain two days at Santarem. On the 16th he proceeded to Alcoentre, where Junot joined him the next day; they then moved to Cercal, and on the day after the action at Roliça the British army distinctly saw their columns in the line of Torres Vedras. To that place Laborde was now recalled, who had retreated beyond it to Montachique; he effected his junction on the 19th, and when General Thiebault arrived with the reserve on the 20th, the whole force which Junot could bring into the field was collected there, in number about 12,000 infantry, and 1200 or 1500 horse.

*Early Cam-
paigns, 18.*

*Thiebault,
190—193.*

*The British
advance to
Vimeiro.*

Aug. 18.

Sir Arthur had not pursued Laborde after the battle of Roliça; the line by which the enemy retired would have led him from the sea. He was beginning his march for Torres Vedras on the morrow, when he received advice that General Anstruther was arrived on the coast. His original intention had been to employ this General's brigade, and that of General Acland, in

besieging Peniche, if that should be necessary; otherwise, to land them in some of the bays near the rock, in the rear of the enemy, while he pressed upon their front. But the resistance which he had experienced at Roliça, and his disappointment of any co-operation from Freire, induced him now to land General Anstruther's troops, and join them to the army. He proceeded therefore to the village of Vimeiro, that being the position best calculated to effect his junction, and, at the same time, a march in advance. Calms prevented the fleet, which was anchored off the Berlings, from standing in, till the evening of the 19th. The brigade was then landed at Maceira, upon a sandy beach, at the foot of a cliff almost perpendicular, the ascent of which is exceedingly steep and difficult. The landing was a measure of extreme difficulty and hazard. The boats were almost always filled in going-in by the surf, many were swamped, and a few men perished; the disembarkation, however, by the great exertions and skill of the navy, was effected with less loss than might have been expected. The French could not oppose the landing, but, profiting by their superiority in cavalry, they sent a body of dragoons, in the hope of attacking the brigade on its march. Against this danger due precautions had been taken. The troops, when they had marched about three leagues, found a detachment under General Spencer waiting at Lourinham to receive them, and took their place in the advanced guard.

The French cavalry were active during this and the preceding day; they scoured the country, and Sir Arthur could obtain no information of the enemy, except that their position was very strong, and occupied by their whole force. On the 20th, at noon, it was announced that General Acland was in the offing; and on the evening of the same day Sir Harry Burrard, the second in command, arrived in Maceira Roads. Sir Arthur immediately went on board, informed him of what had been

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*General
Anstru-
ther's bri-
gade lands.*

*Arrival of
Sir Harry
Burrard
in the roads.*

CHAP. done, and of the present state of things, and laid before him the
 XI. plan of operations upon which he had intended to proceed. His
 1808. purpose was to march on the following morning, push his ad-
August. vanced guard to Mafra, and halt the main body about four or
 five miles from that place, thus turning the enemy's position at
 Torres Vedras. He possessed as much knowledge of the ground
 as good maps and scientific descriptions could impart; Sir
 Charles Stuart (a man whose great military talents had never
 been allowed a field whereon to display themselves) had care-
 fully surveyed this part of the country when he commanded the
 British troops in Portugal; it had not escaped him, that upon this
 ground, in case of serious invasion, the kingdom must be saved
 or lost; and his maps and papers were in Sir Arthur's hands.
 The battle would thus be fought in a country of which he had
 adequate knowledge, and he hoped to enter Lisbon with the re-
 treating or flying enemy. Such was the plan which he had
 formed, and orders for marching on the morrow had actually
 been issued, before Sir Harry's arrival.

*He alters
 the plan of
 the cam-
 paign.*

To Sir Arthur, who had a well-founded confidence in him-
 self and in his troops, no prospect could have been more en-
 couraging; but the new commander did not behold it hopefully.
 The objections to a forward movement preponderated in his
 mind; he learnt that the artillery * horses were inefficient, that

* They were cast off cavalry, purchased in Ireland; and they were described as old, blind, and lame: some of them, it was said, had already at this time died of age, others of work, though they had been carefully fed: nearly a sixth part had thus perished on the way, and of the remainder a great number were not worth the forage which they consumed. Nine years after these poor horses had been delivered over to the dogs and wolves, a representation was made to me in their favour, and I feel myself bound to notice it, were it only for the singularity of the case. I am assured that the 300 horses (which Lord Castlereagh good-naturedly called his countrymen) were

our men, for want of cavalry, were kept close to their encampments by the enemy's horse; and that it would not be possible to go far into the country, because they depended upon the ships for bread. Weighing these things, he was not convinced that Sir Arthur's intentions were expedient; the decision which he was now to make appeared to him most serious in its consequences; he thought it was impossible to calculate the disasters to which a check might expose the army, and therefore he deemed it necessary to wait for Sir John Moore's division. Sir Arthur had recommended that that division, when it arrived in the Mondego, should march upon Santarem, a position from whence it might intercept the enemy's retreat, whether they attempted to make their way to Almeida or to Elvas; but the new commander hearing on his way of the action at Roliça, and disapproving this arrangement, had immediately dispatched instructions by which Sir John Moore was directed to proceed from the Mondego, and join him as speedily as possible in Maceira Roads. In vain did Sir Arthur represent the precious

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selected with the greatest care, as well as knowledge in horseflesh, from 1050 of which the corps was then composed; that they were in the very best condition and working order; they were drafts from a collection made by purchase in 1803, (that is, five years before, and therefore not young); or from the best and most useful horses cast from dragoon regiments, as unfit for dragoon service generally, (the inferior description of such cast horses having been from time to time sold); that they had been always carefully groomed and well fed, and were in excellent condition for common draft, the service for which they were required. From the manner in which this representation was made to me, I have no doubt of its truth. The horses, when they began the campaign, had probably not recovered from the voyage; they were not accustomed to the food of the country, and were employed in much harder work than had ever fallen to their lot before, and upon much worse roads. And so, peace to their memory. I must not however omit to observe, that Captain Eliot, in his Treatise on the Defence of Portugal, says, these artillery horses, in the brigade to which he was attached, did their duty perfectly well at the battle of Vimeiro.

CHAP. time that would be lost before this division could be landed and
 XI. become serviceable at Vimeiro; the far greater utility which
 1808. might be expected from its presence at Santarem; the evil of
August. at once changing their operations from an offensive to a defensive course; and of allowing the enemy to choose their time and ground. For, situated as the two armies now were, it was impossible to avoid an action. If the British troops advanced, they would have the advantage of acting on the offensive; it was his opinion that they might reach Mafra before the French could bring on a general engagement; and in that case they should turn the French position. But these representations were unavailing; an inauspicious spirit of caution prevailed. The whole plan of the campaign was changed; and with the enemy collected within three leagues, the army was ordered to remain stationary, till a corps should arrive, of which no tidings had yet been received. In a general who commands good troops the want of confidence is as great a fault as the excess of it in the commander of an ill-disciplined army.

*The battle
of Vimeiro.*

*Thiebault,
191.*

It was soon seen how well Sir Arthur had judged of the enemy's intentions. Junot was ill supplied with provisions; he could not venture long to be absent from Lisbon: situated as he was, it appeared to him that there would be less evil in an immediate defeat, than must arise from prolonged operations, though they should lead to a victory. His business, therefore, was to bring on an action as soon as possible, and to make the attack; and at the moment when Sir Harry Burrard, resolving upon delay, had countermanded the orders for advancing on the morrow, the French were in motion.

Vimeiro, a name which was now to become memorable in British and Portuguese history, is a village situated nearly at the bottom of a lovely valley, about three miles from the sea, and screened from the sea breeze by mountainous heights, through

which the little river Maceira winds its way. The village stands at the eastern extremity of these heights; and on the opposite side, separated from them by a deep ravine, are other heights, over which the road to Lourinham passes, a little town in the *Termo* or district of which the parishes of Vimeiro and Maceira are included. The western termination reaches the sea-shore. As the army had halted here only for the night, meaning to proceed early on the morrow, they were disposed of, not as expecting an attack, but as most convenient for the troops. Six brigades bivouacked on the height to the westward. The advanced guard was posted on a hill south-east of Vimeiro, to cover the commissariat and stores which were in the village: this height was entirely commanded by higher ground to the westward. The cavalry and the reserve of artillery were in the valley, between the hills on which the infantry were placed; and there were picquets of observation on the hills to the eastward.

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The enemy, who had marched all night, and whom some accidents had impeded on their way, first appeared at eight in the morning, forming in strong bodies upon the heights toward Lourinham, thus threatening the advanced guard and the left, which was the weak part of the British position. Sir Arthur had visited the advanced posts early in the day, and had returned to his quarters before the first shots were exchanged with the enemy's advance. He now moved the brigades of Generals Ferguson, Nightingale, Acland, and Bowes, successively across the ravine to the heights on the Lourinham road. General Anstruther's brigade took post on the right of the advanced guard, and Major-General Hill was moved nearer, as a support to these troops, and as a reserve, in addition to which our small cavalry force was in the rear of their right. The French army was in two divisions, . . the right, of about 6000 men, under General Loison, the left, about 5000, under Laborde. Kellermann had the re-

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CHAP. serve, which was intended to connect the two wings, but they
XI. were too distant from each other. General Margaron com-
1808. manded the cavalry.

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Laborde came along the valley to attack the advanced guard on the eminence or table hill ; he had a column of infantry and cavalry to cover his left flank, and on his right one regiment marched in column to turn the defenders, and penetrate the village by the church ; but this purpose had been foreseen, and part of the 43rd had been ordered into the churchyard to prevent it. The French advanced with perfect steadiness, though exposed to a severe fire of riflemen posted behind the trees and banks, and of seven pieces of artillery well directed. They advanced like men accustomed to action and to victory ; but suffering more severely as they drew nearer, and especially from the Shrapnell shells, (then first brought into use,) they faltered, and opened a confused fire. Still they advanced, and arrived within a few paces of the brow of the hill, where the 50th regiment, under Colonel Walker, with a single company of the rifle corps on its left, stood opposed to them. That regiment poured upon them a destructive volley, and instantly charged with the bayonet, and penetrated the angle of the column, which then broke and turned. The regiment which was entering the village by the church, was attacked in flank by General Acland's brigade, then advancing to its position on the heights ; and our cavalry, poor in number as it was, charged with effect. The discomfiture of this column was then complete ; they fled, leaving about 1000 men on the ground, 350 prisoners, and seven pieces of artillery ; and they were pursued for nearly two miles to the plain beyond the woody ground, where they were supported by a reserve of horse, and where Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, of the 20th light dragoons, who particularly distinguished himself that day, fell, with many of his men, overpowered by a much superior force of

cavalry. The secondary column, under General Brenier, which was to have supported Laborde in his attack, made a side movement to the left, in order to cross the ravine, and thus it was separately engaged by General Anstruther's brigade; and being charged with the bayonet, was repulsed with great loss. An aide-de-camp of Sir Arthur's coming up to tell this General that a corps should be sent to his assistance, he replied, "Sir, I am not pressed, and I want no assistance; I am beating the French, and am able to beat them wherever I find them."

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Loison's attack was made nearly at the same time as Laborde's: it was supported by a large body of cavalry, and made with the characteristic and imposing impetuosity of French troops. They drove in our light troops, but they were checked by General Ferguson's brigade, consisting of the 36th, 40th, and 71st, which formed the first line; after some close and heavy firing of musketry, the 82d and 29th came up, and the brigades of Generals Bowes and Acland. The enemy were then charged with the bayonet: this weapon is of French invention, but it was made for British hands. They came to the charge bravely, and stood it for a moment;... in that moment their foremost rank fell "like a line of grass before the mowers." This is not the flourish of an historian, seeking artfully to embellish details which no art can render interesting to any but military readers; it is the language of an actor in the scene, who could not call it to mind in after-hours without shuddering; for the very men whose superiority was thus decidedly proved, could not speak without involuntary awe, of so complete and instantaneous a destruction, produced as it was, not by artillery or explosions, but by their own act and deed, and the strength of their own hearts and hands. The bodies of about 300 French grenadiers were counted upon the field, who had fallen in this charge. The enemy were pursued to a considerable distance, and six pieces of cannon were taken in the

CHAP. XI. 1808. August. pursuit. General Kellermann made a vigorous attempt, late in the action, to recover these from the 71st and 82d, which were halted in a valley where the guns had been captured. These regiments retired a little way to some advantageous ground, then faced about, fired, and advancing with the bayonet, drove the French back with great loss. Thus were they every where repulsed, though their whole force had been engaged, while not more than half the British army had been brought into action.

Sir Harry Burrard takes the command.

Before the action began Sir Harry Burrard and his staff left the ship; they soon heard the firing after they were on shore, and by the time they reached Vimeiro, which is about three miles from the landing-place, the armies were hotly engaged. They found Sir Arthur on the heights, and he explained in few words to the new Commander the position of the army, and the measures which he had taken for beating the enemy. Sir Harry was perfectly satisfied, and directed him to go on with an operation which he had so happily and so well begun. This he did not as giving up his command for the time, but as fulfilling one of the functions of a commander, by directing Sir Arthur to pursue measures which he approved, and holding himself as responsible for the event as if the plan had been originally his own. So far all was well. Toward the close of the action, when the French were beaten on the left, and it was evident that they must be every where defeated, Sir Arthur went to him, and represented that this was the moment for advancing; that he ought to move the right wing to Torres Vedras, and pursue the beaten enemy with the left. By this movement upon Torres Vedras, the French would be cut off from the nearest road to Lisbon, or if they attempted it, they would find themselves between two bodies of our troops; there remained for them, as the alternative, the circuitous route by Alenquer and Villa-Franca; . . they were dispirited, beaten, and in confusion, absolutely, in his opinion,

incapable of forming or of appearing again in the shape of an army, if they were followed even at a slower rate by a victorious enemy ; and this he said, giving them full credit for discipline and great facility in forming after having been broken. There was plenty of ammunition in the camp for another battle, and provisions for twelve days. But neither these representations, urged as they were with natural and fitting warmth, nor the victory which was before his eyes, could induce the new Commander to deviate from his former opinion. There are some men who, in their desire for the end at which they aim, overlook the difficulties in the way ; there are others who see nothing else ; the former may sometimes fail, the latter never can succeed. Sir Harry's answer was, that he saw no reason to change his purpose, and that the same motives which induced him yesterday to wait for reinforcements, had still the same weight. At this moment the enemy were retiring in great disorder, and most completely disheartened by their defeat. Sir Arthur, grieved at seeing the irrecoverable opportunity go by, made a second attempt to convince the Commander that victory was in his hands. General Ferguson had sent his aide-de-camp to represent the great advantage of advancing, . . he himself could, in fact, have cut off a considerable body of the enemy. Sir Arthur took the aide-de-camp to the Commander. But this second representation was as ineffectual as the first. His Adjutant-General, Brigadier-General Clinton, and Colonel Murray, his Quarter-Master-General, who had coincided in opinion with him the preceding evening, agreed with him now also. He had just heard from an officer who had passed through General Freire's troops, such an account of them and their proceedings, as precluded any hope of rendering them useful ; the artillery horses seemed to him inefficient ; but more especially the want of cavalry, he thought, incapacitated the army from following

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CHAP. up its success. The 260 Portuguese horse which were with us
 XI. had shown themselves nearly useless; the British were only
 1808. 210 in number, and they had suffered severely in the action,..
August. this was known, though the extent of their loss had not yet been
 ascertained. These difficulties preponderated with him; he
 adhered still to his determination; and Sir Arthur, whose sense
 of military duty would not allow him to act in disregard of
 orders, as Nelson was accustomed to do, turned to one of
 his officers, and concealing the bitterness of disappointment
 under a semblance of levity, said, "Well, then, we have no-
 thing to do, but to go and shoot red-legged partridges,".. the
 game with which that country abounds. From that moment he
 gave up all hope of cutting the French off from Lisbon, inclosing
 them there, or preventing them, if they thought proper to at-
 tempt it, from protracting the campaign by retreating upon Elvas
 and Almeida.

The loss of the enemy in this action was about 3000 * killed
 and wounded, thirteen pieces of artillery, and twenty-three
 ammunition waggons; that of the English little more than 700
 killed, wounded, and missing. The British numbers in the field
 were 16,000, of which only half had been engaged; the French
 were about 14,000, including 1300 cavalry, and the whole of this
 force was brought into action. General Solignac was severely
 wounded; General Brenier wounded, and left on the field. He
 was in danger of being put to death by those into whose hands
 he had fallen, when a Highlander, by name Mackay, who was a
 corporal in the 71st, came up and rescued him. The French
 General, in gratitude for his preservation, offered him his watch

* According to General Thiebault, ten guns and 1800 men; but to make up the
 number of killed and wounded, he adds to the British loss, what he takes off from the
 French, and says, we had more than 500 killed and 1200 wounded.

and purse ; but Mackay refused to accept them. When he had delivered his prisoner in safety to Colonel Pack, the French General could not help saying, "What sort of man is this? He has done me the greatest service, and yet refuses to take the only reward which I can at present offer him!" Brenier no doubt contrasted this with the conduct of his countrymen, in whose rapacities and cruelties, it appears by the testimony of the Portugueze, that he had no share ; when, therefore, Colonel Pack replied, "We are British soldiers, sir, and not plunderers," he must have deeply felt the disgrace which had been brought upon the French character. Mackay was immediately made a serjeant by Sir Arthur Wellesley's express desire ; and the Highland Society, at their next meeting, voted him a gold medal, with a suitable device and inscription. The piper to the grenadier company of the same regiment, Stewart was his name, received early in the action a dangerous wound in the thigh : he would not, however, be carried off the field, but, sitting down * where his comrades might hear him, he continued playing warlike airs till the end of the engagement. A handsome stand of Highland pipes, with an inscription commemorating the manner in which he had deserved the donation, was voted him by the Highland society.

Most of the wounded French who fell into the conqueror's hands were young, and of delicate appearance, . . . apparently men whose lot would not have fallen in the army, under any other system than that of the conscription, though, having been forced into it, they had acquired the worst vices which have ever disgraced and degraded the profession of arms. They were

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* *Weel, my bra' lads, I can gang nae farther wi' ye a-fighting; but Deel ha'e my saul if ye sal want music,* were his words.

CHAP. dressed in long white linen coats and trowsers, their firelocks
 XI. were about six inches longer in the barrel than ours, their
 1808. bayonets about three shorter, the locks of their pieces much
August. better finished, and the pans so constructed, that the powder was
 not liable to fall out, . . an accident which at that time often
 happened to ours. A chaplain of the British army, as he was
 endeavouring to render assistance to some of them, while under
 the surgeon's hands, addressed himself to one in the language
 of commiseration, and uttered, at the same time, a natural ex-
 pression of regret at the horrors of war: but the Frenchman
 fiercely answered him, with a mixture of pride and indignation,
 that he gloried in his wounds, and that war was the greatest hap-
 piness of life. During the whole day the armed peasantry
 prowled about the field, taking vengeance upon every wounded
 or straggling Frenchman whom they could find, for the manifold
 wrongs of their country, and the aggravated injuries which they
 had endured. So conscious indeed were the prisoners of the
 little mercy which they deserved at their hands, that they dreaded
 lest these men should break in upon them, and massacre them
 all; and a guard was stationed to protect them. The peasantry,
 however, passed the night in the field, carousing round a large
 fire, recounting to each other what they had done, and rejoicing
 over the day's work.

*The French
 resolve to
 propose
 terms.*

In withholding the army from following up the great advantage which it had gained, Sir Harry Burrard knew how unpopular such a determination must be, and sacrificed his own feelings to his judgement. He thought it not allowable to risk much when the reinforcements which were at hand would make the British force so superior, that any further efforts of the enemy must be vain, and success would be obtained without hazard and with less loss. He erred in judgement; but this honourable testimony was borne to him by Sir Arthur Wellesley,

the person of all others by whom that error must have been felt most keenly, that he decided upon fair military grounds in the manner which he thought most conducive to the interests of the country. The French failed not to profit by the respite which was thus allowed them; they formed a rear-guard of four regiments of cavalry, and retired * at leisure, no attempt being made to harass their retreat. Junot, who is said to have exposed himself at the close of the action so as hardly to have been saved from the British cavalry, summoned Generals Laborde, Loison, Kellermann, and Thiebault, upon the field, and demanded their opinions, whether the army ought again to try the lot of arms, and if not, what course it should pursue. They agreed that they were neither in a condition to give battle, nor to stand one. Their troops were harassed, discontented, and discouraged; their ammunition would not last three hours longer; their provisions were failing, their horses already sinking for want of forage. Their losses were irreparable, whereas the enemy were looking for strong reinforcements; and, in fine, the slightest reverse would now leave them at the mercy of the English and Portuguese. Nothing remained but to preserve the best attitude they could, and retire to Lisbon, the possession of which was now their only safeguard. They retreated accordingly to Torres Vedras. A second council was held there on the morrow; and

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* They remained, according to General Thiebault, long enough to dress 800 of their wounded upon the field, and send them all off for Torres Vedras. The attitude of the grenadiers with which General Kellermann had charged, the rapidity with which the infantry re-formed, and the movements of four cavalry regiments under General Margaron, he says, *concoururent efficacement à contenir l'ennemi. Nous restâmes de cette manière, maîtres du champ de bataille, plus de trois heures après la cessation de l'action.* It is melancholy to observe, that the historical relations of this war which the French have published since its termination, are, generally speaking, as little to be relied on as their official accounts during its continuance.

CHAP. upon a full view of the difficulties and dangers * of their si-
 XI. tuation, and the impossibility of effecting a retreat through so
 1808. large a part of Spain as must be traversed before they could
August. effect a junction with their countrymen, they resolved to try
 what could be done by negotiation. General Kellermann, there-
 fore, was dispatched with a flag of truce to propose a convention
 for the evacuation of Portugal. Meantime Sir Hew Dalrymple
 had arrived and taken the command of the British army, which
 thus had three commanders-in-chief within twenty-four hours.

*Arrival of
 Sir Hew
 Dalrymple.*

Sir Hew Dalrymple had been expressly chosen for this com-
 mand because of the zeal and judgement which he had displayed
 during the whole of those important transactions in the south of
 Spain on which so much depended, and in which he had acted
 upon his own responsibility. In a private letter from Lord
 Castlereagh, then minister for the war department, Sir Arthur
 Wellesley was recommended to his particular confidence, and a
 full persuasion expressed that that officer's high reputation would
 alone dispose Sir Hew to select him for any service which re-
 quired great prudence and temper, combined with much military
 experience ; but, above all, that the habits of communication in
 which Sir Arthur had for a length of time been with his majesty's
 ministers, concerning the affairs of Spain, would point him out
 as an officer of whom it would be desirable for the commander-
 in-chief, on all accounts, to make the most prominent use which
 the rules of the service would permit. Sir Hew embarked at Gibralt-
 ar on the 13th ; and learnt that night from Lord Collingwood,
 who was off Cadiz, that Sir Arthur's corps had either landed, or

* General Thiebault, who was present at this council, represents the force against them, independent of Lisbon, of 30,000 British, and 17,000 Spaniards, at more than 80,000 men, *auxquels rien ne manquoit !* In reality, every man in Portugal was their enemy ; but except animosity and individual courage, the Portuguese at that time wanted every thing.

was about to land, in Mondego Bay. Arriving off the Tagus on the 19th, he was informed by Sir Charles Cotton, that Sir Arthur was proceeding along the coast. It was not Sir Hew's wish to supersede that General in a detached command for which he had been particularly chosen, especially when he was now completely engaged in an enterprise from which it was impossible to recede, and which required all his ability to accomplish. Under these feelings, therefore, the Commander-in-Chief resolved to proceed to Mondego Bay, and there join the expected reinforcements when they should land, leaving Sir Arthur meantime to pursue and complete his own plan. Seeing, however, on the way a number of ships under the land, and receiving a vague account of the action at Roliça from a sloop of war, he sent an aide-de-camp on shore for intelligence, ordering him to inform Sir Arthur, if he chanced to see him, that he was proceeding to fall in with Sir Harry Burrard and the main body, and that though he wished to be informed of his proceedings, he did not mean to interfere with his command. This was on the evening of the 21st; about midnight the boat returned, bringing intelligence of the battle, and that Sir Harry Burrard was in command. There was now no room for that delicacy toward Sir Arthur, as honourable as it was judicious, which he had resolved to observe. His determination was immediately taken, and in the morning the frigate stood in for the shore.

None of the official accounts which Sir Arthur had addressed to him had been received; he landed therefore with no other information than what had been thus gathered upon the way, and entirely unacquainted with the actual state of the French army. When he reached the beach they were embarking the wounded for Porto: during the whole night the sailors had been thus employed, wading nearly up to the middle in the sea, and displaying as much humanity as skill. Arriving at Vimeiro, he

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*He orders
the army to
advance.
Aug. 22.*

CHAP. found the army on the ground which it had occupied the day
 XI. before, the dead lying on the field, and the carts still busy in
 1808. removing the wounded. That ground had not been chosen as a
August. military position, but merely as a halting-place, and it was now
 necessary to remove from it, because of the late action. Sir Hew
 therefore gave orders for marching the next morning at day-
 break toward Lisbon by way of Mafra. Like his predecessor,
 he thought that Sir Arthur had entered upon a hazardous ope-
 ration, which, unless it obtained complete success, must end in
 complete ruin, the British having no prospect of support, nor
 any thing upon which to fall back in case of disaster, so that on
 their part the battle would be fought for existence, while the
 enemy, in case of defeat, would lose only what were killed or
 taken. But he differed from Sir Harry Burrard in this, that he
 deemed it imprudent to wait for Sir John Moore's division, the
 arrival of which was extremely uncertain, and that he saw the
 necessity of pursuing active measures. The French, he knew,
 must either give him battle, for the sake of defending Lisbon, (a
 chance which he was willing to take, though they were superior
 in cavalry, and, as he thought, in numbers, and though they
 would have the great advantage of choosing their ground ;) or
 they would cross the Tagus.

*Kellermann
 arrives to
 propose an
 armistice.*

Soon after mid-day an alarm was given that the enemy
 were advancing to renew the attack ; the position was taken
 as on the preceding morning. It proved to be a body of ca-
 valry with a flag of truce ; and General Kellermann alighting
 at head-quarters, proposed an armistice, for the purpose of con-
 cluding a treaty for the evacuation of Portugal by the French.
 Sir Hew immediately called for his two predecessors. He him-
 self had no means of knowing, but from them, what the con-
 sequences of yesterday's battle really had been ; the responsi-
 bility was his, but for the information upon which the agreement

was to be founded, he trusted to them, and more especially to Sir Arthur. That General's plans had been completely defeated by the refusal to follow up the victory, and by the change which Sir Harry Burrard, before he landed, had made in the intended destination of Sir John Moore's corps. Considering, therefore, that in consequence of these errors the enemy had been allowed leisure to resume a formidable position between the British army and Lisbon, and could not now by any increase of the British numbers be prevented from crossing the Tagus, and occupying in strength the strong place of Elvas, with its stronger fort La Lippe, and Almeida; that the Tagus would not for some time longer be open to the fleet, the army meantime depending upon the ships for supplies, and that its communication with them by the coast must at that season be most precarious: considering also how important it was that the troops should not be delayed by regular sieges in Portugal, but march as soon as possible into Spain, he thought it expedient that the French should be allowed to evacuate Portugal with their arms and baggage, and that every facility for this purpose should be afforded them. They occupied at that time, in a military point of view, he thought, the whole of Portugal, having every strong hold in their hands: their present situation enabled them still to avail themselves of those possessions, and to strengthen them as they might think proper; and he was of opinion that an army which had its retreat open, and possessed such advantages, had a fair claim to be allowed such terms. He wished, however, to limit the suspension of arms to eight-and-forty hours. Sir Hew preferred that it should be unlimited, as it had been proposed; in this he had a view to the disembarkation of Sir John Moore's corps, which was not forbidden by the agreement.

An armistice accordingly for the purpose of negotiating a

*Terms of
the armistice.*

CHAP. definitive convention was concluded upon * these terms : That
 XI. the river Sisandre should be the line of demarcation between the
 1808. two armies, and that neither of them should occupy Torres
August. Vedras ; that the English general should bind himself to com-

* It is asserted by General Thiebault, that General Kellermann was sent to feel his ground, under pretext of a conference relating to the prisoners and wounded. Upon that General's return he says, "*On conçoit de quel intérêt étoient les nouvelles qu'il rapportoit, et combien elles parurent heureuses quand on sut à quel point il avoit réalisé tout ce qu'on avoit pu espérer. Il avoit été reçu avec la plus grande distinction ; il avoit eu le talent de faire prendre aux Anglais l'initiative des propositions qu'il avoit à leur faire ; sachant parfaitement l'Anglais, il avoit suivi la partie la plus mystérieuse de leurs conversations† ; il s'étoit fortifié de la certitude que, malgré l'énormité de leurs avantages, les Anglais, incertains de l'époque de l'arrivée des renforts, qu'ils attendoient, n'étoient pas tranquilles sur leur position : il étoit parvenu à traiter pour la flotte Russe en même temps que pour l'armée Française, et cela en faisant pressenter que les Russes alloient se joindre à nous : il étoit arrivé de cette manière à demander même que nous émenassions la flotte Portugaise, non pour l'obtenir, mais afin d'avoir quelque chose à céder, dans le cas où des articles d'une haute importance seroient trop contestés ; et c'est ainsi, que par autant d'habileté que de fermeté et d'adresse, il parvint à conclure et à signer un traité provisoire.*" This statement is sent into the world with General Kellermann's sanction, Baron Thiebault's *Relation* having, as the preface states, been read to him. General Kellermann was so successful in this negotiation, that he can derive no additional credit from these additions to the plain facts. With regard to the initiative, he came declaredly to treat for an armistice preparatory to a convention for evacuating Portugal, and he produced a paper containing the wishes of the French Commander-in-chief ; the deliberations upon his proposal, which he is said to have overheard, were not carried on in his presence, but in an inner room. (*Proceedings upon the Inquiry*, p. 57.) As to the demand that the French might carry away the Portuguese fleet, the French are certainly bold askers ; and in this negotiation, as in many others, they proved that Fortune favours the bold ; . . but he must have been more than bold, who could have made such a proposal. What was afterwards asked upon that score will appear hereafter.

† Voici quelques-unes des phrases qu'il recueillit : *Notre position est délicate—Le corps de Sir John Moore n'est pas encore arrivé à Figuières—La bonne intelligence des Russes et des Français doit nous donner des inquiétudes, &c.*

prehend the armed Portuguese in the truce, and that their line of demarcation should be from Leiria to Thomar: that it was agreed that the French army should in no case be considered as prisoners of war; that all the individuals of it should be transported to France with their arms and baggage and private property, and that they should be deprived of no part of it whatsoever: that no individual, whether Portuguese, Frenchman, or of a nation allied to France, should be molested for his political conduct, but be protected, both in person and property, and have liberty to retire from Portugal within a limited time, with all his effects: that the neutrality of the port of Lisbon should be acknowledged for the Russian fleet; that is to say, that, when the English army and fleet should be in possession of the city and port, the Russian fleet should neither be disturbed during its stay, nor stopped when it might choose to depart, nor pursued when it had sailed, till after the time fixed, in such cases, by maritime law: that all the French artillery, and all their cavalry horses, should be transported to France.

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A demur was, with good reason, made concerning the baggage and private property which the French were to carry off with them; and Kellermann explained, that the words were only to bear their strict grammatical meaning. The article regarding the Russians underwent more discussion. Sir Hew insisted, that this was a point referable to the Admiral, and that if he did not agree to it, it must be struck out; with this understanding on the part of the French negotiator that article was framed.

While Kellermann was thus employed in the British camp, Junot occupied the positions of the Cabeça de Montechique and Mafra, and hastened himself to Lisbon. On the 20th official intelligence had been published in that city that Laborde had sustained an action with the English army, and though he had only 2000 men, had kept his ground against it; in the

*Junot re-
turns to
Lisbon.*

CHAP. night he had taken a position conformably to his orders, for the
XL. purpose of joining the Commander-in-chief; their junction had
1808. been formed, the enemy were in a strait, and would be attacked
August. on the morrow, when they would be made to see what the French
could do: two English regiments had been destroyed in the
action. The people, however, understood by reports more
worthy of belief than any official statements of the enemy, that
the English had been successful at Roliça. The news of the
battle of Vimeiro also reached them at nightfall of the 22d; it
was asserted, not only that Junot had been defeated, but that
he was taken prisoner; the people openly congratulated each
other in the streets, and the exultation and stir at the Ave
Maria hour were such as to indicate an insurrection. None
of the French deemed it prudent to appear, except General
Travot, who relied, and not in vain, upon that personal good-
will which he had obtained by a conduct always humane and
honourable. At daybreak of the 23d, a letter from Junot was
published, dated from the field of battle, at four in the afternoon.
It stated that the English had been attacked at nine o'clock that
morning, in the fortified position which they occupied, and that
in an instant they had been dislodged from all their advanced
points. The left of the French army had obtained from the
first complete success; their right having to take a circuitous
course, could not arrive in time to decide the action entirely; it
had continued till two o'clock, and they should probably finish
it on the morrow. At two they had taken a position, and were
three leagues nearer the enemy than on the preceding day. The
loss of the English had been great. "On our part," said Junot,
"there have been 150 killed, and from 300 to 400 wounded.
We are stronger now, fresh troops having reached me..to-
morrow, therefore.." there the sentence was broken off,
and General Travot concluded the bulletin by saying, that

many of the enemy's superior officers had been killed or wounded, that the Commander-in-chief was well, and in a few days would be in Lisbon. He arrived, in fact, that afternoon, with the reserve, and such of the wounded as could be removed. A royal salute was fired from the Castle, as if he had returned victorious; but the countenances of the French, even the generals themselves, belied this manifestation of success. It was soon rumoured that a capitulation had been proposed, and no doubt could be entertained concerning this when it was known that an English officer arrived that night in company with Kellermann, and that a boat had been sent off to the English fleet.

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*Noves, v.
151—154.
Observador
Portuguez,
413, 417.*

The British army marched on the morning after the armistice was signed, and took a position near the village of Ramalhal, this movement being made merely for convenience. The Portuguese General, Bernardim Freire, visited the Commander-in-chief there; and received a copy of the armistice; he was dissatisfied with it, and promised to send a confidential officer to communicate with him thereupon. Accordingly Major Ayres Pinto de Sousa soon arrived at Sir Hew's head-quarters. His strongest objections related to that article which stipulated that no persons should be molested for their political conduct; that being a question, he said, which it was for the Portuguese government to decide. It appeared evident to Sir Hew, that General Freire was offended because there was no mention of the Junta of Porto in the armistice. His answer was, that the government of Portugal, to which the decision of this point would belong, nowhere existed; and moreover the measure was wholly military, and admitted of no delay; he desired, however, that General Freire would state in writing whatever observations he had to make, and promised that they should be most favourably considered in the progress of the negotiation.

*General
Freire dis-
satisfied
with the
armistice.*

There arose a difficulty now respecting the Russian fleet.

CHAP. XI. 1808. *Difficulty concerning the Russian squadron.*

Notwithstanding the preparations of defence which had been made on board their ships, the feelings of the Russians and of their Admiral were not with the French, and all Junot's endeavours to make their presence available for the increase of his own means were in vain. Sir Arthur Wellesley had learnt when he visited the British squadron off the Tagus that it was Admiral Siniavin's intention to take no part in the contest between the two contending powers, but claim the protection of a neutral port. It was his opinion, that if they conducted themselves upon this principle, they ought not to be molested, and that it mattered not what became of their ships, so they were not allowed to return to the Baltic. In Sir Hew's judgement the Admiral was the best, if not the only judge of the question, and to him accordingly the stipulation in the armistice concerning them had been referred. Sir C. Cotton refused to ratify it; and upon this Sir Arthur recommended the Commander to put an end to the armistice, and lose no farther time in advancing, leaving it for Junot to renew the negotiation if he thought proper. The Commander was of a different opinion; good faith, he thought, required that the Admiral's sentiments should be communicated to General Junot; but he notified to him, at the same time, that the armistice must be at an end in forty-eight hours, and Colonel Murray, who was the bearer of this notice, was authorized to negotiate a convention.

Convention of Cintra.

The question concerning the Russians was adjusted between the two Admirals. It was agreed that the ships should be held as a deposit by Great Britain, to be restored within six months after the conclusion of peace between Russia and that power; and that the men should be conveyed to their own country at the expense of the British Government, without any condition or stipulation respecting their future services. The definitive convention also was soon concluded. The terms were, that the

French army should evacuate Portugal with their arms and baggage, not be considered prisoners of war, be furnished with means of conveyance by the English Government, and disembarked in any of the ports between Rochefort and l'Orient, and be at liberty to serve on their arrival. They were to take with them all their artillery of French calibre, with the horses belonging to it, and the tumbrils supplied with sixty rounds per gun, all their equipments, and all that is comprehended under the name of property of the army; and all individuals of the army were to be at liberty to dispose of their private property of every description, with full security for the purchasers. The horses of the cavalry and of the officers were to be embarked, those of the former not exceeding 600, those of the latter not exceeding 200; and as the means of conveyance for horses were very limited, facility should be given them for disposing of those which could not be embarked. The garrisons of Elvas, Peniche, and Palmella, were to be embarked at Lisbon, that of Almeida at Porto, or the nearest harbour, and British commissaries were to provide for their subsistence and accommodation on the march. The sick and wounded who were not in a state to be removed were entrusted to the British army, their expenses while they remained to be discharged by the British Government, and reimbursed by France. Should doubts arise as to the meaning of any article, it was to be interpreted favourably to the French. From the date of the ratification of this convention, all arrears of contributions, requisitions, or claims whatever of the French Government against the subjects of Portugal, or any other individuals residing in that country, founded on the occupation of Portugal by the French troops, should be cancelled, all sequestrations upon their property removed, and the free disposal of the same restored to the proper owners. All subjects of France, or of powers in alliance with France, domi-

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CHAP. ciliated in Portugal, or accidentally there, should be protected,
XL. their property respected, and themselves at liberty either to
1808. remain in the country, or to accompany the French army. No
September. Portuguese was to be held accountable for his political conduct;
and all who had continued in office, or accepted it, under the
French government, were placed under the protection of the
British commanders, and were to sustain no injury either in their
persons or property, for it had not been at their choice to obey the
French or not: if they chose to sell their property and remove,
the term of one year should be allowed them for that purpose.
The Spanish troops detained at Lisbon were to be given up to
the British Commander, and he engaged to obtain from the
Spaniards the release of such French subjects, as, not having
been taken in battle, nor in consequence of military operations,
were now detained in Spain.

That this convention, considered in a military point of view,
was advantageous to Great Britain, was the opinion of all the
British Generals. By effecting the immediate deliverance of
Portugal, it left the British army at liberty to advance into Spain,
and reach the main scene of action in time for the great struggle
which was expected there. The details of the treaty were thought of
inferior consideration. Kellermann had declared that the French
would not submit to severer terms, but that if such were insisted
on, they would retire to the strong fortresses in their possession,
defend themselves there till the last extremity, and destroy Lis-
bon before they abandoned it. There was no reason to think
that any compunction would withhold them from doing this;
and though it might possibly have been prevented by bringing
on an action, that action must have been fought in the immediate
vicinity of Lisbon, perhaps in the city itself. Motives of hu-
manity therefore had their weight with the Commander-in-chief
in making such large concessions to an enemy, who, if they had

met with sterner treatment, better suited to their deserts, would presently have lowered their tone, and been glad to accept of any terms which should secure them a safe embarkation.

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The military advantages of the convention were not over-rated; it will indeed appear hereafter that they proved greater than had been foreseen. But some political errors were committed in framing it; and the British Generals did not assume that moral tone which the occasion justified, and which the soundest policy required. Buonaparte was designated in the armistice as his imperial and royal majesty, although Great Britain had never acknowledged him either as Emperor of the French or King of Italy. Junot was allowed to sign the convention as Duke of Abrantes, a title to which he had no better right than to the property which he had amassed in Portugal by rapine. Sir Arthur Wellesley had recommended, pending the negotiation, that some mode should be devised "for making the French Generals disgorge the church plate which they had stolen." An article had been framed accordingly, specifying in direct terms that the property of churches, monasteries, and palaces should not be carried away. But this article was withdrawn, on the repeated representations of Kellermann that its introduction into a public monument would be reproachful to the French army. The Commander-in-chief, he said, was particularly desirous it should be omitted; and he was willing, on that condition, to pledge his word of honour that no property of this kind should be removed. Except in the case of some carriages which the court had left behind, and some beasts taken for the service of the army, he disclaimed all knowledge of any such appropriation of Portuguese property by the French as was imputed to them; and if there were any officers who had thus acted, he expressed a hope that they might reap no benefit from their misconduct. With regard to the churches, a contribution had been regularly

CHAP. levied on them for the public service, and its produce expended;
 XI. this of course the English could not mean to redemand. The
 1808. confidence with which these representations were urged, im-
September. posed for a time upon honourable men, and the obnoxious
 article was withdrawn upon the very ground for which it ought
 to have been retained.

*Remon-
 strances of
 the Portu-
 guese Com-
 mander.*

The convention was concluded on the 30th of August, and ratified by the British Commander, not at Cintra, from which place it has been denominated, but at Torres Vedras. It was communicated immediately to General Bernardim Freire. The reply from that General was, that he was in some measure responsible to the Provisional Government for obtaining for the Portuguese whatever could be useful and honourable to the state; but there was not in the whole treaty a single article relating to the Portuguese army. It became therefore his duty to inquire how far the engagement contracted with the French for the restoration of their civil officers who were in the hands of the Portuguese extended? if the Provisional Government, taking advantage of his conduct in having taken no part in these arrangements, should order him to act in co-operation with the Spanish army in Alem-Tejo against the French, would the British army oppose any such intention? and if the honour and dignity of the Portuguese nation, and the authority of the Prince, should seem to have been compromised by these arrangements, would the British Generals take upon themselves to answer for it? Ayres Pinto, when he delivered this reply, declared that he did justice to the friendship and loyalty of the British nation, and individually felt himself highly honoured by the manner in which Sir Hew had received him; "nevertheless," said he, "your Excellency must well know that the public will judge of us not by our private conduct, but by that which bears an authentic character; and there is no other means of avoiding

the ill will of the public than by obtaining from your Excellency a reply which may convince the Portuguese people that the General to whom the direction of their forces is confided, has yielded only to urgent circumstances, and to the absolute necessity of not compromising the army under his command."

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If the Portuguese General had not separated from the British army, contrary to the advice and request of Sir Arthur Wellesley, he would of course have been a party to the negotiation. Sir Hew, upon occasion of the armistice, had desired him to state his sentiments fully while the negotiations were in progress; not having received one word of comment during that time, he expressed his surprise at this late expostulation on terms to which the honour of the British Commanders was pledged, as far as their influence or power could be supposed to extend by the common and known laws of war. But to this it was replied, that Ayres Pinto had personally communicated the General's objections to the conditions of the armistice, representing that the Portuguese army and the Government were treated too cavalierly in this transaction; that some notice should be taken of them, were it only to prevent factious persons from raising injurious reports; that the French were not strong enough to deserve so much consideration; and that the Portuguese were now in a condition to demand account from them of the robberies, rapines, depredations, murders, and sacrileges of every kind which they had committed in that kingdom, and which called for exemplary vengeance. The Portuguese Commander now poured in his representations and complaints. It was his duty to declare, he said, that not having been consulted on, or privy to this negotiation, in which he supposed his country was concerned, he considered himself exempt from all responsibility for it. He complained that no notice had been taken in the armistice of the troops under the Monteiro Mor in Alem-Tejo,

CHAP. nor of the Spanish army of Estremadura which had entered that
 XI. province. The British army, he affirmed, could not, and ought
 1808. not to be considered in any other light than an auxiliary army;
September. as such it had been applied for by the Provisional Government,
 and as such it was still to be regarded, let its strength be what it
 might. Under these circumstances any treaty with the French
 ought to have been made in conjunction with the Portuguese
 Government, and with its full approbation. He protested finally
 against the treaty in the whole and in its separate parts, . . in the
 whole, because it contained no consideration of the Prince Re-
 gent or the Government which represented him; in its parts,
 because no declaration was made that what places, stores, and
 ships were to be taken possession of should be restored to the
 Portuguese Government; because it stipulated for the impunity
 of individuals who had betrayed their country; and because it
 made no provision for the security of the people of Lisbon and
 its neighbourhood while the French continued there.

*Reply of
 Sir Hew
 Dalrymple.*

These representations were in some respects well founded; they were mingled with futile matter, and there was also a covert purport in them, which Sir Hew Dalrymple perfectly understood, of exciting a popular feeling in favour of the Junta of Porto, that body being desirous of prolonging and extending its authority, after the circumstances which alone rendered it legitimate had ceased. Leaving this question untouched, Sir Hew replied, with a courtesy and frankness that disarm resentment. It was not possible, he said, to engage the existing Government of Portugal in a negotiation purely military in its nature, and in which no reference was had either to the Governments of England or of France. With regard to the indemnity for political offences, it was natural that the French should demand it; and to him it appeared that the treaty afforded a fair occasion for remitting punishments which, by keeping political animosity alive, would

not have tended to the tranquillity and happiness of the country. There was little reason to suppose that persons who had thus rendered themselves obnoxious would venture to remain long after the French ; if they did, they would of course be vigilantly observed, and their future treatment would depend upon their future conduct. It was not from any want of personal respect to General Freire that he did not enter into the discussion of points which it was only incumbent on him to explain to the Government of the country. But being aware of the calumnies which had been disseminated by the enemy in other countries, as now in this, he assured his Excellency, and would use the necessary means for giving publicity to the pledge, that he served in Portugal as the Commander of a force acting in alliance with the Sovereign of that country ; and therefore considered himself bound by duty and honour to pay as strict a regard to the interests of the Prince Regent, the dignity and security of his Government, and the welfare of the nation of which he was the lawful ruler, as even his Excellency himself. But as touching the cessions, he did not see in what terms they could have been better framed. “ The nominal Duke of Abrantes,” said Sir Hew, “ is not the guardian of the Prince Regent’s interests ; and if any pledge is necessary of the pure and disinterested views of the Sovereign I have the honour to serve, I do not think it was through the stipulations of a treaty with that General that it could most properly be conveyed.” The manifest good faith and the temper of this reply produced their proper effect, and General Freire expressed his satisfaction in it as promising the most happy, prompt, and secure accomplishment of the object at which they aimed.

Before the British troops entered Lisbon the Russian Admiral wrote to Sir Hew to inquire what flag was to be displayed when the forts on the Tagus were delivered up, and whether.

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*The British
flag hoisted
in the forts.*

CHAP. if the Portuguese flag were hoisted, the port would be considered
 XI. neuter, and his squadron entitled to the benefit of that neutrality.
 1808. Sir Hew replied, that if he felt authorized to interfere in a
September. business which had been exclusively referred to Sir C. Cotton,
 he could easily anticipate the answer which that Commander
 would make. Contrary, however, to his expectation, when two
 regiments were landed from the fleet, and took possession of the
 ports on the river, the British flag was hoisted. The Portuguese
 were naturally hurt at this ; but before their General could offer
 any representation on the subject, Sir Hew had ordered the Por-
 tuguese colours to be displayed in its stead. The negotiation
 concerning the Russian squadron had not been concluded when
 the question was proposed to the British General, and it was to
 settle in a summary way Admiral Siniavrin's claim to the pro-
 tection of a neutral port that the English flag had been planted
 by Sir C. Cotton.

*Anarchy in
Lisbon.*

During the negotiation Lisbon was in a dreadful state. Those
 wretches who, to the reproach of Christian states and civilized
 society, are bred in the corruption of all great cities, took ad-
 vantage of the temporary dissolution of government as they
 would have done of a conflagration or an earthquake. The
 soldiers of the police, being Portuguese, had almost all gone to
 join their countrymen in arms ; and the French while they went
 the rounds, suffered robberies to be committed in their hearing
 and in their sight, either not understanding the cries for help,
 or not choosing to interfere, now that their reign was at an end.
 They indeed themselves were in such danger, that they soon
 gave over patrolling the streets, and fired upon those who ap-
 proached their quarters in the night. In this manner several
 Portuguese were shot ; the French venturing upon this, not so
 much in the confidence of their own strength, as in full reliance
 upon the interference of the English to protect them.

*Observador
Portuguez,
420. 501-3.
Neves, v.
202.*

There had been a great error of judgement in not following up the victory at Vimeiro ; and in the subsequent negotiations the British Generals had taken a lower tone than the enemy expected, or circumstances required. But they were more censurable for having failed to manifest that moral sense of the enemy's conduct which individually they felt, and yet collectively seemed for a time to have suppressed, for the sake of professional considerations and courtesy, never more unworthily bestowed. The soldiers of Buonaparte in Portugal had forfeited all claim to those courtesies which honourable men will always delight in rendering to honourable enemies. They had disgraced their profession and their country, and it behoved the British, for the sake of theirs, to have testified their sense of this in the most decided manner. But instead of shunning any farther intercourse than was necessary for the execution of the treaty, they entered into social intercourse with the French, entertainments were mutually given, and British Generals sate at Junot's table in company with the men who were responsible for the horrors committed at Evora and Leiria. They were not fully informed of those crimes, and certainly did not believe Junot and his people to be so thoroughly destitute of honour as they soon found them. But proof enough of their wickedness had been given in public and official acts ; and in thus appearing for a time to forget the real character of the cause in which Great Britain was engaged, a moral fault, as well as a political error, was committed.

Elated no doubt by this, as well as by their success in negotiation, the French continued that system of public and private robbery for which they seemed to think the convention had granted them entire impunity. General Freire complained to Sir Hew Dalrymple that they were plundering the treasury, the museum, public libraries, arsenals, churches, and the houses

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September.

*The French
continue to
plunder.*

CHAP. and stores of individuals. The British commissioners for carry-
 XI. ing the convention into effect, Major-General Beresford and
 1808. Lord Proby, informed him, that except the military and naval
September. stores there was no kind of public property which the French
 intended to relinquish; that they meant to carry off the valuables
 of the Prince, the plunder of the churches, and much of the
 property of individuals; that they had packed up the royal
 library, and most of the articles of the museum; that during the
 negotiation they had taken a sum of about £22,000 from the
Deposito Publico, which was in fact a robbery of individuals,
 that money being deposited there till litigations concerning it
 should be decided; and that even after the terms were signed
 they had actually demanded the money arising from the revenues
 of the country. The merchants of Lisbon addressed a memorial
 to the British Commander, stating that Junot had exacted from
 them a forced loan of two million *cruzados*, promising that pay-
 ment should be made out of the enormous war-contribution
 which he had imposed; they had not been paid, and it was now
 his intention to depart without paying them; they therefore
 prayed for redress, and likewise that some steps should be taken
 for recovering their ships and property which had been unlaw-
 fully sequestered in France.

Question
 concerning
 baggage.

There was something absolutely comic in the impudent per-
 suasion of the French that they might continue to pillage, and
 carry off what they pleased, under protection of the British
 army. They proposed to take away the Vasco da Gama and
 some Portuguese frigates; the Gama, it may be remembered,
 was the ship wherein they had embarked great part of the
 treasure which they had collected. The reply was, that these
 vessels did not belong to them, and they were only to carry away
 their individual baggage. Junot actually demanded five ships
 to remove his own personal effects. Such a demand was of

course pronounced to be inadmissible. Sir Hew declared he would not listen to any proposal which compromised his own honour and that of the British nation. He perceived, that owing to the shameless and open manner in which the French were preparing to carry off public and private property, popular indignation was strongly excited, and that because of the interpretation which they by their conduct affected to give the convention, this feeling was little less directed against the English than the French. He instructed the commissioners therefore to require the restoration of these plundered goods; "by this means," said he, "affording a proof to the Portuguese nation that we at least act with good faith, and are therefore entitled to use the necessary measures, however vigorous, for the protection of those obnoxious persons for whose safety that faith is pledged."

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The commissioners exercised their charge with becoming firmness. The money taken from the public deposit they compelled the French to promise to replace, . . a concession which was not obtained till after a very long discussion. The spoils of the museum and royal library were also reclaimed. They had been selected, General Kellermann said, by M. Guiffroi, a member of the National Institute: the objection, indeed, on the part of the English, he admitted to be well founded; nevertheless, he observed that these articles, consisting chiefly of specimens in natural history, and interesting manuscripts, were, in general, duplicates, . . that they were precious acquisitions for the sciences; . . the sciences were of all countries, and far from making war upon them, we ought to promote their communication. They wished, therefore, to select articles of natural history at their pleasure, and to leave for them such compensations as the English might think proper. Of course, the British commander returned a most decided negative, saying he

*The French
endeavour
to carry off
articles
from the
Museum.*

CHAP. could not sell articles which were not his, and would not allow
 XI. them to be removed: and the French general was compelled to
 1808. issue a general order, commanding all individuals of the French
September. army, or administration, to make restitution of whatever they
 had taken from any public or private establishment, within four-
 and-twenty hours.

*They em-
 bark horses,
 carriages,
 and pic-
 tures, which
 are recover-
 ed.*

It was something to have wrung from them such a confession of robbery; yet within a few hours after this very order had been issued, Junot's first aide-dé-camp, Colonel de Cambis, carried off the Prince Regent's horses from the royal stables, to embark them as General Junot's property. Having been compelled to restore them, this same officer the next day endeavoured in like manner to carry off two carriages belonging to the Duke of Sussex, and it was necessary to threaten him with being carried prisoner to England, if he persisted in this sort of conduct. It was ascertained that Junot had embarked a collection of pictures from the house of the Marques de Angeja; restitution was demanded, and he said they had been given to him. This was found to be false; and Junot then laid the affair upon a relation of his who was embarked with him, but who immediately endeavoured to conceal himself in one of the transports. A threat of detaining the General brought this person back; he was ordered on shore, to give an account of the transaction, and as he refused to acknowledge the jurisdiction of the commissioners, or to land, was compelled to do both, and to produce the pictures.

*They carry
 off large
 sums in
 money.*

But in other cases the commissioners were bound by the letter of a treaty, in which it now appeared that one party could not have presumed too little upon the honour of the other, nor one too much. All the money which these plunderers had collected they were allowed to carry off. Sir Hew observed, that this description of property could never come under the pro-

visions of the treaty, and that it was impossible to identify it, or prove exactly from whom it was obtained. But Ayres Pinto had pointed out a simple and satisfactory mode of proof: the French had brought no Portuguese money with them; consequently, whatever they possessed in it must have been the fruits of rapine. Yet the French carried off three months' pay for the whole army, in the general military chest, and, besides this, distributed large sums to the different regiments, to be carried off in their regimental chests. One regiment alone was said to have taken 100,000 crowns with it.

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The French had also a great quantity of silver in bars, into which they had reduced the pillage of the churches and palaces, for the sake of easier conveyance. Kellermann strenuously insisted that the convention guaranteed to them whatever was in their possession previous to the first day of the truce, and declared, most positively, that they never would concede this point. The commissioners, on the contrary, insisted upon the article which restricted them from carrying off other than military and personal baggage; and they declared that the Commander-in-chief would never consent to any other construction. At length they compromised the dispute: the French, though they would not acknowledge that, by the treaty, they were under any obligation, proposed to pay the debts of the army with this silver, for which purpose, they said, it had ever been expressly intended, and agreed, that if any remained after these debts were discharged, it should be delivered up. The commissioners acknowledged, that, by the convention, they could scarcely require more; and Sir Hew pronounced that the offer was fair, and might be acceded to.

Question concerning the silver in bars.

The commissioners, however, were soon convinced that concession was not the likeliest expedient for avoiding new pretensions. The ingenuity of man, they said, could not provide

Further instances of dishonour in the French.

CHAP. against French cavil, and ingenuity in misconstruction ; and in
XI. consequence of the perpetual subterfuges and false promises of
1808. Kellermann, they insisted upon the establishment of a committee,
September. to inquire into all the claims presented by the Portugeze, and
to be invested with full authority to summon persons, and to
order restitution. Property to a very great amount, both private
and public, was recovered by these means. Information was
obtained that fifty-three boxes of indigo were embarked as part
of Junot's baggage : the indigo was found and seized : the French
general, of course, disclaimed any knowledge of the transaction ;
and the commissioners, without hesitation, assured him that every
officer in the British army would acquit him personally on this
head, because it was impossible for him to inspect or know what
was done in his name ! A bold and well-supported attempt was
made to avoid the repayment of the money taken from the De-
posito Publico, and a compensation for articles taken from the
public magazines since the convention, amounting in the whole
to £40,000. The justice of this demand had been acknow-
ledged, and immediate payment promised. Nevertheless, it
had not been made when Junot embarked, and when he was
called upon to fulfil his agreement, Kellermann pleaded that the
money remaining in the *Caisse Militaire* did not amount to the
£60,000, which, by the explanation of the convention, was ad-
mitted to be a fair military chest, and therefore he considered
the agreement to repay these sums as cancelled. The first di-
vision of the French had already sailed, but the commissioners
applied to Sir Charles Cotton to detain the second, and the
Commander-in-chief, till that point should be satisfactorily
settled. Even after this instance of vigour, much litigation and
discussion was permitted ; and when, at length, Kellermann
yielded to necessity, attempts were still made to put off the pay-
ment, till no means of enforcing it should be left. During the

three last days that Junot remained in the river, orders were repeatedly given to the *payeur-general* to pay this money, and they were always evaded, under some frivolous pretext; till at last the commissioners ordered him and his baggage on shore to the arsenal, and then the Frenchman reluctantly refunded this part of the plunder.

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While the commissioners were thus recovering from the French a part of that wealth which they had collected by every means of oppression and violence, the strong interference of the British alone preserved these plunderers from the vengeance of the people. The popular feeling was partaken by all ranks. The Monteiro Mor, who had now advanced to Azeitam, addressed a protest to the British Admiral against the treaty, because the Prince and his Government had not been consulted; and because no attention had been paid to himself, who, without any foreign aid, had found means to expel the enemy from the kingdom of Algarve, and pursuing them, passing on to Alem-Tejo, and compelling them to evacuate all their posts, had taken a position with his army on the south bank of the Tagus. Such fanfaronade could only detract from his own deserts, and discredit the exertions and the sufferings of a brave and loyal nation. He accompanied this protest by a request, that, on account of the robberies and atrocities which the French had committed, the vessels employed to carry them home might be embargoed till the King of England and the Prince of Brazil should have resolved on what was best for the honour and interest of the two nations; and he required that their baggage should be rigorously searched by Portuguese and English commissioners, lest they should carry away with them the booty which they had so infamously obtained. The Juiz do Povo also presented a protest; though the convention had not been published, the people, he said, knew there was no mention made

*Protests of
the Mon-
teiro Mor
and of the
Juiz do
Povo.*

CHAP. in it of the three states of the kingdom, and that it left them
 XL. without satisfaction for the crimes both against divine and
 1808. human laws, and without vengeance for the murders, robberies,
September. and atrocities of every kind, which the usurpers had committed.

“ Our churches stript,” said he, “ the royal palaces damaged, the royal treasury plundered, the people reduced to poverty and misery, so that the streets and squares of the capital are rendered impassable by crowds of beggars, . . nothing of this is taken into consideration : . . yet the safety of kingdoms depends on not letting their rights be invaded without punishing the offenders, and the consequence of permitting such crimes with impunity will occasion incalculable misfortunes. The people and the officers of this tribunal declare their gratitude to the generous allies who have liberated Portugal, but they pray for the suspension of a convention so favourable to the French as this is said to be. It must be invalid after the abuses and hostilities which they have continued to commit in Almeida, and the contribution which they have since extorted ; and this tribunal cannot consent to the return of the enemy to France, as they already threaten that they will come back to destroy what they have left.”

*Danger of
 tumults in
 Lisbon.*

Such language from a magistrate whose name was never heard but in turbulent times, increased the popular ferment ; and General Hope, who now commanded in Lisbon, found it necessary to issue a proclamation, prohibiting the Portuguese from entering the city with arms, or wearing them in the streets ; and enacting that all places where wine was sold should be shut at six in the evening, and not opened before sunrise. To enforce these regulations, and maintain order, strong guards, picquets, and patroles, were appointed to arrest every person who should break the peace. Nothing but this prompt vigilance prevented the people from gratifying their thirst for vengeance. It is said that all the houses in Belem in which the enemy were lodged

were marked in the course of one night, and that lists of those Frenchmen and their adherents who were deemed most worthy of death were posted up. The English were loudly reproached for having protected men who deserved the most exemplary punishment; and there were not wanting persons unreflecting enough to assert, that sure as they were of the Spaniards, they could have exacted that punishment without any necessity for English aid. This feeling, however, was far from general. The English character was too well known in Lisbon, for the English name ever to be unpopular among a people not less retentive of kind and friendly feelings than of injuries. When the English soldiers went to occupy the arsenals and forts, refreshments were brought out for them along the way, and British officers were followed in the streets by applauding crowds; while the hatred which was manifested towards the French was so deep and general, that no people could possibly have incurred it unless they had deserved it to the utmost. Not only did the Portuguese refuse to purchase from them those things which they wished to convert into money, they refused to sell them any thing, even provisions for their hospital. If a Frenchman ventured to appear alone, trusting to escape discovery, he betook himself, upon the first suspicious eye which was directed toward him, to an Englishman for protection. Kellermann came on shore one day after his embarkation to dine with a British officer, and being recognized on his return to the water-side, was attacked by the mob. Our sailors defended and saved him, but not before he had received some severe contusions. Loison, who was a more marked object of execration, was considered in so much personal danger, that four battalions were bivouacked near his quarters, and four pieces of cannon planted there for his protection. But toward those officers who had

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CHAP. demeaned themselves humanely and honourably, the people
 XI. testified nothing but respect and good-will.

1808. The French were not sufficiently humbled to bear this
September. meekly. The success which they had obtained in negotiation,
Temper of in their minds more than counterbalanced the humiliation of
the French. their defeat, and of their present state. They denied that they
 had been defeated; they affirmed that they had dictated the
 terms; and Junot continued to occupy the royal box at the
 opera till his departure. The English generals respected, in
 this instance, the custom of the country, and after the French-
 man had resigned it, left it unoccupied, with the curtain down.
 But however much the enemy might console themselves with
 the confident hope of again becoming masters of the kingdom,
 their pride was bitterly wounded by the display of national feel-
 ing which met them every where, and which they considered
 presumptuous in a people who were soon to be brought again
 under their iron yoke. They called it audacity in the Portu-
 gueze to wear the national cockade, which they still chose to
 denominate a badge of insurrection; and they complained that
 even in their sight lamps were prepared for illuminating the
 city upon their departure, and demanded in greater numbers
 than could be supplied.

Thiebault,
 219—222.

*Embarka-
 tion of the
 French.*

The first division of the French embarked under protection
 of the second, the second and third were protected by the British
 troops from the fury of the Portugeze. Wholly to restrain it
 was impossible, but no serious injury was done. They embarked
 amid the curses of the people. Nine days and nights the re-
 joicings continued, not by any order from the magistracy, but
 by the voluntary act of the inhabitants, whose joy was in pro-
 portion to the misery from which they had been delivered. It
 was a joy which thousands whose fortunes had been ruined in

the general calamity, partook; and which brought the last earthly consolation to many a broken heart. The enemy, while they lay in the river, were within sight of the illuminations and fire-works, and could hear the bells with which that great city rang from side to side. However brave in arms, however skilful in negotiation, they departed under circumstances more reproachful than had ever before attached to any army, or body of military men. As a last act of baseness, one of their general officers called at the commissioners' office, while they were absent, just before he embarked, and carried off all the papers he could collect, in the hope of making it impossible for them to produce an account of their proceedings. But he was driven back to Lisbon by contrary winds, and compelled to restore them. The commissioners concluded the final report of their transactions by stating, that the conduct of the French had been marked by the most shameful disregard of honour and probity, publicly evincing their intention of carrying off their plundered booty, and leaving acknowledged debts unpaid. "Finally, said they, they have only paid what they were obliged to disgorge, and were not permitted to carry off. The British commissioners had represented to General Kellermann, that whatsoever the words, it could never be the spirit of any convention, that an army should, as a military chest, or otherwise, carry off public money, leaving public debts unpaid: they had called upon him, for the honour of the French army and nation, to act justly; and yet, unmindful of any tie of honour or of justice, the French army had taken away a considerable sum in the military chest, leaving its debts unpaid, to a very large amount."

Thus the courtesy which had been shown toward the French Generals in the course of the negotiation, had the effect of fixing upon them a deeper stigma; by bringing into full view a low chicanery, a total want of honour, an utter disregard of truth,

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Final report of the commissioners.

CHAP. which could not have been suspected, if it had not been thus
XI. officially proved, and placed upon public record. Had such
 1808. charges been advanced by the enemy against the general officers
September. of a British army, the strictest inquiry would have been instituted,
 and no rank, no influence, no professional merits, could have
 screened the offenders. They would have been dismissed with
 ignominy from the service which they had disgraced, and for
 ever excluded from all honourable society. There was a time
 when the highest eulogium which the French bestowed upon a
 soldier was to say, that he was without fear and without re-
 proach ; but under the system of Buonaparte nothing was con-
 sidered reproachful in his soldiers, provided they feared nothing
 in this world or in the next.

*Addresses of
 thanks to
 the British
 Commander*

The good faith of the British, and their real regard for the
 interest and feelings of the Portuguese nation, were now ap-
 parent. The national flag was every where displayed, and the
 people were informed by a proclamation that no time would be
 lost in establishing their government upon the basis on which
 the Prince had left it, and substituting the civil for that military
 power which was continued only from necessity and for a few days.
 The magistrates and the clergy meantime, and all persons who
 possessed authority or influence, were called upon to co-operate
 in preserving order. Addresses of thanks came from the pro-
 vinces ; and the Juiz do Povo, who had protested in the name
 of the people of Lisbon so strongly against the convention, now
 for those same people expressed their gratitude to the British
 Commander, the British Sovereign, and the British nation, re-
 questing that their sincere thanks for this great deliverance might
 be made known to the smallest village as well as to the throne.
 Such was the proud situation of the British army at Lisbon.
 Some formalities had been forgotten in the negotiation, some
 minor interests had been overlooked, and the courtesies of war

had been too liberally accorded to an enemy who should have been made to feel their moral degradation. But the unstained honour, the unsuspecting integrity, the open manliness, the plain dignity of the British character, had been manifested throughout the whole of these transactions; and this was felt and acknowledged by the Portuguese.

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Difficulties which could not have been foreseen arose concerning the delivery of Elvas. Galluzo, who commanded the army of Extremadura, and who had hitherto afforded no very efficient aid to the Portuguese, thought proper at this time, when he had been required by every civil and military authority to begin his march towards Castille, in contempt of those orders to enter Alem-Tejo, and besiege Elvas, as if no treaty for its surrender had been made. The French Commandant, Girod de Novillars, upon this required from the inhabitants an immediate loan of money, to the amount of 30,000 francs, and wine and provisions to the value of 20,000 more. Drained as they had been by repeated exactions, the people of Elvas were in no condition to obey this demand; the Bishop and the magistrates therefore easily obtained permission to go to the Spanish camp, and intreat Galluzo to suspend hostilities. That General, however, declared, that if the French did not surrender within six hours, he would open his fire against Fort La Lippe, and put the whole garrison to the sword. He had no time to lose, he said, but must hasten to assist his fellow-soldiers in expelling the enemy from the Peninsula; and the inhabitants must either abandon the city, or take arms against the French. From this dilemma they were delivered by the French themselves, who, during the night, withdrew into the forts, leaving about an hundred men in the hospital. An agreement was then made, with Galluzo's consent, that the city should remain neutral; and the Spaniards began an absurd fire against Fort La Lippe, which is the strongest

Galluzo besieges Elvas

CHAP. XI. fortress in Portugal. Things were in this state when Lieutenant-Colonel Ross arrived with letters from the French Commander, instructing M. Girod to give up the place to him in pursuance of the convention. A demur was made by the Commandant, till he could send an officer to Lisbon, and satisfy himself that the dispatches were authentic ; and difficulties less reasonable in their kind were started both by the Spaniards and Portuguese. Galluzo argued that no agreement between the British and French Generals could be binding upon him. The Spaniards, he affirmed, had a right as besiegers to take possession of Elvas, and the Spanish arms were not to be defrauded of the splendour which this would give them. He threatened Girod that if any injury were offered to the city the prisoners should be put to death, and the garrison receive no mercy ; and he insisted that they should march out and lay down their arms, and that the place should be entered and occupied by the Spaniards only. In his communications with Sir Hew Dalrymple he held rather a lower tone, saying that certainly he should not have besieged and cannonaded Elvas if he had known of the convention ; but it had not been thought proper to announce it to him. He required only a joint surrender to the British and Spanish arms, leaving the place and the prisoners to his Excellency ; but he had heard the garrison were not to be considered prisoners ; that article, though the opinion was that it would not be executed, occasioned some uneasiness, and therefore he would make them lay down their arms, and swear not to bear them again against Spain or her allies.

*Difficulties
concerning
the surren-
der of Elvas*

Galluzo was at this time upon ill terms with the Portuguese. They complained that throughout the struggle in Alem-Tejo he had promised much and performed little ; that the Spaniards had acted as masters in those fortresses which they had entered as friends, countermanded the orders of the Portuguese General,

encouraged insubordination, appropriated to their own use money which had been raised for the national cause, and pillaged the country as they passed through it. On the other hand, Galluzo reproached the Portuguese with want of activity and energy, and with giving his people nothing but water when they went to assist them. His pretensions to Elvas, therefore, which under any circumstances might have given offence, were now peculiarly offensive; and it happened that the Junta of Porto, who were at this time not without hope of getting the government of the kingdom into their own hands, had ordered General Leite to march into Elvas and occupy it as soon as it should be evacuated. The General communicated their orders to Sir Hew, declaring that he felt it his duty to obey, and laying before him his complaints against the Spaniards. These difficulties were surmounted by a proper mixture of conciliation and firmness on the part of the British Commander. The first great object was, that British faith should be kept, and complete protection afforded to the French garrison. For this purpose those troops whom it was intended to canton in Alem-Tejo were immediately ordered thither, and stationed as near Elvas as possible. Colonel Graham was sent to Galluzo to bring him to reason; and if this were found impracticable, then to proceed to Madrid, and call for the interference of higher authorities. Colonel Ross was instructed to bear in mind, that as the French surrendered to no nation except the English, neither Spanish nor Portuguese troops were to appear when they marched out: that with respect to the Portuguese, the feelings of the nation were to be gratified, and their flag every where displayed under a salute; but he was to hold the substantial power, even if he saw cause for allowing a Portuguese General to march in with a detachment of his men. Colonel Graham performed his difficult mission with great ability. Galluzo ceased from all farther in-

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CHAP. XI. 1808. *September.* interference, and was so gratified by the temper in which this affair had been carried on by the British Commander, and the services which had been rendered to the soldiers of Extremadura who had been released at Lisbon, that he ordered the black English cockade to be blended with the red Spanish one in his army, to mark his gratitude, as he informed Sir Hew, and denote the intimate alliance between the two countries.

Elvas and Almeida given up.

All difficulties being at length removed, the forts were delivered up, General Leite entered the city, and the French garrison, between 1400 and 1500 in number, were marched to Aldea Gallega. No insults were offered them on the way; and they were joined by their comrades, who, having been wounded at Evora, had been left in that city, and treated with careful humanity by the inhabitants. The garrison of Almeida were not removed so easily. The Portuguese had kept up an irregular blockade of that fortress after Loison's departure; they borrowed fire-arms from the Spaniards of Ciudad Rodrigo, and were so little scrupulous in their mode of warfare, that a friar poisoned the water of a tank at which the cattle belonging to the garrison used to drink. Almeida might long have defied any efforts which the Portuguese or the Spaniards in that quarter could have made against it; it was, however, gladly delivered up, in conformity to the convention, and the garrison were marched to Porto, under a British escort, there to be embarked. On the day of their arrival, they employed themselves in converting as much of their plunder as possible into money: purchasers were not wanting, and their market continued the whole day and night, horses being the ostensible articles. Such a traffic excited the indignation of all but those who were profiting by it; and that indignation was excited to the highest pitch, when, on the following morning, as the baggage of the French was examined at the Castle of St. Joam da Foz, in presence of the governor

Tumults at Porto.

and of Sir Robert Wilson, several rich church vestments were found in one of the boxes. The horror which the Portuguese feel at sacrilege is perhaps hardly conceivable by those who are not acquainted with them. The governor himself, on this occasion, joined the populace in their outcry, and immediately gave orders that no vessel should be permitted to pass the castle. The news soon reached Porto, exaggerated as it passed from mouth to mouth ; a mob collected, bent upon putting the French to death ; and some insults were offered the English, for protecting them. The Bishop, Sir Robert Wilson, and many officers, Portuguese and English, used their utmost exertions to quiet the tumult. They succeeded in restoring peace at St. Joam da Foz : but the crowd still continued on both sides the river ; and at an early hour of the morning some thousand persons had assembled, with a determination to attack the French on board the transports : they placed artillery on both shores, and mounted guns on board the ships. Fortunately for the French, they were provided with sixty rounds each man, and one of the transports in which they were embarked was armed with six-pounders. The Bishop and Sir Robert Wilson again came down to mediate, and the latter was employed, without intermission, from nine in the morning till five in the afternoon in negotiating between the French General and the populace. It was in vain for the Frenchman to tell Sir Robert that he was bound to see the articles of capitulation executed to the very letter, . . . that was impossible : he had secured their lives, and this was the utmost he could do. The mob insisted that the French should be disembarked, their baggage examined on shore, and that they should leave their arms : there was no alternative, and they were compelled to submit. No sooner had they left the transports, than the rabble boarded them, and began to plunder in their turn : every thing was ransacked ; the very provisions and

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CHAP. XI. wearing apparel of the ship-owners disappeared. Here, however, the tumult ended: the more riotous of the populace retired with their booty; the better classes were ashamed of the disgrace which had thus been brought upon them; and every possible reparation was made, to the entire satisfaction of the British officers.

The Spanish troops at Lisbon embarked for Catalonia.

During the negotiation the French, who were not ashamed to propose any thing, proposed that an equal number of French prisoners should be set at liberty, in exchange for the Spaniards whom they had seized at Lisbon. This Sir Hew declared to be inadmissible; the Spaniards, he said, must be immediately set free, and not the interests alone, but the feelings of the Spanish nation were to be considered. He consented, however, to obtain for them, if possible, the release of such Frenchmen as had been arrested in Spain during the troubles, not having been taken in battle, or in consequence of military operations. Humanity induced him to this; and in communicating it to the Spanish authorities, he relied upon Spanish generosity for complying with his request for their deliverance. The scene at Lisbon, when arms, horses, and artillery were restored to the Spaniards who had been so long detained prisoners, was one of those spectacles at which the heart rejoices. They were about 3800 in number, some 2000 having effected their escape. The ceremony was made as public and impressive as possible, and the Spanish Commander distributed alms upon the occasion among the poor of Lisbon, which caused a general festivity. Applications for these troops were made from various parts of Spain. The Junta of Galicia required them; and some of the Spanish Generals at Madrid wished them to be embarked for Santander, there to join Blake's army. Castaños, to whose judgement at this time that deference was paid which his great services had well deserved, was of opinion that they would be

more serviceable in Catalonia than in any other part. For Catalonia therefore they were embarked in British transports, and Sir Hew advanced a loan of 90,000 dollars to purchase horses for them.

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It was sufficient for the British Commander in these transactions to follow the plain dictates of a humane and honourable mind. In settling a civil government, and thereby putting an end to the fearful anarchy which every where prevailed, he had a more delicate task. The Junta of Porto were intriguing to obtain a continuance of their power; and under a pretext that Lisbon would for some time be in a state of great confusion, they made their wishes known to Sir Hew, that the seat of the temporary government might remain at Porto, and that deputies from the other provinces, as they then did from the northern ones, should repair thither to transact business for those parts which they represented. The Bishop also observed, that an authority had been forced upon him, which he had accepted only in the hope of re-establishing the government of his lawful Prince; and that if it were thought expedient for him to retain it till the pleasure of the Prince was known, it must be under the condition of remaining at Porto, from whence the inhabitants would not permit him to depart, unless by a direct order of their Sovereign. Such an arrangement would be most beneficial to the kingdom in its present state; and that opposition to it which might otherwise be expected, would be obviated if Sir Hew Dalrymple would take upon himself to recommend it. This sort of finesse was little likely to attain its end with a British Commander. Sir Hew, who was better acquainted with the state of affairs in Spain than any other person at that time, had no such advantage in Portugal. But in politics, as in morals, there is a principle of rectitude which always leads us right, and that principle he followed. He neither lent himself to this intrigue,

*Intrigues of
the Junta of
Porto.*

CHAP. nor allowed the displeasure which it naturally excited to pre-ponderate against the real services which the Bishop of Porto
XI. had rendered to his country, and the popularity which in consequence he then possessed. He replied therefore to the Bishop,
1808. that had there been no objection, the Council of Regency which
September. the Prince had appointed at his departure, would now have resumed their authority of course; but seeing that some of its members were strongly suspected of being in the French interest, he felt himself authorized to state, that however desirous the King his Sovereign might be to interfere as little as possible in the internal affairs of Portugal, it was impossible for his Majesty, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, to acquiesce in the return of those persons to power. On the other hand, those members who had kept aloof from the interests of the enemy, and retaining their loyalty had retained the confidence of the nation, had an unquestionable claim to be reinstated in their situations. Declaring therefore that his instructions were to take measures for forming a Regency as soon as possible, composed of such persons of rank, character, and talents, as might be found ready to undertake, and qualified to discharge, the important trust, but with as few changes (particularly in the subordinate departments) as might be compatible with the public interests, in the fulfilment of this duty he naturally addressed himself to his Excellency and the Provisional Board of Government at Porto. "You," Sir Hew continued, "have already turned your thoughts to the great question now at issue, and are doubtless prepared to propose measures for completing the Council of Regency so as to merit the confidence of the nation, and to prevent any just cause of discontent in any other provisional government, or other respectable description of the people. For my own part, I have only been able, from the information I have received since my arrival in Portugal, to form one decided opinion on

this subject; which is, the infinite importance to the public welfare that your Excellency should yourself hold a distinguished place in the proposed Regency."

The Bishop's reply was, that he should readily acquiesce in whatever might be determined upon, except his own nomination to the Council; for he, better than any other person, knew what was necessary for the good of the public cause, and of the northern provinces, and therefore would not remove from the place where he had been stationed by God and by his Prince. It was soon, however, ascertained, that if this Prelate could not remain at the head of the government at Porto, he would not persist in refusing to accept a share in it at Lisbon. Sir Hew therefore, upon mature deliberation, and with the best advice which could be obtained, issued a proclamation, saying, that through the success with which Providence had blessed the British arms, the time was come when the re-establishment of the Portuguese government could be effected. He gave the people due praise for the exertions which they had made against the French; and saying that no views of interest or of national aggrandizement could be imputed to the liberal policy of Great Britain, declared, that the best manner in which he could fulfil the intentions of his Sovereign, and promote the welfare of Portugal, was by restoring that Council to which their Prince had delegated his authority when he preserved his royal dignity from the insults of an implacable enemy, and secured his American dominions. One of that Council had been unhappily sent away from his country; others had incurred imputations which rendered their restoration impossible at this time. The three, however, who had contracted no such disability, the Monteiro Mor, D. Francisco Xavier de Noronha, and Francisco da Cunha e Menezes, he called upon to resume the administration, and with them the Desembargador Joam Antonio Salter de Mendonça, and Bri-

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The Council of Regency re-established.

Sept. 18.

Sept. 20.

CHAP. gadier D. Miguel Pereira Forjas Coutinho, whom the Prince
 XI. had named to succeed in case of vacancies. These persons
 1808. assembled accordingly, and to fill up the number which the act
September. of regency appointed, elected the Marquez das Minas and the
 Bishop of Porto. The Junta of Porto then dissolved itself, de-
 claring, however, that if the Regency should again be overthrown
 by any new invasion of the enemy, (which they prayed God to
 avert,) or any other calamity, they should by that event enter
 again upon the full exercise of the authority which they now
 laid aside. The other Juntas were in like manner dissolved;
 the Regency was acknowledged throughout Portugal, and things
 resumed, as far as possible, their former course.

*Outcry in
 England
 against the
 Convention.*

While Sir Hew Dalrymple was employed in carrying the terms of the convention into effect, putting an end to the anarchy which prevailed, and preparing with all possible speed to advance into Spain, an outcry which he little expected had arisen against him at home. The official account of the battle reached England a fortnight before the news of the armistice and convention: tidings came with it that the French had proposed to evacuate Portugal, and the news of Junot's unconditional surrender was looked for as what must necessarily ensue. When the terms of the convention were received the Park and Tower guns were fired; but the public feeling was not in accord with this demonstration of joy, and never was any public feeling so unanimously and instantaneously manifested. The hopes of the nation had been raised to the highest pitch; their disappointment was in proportion, and it was expressed with a violence only to be explained by the deep and general abhorrence which the conduct of the French in Portugal had provoked. The capitulations of the Helder and of Buenos Ayres were remembered as less mortifying than the convention of Cintra. Nothing else could be talked of, nothing else could be thought of: men greeted each other in the streets with execrations upon those

who had signed this detested convention ; it kept them waking at night, or disturbed their sleep, like a misdeed or a misfortune of their own. The London newspapers joined in one cry of wonder and abhorrence ; on no former occasion had they been so unanimous. The provincial papers proved that, from one end of the island to the other, the resentment of this grievous disappointment was the same ; some refused to disgrace their pages by inserting the treaty ; others surrounded it with broad black lines, putting their journal in mourning for the dismal intelligence it contained ; some headed the page with a representation of three gibbets, and a general suspended from each, cut in wood for the occasion.

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What could be done ? There were not wanting writers who called upon government to annul the convention. The Romans, they said, would have done so, and have delivered up the generals who signed it, bound and haltered, to the enemy's discretion. Would it be argued, that to break the treaty would be to break our faith towards the enemy ? Why, it was so framed that it could not be fulfilled without breaking our faith towards each and all of our allies ! We were the allies of Portugal ; and it was a breach of faith towards Portugal, to transport this army of thieves, ravishers, and murderers out of the country in which they had perpetrated their crimes, and from which they had no other possible means of escape. We were the allies of Spain ; and it was a breach of faith towards Spain, if four-and-twenty thousand French troops, cut off from all succour and all retreat, should be conveyed, under the British flag, into their own country, with arms and baggage, that they might join the forces with which Buonaparte was preparing to march against the Spaniards. We were the allies of Sweden ; and it was a breach of faith towards Sweden to carry Russian sailors through the Swedish fleet for the purpose of manning Russian ships against

CHAP. the Swedes. Were we then to annul this treaty with our enemies,
 XI. or to betray our friends? for to this alternative our triumvirate
 1808. of generals had reduced us! No law of nations could justify
September. them in making such stipulations; no law of nations therefore
 could justify us in performing them. But the French, it was
 urged, had already fulfilled their part of the convention; they
 had evacuated the fortified towns, and admitted us into Lisbon.
 Thus we had already reaped the advantages, and were, in honour,
 bound to carry into effect the remainder of the treaty, which was
 advantageous to them. In whatever way we acted, some loss of
 honour was inevitable; but it was less disgraceful to break the
 terms than to fulfil them; better that the French should reproach
 us, than that they should compliment us upon a fidelity which
 enabled them to injure our allies. The blow, it was affirmed,
 might have gone far towards deciding the fate of Europe.
 France had lost one army in Andalusia, and how deeply Buona-
 parte felt the loss was shown by the anxiety with which he con-
 cealed it from the French people. What might not have been
 the effect of the destruction of a second and larger army, follow-
 ing so close upon that of the former! How would it have en-
 couraged the Portuguese, given new animation to the Spaniards,
 and raised the hope and the courage of those various states who
 were suffering under the tyrant's yoke!

The conditions which had been granted to the Russian Ad-
 miral were condemned with the same vehement feeling of dis-
 appointment. The intimate connexion which had so lately sub-
 sisted between the Courts of London and Petersburg, and the
 personal regard which the British Admiral entertained for Ad-
 miral Siniavin, had been adduced as reasons why an agreement
 acceptable to both nations should be concluded. Certainly it
 became us to manifest every mark of personal respect toward
 the Russian officers, because, though the false policy of their

government had engaged the two countries in war, there existed no angry feelings nor jarring interests between them; and the wishes of both were for a renewal of that long established intercourse which was beneficial to both. It also behoved us especially to show ourselves grateful for the protection which the Russians had afforded to the English and Portuguese refugees, and the facilities which they had given them of effecting their escape. These were personal favours, for which the obvious personal return should have been to have immediately sent home men and officers under an engagement not to serve against us or our allies, and to have shown towards them every courtesy and kindness by which the evils of hostility can be mitigated. But that personal regard should influence the terms of capitulation, was a thing as unheard of as the terms themselves. "Hold in deposit!" The phrase had never before been known in the British navy. They knew what it was to fight their enemies; they knew what it was to beat, capture, sink, burn, and destroy them, according to the spirit and letter of their instructions. This was said by the navy, and by the nation; and the bitter reflection arose, how would Nelson have received such a proposal!

Such language as this arose from a right feeling; but the disappointment of well-founded and high-raised hopes had heated the public mind, and disqualified it for regarding the whole transaction dispassionately. The manner in which the Portuguese had been overlooked in the negotiation was aggravated in England by persons who supported the pretensions of the Junta of Porto; and undue stress was laid upon the neglect of formalities which could not have been overlooked if the Portuguese General had been acting with the British army as he ought. There had been one serious omission affecting the Portuguese, which was, in not insisting upon a stipulation that the

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CHAP. XI. troops of that nation who had been sent to serve in Buonaparte's armies should be restored to their own country; such a stipulation ought to have been required, though it would undoubtedly have been broken. The other oversights which were objected were merely frivolous, and the manner in which, through all the subsequent details, the feelings as well as interests of the Portuguese had been consulted, had already contented them, and made them grateful for the conduct of their allies. There was another cause which exasperated the English people: they compared the treatment of Junot's army with that of Dupont's, and were mortified by a comparison which ought rather to have elated them; for looking to what seemed advantageous, and not to what was just, they did not perceive that in deferring to a popular cry the Junta of Seville had broken a solemn engagement. The strong disapprobation with which Sir Hew Dalrymple regarded that breach of faith, acted upon him, perhaps unconsciously, when he allowed the French the utmost which could be claimed upon the most liberal construction of the letter of the treaty in their favour.

*Board of
Inquiry ap-
pointed.*

Meetings were convened in most parts of England to express the indignation of the people at the convention, and call for the punishment of those by whom it had been negotiated. The Common Council presented an address to the same purport, and were told in reply that it was inconsistent with the principles of British justice to pronounce judgement without previous investigation, and that their interposition was not necessary for inducing the King to institute a due inquiry into a transaction which had disappointed the hopes and expectations of the nation. Accordingly the three Generals were recalled, and a Board of Inquiry was appointed, composed of the Earl of Moira, General Craig, Lord Heathfield, the Earl of Pembroke, Sir George Nugent, and Lieutenant-General Nicolls, with Sir David Dundas for pre-

sident. Their decision, after a long and full investigation, was, that they could not pronounce, with confidence, whether the victory of Vimeiro ought to have been pursued or not ; but, considering the extraordinary circumstances under which two new commanders arrived from the ocean, and joined the army, (the one during, and the other immediately after the battle, and these successively superseding each other, and both the original commander, within the space of twenty-four hours,) it was not surprising that the army was not carried forward until the second day after the action, from the necessity of the generals' being acquainted with the actual state of things, and proceeding accordingly. On a consideration of all circumstances, they were of opinion, that no farther proceeding was necessary ; and, however some of them might differ respecting the fitness of the convention, it was their unanimous declaration, that unquestionable zeal and firmness had been exhibited by all the three generals.

As this was, in fact, delivering no opinion at all, the board was called upon, by the Duke of York, as commander-in-chief, to resume its consideration of the armistice and convention, and pronounce decidedly whether they thought them adviseable. The armistice was disapproved by Earl Moira ; the convention by the same nobleman, by the Earl of Pembroke, and General Nicolls : thus, six of the seven members approved the armistice, and four approved the convention. The dissentient members delivered in their reasons for the opinion which they gave. General Nicolls and Earl Pembroke confined themselves to a military point of view. Earl Moira took a wider scope, and argued ably against the moral and political effects of the treaty. The proceedings were concluded by a declaration from the King, adopting the unanimous opinion of the board, that no farther proceeding was necessary ; but expressing his disapprobation of those articles of the convention in which stipulations were made,

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CHAP. directly affecting the interests or feelings of the Spanish and
XI. Portuguese nations. That disapprobation his Majesty had sig-
1808. nified to Sir Hew Dalrymple when the treaty was first laid before
him, and he repeated it, deeming it necessary that his sentiments
should be clearly understood, as to the impropriety and danger
of the unauthorised admission, into military conventions, of
articles of such a description. Nor could he forbear observing,
that Sir Hew's delaying to transmit the armistice concluded on
the 22d of August, till the 4th of September, when the ratified
convention was transmitted at the same time, was calculated to
produce great public inconvenience, and that such inconvenience
had, in fact, resulted therefrom. The King abstained from any
observations upon other parts of the convention.

Thus the whole censure fell upon Sir Hew Dalrymple. But
it was seen by the people that the great error of judgement had
been committed at home, in not providing that the General by
whom the campaign was planned should carry it to the end.
And how often may it be observed in history, as in private life,
that the course of events is better directed to the end desired,
than if the persons most interested in the success could them-
selves have ordered it! So it was in this campaign, which at
the time so severely disappointed the nation. A more splendid
triumph might have been obtained in the field, a higher tone
might have been taken in the negotiation; but in either of these
cases Almeida and Elvas would have been left in possession of
the enemy; and whatever efforts might have been made for re-
ducing them, they could easily have held out till the dispersion
of the Spanish armies. It would then have been a great object
with the French to relieve the garrisons, and this would have
brought them to Lisbon at a time when there were neither pre-
parations nor means for resistance there.

CHAPTER XII.

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CENTRAL JUNTA. OPERATIONS IN CATALONIA. EMBARRASSMENTS AND MOVEMENTS OF THE SPANISH ARMIES. ESCAPE OF THE SPANISH TROOPS FROM DENMARK.

WHEN Castaños was informed of Sir Hew Dalrymple's ap- 1808.
pointment to the command of the British army, he declared that he regarded this nomination as the most fortunate event of his own life ; so much advantage to the common cause did he anticipate from their confidence in each other, and the cordial co-operation which would ensue. In reality that influence which the confidence of a British commander would have given him, might have been of the most essential benefit to Spain at this momentous crisis.

*Necessity of
a provision-
al govern-
ment.*

Such was the national character, that when the struggle commenced every man was ready to follow in the cause of his country ; but so pitiable had been the state of education, and so successfully had the double despotism of the government and the inquisition shut out knowledge from their empire, that no man was fit to lead. There were now as many governments as there were Juntas, each acting with little regard to the others ; and as these were every where filled by persons chosen because of their station, the government throughout Spain was delivered, or rather fell into the hands of the provincial nobility and gentry, with a few clergy ; a set of men whom their general want of information, their prejudices, and their previous way of life, in great measure disqualified for the task to which they were called.

CHAP. XII. 1808. Among them were some persons who had formerly been in office at Madrid; but whatever advantage they might have derived from habits of business, was more than counterbalanced by the dilatory formalities acquired at the same time, and their attachment to the old routine with all its defects and evils. Wherever therefore such statesmen of the old school were found, the Juntas were less efficient than they might have been without them. The powers with which these bodies found themselves invested were neither limited in extent or duration: the people in their confidence (which at such times is as blind as their suspicion) never thought of proposing restrictions: and the Juntas, when once in possession of authority, thought only of making it as extensive, and retaining it as long as they could. Some of them passed decrees bestowing upon themselves the titles of Excellencies and Highnesses, and adopted uniforms of the gaudiest fashion. This was mere vanity; but serious injury was done, when, with as little decency as had been observed under the old system, they conferred commissions and commands, not upon those persons who had the fairest claim, but upon their own friends and relations and dependents; and thus, as the enrolment was general, the armies were filled with officers who had no other pretensions to rank and promotion than what they derived from favour.

Castellanos prevents a contest between Granada and Seville.

After the great success in Andalusia, the provincial Juntas, instead of exerting themselves to the utmost for completing the deliverance of the country, became jealous of each other. Where the rival authorities were far distant, this feeling impeded the public service; greater evils were threatened when they bordered upon each other. Granada at this time refused to acknowledge the supreme authority which the Junta of Seville assumed, and had hitherto exercised with ability and good fortune. A warm contention ensued; and Tilly, either from irri-

tation, or worse motives, proposed that a division of the Andalusian army should be sent to enforce submission. Fortunately Castaños was present at the meeting in which this proposition was made; he rose from his seat, and, striking the table, said, he should like to see the man who dared order a division of the troops under his command to march without his authority! He knew no distinction of provinces; he had the honour to command part of the army of Spain, and never would he suffer it to be made the instrument of civil war.

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The occasion required, and therefore justified, this prompt assumption of a power, dangerous in its kind, and in nowise congenial to the unambitious temper of Castaños, a man whose only desire was to do his duty like a true Spaniard under any circumstances. It proved, however, the necessity of establishing a more legitimate authority than as yet existed. Lord Collingwood, in his first communications with Seville, had advised that a general Council, Cortes, or Congress, should be appointed, and invested with power from the several provincial Juntas to preside over and act in the name of the whole. The necessity of some such arrangement became every day more apparent. Some persons proposed to establish a military form of government, in which that vigour which the emergency required might be found; some were for assembling a Cortes; others recommended that a viceroy or lieutenant of the kingdom should be appointed, and to this Castaños was at one time inclined. His first thought before the struggle began had been to invite the Archduke Charles; but upon considering that the invitation could not be accepted while Austria continued at peace with France, and that if a war between those powers took place, the Archduke's services would be required at home, he then thought the Prince Royal of the house of Naples would be the fittest person to hold the regency till the fate of Ferdinand should be

*Plans for a
government*

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*Arrival of
a Sicilian
Prince at
Gibraltar.*

known; and this he proposed to the Junta. The Sicilian court from the commencement of the insurrection had directed their views to the same object: their minister in London had sounded the disposition of the British Government, and found it decidedly unfavourable to their schemes; and they sent a plenipotentiary to reside at Gibraltar, for the purpose of furthering the interests of the family. But Sir Hew Dalrymple happened to be informed of what had passed in London, and finding that the object of this mission was altogether disapproved by the British Government, and that the agent had papers which he intended to circulate without previously communicating their contents to him, felt it necessary to let him know that his residence in the garrison, under these circumstances, might be attended with inconvenience, and therefore he must return to Palermo for new instructions. This was about the middle of July; in the ensuing month, a few days before Sir Hew left Gibraltar to take the command of the army, Prince Leopold, second son of the King of the Two Sicilies, with the Duke of Orleans and a large retinue, arrived there in a British man of war. A more ill-judged step could hardly have been taken. Great Britain had scrupulously avoided any thing which could have the appearance of dictating to the Spaniards, or interfering with them in any other way than that of giving the most prompt and liberal support; but what a pretext would it afford those who were ever ready to malign the measures of England, if at a time when the Spaniards were deliberating concerning the settlement of their government, a Prince who claimed the regency should be received with royal honours at Gibraltar, and at the very juncture when a British army arrived upon the coast! Under these embarrassing circumstances Sir Hew acted with great firmness and discretion. Persisting in that upright and steady course of conduct which had in so great a degree contributed to win the con-

fidence of the Spanish nation, he refused in any manner to support pretensions which he had reason to believe were not approved by his government; to that government he referred the Duke of Orleans, who accordingly resolved to go to England, and make his representations in person; the Prince was received into Gibraltar, and left there, when Sir Hew went to the army; if he were chosen Regent, any deputation duly appointed to announce that nomination was of course to be admitted, and considered as attached to his retinue; but no such deputation from any local or provisional government was to be received on such terms.

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There was at this time a report that the Junta of Seville had declared for a regency, and were hesitating between the Archbishop of Toledo, as the only remaining member of the Bourbon family in Spain, a Prince of the Neapolitan house, and the Conde de Montijo, the most intriguing, and then one of the most popular persons in Spain. As this individual had no pretensions to such a charge, except what his undeserved popularity might give him, the report was probably raised by himself as one means to bring about his elevation. Some members of that Junta were intoxicated with success; a few others cared for nothing but their own interest: the latter wished for a Regent of their own appointment, under whose name they might possess the real power; the former were for retaining the authority which hitherto they had administered well, but which ceased to be legitimate when it became apparent that it was retained for ambitious motives. A paper from the Junta of Murcia, which expressed the opinion of Florida Blanca, had forcibly pointed out the necessity of a central government, and the inevitable ruin which a polyarchy of independent Juntas would bring on. It advised that the cities which had a seat in the Cortes should elect a council to govern in the name of Ferdinand, and that the mili-

*Ambition of
 the Junta of
 Seville.*

CHAP. tary affairs should be entrusted to a council of generals. The
 XII. Junta of Seville suppressed this paper wherever their influence
 1808. extended; but a like measure was now recommended by an
 authority with which the Junta could not cope.

The Council of Castille advise a central Junta.

Aug. 4.

The Council of Castille had recovered some of its lost reputation by the tardy resistance which it opposed to the Intruder, and by exerting itself with authority to maintain order in the capital, after the retreat of the French. It published a justification of its own conduct, more elaborate than convincing, and dispatched a circular address to the provincial Juntas, declaring its readiness to co-operate with them in any plans of defence. With respect to measures of another kind, it said, which were necessary to save the country, all that belonged to that Council was to excite the authority of the nation, and assist it with its influence, advice, and knowledge. Under circumstances so extraordinary it was not possible to adopt at once the measures indicated by the laws and customs of Spain; the Council therefore would confine itself to recommending that deputies should be appointed by all the different Juntas, who should meet together, and, in union with it, confer and determine upon this important object; so that all provisions proceeding from this common centre might be as expeditious as the end required.

Project of the Junta of Seville.

The better spirits in the Junta of Seville prevailed on this occasion, and that body, yielding with a good grace to the general opinion, seemed at the same time to direct it. They published an address, written with the ability which distinguished all their public papers. Hitherto, they said, the cause of the Spaniards had been prosperous, and nothing could frustrate their hopes of success, except a want of union among themselves. Their enemies were anxious to foment divisions. Human passions, personal interests ill understood, the ignorance, the weakness, the blindness of men, might assist these evil designs, destroy a

beginning so glorious, and facilitate the ruin of Spain. This they were endeavouring to guard against, protesting, before God and man, that they wrote nothing but what was dictated by the love of their country, being ready to hear the opinions of other provinces, and to amend their own errors, whenever it should be shown that they had committed any. The chief care should be to avoid whatever might serve to sow disunion : of this nature were all discussions concerning the royal house, and the order of succession in the different families which derived a right from it. The laws upon this point were well known ; but are we, said they, in a situation to talk of this ? Long live King Ferdinand VII. and his august brothers, heirs of the crown after his attested decease ! Why anticipate inquiries which could only be necessary in default of them ?

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The second question which agitated the people was of a different nature : . . . Was there a necessity for creating a supreme government, which should unite the sovereign authority of all the provinces, till the restitution of Ferdinand to his throne ? From the beginning they had been persuaded such a government was by all means necessary. Many Juntas and many military commanders had expressed their conviction of this truth, . . . a conviction arising from the necessity in every nation of a civil government, to which the military may be subordinate. Spain, deriving wisdom from history, had never thought of appointing a dictator. Her generals (and the fact was most honourable to the Spanish name) had been the first to acknowledge a system of things as ancient in Spain as the monarchy itself. The confidence of the people in the Supreme Juntas, the abundance with which pecuniary resources had been placed at their disposal, the heroic loyalty wherewith the army had obeyed them, and the happy issue, thus far, of their civil administration, and of the military enterprises which they had directed, placed in the most

CHAP. conspicuous light, and established, beyond all doubt, this funda-
 XII. mental truth, and most essential political principle. But who
 1808. was to create this supreme civil government? Who were to
 compose it? Where should be its place of residence? What
 the extent of its authority? How might it be established, with-
 out producing disunion among the different provinces? These
 were the important questions to be examined.

It had been said that the Cortes ought to assemble, that the Council of Castille should convoke them, and the whole proceedings be executed under the authority of that tribunal. But the Council of Castille never possessed the right of convoking the Cortes, . . why then should they give it that authority? Was it because it had lent the whole weight of its influence to the usurpation? Because it had acted in opposition to those fundamental laws which it was established to preserve and defend? Because it had afforded the enemy every facility to usurp the sovereignty of Spain, to destroy the hereditary succession of the crown, and the dynasty legally in possession? Because it had recognized and seated on the throne a foreigner, destitute even of the shadow of a title to it? What confidence could the Spanish nation place in a government convoked by an authority incompetent, illegal, and guilty of acts which might justly be ranked with the most atrocious crimes against their country? But the Council of Castille being thus excluded from all consideration, who was to convoke the Cortes? It was the peculiar and exclusive prerogative of the King to summon them; the provinces would not submit to any other authority; they would not unite: thus, therefore, there would be no Cortes, or, if a few deputies were to assemble, that very circumstance would occasion divisions, the very evil which all were anxious to avoid. The kingdom found itself suddenly without a king and without a government, . . a situation unknown in its history, and to its laws.

The people legally resumed the power of appointing a government. They created Juntas without any regard to the cities which had votes in the Cortes. The legitimate power was therefore deposited with the Juntas: in virtue of that power they had governed, and still were governing, and had been, and still were, universally acknowledged and obeyed. Their situation had not changed; the danger still existed; no new authority had supervened: the lawful authority resided entire in the Juntas to which the people had confided it. It was therefore incontestable that the sole and exclusive right of electing those who were to compose the supreme government was vested in the supreme Juntas. And whom should they elect? Most certainly individuals of their own body; for they alone derived their power from the people, and in them the nation had reposed entire confidence. Hence, if there were any province in which the military power subsisted alone, it was absolutely necessary that a supreme Junta should be constituted there, by which the people might act; this being indispensable, in order to concentrate the legitimate power of the people; for, under present circumstances, the government could not be legitimate, unless it originated in their free consent.

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The Junta of Seville was therefore of opinion that the supreme Juntas, meeting on the same day, should each elect, from its own members, two deputies; and the persons so elected, from that moment, be acknowledged as governors-general of the kingdom. The supreme Juntas ought nevertheless to be continued till the termination of the present state of things, being invested with the internal management of their respective provinces, but under due subordination to the general government. They ought to give instructions to their deputies constituting that government, and it would be the duty of those deputies to observe them, and to represent and support the claims of their provinces, as far as was consistent with the public weal. If there were one

CHAP. of the Royal Family capable of presiding in the supreme go-
 XII. vernment, he, and no other, ought to be appointed to that
 1808. office; but if there were no person of the royal blood, then it
 must elect a president from its own body; and, to obviate all
 danger, the presidency should be only for such limited time as
 might seem best. The Juntas would appoint a place for the
 seat of government, which the government might afterwards
 change, if it should see cause. It ought to be at a distance from
 the dangers of war, and to possess other local advantages. Seville
 possessed those advantages, but had no anxiety to be selected,
 and willingly sacrificed her claims. The Junta of that city
 would, however, frankly state, that, in their opinion, La Mancha
 was most convenient for the seat of government, and, especially,
 either the city of Ciudad-Real, or Almagro. But this point was
 to be decided by the free choice of the supreme Juntas. The
 paper concluded with a brief and dignified recapitulation of what
 the Junta of Seville had done for their country, disclaiming, on
 their part, any affectation or desire of superiority, and declaring,
 that whatever they had done was no more than their indispensable
 duty.

*The Pro-
 vincial
 Juntas as-
 sent to it.*

The general opinion was undoubtedly in favour of the plan
 of government thus recommended; and it is no light proof of
 its fitness, that schemes the same in principle and effect should
 have been suggested by persons who had no communication with
 each other, and whose views were in other respects so different.
 There were many in England who thought it would have been
 better to have at once convoked the Cortes, in the supposition
 that there was more resemblance between the Cortes and the
 English parliament than had ever really existed, and in the ge-
 neros but mistaken hope that vigorous measures might be ex-
 pected from a free legislative assembly. The best and wisest of
 the Spaniards wished also for a Cortes, and looked to it for such

judicious reforms as were conformable to the constitutional principles of the monarchy, and suited to the habits and feelings of the nation. But they saw that many points must be determined before the manner of assembling the Cortes could be adjusted, and that the necessity of forming a central government was immediate and urgent. The plan therefore which the Junta of Seville proposed was assented to without opposition. Still it was a great object with many of the provincial Juntas to retain their power. That of Valencia drew up secret rules for its deputies, declaring that they were to follow the direction of their constituents, remain subject and obedient to them, communicate regularly with them, and in no instance depart from their instructions; and they reserved to themselves the power of displacing their deputies at pleasure. This paper was made public; and it was known that other Juntas, that of Seville in particular, had pursued the same mischievous course.

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The Junta of Seville, however, did worse than this. In electing its deputies it chose two persons so notoriously unworthy of such a trust, that the only motives which could be assigned for the choice were a desire of being rid of them, or an opinion that they would submit to any terms for the sake of the appointment. D. Vicente Hore was the one; he had been a creature of Godoy's, and was so sensible of the estimation in which he was held, that he declined the charge, knowing his life would be in danger if he appeared in Madrid, where it was of course expected that the Central Junta would assemble. D. Juan de Vera y Delgado, titular Archbishop of Laodicea, and coadjutor of Seville, was then chosen in his place; and this was an unexceptionable choice. It was hoped and expected that Tilly, the other member, would follow Hore's example, in declining an appointment for which he was equally disqualified; but Tilly was of a bolder stamp. A blasted character had not prevented him from obtaining great popularity at Seville; and being utterly regardless

*Unworthy
choice of
the Junta
of Seville.*

CHAP. of the means by which he brought about his ends, he was ready
 XII. to venture for the highest stake in the game of revolution.
 1808. Foul facts had been proved against him, and fouler were, upon
 no light grounds, imputed. He had found it necessary to fly
 from Madrid before the troubles, because he was implicated in
 the robbery of a jeweller. The murder of the Conde de Aguila
 was attributed to him, because it was certain that he might have
 saved the Count by the slightest interference in his behalf. A
 wretch who was notoriously his creature had been one of the most
 active instruments in Solano's death; and Reding would have
 been made away with by his means before the battle of Baylen,
 if the intention had not been disclosed to Castaños, and by him
 prevented.

*The other
 members
 unexceptionable.*

This appointment was not perhaps what Tilly would have
 chosen; for it was believed that he had no inclination to show
 himself at Madrid; but he trusted to his talents for intrigue,
 obtained a monthly allowance of 500 dollars, and looked for
 those opportunities which revolutionary times offer to insane
 and desperate ambition. It is to the honour of the Spaniards,
 that this was the only exceptionable person elected for the central
 Junta: perhaps in no country could an equal number of men,
 under similar circumstances, have been chosen more worthy of
 the trust reposed in them. To be elected to a situation of so
 great responsibility, in a time of unexampled difficulties, was no
 object of desire; in no instance was the appointment solicited,
 and in most it was reluctantly accepted. The persons deputed
 were thirty-five* in number; of whom Florida-Blanca and

* LIST OF THE MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL JUNTA.

For Aragon..D. Francisco Rebolledo de Palafox y Melzi, Gentleman of the Bed-
 chamber, and Brigadier in the army; D. Lorenzo Calvo de Rozas, In-
 tendant of the army and kingdom of Aragon.

Jovellanos were the most remarkable, for the offices which they had formerly filled, and the rank which they held in public opinion. Both were scholars as well as statesmen, both men of

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Asturias.. D. Gaspar Melchor de Jovellanos, Knight of the Order of Alcantara, of the Royal Council of State, and formerly Minister of Grace and Justice; Marques de Campo-Sagrado, Lieutenant-General of the army, and Inspector-general of the troops of Asturias.

The Canaries.. Marques de Villanueva del Prado.

Old Castille.. D. Lorenzo Bonifaz y Quintano, Prior of the holy Church of Zamora; D. Francisco Xavier Caro, Professor of Laws at Salamanca.

Catalonia.. Marques de Villed, Conde de Darnius, a Grandee, and Gentleman of the Bed-chamber; Baron de Sabasona.

Cordoba.. Marques de la Puebla de los Infantes, a Grandee; D. Juan de Dios Gutierrez Rabé.

Extremadura.. D. Martin de Garay, Intendant of Extremadura, and Honorary Minister of the Council of War; D. Felix Ovalle, Treasurer of the army of Extremadura.

Gallicia.. Conde de Gimonde; D. Antonio Aballe.

Granada.. D. Rodrigo Riquelme, Regent of the Chancery of Granada; D. Luiz Funes y Salido, Canon of the holy Church of Santiago.

Jaen.. D. Francisco Castanedo, Canon of the holy Church of Jaen, Provisor and Vicar-general of that diocese; D. Sebastian de Jocano, of his Majesty's council, in the *Tribunal de Contaduria Mayor*, and *Contador* of the province of Jaen.

Leon.. Frey D. Antonio Valdes, Bailey and Grand Cross of the Order of S. Juan, Knight of the Golden Fleece, Gentleman of the Bed-chamber, Captain-General of the Fleet, Counsellor of State, formerly Minister of the Marine, and acting Minister of the Indies; the Vizconde de Quintanilla.

Madrid.. Conde de Altamira, Marques de Astorga, a Grandee, Knight of the Golden Fleece, Grand Cross of the Order of Charles III., First Equerry, and Gentleman of the Bed-chamber; D. Pedro de Silva, Patriarch of the Indies, Grand Cross of the Order of Charles III., and formerly Camp-Marshal of the Royal Armies.

Majorca.. D. Tomas de Veri, Knight of the Order of S. Juan, Lieutenant-Colonel of the Palma Volunteers; Conde de Ayamans, Lieutenant-Colonel of the Palma Militia.

CHAP. business, both high-minded and honourable Spaniards. Florida-
 XII. Blanca had more of the spirit of his country, Jovellanos was
 1808. more influenced by that of the age. The former had been an
 ambitious politician; the latter was always a philosopher, in the
 true and virtuous meaning of that polluted word. As the de-
 spotic minister of an absolute king, Florida-Blanca had used
 his power vigorously to uphold the dignity of the kingdom, and
 improve its internal condition; most of his measures were wise,
 and all were well-intended; but if he had ever conceived a wish
 to correct the abuses of the state, it had never appeared in his
 actions: Jovellanos had unwillingly accepted office, because it
 placed him in a sphere uncongenial to his modest habits and
 better mind, and withdrew him from the task to which he had
 devoted himself, of improving his native province. Jovellanos's
 desire was to meliorate the government and the nation by recur-
 ring to the free principles of the old constitution; Florida-Blanca
 thought that if governments were administered as they ought
 to be, the strongest must be the best. Both, without hesitation*,

Murcia.. Conde de Florida-Blanca, Knight of the Golden Fleece, Grand Cross of the
 Order of Charles III., Gentleman of the Bed-chamber, and formerly First
 Secretary of State, and acting Minister of Grace and Justice; Marques del
 Villar.

Navarre.. D. Miguel de Balanza; D. Carlos de Amatria, Members of the Deputation
 of the kingdom of Navarre.

Seville.. D. Juan de Vera y Delgado, Archbishop of Laodicea and Coadjutor of
 Seville; Conde de Tilly.

Toledo.. D. Pedro de Ribero, Canon of the holy Church of Toledo; D. José Garcia
 de la Torre, Advocate of the Royal Councils.

Valencia.. Conde de Contamina, a Grandee, Gentleman of the Bed-chamber; Prin-
 cipe Pio, a Grandee, Colonel of Militia.

* Llorente, under his name of Nellerto, (vol. i. 155,) asserts, that when Florida-
 Blanca was summoned to the central Junta he left a writing, addressed to the munici-

obeyed the call of their country, though Florida-Blanca, who was in extreme old age, would more willingly have passed the short remainder of his days in preparing and waiting for death ; and Jovellanos, broken down, more by the infirmities which an unjust and cruel imprisonment had aggravated or induced, than by the weight of sixty-five years, desired for himself nothing in this world but tranquillity. The former brought with him little more than a venerable name ; but Jovellanos was in full possession of his intellectual powers.

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Every effort had been made by Azanza, O'Farril, Urquijo, Mazarredo, and Cabarrus, to engage this excellent man in the Intruder's service. He had lived in habits of friendship with all these persons, more especially with the two last. Knowing how inaccessible he would be to all unworthy inducements, they endeavoured to deceive him, as they would fain have deceived themselves, by representing that theirs was the only course which could secure the welfare of Spain ; and that by no other means could the calamities with which it was threatened be averted ; for they thought it absurd to imagine any effectual resistance could be opposed to the determined ambition of Buonaparte. His reply was, that if the cause of their country were as desperate as they supposed it to be, still it was the cause of honour and loyalty, and that which a good Spaniard ought to follow at all

*Jovellanos
refuses all
offers of the
Intrusive
Government*

pality of the city of Murcia, protesting that he acted under fear and compulsion, and in the full knowledge that his country was going to destruction ; and adding, that he made this solemn declaration lest King Joseph should one day treat him as a criminal. This infamous calumny, which by its own absurdity confutes itself, is advanced by the ex-secretary of the Inquisition upon no better authority than that of a Madrid journal, published under the Intruder's government. It is so palpably calumnious, that I should not have thought it worthy of contradiction, if it had not been doubtfully repeated by Col. Jones in his very able Account of the War.

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hazards. Jovellanos held with his favourite author Cicero that friendship was to be preferred to every thing except honour and virtue ; he had given proof of this by his former conduct toward some of these friends, and they found now, as they had then, that no considerations could ever prevail in him over the sense of duty. It gave him no little pain that his name should be published in the Madrid gazette as one of Joseph's ministers ; thus to appear a traitor even for a few days to those who knew him not, or knew not how decidedly he had refused the appointment, was an injury which he felt severely. This was one of Buonaparte's insolent acts ; fallen as Urquijo and his colleagues were, they would not have thus outraged the feelings of a man whom it was not possible that they could ever cease to respect and admire. At length, the Intrusive Government having ascertained that he was really suffering under severe bodily infirmities, forbore to molest him with further solicitations. He was gradually recovering when news of the battle of Baylen refreshed his heart, and seemed to give him new life as well as hope. And when his appointment to the Central Junta was announced, though his first thought was of the ravages which age and affliction had made upon his debilitated frame, the sense of duty overcame all personal considerations, and he notified his acceptance without delay, at the same time declining a salary of 4000 ducats which had been assigned him.

*Jovellanos
a sus Com-
patriotas,
p. ii. art. i.
18—25.*

*Aranjuez
chosen for
the place of
meeting.*

In little more than a week he joined the deputies for Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia, at Madrid ; and then two difficulties, which had not been anticipated, occurred. The first related to the instructions with which the Junta of Seville had fettered their members ; instructions wholly repugnant to the principle upon which the provisional government was formed. The inconsistency and the evils of this measure were represented to Castaños, who was then in Madrid with his army ; that General's

influence was never exercised unworthily, nor withheld when it might be useful; and in consequence of his remonstrance the obnoxious instructions were withdrawn, though it appeared afterwards that secret ones to the same tenour had been substituted. The other difficulty was concerning the place of meeting. Jovellanos thought that no place could be so proper as the metropolis: there, in the palace of their kings, the Central Junta would derive consequence and respect from the place; they would appear at the head of the first tribunals and chief magistracy; the public documents were upon the spot, and any advice or assistance which they might require at hand. The members who were at Madrid agreed in this opinion, which was supported also by Castaños: but the Junta of Seville were averse to any measure which might lessen their authority, and in this instance they were well served by Tilly for reasons which nearly concerned himself. He had stopped at Aranjuez, and succeeded in persuading Florida-Blanca, who was decidedly for fixing the government at Madrid, that it would be convenient to hold their first sittings where they were, and determine there upon the forms which they should observe in the capital. He gained time by this... always a great object for one who trusts to intrigue and fortune. So fully persuaded however were Jovellanos and his colleagues when they went to Aranjuez that they should speedily adjourn to Madrid, that they left orders for forming an establishment there.

The greater part of the deputies having arrived, their installation was performed with as much ceremony as the place and circumstances would permit. The Archbishop of Laodicea performed mass, and administered an oath to his colleagues, first taking it himself, that they would preserve and extend the holy, Catholic, Apostolic, and Roman religion, defend their Sovereign Ferdinand, their rights, privileges, laws, and usages,

CHAP.
XII.

1808.
September.

*Installation
of the Cen-
tral Junta.
Sept. 26.*

CHAP. and especially those relating to the succession in the reigning
 XI. family, promote every thing conducive to the welfare and im-
 1808. provement of the kingdom, keep secret every thing which ought
September. not to be divulged, maintain the laws, and resist the enemies of
 the country at all hazards. The oath having been taken, Te
 Deum was sung by the barefooted friars of St. Pasqual, and the
 assembly then adjourned to the hall chosen for their sittings.
 Florida-Blanca was appointed president, and his first act was to
 proclaim King Ferdinand from the great gallery of the principal
 front of the palace. The gates of the palace had not been
 opened till now since the departure of Charles for Bayonne ;
 and the ceremony of thus proclaiming Ferdinand in the favourite
 residence of his ancestors, . . the scene of his own childhood, . . the
 spot where, six months ago, he had been acclaimed King, . . he
 who was now prisoner in a foreign land, and in the power of the
 perfidious tyrant who had ensnared him, . . moved the venerable
 statesman to tears when he pronounced his name, and excited
 feelings of grief and indignation in the multitude, which height-
 ened and hallowed the enthusiasm wherewith they repeated it.

*Conduct of
 the Council
 of Castille.*

The Junta dispatched copies of the act and oath of installa-
 tion to the different councils and tribunals, requiring their mem-
 bers to take the same oath, and issue orders to all the sub-
 ordinate Juntas, provinces, magistrates, governors, and viceroys,
 for obeying the new government, as holding in deposit the sove-
 reign authority for Ferdinand, the councils continuing in the
 exercise of their ordinary functions, but referring to the Central
 Junta all matters exceeding their powers, and upon which the
 Sovereign ought to be consulted. Other tribunals immediately
 signified their prompt and unreserved obedience ; the Council of
 Castille alone delayed their answer. The mortification which
 they felt at not being incorporated with the provisional govern-
 ment, as they had proposed, was embittered by a consciousness

that they had forfeited all claim to the confidence of the nation. Having, however, almost by accident, recovered so much authority, they strove to extend it, and after five days returned an answer, saying that, having given the subject their most serious consideration, they had resolved to take the oath, and circulate the necessary orders that the Central Junta should be obeyed in whatever was for the service of the King and of the public cause. But they added, that in discharge of their indispensable duty, they would hereafter communicate to the Junta the result of their consultations for the observance and maintenance of the laws. The reservation implied in this reply offended the Junta, and more especially the President Florida-Blanca, who had not been accustomed to tolerate delay or demur under his administration; and an answer was returned conveying reproof in the form of admonition, which reduced the Council of Castille to a quiet but malevolent submission.

The Leonese deputies had been seized by General Cuesta on their way. One of them, the Bayley Valdes, notified his arrest to Florida-Blanca, who instantly perceiving what fatal consequences must arise from any serious dispute between the civil and military authorities, wrote mildly to Cuesta, requesting that he would release the deputies, prefer his charges against them to the Junta, and leave the decision to that body. At the same time Castaños, to whom the judicious part of the people in Madrid looked for some interference in their fear at this unexpected act of military violence, addressed a letter to the Castillian general, representing to him calmly, but forcibly, the surprise and alarm which this arrest had occasioned, at a time when the great object of forming a provisional government was on the point of being happily effected; and asking what offence the deputies had committed, men as they were of high character, and the Bayley Valdes distinguished for the services which he had per-

CHAP.
XII.

1808.
September.

*The Leonese
deputies ar-
rested by
Cuesta.*

CHAP. formed? what authority was competent to arrest and detain
 XII. them? why, if they were delinquents, they had not been de-
 1808. nounced to the Juntas of their respective provinces? why their
September. crimes were not published in the face of the nation, and them-
 selves accused before the Central Junta, then about to assemble?

*Cuesta's
 vindication
 of his con-
 duct.*

In his answer to Castaños, Cuesta declared, that as principal and sole chief of the provinces of Castille and Leon, he was not bound to give an account of his conduct to any other provincial authority, being independent of all till a general government or regency should be established; nevertheless, as his Excellency apprehended some uneasiness in the people of Madrid, and in the whole nation, concerning this transaction, he deemed it proper to satisfy his doubts. The Junta of Castille having been dissolved by the entrance of the enemy into Valladolid, he had increased the Junta of Leon by adding to it a deputy for every intendency or province of Castille, and had confirmed Valdes as their president, Valdes having promised to obey his orders in all things, without consideration of his own rank. But after the battle of Rio Seco, a few members of this Junta, seeing him pursued by the French, and forsaken by the Galician army, retired to Ponferrada, instead of Astorga, whither he had directed them to repair: and there, under the influence of Valdes, treated clandestinely with the Junta of Coruña, to unite with them at Lugo, and from thence govern both Castille and Leon, independently of the captain-general, who, indeed, was to become subordinate to them. The Bayley had notified this to him, and at the same time ordered him to deliver up his cavalry to General Blake. Instead of obeying such orders, he had immediately annulled this fugitive Junta, and commanded the inferior Juntas to break off all communication with it, which they had accordingly done, except in those parts of Leon which were under the immediate power of the Galician general. The fugitive Junta

persisted in its pretensions, and had elected Valdes and the Vizconde de Quintanilla as its representatives in the Central Junta. Let any impartial person then say whether he had not good reason to arrest them for insubordination! Not having been elected by any competent authority, they were not members of the Central Junta, and therefore no offence had been offered to that body in arresting them. Whenever that body should be assembled, he would be the first person to obey it, and submit to its high consideration the cause of Valdes and his accomplices: till then neither the rank of the Bayley, nor his assumed quality of member of the Central Junta, for the provinces of Castille and Leon, shall suffice, said the old General, to exempt him from my jurisdiction. The same answer he returned to Florida-Blanca, and sent back the letter which that nobleman had addressed to Valdes, saying that the prisoner was in strict confinement, deprived of all communication.

Castañes, not receiving a reply as soon as he had expected, called upon the Council of Castille to interfere; and that tribunal, well pleased that its authority should be appealed to on so important an occasion in such times, wrote in consequence to Cuesta, remonstrating on the dangerous tendency of his conduct. But he returned for answer, that the imprisonment of these persons was the best means of preventing danger, as it would effectually preclude the contentions which might arise if a double set of representatives for Castille and Leon should present themselves; that neither prudence nor justice permitted him to overlook the infidelity, insurrection, and insubordination of a Junta which he had created; and that for these offences, as Valdes was a general, he would deliver him over to be tried by a council of war, composed of generals, unless a sovereign regency should first be established; in which case he would submit the whole proceeding to their judgement, and his own

CHAP.
XII.

1808.

September.

The Council of Castille interfere.

CHAP. powers also, . . powers which till then he considered independent
XII. of any other authority.

1808.

September.

*Cuesta is
summoned
before the
Central
Junta.*

Upon this principle, and an assumption that the Juntas in Castille and Leon derived their authority from him and not from the people, Cuesta made the Junta of Valladolid, who had assembled in Leon, send a representative to the Central Junta. The assembly refused to admit him, and ordering Cuesta to set his prisoners at liberty, summoned him also to Aranjuez, that all parties might be heard. This was in effect removing him from the command of his army. Such an assertion of their power was well-timed, for Cuesta, making no secret of his hostile intentions against them, had declared to the British agent, Mr. Stuart, that two measures were necessary for the public good; first, the restoration of the authority of the Captains General and of the Royal Audiencias, (which would have ensured to him the continuance of his command); and, secondly, the exercise of military influence over the Junta, to make them elect an Executive Council, of three or five members, each of whom should be placed at the head of one branch of the government, and responsible to the nation only. But Cuesta, intemperate as he was, sincerely desired to serve his country; and he obeyed the summons without hesitation. Mutual accusations were made. The Junta of Leon reproached the General with his attempts to maintain order at the commencement of the insurrection, and thereby serving the Intrusive Government. They injured themselves more than Cuesta by this disingenuous attack; for his defence upon that point was full and satisfactory: what persons in authority were there throughout Spain, he asked, who had not endeavoured to suppress the first popular movement, knowing how great a force the enemy had in the heart of the country, ready to act anywhere, and not knowing that the spirit of resistance was uni-

versal? As soon as that spirit was fairly manifested, he had taken the national side, had brought armies into the field, and had done his duty faithfully, if not fortunately. It was base indeed in the Junta to bring against him this accusation, which, if it had been taken up by the populace, or his own soldiers, might so easily have occasioned his murder. On the other hand, it was found, that in the affair of the deputies Cuesta's conduct had not been distinguished by that honest obstinacy which appeared in his own account, and which characterized his general conduct. He had not disapproved of the Junta's measures till they ordered him to send his cavalry to Blake, a measure which all the military men in Madrid considered of the utmost importance at the time. His opinion of the Bayley Valdes had been so favourable, that he had made known his intention to have him elected as his own colleague; and the immediate cause of this rash and intemperate proceeding was anger that he himself had not been chosen. So completely had this feeling mastered him, that instead of advancing with his army to Burgo del Osma, (as had been resolved in a council of war at Madrid at which he was present,) he had actually fallen back to Segovia to gratify his resentment by seizing Valdes. Valdes would now have terminated the dispute by giving in his resignation: this it was not thought proper to accept; the validity of his election was admitted, and the other points were referred to a competent tribunal, but the course of events soon put an end to all further proceedings.

The Central Junta, thus peaceably established, and unanimously recognized by the nation, began their administration with the fairest promises. They acknowledged the national debt, and took upon themselves the obligations contracted by the crown, which formed the patrimony of many families; and which they pledged themselves punctually to pay. That portion of the revenue which had formerly been swallowed up in the

CHAP.
XII.

1808.

September.

*Declaration
of the Cen-
tral Junta.*

CHAP. enormous expenses of the royal household, or engrossed by the
XII. favourite, would, they trusted, enable them to diminish the im-
1808. posts laid upon the towns and villages; and great resources
September. would be found in the property forfeited by those who had be-
trayed their country. The sum total of the funds arising from
these sources, from the regular revenues, and from the donatives
and contributions of Spain and the Indies, they promised an-
nually to publish, with an account of its expenditure. They
would simplify, as far as possible, the revenue system, gradually
suppress useless offices, establish economy in all the branches of
financial administration, and remove the abuses introduced into
it by the old government.

The duties which they proposed to themselves, and the bene-
fits which they promised the people, were farther explained in
an address to the nation; for they affirmed, it became them to
inform the people of their situation, with a dignity becoming the
Spanish character; and to establish, in a frank and generous
manner, those relations of reciprocal confidence which ought to
be the basis of every just and wise administration. A tyranny
of twenty years, exercised by the most incapable hands, had
brought them to the very brink of perdition: the nation was
alienated from its government by hatred or contempt: every
thing favoured the perfidious plot which Buonaparte had formed
against them, when they rose to vindicate their rights, and be-
came at once the admiration of Europe. Their situation was
unexampled in their history, unforeseen by their laws, and, as
it were, opposed to their habits. Great and wonderful things
they had accomplished; but all their enthusiasm and all their
virtue were required for what remained to be done. Their
armies were naked and unprovided with every thing. The
French, collected behind the Ebro, were expecting reinforce-
ments, and ravaging Upper Castille, Rioja, and the provinces
of Biscay; Navarre and Catalonia were almost wholly in their

power; they possessed the passes, and had made themselves, by what treachery was well known, masters of the strong frontier fortresses, and of Barcelona. The despot of France, deceiving, by the grossest impostures, the slaves who obeyed him, was striving to keep all other states in inactivity, that he might bring the whole enormous weight of his military force upon Spain. The continental powers were watching the issue of this first struggle, desiring to declare themselves against the common enemy, but proceeding with the timid circumspection which they had learnt from past misfortunes. A confederacy against the tyrant was evidently their only means of preservation: for what state could now hold relations of amity with him? who could now give credit to the words and promises of Buonaparte, or trust to his good faith? The fate of Spain was at once a lesson and a warning to Europe, . . . her resolution would serve as an example, her victories as an incentive; and the reprobate, who had trampled under foot the principles of justice, had placed himself in that fearful situation, that he must either become master of all, or perish in the struggle which he had so wantonly provoked.

But this co-operation would not be obtained till the Spaniards had given such earnest of success as rendered victory certain: they must therefore call forth all their means, as if they were singly to contend against the whole power of France. The Junta believed it would be necessary to maintain 500,000 men in arms, besides 50,000 cavalry, . . . a force which, however disproportionate to their present situation, and to all former exigencies, was not more than the present times required. The power of their adversary was colossal, his ambition even greater than his power, and his existence incompatible with their liberty. His exertions were to be estimated by the barbarity of his character and the extremity of his danger; but they were the

CHAP.
XII.
1808.
September.

CHAP. exertions of a tyrant, and would be confounded, when opposed
XII. to the constancy of a great and free people.

1808. The last government . . if that might be called government
September. which was one continued and monstrous dilapidation, had exhausted all the sources of prosperity. The resources which arose from the revenues of the royal household, from the enormous sums formerly devoured by the insatiable avarice of Godoy, from his collected rapine, and the confiscated estates, from a free trade, a well-arranged administration of the revenue, and regularly distributed contributions, had already been indicated. The succours already given so generously by England, and still to be expected from that nation, were to be added to these means. "But," said the Central Junta, "it is incumbent on us that these succours, which have been so opportunely given, and so gratefully received, and the effects of which have been so beneficial, should be hereafter recognized and recompensed with the reciprocity and decorum which become a great and powerful nation. The Spanish monarchy must not, in this respect, be placed in a state of inequality and dependence on its allies. The produce of these various means would be great, but slow, and therefore insufficient for the urgent necessities of the state. Would they be sufficient to furnish for a time the ordinary supplies, discharge the great debt which must be incurred, and maintain the formidable army which must be kept up? If not, the government would at once have recourse to the nation, certain, from the fidelity with which its accounts would regularly be published, from the necessity and notoriety of the public wants, and the patriotism of the nation, that, although to evils so extraordinary as the present remedies as extraordinary must be applied, its demands would neither be disregarded through distrust, nor detested as arbitrary.

"The defence of the kingdom, and the means of providing

for it, must necessarily be the first duty of the government ; but it would fulfil only half its duties if it attended to this alone : other duties remained, to be the great reward of the virtue of the Spaniards and of their sacrifices. A little time only had passed since, oppressed and degraded, ignorant of their own strength, and finding no protection against these evils, neither in the institutions nor in the laws, they had even regarded foreign dominion as less hateful than the wasting tyranny which consumed them. The dominion of a will always capricious, and most often unjust, had lasted too long : their patience, their love of order, their generous loyalty had too long been abused : it was time that law, founded on general utility, should commence its reign. This was the desire of their good and unfortunate King Ferdinand ; this was what he pointed out, even from the captivity to which a perfidious traitor had reduced him. The name of their country ought no longer to be a vague and idle word to the Spaniards ; henceforward it was to import to their ears and to their hearts the sanctuary of laws, the theatre for talents, the reward of virtue. Such a country the Junta solemnly promised they should possess ; and till the military operations, which must at first be slow, in order better to insure success, should furnish the leisure necessary for this great and solemn reform, the government would privately prepare for it. Instead of rejecting the advice of enlightened men, they desired and requested it. The knowledge and illustration of their ancient and constitutional laws ; the changes which change of circumstances rendered necessary in their re-establishment ; the reform which might be necessary in the civil, criminal, and commercial codes ; projects for improving public education, which was in Spain so greatly on the decline ; a system of regulated economy for the distribution and collection of the public revenue, . . these were subjects for the investigation of wise and thoughtful men, and on which the opinions of such men were

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XII.

1808.

September.

CHAP. XII. solicited. The Junta would form different committees, each entrusted with a particular department, to whom all writings on matters of government and administration might be addressed : so that each contributing by his exertions to give a just direction to the public mind, the government might be enabled to establish the internal happiness of Spain."

1808.
September.

*Jovellanos
proposes a
Regency,
and that a
Cortes be
summoned.*

These were fair professions ; nor were the intentions of the Central Junta less laudable than their language. Tilly alone excepted, the members were upright and honourable men, worthy to represent a nation distinguished for its high sense of honour. But they were unacquainted with each other, and except the President, Jovellanos, and Garay, wholly unused to business : for a national assembly too few, and for an executive government too many. Jovellanos was of opinion that they ought immediately to appoint a regency of five persons, one of them being a dignitary of the church, to be installed on the first day of the ensuing year : that the Central Junta should then be reduced to half its original number, retaining one member only of each deputation, for the purpose of watching over the observance of the constitution entrusted to the regency, and corresponding with the provincial Juntas, which should thenceforward consist of four members each : these were to exist as long as the Council of Regency ; and the Central Junta of Correspondence, as it was then to be called, only till the meeting of the Cortes, which Jovellanos maintained ought immediately to be announced as to assemble as soon as the enemy should have been driven out of Spain, or, at all events, in two years from the present time, if the delivery of the country should not be accomplished before. He proposed also that the Junta, before it resigned its powers, should appoint persons qualified for such a task to prepare plans of reform in the constitution, laws, finance, system of public instruction, army, and marine ; . . these plans were to be formed under the inspection and approbation

of the Council of Regency and the Junta of Correspondence, and finally submitted to the Cortes. In delivering this advice, Jovellanos, to remove all suspicion of any interested views, repeated in writing the solemn declaration which he had before made by word of mouth, that he never would accept of any office or employment himself; the natural and invincible repugnance which he had ever felt for such preferment, the bitter price which he had paid for having once accepted it, in deference to a brother whom he respected like a parent, and the sad sense of decay both in his physical and moral powers, determined him to this resolution. The only duty which he would undertake to perform was the noble one of simply delivering those opinions which he thought most conducive to the good of his country, in discharge of the high trust wherewith his own province had honoured him.

CHAP.
XII.

1808.

October.

Jovellanos
Memoria,
p. ii. § 33,
34. Apen-
dices, No. 5.

Jovellanos expected the greatest benefit from a Cortes; but he apprehended great evil if it were hastily convoked, and without due preparation. That party who have since assumed the appellation of *Liberales* censured him for proposing to postpone it so long. They were then a very small, but active, minority, consisting chiefly of physicians, lawyers, and unbelieving priests, whose little knowledge, exclusively derived from prohibited French books, was worse than ignorance. These persons were for hurrying on to a jacobinical revolution, and were impatient for a Cortes as the first great means of embodying that democracy which they expected to govern. But there were also many of the best of the Spaniards who looked to the Cortes as the surest means of delivering their country, and restoring it to its former dignity and power; and the same views were very generally entertained in England, and by the British Government itself. In fact, the assembling of a Cortes had been proposed by our first authorized agent, Mr. Stuart, to the Juntas of Galicia and Asturias. Some of the difficulties which would

Expecta-
tions from
a Cortes.

CHAP. attend it were then perceived; the Asturians proposed that it
 XII. should assemble at Oviedo, the Galicians at Villa Franca in the
 1808. Bierzo, each Junta wishing that it should be convoked near
 October. their own place of abode; and for the purpose of retaining their
 power, they wished to enlarge the deputation, so that all their
 own members might be included. Though it was thus seen that
 the measure was not so easily accomplished as had been sup-
 posed, still the opinion prevailed in England, that if a free
 legislative assembly were established in Spain, the same bless-
 ings would ensue which the British people enjoy under the
 well-tempered constitution which has grown with their growth,
 and adapted itself to their circumstances. There are errors
 from which it is painful to be undeceived. Those persons were
 wiser in their generation, who, having the recent example of
 France before their eyes, believed that legislative assemblies, in
 countries unaccustomed to such modes of legislation, are more
 to be dreaded than desired; that the reformation which is thus
 begun tends to certain anarchy; and that where great and ex-
 tensive improvements in the existing system are necessary, the
 only means whereby they can be effected, without inducing worse
 evils than those which are removed, is by an upright and far-
 sightest minister, under a strong government. Upon this point
 Florida-Blanca judged more truly than Jovellanos. Such, how-
 ever, was the respect with which the opinions of that admirable
 man were at this time heard, that his proposal would have been
 carried, if the Junta had come to an immediate decision upon
 it; and it was only by deferring the final discussion till Nov. 7,
 being that day month, that the minority averted a measure which
 shocked their prejudices as much as it alarmed their fears.

*Florida-
Blanca
averse to it.*

*Jovellanos
Memoria,
p. ii. § 35.*

*State of Ca-
lania.*

The Junta were at this time full of hope; they had just con-
 fidence in the national character; and they were elated by the
 enthusiastic spirit which had manifested itself, the splendid suc-
 cesses which had been obtained, the apparent inactivity of the

enemy, and the promised co-operation of Great Britain, which had already effected the delivery of Portugal. They had also encouraging advices from Catalonia. After relieving Figueras, the French dispatched a force from that fortress to get possession of Rosas, but failed in the attempt. Ill armed, and worse disciplined as they were, the Catalans displayed that unconquerable spirit which in all ages has distinguished them. In no other province were such great and continued exertions made against the invaders: and in no other province were the people left so entirely to their own resources. They made the most urgent solicitations to the Junta of Seville for a supply of artillery, which could have been spared in abundance from the arsenals of Seville and Cadiz, and which Lord Collingwood offered them the means of conveying; but they could obtain none, and were fain, therefore, to use the trunks of trees, bored, and hooped with iron. The want of cavalry was even more severely felt in all the level part of the country; . . no substitute could be found for this, nor was it possible that their volunteers and newly-raised levies could resist well-disciplined horse-soldiers upon plain ground. They had, however, been eminently successful where the ground favoured them; and confiding in their numbers, they occupied the right bank of the Llobregat from San Boy to Martorell, in order to distress the enemy in Barcelona. From thence they were dislodged by General Lechi, who, marching out by night with 2500 men, forded the river in several places at daybreak, drove them from their batteries, sacked the towns and villages along the line, set fire to them, and returned in triumph, bearing as trophies the banners of the churches which had been plundered. Duhesme then resolved to undertake the siege of Gerona, having concerted it with Reille, who was to co-operate with him from Figueras. It was an object of great importance; for while Gerona and Hostalrich were in possession of the Spaniards, they would be able greatly to molest, if not

CHAP.
XII.

1808.

*October.**July 16.**Duhesme
resolves to
besiege
Gerona.*

CHAP.
XII.

1808.

July.

*Cabañas, p.
i. 80—85.*

*Difficulties
on the
march.*

wholly to interrupt, the communication by land between Barcelona and France. Materials of every kind were found in the well-stored arsenals and magazines of Barcelona, and the horses, mules, and carriages of the inhabitants of that city were put in requisition for conveying them. So sure of success was Duhesme, and so exasperated by his former failure, that he is said to have declared he would arrive before the city on one day, attack it the next, take it on the third day, and on the fourth destroy it.

He began his march on the 10th of July, with about 6000 men. From Barcelona to Gerona is a journey of twenty hours; but Duhesme had not calculated upon the obstacles which he was to encounter on the way. The road for two-thirds of the distance lies always within sight of the sea, and in great part along the coast; the Catalans, under D. Francisco Milans, had broken it up, and annoyed him with great activity on his left, while an English frigate, and some smaller vessels, brought their guns to bear upon him from the sea; these impediments delayed him five days between Caldetas and San Pol. On the 19th he divided his troops; one part crossed the wild mountains of Vallgorguina to S. Celoni, and endeavoured by a sudden attack to get possession of Hostalrich. Twice they attempted to escalate it, and were repulsed with loss by the acting governor D. Manuel O'Sullivan. The other division continued the coast road, losing many guns and much of its ammunition there. They rejoined on the way to Gerona, and arrived before that city on the 22nd, where they were met on the following day by Reille with 2000 men from Figueras; but Duhesme had suffered so much on the march, that he was in no condition for active operations, and the remainder of the month was employed in preparing for the siege.

*Cabañas, i.
85—87.*

*Troops
from Mi-
norca land
at Tarrag-
ona.*

On the very day that the French General appeared for the second time before Gerona, the Marques del Palacio, with 4600 regular troops from Minorca, landed at Tarragona. Many officers,

who had hitherto remained in Barcelona, and several magistrates, escaped now from that city to join him. The first measure of the Marques was to strengthen the line of the Llobregat, which the Somatenes and Miquelets, undismayed by their late defeat, had again occupied. The Conde de Caldagues was sent with a detachment upon this service, and the garrison, who made a vigorous attempt to dislodge him immediately on his arrival, were repulsed. The Catalans were now in high spirits, and with the assistance of Lord Cochrane, in the *Imperieuse* frigate, made a successful attack upon the Castle of Mongat, a small fort on the coast, about nine miles from Barcelona, which the French had strengthened, as a point of support for their plundering incursions to the eastward. About an hundred prisoners were taken there, seven pieces of cannon, and a considerable quantity of ammunition and stores. The enemy could no longer maraud in that direction, and feeling great present inconvenience, began to apprehend serious consequences from the blockade of Barcelona: the British cruisers watched it effectually by sea, and in the only part of the land now open to them, which was the mountainous country in their immediate vicinity, between the Llobregat and the Besos, they had to contend with an armed and exasperated peasantry; for even those persons who would have remained quiet were driven to despair by the system of fire and sword which Duhesme pursued.

CHAP.
XII.
1808.
August.

*Barcelona
blockaded.*

*Cabañas, p.
ii. 3—25.*

Barcelona, with its fort Monjuich, is one of the strongest places in Europe. It is remarked by Swinburne, that the citadel was calculated to overawe the inhabitants at least as much as to protect them from a foreign enemy. For this in fact it was built, when six hundred houses were demolished for its site; and to the same purpose it was now applied against the family which built it, when Buonaparte's perfidy had made the Bourbons as popular in Catalonia as they had been hated there during the war

Barcelona.

CHAP.
XII.
1808.
August.

of the succession. Every house in Barcelona lies exposed to Monjuich, which stands singly on the south-west. A new fortress had been erected there early in Charles the Third's reign, and it had that completeness and magnificence which characterised public works in Spain. On the sea side it was considered impregnable, so admirably had the natural strength of the situation been improved by art; and toward the land the glacis had been sloped at an incredible expense in such a manner that no approaches could be made under shelter. The population of Barcelona in 1797 was 130,000, and if the increase since had been in proportion to that of the ten years preceding, it must have amounted to 150,000 at this time. Yet this population, than which a braver and nobler-minded people were no where to be found, was kept under control by 4000 French, Lechi having been left with no greater force. The city was so completely at the mercy of the citadel and Monjuich, that the invaders had nothing to fear from open attacks. Their only danger was from stratagems or famine. Against the former they were always on their guard; and it was to open the communication for supplies and reinforcements from France that Duhesme had undertaken the expedition against Gerona.

*The Junta
of Cata-
lonia re-
moves to the
head-quar-
ters.*

The Marques del Palacio arrived in Catalonia without treasure or provisions, and there was no government to which he could look for either. The contributions which had been raised had already been expended, and nothing was to be obtained by way of loan. A temporary resource was found in the confiscation of French property; for in these calamitous times the numerous French families who were settled in Spain bore their full share in the general misery and ruin. These funds, however, could not long suffice; and for the better establishment of some permanent system, it was agreed that the Supreme Junta of Catalonia, which had hitherto resided at Lerida, should remove from

that inconvenient situation, and accompany in future the headquarters. The Junta was newly constituted accordingly, and the Commander-in-chief was chosen president. The Marques would now have marched to raise the siege of Gerona; but such means as he would have deemed adequate were wanting; he had no cavalry, the little which there was in Lerida and Tarragona was unfit for action, and perhaps he reasonably distrusted his troops if they were led against a well-disciplined army. Caldagues, however, was sent to harass the enemy and interrupt the siege, with four companies of regular troops, 2000 Miquelets and Somatens, and three pieces of artillery. He was joined at Hostalrich by more of these new levies, making his whole number 4800 men, and he received two cannon from that fortress. They advanced to Castella, passing within sight of the French encampment; some officers came out of the city to confer with the Count, and a joint attack upon the enemy's batteries was concerted for the following morning.

CHAP.
XII.
1808.
August.

Caldagues sent to interrupt the siege of Gerona.

Cabañes, ii. 30—32, 52—55.

This was on the night of the 15th; Duhesme had been so harassed in his operations, and so slow in them, that though he arrived before Gerona on the 19th of July, it was not till the morning of August 13 that his batteries began their fire. It was directed chiefly against the Castle, which, like that at Barcelona, bears the name of Monjuich, and which, with all the other forts around Gerona, had been neglected, and was in a state of great dilapidation. On the 15th a considerable breach had been made. The garrison was then strengthened with 900 men, who were ordered to be ready at daybreak, and to sally as soon as the relieving troops should be ascending the hill of Monjuich; but instead of waiting for this, they sallied as soon as they saw them marching down the distant heights of St. Miguel and Los Angeles. The execution therefore was as rash as the plan, and certainly few attempts in war have ever been made in which there was so

He attacks the enemy's batteries with success.

CHAP.

XII.

1808.

August.

little reasonable prospect of success. The besieging army consisted of 11,000 men, of which 1000 were cavalry, all disciplined soldiers, upon whom their officers could rely. There were 4700 regular troops in Gerona, who, for want of discipline, were not to be relied on in the field ; and of the force which Caldagues had now collected, amounting to 6000, there were but 300 regulars. But Duhesme was at this time too much dispirited by the general prospect of affairs in Spain, and the reverses which he himself had suffered, to be sensible of his own superiority, or to profit by the errors of his opponents. One battery was taken at the point of the bayonet in this premature sally, and presently set on fire. A second also was stormed ; the French, who had been driven from it, recovered it, being reinforced by a Swiss battalion ; but a column of the Spaniards arrived in time to assist their countrymen, and it was again taken, and the carriages burnt. D. Henrique O'Donell, who held the rank of *Sargento Mayor* in the regiment of Ultonia, distinguished himself greatly in this part of the action. The destruction of these batteries was the object for which Caldagues had hazarded an attack upon an enemy so greatly superior in strength. His own troops, meantime, drove the French from the heights of S. Miguel to the village of Camp-Dura ; from thence they, in their turn, were driven back to the heights, and being there reinforced, made the enemy again give way before them, dislodged them from Camp-Dura, and pursued them till they crossed the river Ter to Sarria.

*Cabañas, ii.
55—62.*

*Duhesme
raises the
siege.*

Caldagues dispatched news of his victory from the field of battle to Tarragona, saying that the enemy's batteries were demolished, and all the artillery taken with which they had battered Monjuich in breach. All that he had hoped, and more than he could reasonably have expected, had been obtained ; and when his troops, flushed with success, would have exposed themselves in the plain to the French cavalry, he restrained them, ordered

them to fortify themselves upon the heights, and exerted himself to repair the breach in Monjuich, lest it should be attacked in the morning. Duhesme indeed might have recovered in the night the positions which he had lost, so little discipline was there among the Spaniards, and so little watch or order was observed, notwithstanding the strict injunctions of the Commander. But Duhesme appears to have been one of those men who lose their powers of mind when good fortune forsakes them; and Caldagues, when day broke, and he was expecting a formidable attack, discovered, to his astonishment, that the enemy had disappeared. They had fled, rather than retreated, in the night, and in such haste, that they left several hundred barrels of powder which they might with ease have rolled into the river. Reille returned to Figueras with little loss, there being no impediment in that direction; but Duhesme, who did not venture a second time upon the coast road, when he reached Calella took a line between the high mountains and the sea, throwing his artillery down the precipices, and abandoning great part of the baggage and stores, and even leaving the sick and wounded who were not able to sit on horseback. The retreat was made with such precipitation, that Milans, who pursued, did not come up with them till they were within seven miles of Barcelona, on the heights of Mongat. But Lechi being, fortunately for them, apprised by a spy of their approach, met them there with part of the garrison, at a time when a small Spanish force might have completed their destruction.

An outcry was raised against Palacio because he had not intercepted the enemy in their retreat, nor was he ever forgiven by the unreasonable people for not having done what it was impossible to do. When the account from the field of battle reached him at Tarragona, the French were half way to Barcelona; and before he was apprised that they had broken up the

CHAP.
XII.

1808.
August.

*Marshal
Gouvion
St. Cyr,
Pieces Jus-
tif. No. 3.
Cabañes, ii.
62—81.*

*Unpopu-
larity of
the com-
mander
in Cata-
lonia.*

*Cabañes, ii.
101.*

CHAP. XII. } siege, they were already in that city. The command which he
 1808. } had undertaken was no enviable one. The repulse of the enemy
 August. } at Valencia, their losses in Andalusia, and the heroic defence of
Difficulties } Zaragoza, had raised hopes which nothing but the most brilliant
of the ser- } success could satisfy; the service in which he was engaged re-
vice. } quired great steadiness and military skill; the best of his troops
 } were wanting in both, and the great body of them fit only for
 } irregular war. The Junta of Catalonia had decreed that an
 } army of 40,000 men should be raised; and because there were
 } no officers to command, and no time for disciplining them, they
 } determined that the whole force should consist of Miquelets.
 } This class of irregular troops was originally called * Almoga-
 } vares; but when they began to alter their savage appearance
 } and barbarous mode of warfare, they took their present name
 } from one of their favourite commanders, Miquelot de Prats, a
 } notable partizan who attached himself to Cæsar Borgia. The
 } name was popular among the Catalans, the Miquelets having
 } distinguished themselves whenever the country was invaded,
 } and especially in the succession war. It was intended to raise
 } forty *tercios* of a thousand men each, and this might have been
 } done in a few days, such was the national spirit, if equipments
 } of every kind had not been wanting. A great bounty was given
 } to these Miquelets, but this prevented recruiting for the line,
 } and the regular troops were disgusted at seeing that men re-
 } ceived larger pay for engaging in a service where they had more
 } liberty, and were subject to less discipline. On the other hand,

*D. Fr. Ma-
 noel Hist.
 de Catala-
 ña, i. iv. p. 90.*

*Cabañes, i.
 90—93.*

* An account of them may be found in the notes to the Chronicle of the Cid, pp. 141 and 418. Marshal Gouvion St. Cyr says of the present Miquelets, that they are the best light troops in Europe (p. 54.) But Cabañes argues that they cannot possibly be so efficient as they were when war was carried on less scientifically, and he regrets that it was not possible to raise regular regiments in their stead. P. i. 90.

the Miquelet officers received less pay than those of the army, and were less esteemed, their rank being only during the war. The force which was thus defective in its constitution, was also ill armed. Sir Hew Dalrymple, upon whom pressing demands for arms were made from all that side of the peninsula, could allot but few to Catalonia ; and the abundant supplies which had been sent out by England were dispatched to other parts, where they were neither so much wanted nor so well bestowed ; for Barcelona was the great arsenal of the province : 50,000 firelocks had there fallen into the enemy's hands, whereas the manufactory at Ripoll could furnish the Catalans with not more than 150 per week. Palacio therefore ordered pikes or partisans to be made, with which he armed the two foremost ranks of the Miquelets, who, as upon the old system, were drawn up three deep. In hands that can be trusted with the bayonet the pike would be a weapon hardly less efficient ; but for these raw troops the want of fire-arms lessened the little confidence which they felt in themselves when they were brought to encounter soldiers as well disciplined as armed. Even the regular troops knew their own inferiority in the art of war. They were incapable of manœuvring in the face of an enemy ; for so greatly had their discipline been neglected while no danger was apprehended, that they had gone through none of the rehearsals by which soldiers are prepared for real action ; mere drilling seems to have been all the instruction they had received.

CHAP.
XII.
1808.

Cabañas, ii.
130—132.

Cabañas, i.
78.

With this force, as ill officered as it was ill provided in all other respects, the Marques removed his head-quarters to Villafranca, to maintain the line of the Llobregat, and take advantage of any opportunity for recovering Barcelona while the blockade was kept up. An expectation that something would be attempted by the inhabitants seems to have influenced the Spaniards to this measure, otherwise ill judged. The recovery of Barcelona

*The Mar-
quis ap-
proaches
Barcelona.
Sept. 1.*

CHAP. XII. was indeed an object of the greatest importance; but weakened
 1808. as Duhesme then was, a few thousand Miquelets, with the armed
 September. population, would have sufficed to prevent the incursions of the
 garrison, and the Spaniards should have taken their post on the
 Fluvia instead of the Llobregat, with the Ter for their second
 position, and Gerona and Hostalrich to support them, . . there
 they could best have impeded the efforts which the French would
 make for relieving and securing to themselves the strongest
 place in Spain. A British force might here have rendered the
 most essential service. Deputies from the Junta of Catalonia
 were sent to Madrid, to consult with the Council of Generals
 there upon the affairs of the province; and in the hope of ob-
 taining British aid one of them proceeded to Lisbon to confer
 with Sir Hew Dalrymple. All that could be done in that quarter
 was effected; the Spanish troops in Lisbon were embarked for
 Catalonia; and the British Government, sensible of what might
 be effected there by timely measures, ordered thither 10,000
 men from the army at that time stationed in Sicily. But a feint
 of invading Sicily was made by Murat, who had succeeded Jo-
 seph Buonaparte as Intrusive King at Naples; and the troops
 were detained in an inactive and unworthy service, when they
 ought to have been co-operating for the most important ends with
 one of the finest and bravest people in the world. At no other
 time or place during the whole war could such a body of English
 troops have been employed to so much effect as at this time in
 Catalonia. Some petty jealousies or idle forms had hitherto
 deprived the Catalans also of cavalry when it might have been
 most useful. There was a regiment of hussars in Majorca, for
 which the Junta repeatedly applied, and its applications were
 earnestly enforced by the British officers who were in communi-
 cation with that island; but it was not till after a series of frivolous
 and vexatious delays that they were embarked at length in the

*Marshal
Gouvion
St. Cyr,
280.*

*British
troops or-
dered from
Sicily, but
detained
there by the
commander.*

*Cabañes, ii.
129.*

beginning of October ; and a detachment of them had not reached the Llobregat more than twenty-four hours before they were led to intercept the enemy at S. Culgat, on their return to Barcelona from a marauding expedition. Not expecting to be attacked by cavalry, the French were taken by surprise ; they suffered a considerable loss, and from that time confined their incursions within narrower bounds. The troops from Portugal soon afterwards arrived ; reinforcements also came from Valencia and Majorca ; Palacio was removed from the command, because of the unpopularity which he had incurred, and was succeeded by D. Juan Miguel de Vives.

CHAP.
XII
1808.
September.

*Cabañes, ii.
161.*

The want of military knowledge and military talent was never more severely felt in any country than in Spain at this momentous crisis. It could not be doubted that Buonaparte was preparing to bring against the Spaniards that tremendous force which none of the continental powers had hitherto been able to withstand. If he seemed to delay, it was only that the preparations might be more complete ; sure, meantime, that neither Spain nor England knew at that time how to profit by the interval, and that very probably disunion might arise among the Spaniards themselves, of which he might take advantage. The French had paid dearly for the error of dividing their forces, and advancing where they had no point of support ; they were now in strong positions, receiving reinforcements from time to time, and waiting in security till Buonaparte should come in person to complete the subjugation of Spain, which they, as well as the tyrant himself, believed could not be averted by any human interference. About the middle of August they sent a detachment to take possession of Bilbao, a beautiful but defenceless city, commanded on every side by its hanging gardens. The inhabitants, inferior in number, ill armed, and without any works to protect them, made a brave resistance, in revenge for

Bilbao occupied by the French.

CHAP. which the French committed great enormities when they entered
 XII. the town: had they arrived a few hours later, they would have
 1808. got possession of arms, ammunition, and money from England,
 which were just entering the harbour.

*Difficulties
 in bringing
 the Spanish
 armies into
 the field.*

A full sense of their danger, when the whole wrong which was intended them was avowed, had roused the Spaniards to their first great and successful exertions. After their victorious troops had entered Madrid, they were less alive to the danger, and more sensible of the embarrassments of their situation. Sudden efforts, directed by the emergency which called them forth, would no longer avail. Foresight and combination were required for extensive operations; and these were thwarted by selfish views, and still more by capricious or obstinate tempers, which in this state of general insubordination there was nothing to restrain. The Galician army under Blake, having the plains of Castille before them, could not advance without cavalry in the face of an enemy who had from three to five thousand dragoons; and Cuesta would not send his cavalry to act under Blake, because of his quarrel with that General and with the Junta of Galicia. The Extremaduran army, from a similar feeling of pride, was kept vapouring before Elvas, while it was called for by all the authorities at Madrid. A more vexatious impediment was interposed by the Junta of Seville. That Board had thought proper, when the army in Andalusia was first raised, for one of its members to accompany the Commander-in-chief, that no injury might arise from delay in consulting the civil authority, and perhaps also to rid themselves of Tilly, who was the person appointed. When, to their disgrace, they elected this man to the Central Junta, D. Andres Miñano was deputed to the army in his stead, with a salary of a thousand dollars per month; but public opinion at Seville was so strongly expressed against this misapplication of the public money, and supported

by so many members, especially by the Archbishop, that the allowance was reduced one half. The whole was a needless expense, for the Junta was still so tenacious of their authority, that this representative was a mere agent to execute their pleasure, and not to determine upon his own judgement. They sent positive orders that the army of Andalusia should not advance beyond Madrid; and knowing that Castaños had delivered his opinion strongly upon the impropriety of regarding any army as belonging to its own province instead of the kingdom at large, they let him know, that if these instructions were disobeyed he should not be supplied with money. At this time the French had driven the Spaniards from Tudela, and pushed forward to Borja; the troops which were opposed to them in that quarter falling back upon Zaragoza. Pressing demands for support came from Palafox: the Generals who were at Madrid saw that the Andalusian army ought to advance without delay, and this it could not do without money. This matter was taken up warmly by the British agents at Madrid and Seville; and as the Junta of that city had received two millions of dollars from the British Government, a strong remonstrance was presented to them upon their present conduct, and they were called upon to apply it to the public service without delay. Their reply, which, like all their papers, was written with great ability, would have been satisfactory, if they had not passed over in silence their orders that Castaños should not advance. They argued, that after all that Andalusia had done, it was to be expected that La Mancha and the other provinces which the Andalusian army was gone to protect, would provide for it while it was employed in their service. The sums which they had received from Great Britain had been sent expressly to them, as other sums had to the Juntas of Galicia and Asturias, who had neither incurred such expenses, nor contributed such aid to other parts of Spain.

CHAP.
XII.
1808.

CHAP. But upon this matter they waived all discussion ; . . they answered
 XII. the bills which an English agent at Madrid had negotiated for
 1808. the use of their army, authorized Castaños to draw on them
 according to his wants, and immediately sent forward 200,000
 dollars. This was just before the meeting of the Central Junta :
 the Andalusian army was then advanced to Soria, the Valencian
 under General Llamas moved to Zaragoza, and Blake toward
 Miranda upon the Ebro.

*The Mar-
 ques de la
 Romana.*

One of the first things which Castaños had requested after he had opened a communication with Gibraltar was, that dispatches might be forwarded to Romana, who commanded the Spanish troops in the Baltic. He expressed the greatest anxiety concerning him and his army, who had been thus treacherously removed to so great a distance from their own country, but at the same time the fullest confidence in them and their Commander. He judged of the men as Spaniards, of the General by his individual character. D. Pedro Caro y Sureda, Marques de la Romana, was a man whose happy nature had resisted all the evil and debilitating influences of the age and country and rank in which he was born. His public career was begun in the navy; but having attained the rank of *Capitan de Fragata*, he quitted that profession for the land service, a change not unfrequent in Spain. During the French revolutionary war he served under his uncle, D. Ventura Caro, who commanded on the Biscayan frontier; and having distinguished himself there, was made General of division in the army of Catalonia, under Urrutia, where he continued to be conspicuous for his good conduct. When that miserably miscondacted war was concluded by a scandalous peace, Romana devoted part of his leisure to the theory of his profession, which he was the better able to study as having received an excellent education, and made the best use of it. And so evenly did he steer his course, that

without in the slightest degree courting the favour of Godoy, or sully-
 ing himself by any condescension; he never became an ob-
 ject of his persecution; a singular instance of good fortune in
 those disgraceful times, or rather of what may be effected by
 undeviating rectitude and good sense. For he possessed a rare
 union of frankness and perfect prudence; and while his own
 breast wore no disguise, and needed none, could read with un-
 erring intuition the characters of others. There was in his
 manners that simplicity which is the sure indication of ge-
 nerosity and goodness, and which wins confidence while it com-
 mands respect. Spain, where honour is the characteristic virtue
 of the nation, where so many heroic and illustrious men have
 arisen, has never produced a man more excellently brave, more
 dutifully devoted to his country, more free from all taint of
 selfishness, more truly noble than Romana.

The force under his command consisted of about 14,000
 men. They were marched to Hamburgh in Aug. 1807, and
 quartered there, along the Elbe and at Lubeck, as part of the
 army under Marshal Bernadotte, then Prince of Ponte Corvo. It
 was reported that this army was to invade Sweden, in conjunction
 with the Danes, and the Spanish division was put in motion ac-
 cordingly about the middle of March. But when the vanguard,
 having safely crossed the Little Belt to the Isle of Funen, was
 preparing for the passage of the Great Belt, they were prevented
 by the appearance of an English frigate and brig between Nye-
 borg and Corsoer, at a season when it was thought no enemy's
 vessels would venture into those seas. The remainder of the
 troops therefore were of necessity ordered to halt, and were
 quartered in Sleswic, till they should be able to effect the passage.
 The Prince Christian Frederick, of seventy-four guns, was sent
 to clear the Great Belt of these enemies, but falling in with the
 Stately and the Nassau, was captured, after a severe action,

CHAP.
 XII.
 1808.

*Distribution
 of his troops
 in the Baltic*

CHAP. close to the shore of Zeeland. Bernadotte, who had crossed to
 XII. that island a few hours only before the English cruisers appeared,
 1808. was now, in order to return to his head-quarters at Odensee, obliged to go round the Isles of Falster and Laland, land in Sleswic, travel to Kolding, and from thence cross the Little Belt. Watching their opportunity, as they could during the months of April, May, and June, some of these troops got to the Isle of Langeland; and some succeeded in effecting by night the passage of the Great Belt from Funen to Zeeland, the greater number still remaining in Funen, or upon the coast of Jutland.

Their conduct when the oath of allegiance to Joseph was proposed.

The French journals affirmed that these troops had taken the oath of allegiance to the Intruder with unanimous enthusiasm. No man who knew the Spanish character believed this falsehood. They were in a situation where they were cut off from all communication with their own country, and where no intelligence could reach them but what came through the French press, or other channels equally under the control of the French government. Nevertheless in these garbled and falsified accounts they saw enough to convince them that their countrymen were not submitting to a foreign dominion so easily as the tyrant endeavoured to represent. This opinion was confirmed when a dispatch arrived from Urquijo to Romana, requiring the army to take the oath to the Intrusive King, that dispatch being the only paper which the courier brought; . . it was plain, therefore, that private letters were intercepted, and that something must have occurred of which it was important that they should be kept in ignorance. When the oath was proposed, it was taken without much demur by the troops in Jutland under D. Juan Kindelan, the second in command. Those in Funen, with the Commander, refused it vehemently at first, but took it at length conditionally, that is to say, with a protestation that it was to be null if the changes which had occurred in Spain were not confirmed by the

general consent of the nation. The regiments of Asturias and Guadalaxara, which were in Zeeland, were less placable; being under the immediate command of a Frenchman, General Frerion, they attacked his house, killed one of his aids-de-camp, and wounded another, and he himself only escaped with life by disguising himself, and flying to Copenhagen. The men then planted their colours, knelt round them, and swore to be faithful to their country.

CHAP.
XII.
1808.

The British Government meantime had not been inactive. The first difficulty was how to communicate with the Spanish Commander. A Roman-catholic priest, by name Robertson, was found willing to undertake this dangerous service, and qualified for it by his skill as a linguist. One Spanish verse was given him; to have taken any other credentials might probably have proved fatal, and there was an anecdote connected with this which would sufficiently authenticate his mission. During Mr. Frere's residence as ambassador in Spain, Romana, who was an accomplished scholar, had recommended to his perusal the Gests of the Cid, as the most animated and highly poetical, as well as the most ancient and curious poem in the language. One day he happened to call when Mr. Frere was reading it, and had just made a conjectural emendation in one of the * lines; Romana instantly perceived the propriety of the proposed reading, and this line, therefore, when he was reminded of it, would prove that Mr. Robertson had communicated with his friend the British Ambassador. Mr. Mackenzie was sent with Robertson to Heligoland, there to provide means for landing him on the continent, and to make farther arrangements as circumstances might direct.

*An agent
sent to com-
municate
with him.*

* Aun vea el hora que vos *merexca* dos tanto. V. 2348, p. 318.
Mr. Frere proposed to read *merexcades*.

CHAP.
XII.

1808.

*He asks for
a force to
cover his
retreat.*

The war with the Northern powers, and the interdict against British goods, had given the miserable island of Heligoland an importance at this time which it had never before possessed. Upon Mr. Mackenzie's arrival, an embargo was placed on the shipping there, and Robertson was dispatched in a boat to land on the nearest shore ; but so vigilant a watch was kept wherever this might have been possible, that after three days he returned to the island, convinced there was no hope of accomplishing his errand unless he were provided with a passport. Fortunately a vessel belonging to the port of Bremen had recently been captured, and carried into Heligoland. Mr. Mackenzie sent for the master, and proposed to liberate him and his ship if he would engage to procure a passport for Robertson at Bremen. It happened to be in the man's power to redeem himself and his property upon these easy terms, for he had a near relation in office in that city. The engagement was faithfully performed ; and Robertson, whose appearance was quite German, and who assumed the character of a schoolmaster, found his way to Romana. That noble Spaniard was greatly agitated at learning the real situation of his country ; the success in Andalusia, the deliverance of Zaragoza, and the retreat of the Intruder from Madrid, were not known in England at the time of Robertson's departure ; but he did not hesitate a moment. Their conversation was in Latin ; and Robertson was sent back with a request that Mackenzie would proceed to the Baltic, and procure the assistance of as many troops as might be necessary to cover the retreat and embarkation of the Spaniards. Ten thousand British troops, under Sir J. Moore, had been sent to Gottenburgh in the month of May, to co-operate with the Swedes. It was this aid that Romana required.

*Sir Richard
Keats goes
upon this
service.*

This information was immediately communicated to the British Government, and within a week Mr. Mackenzie received

letters for Sir John Moore, directing him to employ the troops in this service. Instead of sending these dispatches, he thought it better to carry them, and confer with that Commander in person, but when he reached Gottenburgh the expedition had sailed for England. Having left Heligoland without permission, he now attempted to return thither, and for that purpose embarked in the packet. A gale of wind drove it on the Danish coast. A privateer, carrying sixteen guns, and well manned, came out, expecting an easy capture; inferior as the English were, both in men and guns, a fight of four hours was supported, till the Dane put his ship about, and the packet returned to Gottenburgh in a shattered state. Baffled in this intent, he thought his better course would be to make for the fleet in the Baltic, and acquaint the Admiral with the disposition of the Spaniards. Travelling therefore with all speed to Ystad, he there found a Swedish vessel, which conveyed him to Sir James Saumarez's ship the Victory; and upon his representations Sir James, without waiting for instructions, ordered Admiral Sir Richard Keats, with part of his squadron, to the Great Belt, there to act in concert with Romana. While they were preparing, orders for the performance of this service arrived. A Spaniard attached to the embassy in London came out with the dispatches, bringing letters from the Junta of Galicia, and from individuals to Romana and the second in command.

CHAP.
XII.
1808.

It was of great importance that Romana's determination should be kept secret as long as possible, lest the French and the Danes, who were but too ready to have acted with them, should overpower his dispersed forces. A young Spanish officer crossing from Zeeland to Langeland was taken by this squadron; the letters were intrusted to him, he was secretly put on shore in Langeland, and from thence crossed to Funen. Such a messenger, it was thought, would not excite suspicion. Admiral

*Plan for
collecting
the Spanish
troops.*

CHAP.
XII.

1808.

August.

Keats proposed that the troops in Funen should secure themselves in a peninsula on the north side of that island, from whence, if necessary, they might be removed to the small island of Romsoe. The Danish gun-boats would be rendered inactive if Romana was able, and should think proper, to seize on the town and port of Nyborg; but this the Admiral thought would endanger the troops in Zeeland and Jutland, by provoking the Danes to act as enemies, when otherwise it might be hoped they would be disposed secretly to favour the quiet removal of the Spaniards, or at least to make no serious efforts for impeding it. There was little probability that any negotiation for their peaceable departure would be successful, subservient as the court of Denmark was to the policy of France; but after the movement should have commenced, a declaration of the honourable and unoffending object in view might be advantageous. The two regiments in Zeeland, it was proposed, should attempt to force their way to the peninsula near Corsoer; if they succeeded in this, they might probably defend the isthmus there, till they could be removed to the little island of Sproe, half way between Corsoer and Nyborg. There were four regiments in Jutland, distributed at Aarhus, Ebeltoft, Greenaae, Randers, Hobroe, Mariager, and some as high as Aalborg on the Gulf of Limefiord. Orders were sent to these that they should take possession of such vessels as they could find at Randers, Aarhus, Fredericia, and Snogoe, and make their way to Funen.

*Romana
takes pos-
session of
Nyborg.*

It was scarcely possible that these movements could be concerted without exciting suspicion, prepared as the French officers and the Danish Government were to expect some such attempt, and especially after the manner in which the regiments in Zeeland had expressed their national feeling. The French Commandant in Langeland discovered that the officer who had passed from thence to Funen had communicated with the English ships.

When Romana understood this, he doubted not but that the French in Holstein and Sleswic would be brought up by forced marches ; and as there were more than 3000 Danish troops in Funen, he thought it necessary to take possession of Nyborg without delay. The garrison were too weak to resist, and no violence or incivility was offered : the concerted signal was then made to Admiral Keats, who had hoisted his flag the preceding day in the *Superb* off that town ; and he dispatched a letter to the Governor, assuring him, that notwithstanding the state of war between England and Denmark, it was his wish to abstain from every hostile and offensive act, provided no opposition were made to the embarkation of the Spaniards. While this was going on, he must co-operate with those troops, and consequently often communicate with the town of Nyborg ; but the strictest orders had been given that all under his command should observe the utmost civility toward the inhabitants. If, however, the Spaniards were opposed, he must, however reluctantly, take measures which might occasion the destruction of the town.

The Danish garrison had yielded to circumstances ; but an armed brig and cutter, which were moored across the harbour, rejected all the pacific offers both of the Spaniards and English, and even the remonstrances of their own countrymen ; such small vessels and boats as could be collected were sent against them, and they were captured after half an hour's resistance and some waste of lives. Romana had been careful that no act of hostility should be committed by his people, except what was absolutely necessary for securing their embarkation ; but some of them, now irritated at the obstinacy with which their friends and deliverers were opposed, fired a few shots at the Danish ships from the batteries before they struck. Admiral Keats then wrote a second time to the Governor, saying, that as his entrance into the harbour had been resisted, he was bound by

CHAP.
XII.

1808.

August.

Aug. 9.

*The entrance of
the British
squadron
is resisted.*

CHAP. no law or usage to respect the property of the inhabitants. The
 XII. Spaniards had occasion for some of the vessels in that port, and
 1808. unless the masters and crews would assist in equipping and
 August. navigating them, he could not secure them from injury; if they
 would, he pledged himself to do so, and to grant them passports
 to return in safety, after the short service for which they were
 required should be ended.

*Arrival of
 some of the
 regiments
 from Jut-
 land.*

On the same day that Nyborg was thus taken possession of, the Spaniards, who were at Svendborg, which is at the southern extremity of Funen, got possession of some gun-boats, that might otherwise have prevented their passage, and crossed to Langeland. The regiment of Zamora on the same day also arrived from Ebeltoft and Greenaae at Middlefahrt; and starting from that place at ten on the same night, performed the march to Nyborg in twenty-one hours, a distance of more than eighty English miles. The regiment which made this prodigious exertion for the sake of returning to assist in the deliverance of Spain, was one of those which the French papers described as having displayed the greatest satisfaction at the accession of the Intruder! The troops which were at Hobroe and Mariager, and those at Aarhus, succeeded also in embarking, and arrived safely in the port of Nyborg. The two regiments in Zeeland were unable to escape; three of the battalions had previously been disarmed for their conduct when the oath was proposed to them, and the others were now surrounded by Danish troops: and there still remained three cavalry regiments and one of infantry, in Jutland, of which, and of the officers sent to them, no account had been received. While the troops were embarking on board such vessels as were in the port of Nyborg, one of these regiments arrived.

*They leave
 the Isle of
 Funen.*

The British Admiral had been at first of opinion, that if the troops in Langeland felt themselves safe, it would be better to

land all the others there, from whence they might be removed at leisure. The possession of Langeland had now been secured, but Nyborg was an insecure position ; it was reported that some thousand French had collected upon the shores of the Little Belt ; and these, with the Danes in Funen, and the garrison of Nyborg, might seriously impede the embarkation from that town, or perhaps succeed in cutting off the rear-guard. It was judged expedient, therefore, to spike the guns there, and remove the troops to a neck of land called Slipshavn, about a league distant ; and from thence they were shipped with as much expedition as the unfavourable weather permitted.

CHAP.
XII.
1808.
August.

Two of the regiments which had been quartered in Funen were cavalry, mounted on the fine, black, long-tailed Andalusian horses. It was impracticable to bring off these horses, about 1100 in number ; and Romana was not a man who could order them to be destroyed lest they should fall into the hands of the French : he was fond of horses himself, and knew that every man was attached to the beast which had carried him so far, and so faithfully. Their bridles, therefore, were taken off, and they were turned loose upon the beach. As they moved off, they passed some of the country horses and mares, which were feeding at a little distance. A scene ensued such as probably never before was witnessed. The Spanish horses are not mutilated, and these were sensible that they were no longer under any restraint of human power. A general conflict ensued, in which, retaining the discipline that they had learnt, they charged each other in squadrons of ten or twenty together ; then closely engaged, striking with their fore-feet, and biting and tearing each other with the most ferocious rage, and trampling over those which were beaten down, till the shore, in the course of a quarter of an hour, was strewn with the dead and disabled. Part of them had been set free on a rising ground at some distance

*Fate of the
horses.*

CHAP.
XII.

1808.

August.*Aug. 11.
The Spaniards are
landed in
the Isle of
Langeland.**Aug. 13.*

they no sooner heard the roar of the battle than they came thundering down over the intermediate hedges, and catching the contagious madness, plunged into the fight with equal fury. Sublime as the scene was, it was too horrible to be long contemplated, and Romana, in mercy, gave orders for destroying them; but it was found too dangerous to attempt this; and after the last boats quitted the beach, the few horses that remained were seen still engaged in the dreadful work of mutual * destruction.

On the second morning all were safely on board, but the wind detained them in the harbour; and there, on the evening of that day, the regiment from Aarhus joined them, in four vessels, which they had seized. The one at Randers did not succeed in making its escape. The south part of Langeland was in possession of the Spaniards. As soon as the wind permitted, their fellow-soldiers were landed there. The whole number was about 9000 men, with some 230 women and children. Stores and water were to be laid in for their voyage to Gottenburg. The Danish Governor, General Alsfeld, agreed not to molest them, and withdrew his troops to the northern part of the island, promising, that if any French were known to arrive in Funen, he would then deliver up their arms. It was thought necessary to demand them the ensuing day, upon a rumour that this had occurred; and also because a body of Danish cavalry had appeared as if observing the Spaniards for some military view; and because the escape of the French Commandant had been facilitated by the General. Some of the troops refused to obey, a detachment was therefore marched against them to enforce obedience, and this demonstration of force was sufficient.

* I give this remarkable story from that very meritorious journal 'The Plain Englishman,' (vol. i. 294,) where it is related by the editor on the authority of Sir Richard Kents himself.

They took the horses also, having only about 200 of their own, which had been brought from Svendborg; but they voluntarily promised that these arms and horses, and whatever else belonged to the Danes, should be left upon the beach at their departure. Some robberies, which a few of the men committed, were instantly punished, and restitution made; and a just price was fixed for the provisions which were demanded: they were supplied, therefore, without reluctance. Meat was in abundance, but there was a difficulty in obtaining bread; and the water lay at a distance from the shore, . . . a thousand men, and all the carriages that could be procured, were employed in conveying it. Their situation was still an anxious one: an attack was to be apprehended from the opposite port of Svendborg; it was known that the Danes could collect as many as four-and-twenty gun-boats there, and the channel would not admit of frigates to defend it: a flotilla, indeed, came out from thence one night, and kept up an idle cannonade upon the Spanish encampment. It was reported that French troops had arrived there, and of this no certain information could be obtained, for not a peasant in Langeland could be induced by the offer of any reward to go and ascertain the fact; an instance of national honour which may more than counterbalance the unworthy conduct of the Danish Government at this time. That the French were not inactive was certain. Proclamations from Bernadotte were introduced into the camp, endeavouring to deceive the Spaniards with regard to the state of affairs in their own country, to excite suspicion of the English, and to make them arrest their leaders; but these papers provoked only the contempt which they deserved.

On the sixth day after their landing Admiral Saumarez arrived, and in three days more, every thing being ready, the troops were re-embarked. The arms and horses which they had

CHAP.
XII.
1808.
August.

*They sail
for Gotten-
burg, and
there em-
bark for
Spain.
Aug. 18.*

CHAP. taken from the Danes were left in the batteries. Before they
 XII. departed a flag of truce was sent to Copenhagen, requiring, on
 1808. the part of their Commander, that the regiments which were de-
September. tained should be allowed to depart. The vessels from Aarhuus,
 being manned by Danes, were supplied by the British Admiral
 with stores for eight days, and released. Those from Nyborg
 were manned from the fleet, and an offer was made to send them
 back from Gottenburg with the crews of two Danish vessels
 which had been captured, provided the Danes would release
 an equal number of British prisoners in exchange. But these
 measures were not met with a corresponding temper by the
 Danish Government, and the convoy was fired at as it passed
 the battery of Slipshavn. They reached Gottenburg in safety;
 and the Spaniards there received the first intelligence of the
 successes which their countrymen had obtained. They were
 landed, for the sake of health and comfort, upon the islands in
 the harbour; transports from England arrived in a few days,
 and this little army then sailed for their own country, full of
 ardour, . . to lay down their lives in its defence.

*Romana
 lands in
 England.*

While the convoy proceeded on its voyage to Coruña, Romana landed in England, for the purpose of consulting with the British Government. It was there determined that his force should be disembarked at Santander, to be incorporated with the Galician army; and to avoid all immediate difficulty concerning its support, the existing armies in the present disorganized state of Spain being raised and subsisted by their respective provinces, Great Britain undertook to pay and feed it for two months, by which time it was supposed the Central Junta would be ready to perform this part of its duties. These were troops on whose discipline and courage entire reliance might be placed; and Romana's intention was to triple the infantry, by forming upon each battalion a regiment of three. And as it was designed

that a British army should advance to bear its part in the first brunt of the great contest, the intention was, that, if possible, it should act with Romana on the left flank, and Castaños on its right. With both these officers it was justly thought the service might proceed in the true spirit of confidence and good will; the reputation of both stood deservedly high, and their disposition was even of more importance, when operations were to be carried on by concert between the generals, not by a paramount and controlling command. For, by a strange error, the Spanish Government had resolved to make the commands independent of each other. This error seems to have been committed less from want of judgement, than in deference to the provincial Juntas, and in fear of offending them; yet at that time public opinion would have supported them had they appointed Castaños commander-in-chief.

CHAP.
XII.

1808.
September.

*Error of
the Span-
iards in not
appointing
a Comman-
der-in-chief*

It was not, however, the abilities of any single general, however pre-eminent, which could have saved the Spanish armies, constituted as they then were, from inevitable defeat, unless a strong British force had been ready to have acted with them. Preparations upon an adequate scale had been promised and intended by the Central Government; but when they had raised men and embodied them, the difficulty of maintaining them occurred, a difficulty which has at all times been greater in Spain than in any other civilized country. Our own commissariat was then far from effective; for great experience, as well as great activity and talents, are required in the business of providing an army: it is not then to be wondered at that the Spaniards, under their complicated embarrassments, should have been grievously defective in this main branch of the military art; but this was one cause why the number of their armies fell far short of their computed force, many young recruits returning

*Difficulty
of feeding
their armies.*

CHAP. to their homes, when they saw how miserably they fared in the
 XII. camp. It would have been most desirable to have followed up
 1808. the first successes with vigour, and have attacked the enemy
September. while the impression made upon them by so many humiliating
 failures was fresh, and before farther reinforcements should enable
 them to resume the offensive. But this had not been possible.
 The French were strongly posted, and well provided with all the
 means of war ; and their cavalry gave them complete command
 of the plains of Castille. They had ravaged the land from
 Burgos to Astorga, and driven in contributions from the very
 gates of the latter city. Blake could oppose no resistance to
 them in that open country without cavalry, and for want of that
 essential arm was obliged to alter his intended plan of operations,
 and pursue, at considerable risk, a different course. He resolved
 to take a position between Bilbao and Vitoria, and menace the
 right flank and rear of the French, while the army of Aragon
 should act on their left.

*Bilbao
 taken and
 retaken.
 Sept. 20.*

Bilbao had remained a month in possession of the enemy ;
 it was then retaken by the Marques de Portazgo, and if his ad-
 vanced posts had not begun to fire too soon, the garrison might
 have been surprised and made prisoners. After an action of
 three or four hours they effected their retreat, losing some 400
 men. But considerable bodies of French had now passed the
 Pyrenees ; and Marshal Ney, who came at this time to take the
 chief command till Buonaparte himself should arrive, feigning
 to retreat upon Vitoria for the purpose of deceiving Portazgo,
 suddenly marched with the centre of his army upon Bilbao.
 The Marquis drew off in time, without losing a man or a gun,
 and took up a position at Valmaseda. There he was joined by
 a detachment of the Galician army, and Blake immediately made
 preparations to recover the city ; but General Merlin, whom

Ney had left to command there, knew that the place was not tenable against a superior force, and evacuated it on the night of Oct. 11.

CHAP.
XII.

1808.

October.

*Position of
the armies
in October.*

The French force at that time amounted to about 60,000 ; and the Spanish Generals knew, by an intercepted dispatch, that 72,000 more would enter Spain before the middle of November. The Spaniards were nominally 130,000, but the effective number was very far short of this. With the left or western army Blake occupied a line from Burgos to Bilbao. The eastern army, that of Aragon and Valencia, under Palafox, was stationed, part near Zaragoza, and part was as far advanced as Sanguessa, on the left of the enemy, outflanking them on that side, as Blake did on the west. The head-quarters of the central army, under Castaños, were at Soria ; . . so that the whole formed a crescent. The Spaniards now began to experience the ruinous effects of that false policy which had exaggerated their successes and their strength, and had represented the final deliverance of the country as an event soon and certainly to be looked for. This delusion made the people clamorous for the accomplishment of their expectations, and the government itself either partook or yielded to this impatience. The wise precautions with which the Junta of Seville began the war were disregarded, and the Central Junta called upon the Generals to hasten their operations. However strong, they said, might have been the reasons for delay, loss of time had already proved injurious, and must be more so if the enemy should receive their expected reinforcements. An end therefore must be put to this inactivity. And, as if dissatisfied with their generals, they appointed D. Francisco Palafox to go as their representative to the armies, with the Marques de Coupigni and the Conde de Montijo under him. He was to be received with the same honours as a Captain-General of the army, to confer with the Commanders, concert operations with them, and himself

*Commissioners sent
to the Spanish
armies.*

CHAP. decide upon the plan of attack. Another reason for this mission
XII. was, that Castaños and Palafox differed totally in opinion con-
1808. cerning the measures which ought to be pursued. The latter
October. was eager for action, because he believed that every thing might
be accomplished by zeal and courage; the former understood
the art of war better, and knew how little these qualities alone
were to be trusted in the open field against an enemy strong in
cavalry, equal in numbers, and superior in discipline. The
commissioners were sent to determine between them. Of all
the measures of the Central Junta this was the worst. It was
taken a few days before Romana arrived in Spain. Had he
been present, his authority, coming in aid of the opinion of
Castaños, which was decidedly but warily expressed, might have
prevented so preposterous a mission, and averted the evils which
were thus precipitated.

CHAPTER XIII.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT. CONFERENCE
AT ERFURTH. PROPOSAL FOR PEACE. BUONAPARTE EN-
TERS SPAIN.

It had always been Buonaparte's system, and therein it was that the strength and wisdom of his policy consisted, to ensure success, as far as the end can be rendered certain by the employment of adequate means. Having stripped Spain of its best troops, introduced his armies into the heart of the country, seized the most important fortresses, inveigled into captivity the whole Royal Family, and extorted from them a formal renunciation of the crown in his favour; the people, he thought, if they dared attempt any partial opposition, would be effectually intimidated by the first slaughter, and the military executions which should follow it. His calculation was erroneous, because the Spanish character, and the strength of good principles, had not been taken into the account. He had never dreamt of a national resistance; and the defeat of armies, till that time irresistible, affected him the more deeply, because he felt that the measures which had drawn on these disasters were as infamous as he now perceived that they were impolitic. The reverses which befell him in the latter part of his bloody career he bore with the coldest insensibility; but he was distressed by these, and all but cast down.

1808.
*Buonaparte
is deeply af-
fected by the
reverses in
Spain.*

*Marshal
Gouvion
St. Cyr, 18.*

CHAP.
XIII.

1808.

*He conceals
them from
the French
people.*

But it was too late to recede ; the infamy was indelible, it remained only to secure the prize, and this he believed there would be no difficulty in effecting. His first care was to conceal from the French all knowledge of the mortifying failure his arms had experienced, till he should have secured the subserviency of the other continental powers, and collected fresh armies to pour into the peninsula. His system of government was founded upon falsehood as well as force. While all Spain was in arms, the French papers represented it as joyfully welcoming its new sovereign. "The disturbances," they said, "which broke out in a few provinces were completely quelled : they had been occasioned only by the common people, who wished to pillage the rich : the disaffected had got together some bands of smugglers, opened the prisons, and put arms into the hands of the felons : these wretches had committed great excesses upon their peaceful countrymen, but every thing was now quiet. The captains-general, the magistrates, and the polished part of the nation, displayed the best sentiments, and the greatest repose and best state of mind prevailed. At Cadiz the public tranquillity did not experience a moment's interruption ; the inhabitants of that interesting city had resisted all the insidious offers of the English. Throughout the peninsula, indeed, only a few insignificant individuals had been led astray by the spies of England. But the Council of Castille, and the most respectable persons, had exerted their influence with all ranks, to crush the seeds of sedition before they should shoot forth ; and their efforts had been completely successful." Over great part of France and of the continent these accounts would be believed ; wherever, indeed, a vigilant tyranny could keep out all information except its own. But at Bayonne it was not possible that the truth could be concealed ; and by the falsehood which was officially circulated in that part of the country, it

seems that the general opinion there was strongly against a war, provoked solely for the aggrandizement of the Buonaparte family. M. Champagny addressed a note to the prefect of the Gironde, informing him, that the Emperor had just received advices from his brother the King of Holland, saying the King of England was dead, and that the first act of George IV. had been to make a total change of ministers. This was not given as a report, but as an authenticated fact, officially communicated: "and may this event," it was added, "be the presage of a general peace, . . the object of the Emperor's wishes, to the want of which Europe is so sensible, and which would be so advantageous to the commerce of Bourdeaux in particular!" The same falsehood was repeated in that number of the Madrid * Gazette which contained Buonaparte's proclamation of Joseph as King of Spain and the Indies. Buonaparte endeavoured also to keep his allies as well as his subjects ignorant of the real state of things. The Russian Ambassador at Madrid could find no means of communicating to his court an account of what was passing in Spain, all his letters being intercepted in France, till at the end of August, when some British officers were in Madrid, an opportunity was afforded him of sending his dispatches through England; he then confided to the honour of a hostile power what could no longer be trusted to an unprincipled ally.

It was not till two months after the capture of the ships at Cadiz, and five weeks after the flight of the Intruder from Madrid, that any account of the affairs of Spain appeared in the French papers, except assurances that all was well. A long narrative was then published, written with the usual falsehood

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1808.

June 8.

Statement
of the
French
government

Sept. 6.

* June 14. *Se sabe de oficio que ha muerto el 26 de Mayo el Rey de Inglaterra; y que su sucesor ha mudado todo el ministerio, eligiendo sugetos decididos por la paz.*

CHAP. of the French government, but not with its usual skill. The
XIII. insurrection was ascribed entirely to the artifices and bribes of
1808. England, assisted by the monks and the Inquisition, . . . the In-
September. quisition, which had lent its whole authority to the usurpation!
Great stress was laid upon the excesses which the patriots had committed; whereas the list of persons who were here claimed as martyrs in the Intruder's cause did not equal in number the victims of one *noyade* in the Loire, scarcely exceeded that of one day's allowance for the guillotine in Paris. The military detail, which was called a correct abstract of the events of the campaign, was composed with studied and inextricable confusion; all order of time and place was inverted and involved, and facts, exhibited thus piecemeal, were still farther disguised by suppression, exaggeration, and falsehood. At Valencia, it was said, French intrepidity overcame every obstacle: twenty pieces of artillery were taken; the suburbs were carried, and the streets strewed with dead bodies: . . . this indeed was true; but they were the bodies of the French. At Zaragoza, fourteen cloisters, which had been fortified, three-fourths of the city, the arsenal, and all the magazines were in their possession. That unfortunate city was almost ruined by fire, the bombardment, and the explosion of mines. Not a hint was given of the event of that memorable siege. The loss of the fleet was not mentioned. Dupont was so spoken of, as to make it evident, that, if he returned to France, his life would atone for his failure. After a series of events which could not be described, because they ought to be a subject of judicial inquiry, he had committed the triple fault of suffering his communication with Madrid to be cut off, of letting himself be separated from two-thirds of his army, and then giving battle in a disadvantageous position, after a forced night-march; and, manifesting an equal deficiency of political as of military talent, he had allowed himself to be

deceived in negotiations. This unexpected event, the numerous descents of the English upon the coast of Galicia, (where no English had landed, except a few officers,) and the excessive heat of the season, had induced the King to assemble his troops, and place them in a cooler climate than that of New Castille, and in a situation possessing a milder atmosphere, and better water: therefore, he left Madrid, and the army went into cooler cantonments. The bodies of insurgents scarcely deserved to be mentioned: they defended themselves behind a wall or a house; but a single squadron of cavalry, or a battalion of infantry, was sufficient to put many thousands of them to the route. "All that the English papers have published," said Buonaparte's gazetteer, "is unfounded and false. England knows well the part that she is acting; she also knows well what she is to expect from all her efforts. Her only object is to involve Spain in confusion, that she may thereby make herself mistress of such of its possessions as best suit her purposes."

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At the same time, two reports from the minister of foreign affairs were laid before the French senate. The first of these bore date from Bayonne, so far back as the 24th of April. Hitherto the modern powers of Europe had always thought it necessary to hold forth some decent pretext for engaging in hostilities, however iniquitous might be the latent motives... but the semblance of moral decorum was now contemptuously laid aside; and in this state-paper Buonaparte was advised to seize upon Spain, for the purpose of carrying on the war against England more effectually, every thing being legitimate which led to that end. No state in Europe was more necessarily connected with France than Spain: she must be either a useful friend, or a dangerous enemy;... an intimate alliance must unite the two nations, or an implacable enmity separate them. Such an enmity had in old times become habitual:... the wars of the

*Report of
M. Cham-
pagny.*

CHAP. 16th century proceeded as much from the rivalry of the nations
XIII. as of the sovereigns : the troubles of the League and the Fronde

1808. had been excited and fomented by Spain ; and the power of

September. Louis XIV. did not begin to rise, till, having conquered Spain, he had formed that alliance with the royal family which ultimately placed his grandson on the throne. That act of provident policy gave to the two countries an age of peace, after three ages of war : but the French revolution broke this bond of union ; and the Spanish Bourbons must always, through their affection, their recollections, and their fear, be the secret and perfidious enemies of France. It was for the interest of Spain, as well as of France, that a firm hand should re-establish order in her affairs, now when a feeble administration had led her to the brink of ruin. A king, the friend of France, having nothing to fear from her, and not being an object of distrust to her, would appropriate all the resources of Spain to her interest, and to the success of that common cause which united Spain to France and to the continent. Thus would the work of Louis XIV. be re-established. What policy suggests, said the report, justice authorises. The increase of the Spanish army before the battle of Jena, was really a declaration of war : the laws of the customs were directed against French commerce : French merchants were aggrieved, while the ports were open to the contraband trade of England, and English merchandize was spread through Spain into the rest of Europe : Spain, therefore, was actually in a state of war with the Emperor.

Even M. Champagny, however, had not the effrontery to press this conclusion. Exclusive of this, he said, existing circumstances did not permit the Emperor to refrain from interfering in the affairs of Spain. He was called upon to judge between the father and the son. Which part would he take ? Would he sacrifice the cause of sovereigns, and sanction an

outrage against the majesty of the throne? Would he leave on the throne a prince who could not withdraw himself from the yoke of England? In that case, France must constantly keep a powerful army on foot in Spain. Would he reinstate Charles IV.? This could not be effected without overcoming a great resistance, and shedding French blood. And should that blood, of which France was prodigal for her own interests, be shed for a foreign king, whose fate was of no consequence to her? Lastly, would he abandon the Spanish nation to themselves, and while England was sowing the seeds of trouble and of anarchy, leave this new prey for England to devour? This was not to be thought of. The Emperor, therefore, occupied, of necessity, with the regeneration of Spain, in a manner useful to that kingdom and to France, ought neither to re-establish the dethroned king, nor to leave his son upon the throne; for in either case it would be delivering her to the English. Policy advised, and justice authorized him to provide for the security of the empire, and to save Spain from the influence of England.

Thus was the principle, that whatever is profitable is right, openly proclaimed by the French government, . . a principle which the very thief, on his career to the gallows, dares not avow to himself. The other report from the same minister was of four months later date, though the former had plainly not been written till it was thought expedient to publish it: for the Tyrant needed no adviser in his conduct at Bayonne; and if his usurpation had been passively submitted to by the Spaniards, Spain would have been represented as the brave and faithful ally of France, and the new dynasty exhibited as the reward of her loyalty, which was now to be the means of curbing her hostile disposition. This second report began by proposing to the Emperor that he should communicate to the Senate the treaties which had placed the crown of Spain in his hands, and the constitution, which,

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*Second re-
port.*

Sept. 1.

CHAP. under his auspices, and enlightened by his advice, the Junta at
 XIII. Bayonne, after free and mature deliberation, had adopted, for
 1808. the glory of the Spanish name, and the prosperity of Spain
September. and its colonies. He had interfered with Spain, it said, as a
 mediator; but his persuasive means, and his measures of wise
 and humane policy, had not been successful. Individual in-
 terests, foreign intrigues, and the influence of foreign corruption
 had prevailed. The disturbances in Spain were occasioned by
 English gold. Would, then, his Majesty permit England to say,
 "Spain is one of my provinces! My flag, driven from the Baltic,
 the North sea, the Levant, and even from the shores of Persia,
 rules in the ports of France?" No, never! To prevent so much
 disgrace and misfortune, two millions of brave men were ready
 to scale the Pyrenees, and chase the English from the peninsula.
 If the French fought for the liberty of the seas, they must begin
 by wresting Spain from the influence of the tyrant of the ocean.
 If they fought for peace, they could not obtain it till they had
 driven the enemies of peace from Spain. If they fought for
 honour, they must promptly inflict vengeance for the outrages
 committed against the French name in Spain. The probability
 of meeting the English at last, of fighting them man to man, of
 making them feel the evils of war themselves, . . evils of which
 they were ignorant, having only caused them by their gold, was
 represented as no small advantage. They will be beaten, said
 M. Champagny, destroyed, dispersed, or, at least, they will make
 haste to fly, as they did at Toulon, at the Helder, at Dunkirk,
 in Sweden, . . wherever the French armies have been able to
 find them! But their expulsion from Spain would be the ruin
 of their cause; it would exhaust their means, and annihilate their
 last hope. In this contest the wishes of all Europe would be with
 France!

*Report of
 the war-
 minister.*

These reports, with the two mock treaties of Bayonne, were

laid before the Senate, and, at the same time, a report of the war-minister was presented. France, it was said, had never possessed more numerous or better appointed armies, neither were they ever better kept up, or better provisioned. Nevertheless, the events which had taken place in Spain had occasioned a pretty considerable loss, in consequence of an operation, not less inconceivable than painful, of the division under General Dupont. His Majesty had notified his resolution of assembling more than 200,000 men beyond the Pyrenees, without weakening either the armies in Germany or that in Dalmatia. A levy of 80,000 was therefore indispensable, and these could only be taken from the four classes of the conscription of the years 1806, 7, 8, and 9, which, exclusive of the men who had married within those years, might furnish 600,000. In levying 80,000, only one conscript out of seven would be called out, and the vacancies in the armies would thus be filled up with soldiers of 21, 22, and 23 years of age, that is, with men fit to undergo the fatigues of war. "It is true, Sire," said the war minister, "that the custom observed of late years might, to a certain degree, induce a part of your subjects to consider themselves released from the duty of the conscription, as soon as they had furnished the contingent required for the year; and, under this point of view, what I propose might appear to require from your people a sacrifice. But, Sire, there is no one but knows, that, by the words of the law, your Majesty would be authorised to call to your standard the whole of the conscription, not only of the last four years, but even of the antecedent years: and even were there question of a real sacrifice, what sacrifice is it that your Majesty has not a right to expect from the love of your subjects? Who among us is ignorant that your Majesty wholly sacrifices yourself for the happiness of France, and that upon the speedy accomplishment of your high designs depend the repose of the

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CHAP. world, the future safety, and the re-establishment of a maritime
 XIII. peace, without which France can never enjoy tranquillity? In
 1808. proposing to your Majesty to declare, that henceforth no re-
September. retrospective call shall take an antecedent conscription, I only
 participate, Sire, in your paternal wishes. I think it expedient,
 at the same time, to propose to your Majesty to order out the
 conscription of the year 1810, determining the amount of it,
 from the present instant, at 80,000 men . . to furnish the means,
 as occasion may require, of forming camps of reserve, and of
 protecting the coast in the spring time. This conscription would
 be raised only under the apprehension of a war with other
 powers, nor would it be called out before the month of January
 next."

*Suspicion
 of the views
 of Austria.*

Thus, then, it appeared that those persons who had escaped from the conscriptions of four years were again to stand the hazard of this dreadful lottery, and that of the unmarried men, between the ages of 21 and 23, one in seven was to be sent to the armies! . . and this draught upon the morality, the happiness, the vital strength, the flesh and blood of the French people . . was required, because their Corsican master had thought proper to appoint his brother to be king of Spain! The promise that no retrospective conscription should again be called for, shows plainly what the feelings of the nation were at such a measure, when Buonaparte thought it necessary to soothe them, by declaring, that it was not to be repeated. This was not all: one year's conscription had already been anticipated, another year was to be levied in advance, and 80,000 men, whose services, by these baleful laws, were not due till 1810, were now to be called forth. This was necessary, the report said, because England and Austria were increasing their armies; and it was an evil inseparable from the present state of Europe, that France must increase hers in the same proportion. A suspicion of the in-

tentions of Austria was now intimated. Its armaments, the war minister declared, had often excited his solicitude. He had been told by the minister for foreign affairs, that the best understanding prevailed with the court of Vienna ; but though it did not belong to his department to dive into the views and interests of states, and explore the tortuous labyrinths of politics, it was his duty to neglect nothing for preserving to the French armies, at all points, that just superiority which they ought to possess. The plan which he had proposed would give the army of Spain 200,000 men, without weakening the other armies ; and the conscription of 1810 would increase the armies of Germany, of the North, and of Italy, by more than 80,000. From such a force what could be expected but the speedy re-establishment of tranquillity in Spain, of a maritime peace, and of that general tranquillity which was the object of the Emperor's wishes ? Much blood would be spared, because so great a number of men would be ready to shed it. . . Here the tyrant's principle is right : and grievously was that parsimony of strength on the part of his mightiest enemy to be lamented, which, by never sending a force sufficient to insure its object, so often wasted what it sent.

A message from Buonaparte accompanied these reports, when they were laid before the Senate. He mentioned his firm alliance with Russia, and said, that he had no doubts of the peace of the continent, but that he ought not to rely upon the false calculations and errors of other courts ; and since his neighbours increased their armies, it was a duty incumbent upon him to increase his : he therefore imposed fresh sacrifices upon his people, which were necessary to secure them from heavier, and to lead them to the grand result of a general peace. “ I am determined,” said he, “ to carry on the war with Spain with the utmost activity, and to destroy the

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*Message
from Bu-
naparte to
the Senate.
Sept. 4.*

CHAP. XIII. armies which England has disembarked in that country. The future security of my subjects, a maritime peace, and the security of commerce, equally depend upon these important operations. Frenchmen, my projects have but one object in view... your happiness, and the permanent well-being of your children; and if I know you right, you will hasten to comply with this new call, which is rendered necessary by the interests of the country."

*The Senate
approve his
measures.*

In the first of Buonaparte's three constitutions for France, the affectation of Roman titles, and the false taste with which they were applied to offices essentially different, were equally to be remarked. The name of Senate, however, was well retained under his imperial government, just such a Senate having existed during those disgraceful ages of the Roman empire, when a despotism, similar to that which he had established in France, was degrading their country, and preparing the way for the universal barbarism and misery which ensued. The baseness of those wretches who sanctioned the iniquities and cruelties of Tiberius and Caligula was equalled by the obsequious senators of Buonaparte. On the day after his message had been presented, they voted an address, echoing the gross and palpable falsehoods of his assertions, applauding his measures, and appropriating to themselves, and, as far as the crimes of a government can be imputed to the people, to the French nation also, the guilt of his conduct towards Spain. "Your Majesty," said they, "desires to defend solemn and voluntarily concluded treaties; to maintain a constitution freely discussed, adopted, and sworn to by a national junta; to suppress a barbarous anarchy, which now covers Spain with blood and mourning, and threatens our frontier; to rescue the true Spaniards from a shameful yoke, by which they are oppressed; to assure to them the happiness of being governed by a brother of your Majesty; to annihilate

the English troops, who unite their arms with the daggers of the banditti; to avenge the French blood, so basely shed; to put out of all doubt the security of France, and the peace of our posterity; to restore and complete the work of Louis XIV.; to accomplish the wish of the most illustrious of your predecessors, and particularly of him who was by France most beloved; to extend your great power, in order to diminish the miseries of war, and to compel the enemy of the continent to a general peace, which is the sole object of all your measures, and the only means for the repose and prosperity of our country. The will of the French people is, therefore, Sire, the same as that of your Majesty. The war with Spain is politic, just, and necessary.".. If the transactions which are the subject of this history had passed in remote ages, and such a narrative as is here presented had been preserved to us, it would scarcely be possible, when we found the Senate of a great nation, like France, thus solemnly approving and ratifying the conduct of its Emperor, not to suspect that the history had been handed down in an imperfect state; that some facts had been suppressed, and others distorted; for, however credible the usurpation itself might appear, as the act of an individual tyrant, that it should, with its attendant circumstances of perfidy and cruelty, be thus represented as a just and necessary act, by a legislative assembly, and made the ground of a national war, is something so monstrous, that it would startle our belief; and, for the honour of human nature, we should hesitate before we trusted human testimony.

The conscription for which the tyrant called was decreed without one dissentient voice, by an assembly constituted for no other purpose than that of executing his will and pleasure. His other measures had already been taken. About the middle of August he had ordered General Gouvion Saint Cyr from Boulogne, to repair to Perpignan, and there collect an army,

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*March of
the troops
toward
Spain.*

CHAP. with which to enter Catalonia, as soon as Buonaparte himself
XIII. should enter Spain on the other side. He gave him no other
1808. instructions than that he should use all efforts to preserve Bar-
September. celona: "if that place be lost," said he, "to recover it will
cost me eighty thousand men." The troops from Prussia and
Poland were recalled; they consisted not of Frenchmen alone,
but of Germans and Italians, Poles, Swiss, and Dutch, Irish and
Mamelukes, men of all countries and languages, of all religions
and of none, united into one efficient body by the bond of dis-
cipline. They cared not whither they were ordered, so it were
only to a land which produced the grape, . . upon what service,
or in what cause, was to them a matter of indifference; war was
their element, and wherever they went they expected to find free
quarters, and no enemy who could resist them. Not a few of
them when they heard, as they had so often heard before, that
they were now to give the last blow to the tottering power of
England, believed they were about to march to England by
land through Spain; the desert, they said, had separated them
from that country when they were in Egypt, and when they were
at Boulogne there was the sea; but they should get there now.
As soon as these troops had crossed the Rhine, they were received
with public honours in every town along the line of their march.
Deputations came out to welcome them, they were feasted at the
expense of the municipality, and thanked at their departure for
the honour they had conferred upon the place. This was Buona-
parte's policy. But the conduct of the soldiers showed what an
enemy might expect from them, when their own countrymen,
upon whom they were quartered, did not escape ill usage. They
treated them as they had done the Germans; and the allied
troops took the same licence which they had seen the French
exercise among an allied and friendly people. Under the im-
perial government every thing was subject to the sword.

Buonaparte reviewed them at Paris. "Soldiers," said he, "after having triumphed on the banks of the Danube and the Vistula, you have passed through Germany by forced marches. I shall now order you to march through France, without allowing you a moment's rest. Soldiers, I have occasion for you! The hideous presence of the leopard contaminates the continent of Spain and Portugal. Let your aspect terrify and drive him from thence! Let us carry our conquering eagles even to the pillars of Hercules: there also we have an injury to avenge!" The capture of the French squadron at Cadiz had never been published in France, and this hint is the only notice that ever was publicly taken of it. "Soldiers," he pursued, "you have exceeded the fame of all modern warriors. You have placed yourselves upon a level with the Roman legions, who, in one campaign, were conquerors on the Rhine, on the Euphrates, in Illyria, and on the Tagus. A durable peace and permanent prosperity shall be the fruits of your exertions. A true Frenchman can never enjoy any rest till the sea is open and free. Soldiers, all that you have already achieved, and that which remains to be done, will be for the happiness of the French people, and for my glory, and shall be for ever imprinted on my heart."

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September.

*Speech of
Buonaparte
to the troops.*

The preparations for war were answerable to the arrogance of this harangue. All the roads to Spain were thronged with troops, marching from all parts of France and its dependencies toward the Pyrenees. While they were on their march, Buonaparte set out for Germany, to meet his dependent German princes, and the Emperor Alexander, at Erfurth. Some of the performers of the *Theatre Française* had orders to precede him, that these potentates might be provided with amusement. An opportunity was taken of giving Alexander a momentous hint of the superiority of his new friend: . . . Buonaparte took him to

*Conferences
at Erfurth.*

CHAP. XIII. the field of Jena ; a temple, dedicated to Victory, was erected on the spot where the French Emperor had past the night previous to the battle ; tents were pitched round it ; and, after a sumptuous breakfast, he was led over every part of the ground which the two armies had occupied, and left to make his own reflections upon the spot where Prussia received the reward of its long subserviency to France, and of its neutrality when the fate of the continent was upon the hazard. The immediate consequence of the meeting was a proposal for peace to Great Britain.

*Overtures of
peace from
Erfurth.*

Oct. 12.

These overtures were made in the customary diplomatic forms ; but they were accompanied by a joint letter from the Emperors of France and Russia to the King of England. Having been brought together at Erfurth by the circumstances of the continent, their first thought, they said, had been to yield to the wishes and wants of every people, and to seek, in a speedy pacification, the remedy for the common miseries of Europe. The long and bloody continental war was at an end, and could not possibly be renewed. Many changes had taken place, many states had been overthrown. The cause was to be found in the evils arising from the stagnation of maritime commerce. Still greater changes might yet occur, and all of them contrary to the policy of the English nation. Peace was their interest, as well as the interest of the continent. We unite, therefore, said they, in intreating your Majesty to listen to the voice of humanity, silencing that of the passions ; to seek, with the intention of arriving at that object, how to conciliate all interests, and by that means to preserve the powers which still exist ; and to insure the happiness of Europe, and of this generation, at the head of which Providence has placed us. The official notes stated, that Russian plenipotentiaries would be sent to Paris, there to receive the answer of England ; and that French plenipotentiaries would repair to any city on the continent, to which

the King of Great Britain and his allies should send theirs. It was added, that the King of England must, without doubt, feel the grandeur and sincerity of this conduct on the part of the two emperors; that their union was beyond the reach of change; and that it was formed for peace as well as for war.

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1808.
October.

In answer to the Russian minister, it was stated, that however desirous his Majesty might be to reply directly to the Emperor Alexander, the unusual manner in which his letter was drawn up, deprived it entirely of the character of a private and personal communication, and it was impossible to adopt that mark of respect towards him, without, at the same time, recognizing titles which the King of England never had acknowledged. This was a needless demurral. We had sent ministers to treat with Buonaparte since he had been Emperor of France, . . surely this was, to all intents, an effectual recognition of his title. It was weakening the moral strength of our cause, to rest, even for a moment, upon a point of punctilio. In every other respect, the correspondence on the part of England was worthy of the cause. An immediate assurance that France acknowledged the government of Spain as party to any negotiation, was declared to be absolutely necessary: that such was the intention of the Emperor of Russia, it was added, his Majesty could not doubt. He recollected the lively interest which that Emperor had always manifested for the dignity and welfare of the Spanish monarchy, and wanted no other assurance that he could not have been induced to sanction, by his concurrence, or by his approbation, usurpations, the principles of which were not less unjust than their example was dangerous to all lawful sovereigns.

*Reply to the
Russian
minister.
Oct. 28.*

The letter of the two Emperors was fully and most ably answered in an official note. The King's readiness and desire to negotiate a peace on terms consistent with his own honour, and with the permanent security of Europe, were again declared.

*Reply to the
overtures.*

CHAP. If the condition of the continent were one of agitation and of
XIII. wretchedness, if many states had been overthrown, and many
1808. more were still menaced with subversion, it was a consolation to
October. the King to reflect, that no part of those convulsions could be
in any degree imputable to him. Most willing was he to acknowledge that all such dreadful changes were indeed contrary to the policy of Great Britain. And if the cause of so much misery was to be found in the stagnation of commercial intercourse, although he could not be expected to hear with unqualified regret that the system devised for the destruction of the commerce of his subjects had recoiled upon its authors or its instruments, yet it was neither in his disposition, nor in the character of the people over whom he reigned, to rejoice in the privations and unhappiness even of the nations which were combined against him. He anxiously desired the termination of the sufferings of the continent. The war in which he was engaged was entered into for the immediate object of national safety ; but, in its progress, new obligations had been imposed upon him, in behalf of powers whom the aggressions of a common enemy had compelled to make common cause with him, or who had solicited his assistance and support in the vindication of their national independence. The interests of Portugal and of Sicily were confided to his friendship and protection ; and he was connected for peace, as well as for war, with the King of Sweden. To Spain he was not yet bound by any formal instrument, but he had, in the face of the world, contracted with that nation engagements not less sacred, and not less binding upon his mind than the most solemn treaties. He therefore assumed, that, in an overture made to him for entering into negotiations for a general peace, his relations subsisting with the Spanish monarchy had been distinctly taken into consideration, and that the government acting in the name of his Catholic Majesty, Ferdinand VII.,

was understood to be a party to any negotiation in which he was invited to engage.

The answer of the Russian minister was, that the admission of the sovereigns in alliance with England could not be a point of any difficulty; but this principle by no means extended to the necessity of admitting the plenipotentiaries of the Spanish insurgents, and the Emperor Alexander could not admit them. He had already acknowledged King Joseph Napoleon; he was united with the Emperor of the French; and he was resolved not to separate his interests from those of that monarch. But Count Romanzoff added, he saw, with pleasure, that, in this difference of opinion respecting the Spaniards, there was nothing which could either prevent or delay the opening of a congress; because his Britannic Majesty had himself admitted, that he was bound to no positive engagement with those who had taken up arms in Spain. Count Romanzoff did not intend to insult a British King, by telling him he might violate his word and honour, because he was not bound to keep them by any formal instrument;... but M. Champagny's reply was intentionally insulting. "How," said he, "is it possible for the French government to entertain the proposal which has been made to it, of admitting the Spanish insurgents to the negotiation? What would the English government have said, had it been proposed to them to admit the Catholic insurgents of Ireland? France, without having any treaties with them, has been in communication with them, has made them promises, and has frequently sent them succours." The writer did not perceive what warning this utterly irrelevant argument held out to the disaffected in Ireland, by thus plainly informing them, that however Buonaparte might promise them support, he was at all times ready to abandon them, whenever it might suit his views. Menacing language was then introduced. England, we were told, would

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XIII.

1808.

*Reply of
the Russian
and French
ministers.
Nov. 8.*

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XIII.

1808.

find herself under a strange mistake, if, contrary to the experience of the past, she still entertained the idea of contending successfully, upon the continent, against the armies of France.

What hope could she have, especially when France was irrevocably united with Russia? France and Russia could carry on the war till the court of London recurred to just and equitable dispositions; they were resolved to do so; and the English were admonished not to lose sight of the inevitable results of the force of states.

Dec. 9.
Final answer of the
British government.

Mr. Canning's replies were equally decided and dignified. To Count Romanzoff he expressed the King's astonishment and regret, that it should be supposed he would consent to commence a negotiation by the previous abandonment of the cause of the Spanish nation, and of the legitimate monarchy of Spain, in deference to an usurpation which had no parallel in the history of the world. He had hoped that the participation of the Emperor Alexander in these overtures would have afforded a security to him against the proposal of a condition so unjust in its effect, and so fatal in its example. Nor could he conceive by what obligation of duty or of interest, or by what principle of Russian policy, his Imperial Majesty could have found himself compelled to acknowledge the right assumed by France, of deposing and imprisoning friendly Sovereigns, and forcibly transferring to herself the allegiance of loyal and independent nations. If these were indeed the principles to which the Emperor had inviolably attached himself, to which he had pledged the character and resources of his empire, and which he had united himself with France to establish by war, and to maintain in peace... deeply did the King of England lament a determination by which the sufferings of Europe must be aggravated and prolonged: but not to him was to be attributed the continuance of the calamities of war, by the disappointment of all hope of such

a peace as would be compatible with justice and with honour. To the French minister Mr. Canning said, he was especially commanded to abstain from noticing any of those topics and expressions insulting to his Majesty, to his allies, and to the Spanish nation, with which the official note of M. Champagny abounded. The King of England was desirous to have treated for a peace which might have arranged the respective interests of all the belligerent powers on principles of equal justice, but he was determined not to abandon the cause of the Spanish nation, and of the legitimate monarchy of Spain; and the pretension of France, to exclude from the negotiation the central and supreme government, acting in the name of his Catholic Majesty, Ferdinand VII., was one which he could not admit, without acquiescing in an usurpation unparalleled in the history of the world.

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1808.

As soon as this correspondence was concluded, the rupture of the negotiation was made known in England, by a declaration which, while any sense of honour remains in the English nation, may always be recollected with pride and satisfaction. The continued appearance of a negotiation, it said, when peace was found to be utterly unattainable, could be advantageous only to the enemy. It might enable France to sow distrust and jealousy in the councils of those who were combined to resist her oppression: and if, among the nations which were groaning under the tyranny of French alliance, or among those which maintained against France a doubtful and precarious independence, there should be any who were balancing between the certain ruin of a prolonged inactivity and the contingent dangers of an effort to save themselves from that ruin . . . to nations so situated, the delusive prospect of a peace between Great Britain and France could not fail to be peculiarly injurious. Their preparations might be relaxed, by the vain hope of return-

British declaration.
Dec. 15.

CHAP. ing tranquillity, or their purpose shaken, by the apprehension
XIII. of being left to contend alone. That such was, in fact, the main
1808. object of France in the proposals transmitted from Erfurth, his
Majesty entertained a strong persuasion. But at a moment
when results, so awful from their importance, and so tremendous
from their uncertainty, might be depending upon the decision
of peace or war, he felt it due to himself to ascertain, beyond the
possibility of doubt, the views and intentions of his enemies. It
was difficult for him to believe that the Emperor of Russia had
devoted himself so blindly and fatally to the violence and am-
bition of the power with which his Imperial Majesty had unfor-
tunately become allied, as to be prepared openly to abet the
usurpation of Spain. He therefore met the seeming fairness and
moderation of the proposal, with fairness and moderation on his
part real and sincere, expressing his just confidence that the
Spanish government, acting in the name of Ferdinand VII., was
understood to be a party to this negotiation. The reply returned
by France to this proposition cast off at once the thin disguise,
which had been assumed for a momentary purpose, and dis-
played, with less than ordinary reserve, the arrogance and in-
justice of that government. The universal Spanish nation was
described by the degrading appellation of the Spanish insurgents,
and the demand for the admission of its government as a party
to any negotiation was rejected, as inadmissible and insulting.
With astonishment, as well as grief, he had received from the
Emperor of Russia a reply similar in effect, although less in-
decorous in tone and manner. The King would readily have
embraced an opportunity of negotiation which might have af-
forded any hope or prospect of a peace compatible with justice
and with honour. He lamented an issue by which the sufferings
of Europe were prolonged; but neither his honour nor the ge-
nerosity of the British nation would admit of his consenting to

commence a negotiation by the abandonment of a brave and loyal people, who were contending for the preservation of all that is dear to man, and whose exertions, in a cause so unquestionably just, he had solemnly pledged himself to sustain.

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XIII.
1808.

Such an answer was consistent with the honour, the principles, and the feelings of the British people. Buonaparte anticipated it: his proposals might have that effect which the English cabinet had foreseen, upon the powers which he oppressed, and they might deceive the French people; at least they gave a popular topic for his sycophants in the Senate, and those whose office it was to mislead the public mind. He himself knew what the result must be, and had not for a moment suspended or slackened his preparations. Before a reply could be made to the first overture, he returned to Paris, and, in his address to the legislative body, informed them that he should depart in a few days, to put himself in person at the head of his army, and, with God's help (such was the expression of the blasphemer), to crown the King of Spain in Madrid, and plant his eagles on the forts of Spain. It was a distinguished favour of the providence, he said, which had constantly protected his army, that passion had so far blinded the English councils, as to have made them abandon the defence of the seas, and at last produce their army on the continent. His vaunts and his impieties were, of course, echoed by those whom he addressed; but their flattery was far exceeded by the language of some deputies from the new Italian departments, who had audience on the same day. The destinies of the whole world, they told him, were confided by the Almighty to his impenetrable views, to the supreme power of his genius, to the miraculous exploits of his arms. Hence a new order of things, already written in the books of the Eternal, was prepared for their country. In the necessity in which he was to overthrow, to destroy, to disperse all enemies, as the wind dissipates the

*Buonaparte
departs for
Spain.*

Oct. 25.

CHAP. dust, he was not an exterminating Angel; but he was the Being
XIII. that extends his thoughts, and measures the face of the earth, to
1808. re-establish its happiness upon a better and surer basis. He was
destined before all ages to be the Man of God's right hand; the
Sovereign Master of all things. Language of more idolatrous
adoration was never listened to by the frantic Caligula, nor
uttered by the infatuated followers of Sabatai Sevi. It was not,
however, too gross for the tyrant to whom it was addressed; and
he applauded it in his reply. Immediately after this scene he
left Paris, reached Bayonne on the 3d of November, and, five
days afterwards, put himself at the head of his army at Vitoria.

CHAPTER XIV.

BUONAPARTE ENTERS SPAIN. DEFEAT OF THE SPANISH ARMIES. SURRENDER OF MADRID. THE SPANIARDS ENDEAVOUR TO RALLY AT CUENCA, AND ON THE TAGUS.

AN old prophecy was at this time circulated in Paris, im-
 porting that the disasters which would lead to the overthrow of
 the French empire were to originate in Spain. It had probably
 been sent abroad in the days of Louis XIV. when his designs
 upon that kingdom were first manifested, and the resistance
 which they would provoke from the powers of Europe was fore-
 seen. The persons by whom it was now reproduced, apprehended
 that the English would land a strong force in the north of the
 peninsula, so as to cut off the French armies from their com-
 munication with Bayonne. Like all desponding or discontented
 politicians, they overrated the wisdom and the power of the
 enemy. If indeed, when an expedition was sent to Portugal,
 this had been done at the same time, the issue can hardly be
 deemed doubtful. We had disciplined soldiers, ships to transport
 them, and means of every kind in abundance; but vigour was
 wanting in our councils, and in offensive war we had every thing
 to learn. It was, however, intended that an army little short of
 40,000 men should take the field with the Spaniards; and had
 such an army been in the field, under an able and enterprising
 commander, subsequent events have given an Englishman right

1808.

October.

*Pasley on
 the Military
 Policy of
 Great Bri-
 tain, p. 34.*

CHAP. to affirm, that no force which could have been brought against
 XIV. it in one point, would have been able to defeat it. But this
 1808. intention was frustrated as much by the precipitance of the
October. Spaniards as by the dilatoriness of the British movements.

*Movements
 against
 Blake's
 army.*

By the latter end of October not less than 100,000 troops had crossed the Pyrenees from the side of Bayonne, to reinforce their countrymen. The head-quarters were at Vitoria, where they had continued since Joseph arrived there on his flight from Madrid. The left wing, under Marshal Moncey, Duke of Cornegliano, was posted along the banks of the Aragon and the Ebro, having its head-quarters at Tafalla ; Marshal Ney, Duke of Elchingen, had his head-quarters at Guardia ; Marshal Bessieres, Duke of Istria, at Miranda, with a garrison at Pancorbo ; Marshal Lefebvre, Duke of Dantzic, occupied the heights of Durango, and defended the heights of Mondragon from the threatened attack of the Spaniards. Blake had posted the main body of his army in front of Lefebvre's force, and occupied with the rest the debouches of Villarcayo, Orduña, and Munguia. He hoped that the Asturian General, Azevedo, would cut off the communication between Durango and Vitoria by Ochandiano, and that, by possessing himself of the heights of Mondragon, and thus getting in the rear of the enemy's advanced guard, he might be enabled to strike a great blow. The plan was good, if it could have been executed in time ; but Blake persisted in it after he knew that the French had received strong reinforcements. Some trifling advantages, and the confidence of the Spanish character, encouraged him to this imprudence, by which he exposed himself to be entirely cut off. It was Buonaparte's intention to take the advantage which was thus offered him ; and Lefebvre therefore had been ordered to content himself with keeping the Spaniards in check till the Emperor should arrive ; but his flanks were so much annoyed by Blake, that this delay

became inconvenient, and on the last day of October the French attacked him. After a long and well-contested action of nine hours the Spaniards retreated in good order by Bilbao and Valmaseda to Nava, without losing colours or prisoners. No artillery had been used, the country being too mountainous for it. The enemy entered Bilbao the next day; and the corps of Marshal Victor, Duke of Belluno, arriving at this time, was directed by Munguia and Amurrio to Valmaseda, to fall upon the flank of the Galician army.

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XIV.

1808.

October.

Blake's intention had been to fall back till he could concentrate his whole force; but the second division, and a part of the Asturians under Azevedo, had their communication cut off; and as the French were strengthening themselves at Arancadiaga and Orrantia to prevent the junction, he prepared to attack them. They retreated during the night of the 4th; but on the following day a division of his army came up with 7000 of the enemy near Valmaseda, and drove them from thence with considerable loss. Having thus effected the junction, he attacked the enemy again on the 7th at Gueñes, and turned their left wing, but his own centre was unable to advance; and perceiving that the French had received very considerable reinforcements that day from Bilbao, his own men too being exhausted by hunger and fatigue, he deemed it prudent to retire to Espinosa de los Monteros, where he hoped to refresh and feed his men, and draw artillery and supplies from Reynosa. Seldom indeed have any troops endured greater hardships. From the 23rd of October they had been continually in the open air, among the mountains of Biscay, during rainy nights and the most inclement weather: they were all without hats, great part of them half clothed, and barefooted, and they had been six days without bread, wine, or spirits; indeed, without any other supply of food than the sheep and cattle which were to be found among the moun-

*Blake falls
back to Es-
pinosa.*

CHAP. tains. There had been a considerable desertion among the
 XIV. young recruits ; but from those who remained not a murmur was
 1808. heard under all these privations : they manifested no other wish
 November. than that the sacrifice of their lives might contribute to the
 destruction of the enemy, and the deliverance of Spain.

*Battle of
 Espinosa.*

The system of the French was to beat this army down, as their increasing numbers enabled them to do, by repeated attacks. Blake intended to remain some days at Espinosa, for the purpose of giving his men some rest. But having arrived on the 9th, his rear-guard, under the Conde de San Roman, one of the officers who had escaped from the Baltic, was attacked on the following day, by a far superior force. He immediately posted his army in front of the town ; Azevedo, with the Asturians and the first division, on a height to the left, covering the road to S. Andero ; the second division on a hill to the right ; the third and the reserve in the centre. The van-guard was posted on a little hill close in the rear of the centre, with six four-pounders. The enemy were successful in their first attack, and drove the Spaniards from a wood which they had occupied ; they returned, however, to the charge, being reinforced with the third division, and the action became general, except on the left of the Spanish position. It continued for three hours, till evening closed in ; and Blake thought the advantage was on his side, though the enemy had gained possession of a wood and ridge of hill in front of his centre and right. The contest had been very severe, and a very great proportion of the Spanish officers had fallen, San Roman among them, and the Galician General Riquelme, both mortally wounded. The men lay on their arms that night, and Victor, who commanded in this battle, brought up fresh troops from his rear to the ridge. At daybreak, when the main attention of the Spaniards was drawn towards this point, he made his great attack upon their left, commencing it with a strong body of sharp-shooters ;

they were twice repulsed ; meantime one of their large columns, under General Maison, came up and formed in line ; the sharpshooters, being reinforced, returned to the charge, and General Ruffin, with his division, attacked the centre. There the enemy were well resisted ; but on the left they succeeded, owing, in great part, it appears, to the system which on this and the preceding day was practised, of marking out the officers. Azevedo, and the two Asturian Generals who were next in command, fell ; this threw the men into confusion, and when they saw themselves cut off from the road to S. Andero, and that the French were advancing to occupy a height in rear of the town which commands the road to Reynosa, they gave way, and nothing remained but to order a general retreat. They had to retire by a bridge over the Trueba and a defile ; and instead of attempting to save the guns, which would necessarily have impeded the retreat of the army, Blake thought it better to employ them till the last moment ; this was done with great effect, and they were spiked when the enemy was close to them.

Blake was one of those men who would have been thought worthy of the chief command if they had never been trusted with it. His talents were considerable ; he understood the theory of his profession well, and could plan an action or a campaign with great ability ; but he was deficient in that promptitude and presence of mind which are the first qualifications of a commander. His own game he could play skilfully, but when the adversary disconcerted it by some unexpected movement, he was incapable of forming new dispositions to meet the altered circumstances. By persisting against a superior and continually increasing force in operations which had been calculated against an inferior one, he exposed himself to the imminent hazard of being entirely cut off ; and by advancing so far into a country which had been stripped of its provisions, and with no commissariat to follow him,

CHAP.
XIV.
1808.
November.

CHAP. he exhausted his men. Under every privation he indeed set
 XIV. them an example of cheerfulness, and let them see that he fared
 1808. as hardly as themselves ; but this could not counteract the effects
 November. of inanition. They were in a state of famine when they arrived
 at Espinosa, and would have found nothing there to relieve them
 if 250 mules, laden with biscuits, had not most opportunely arrived, sent by Major-General Leith, who was forwarding partial supplies toward them by every possible way. But men thus hungered, and enfeebled also by long continued exposure to cold and rain, were ill fitted for close action, in which much depended upon personal strength. Another and more lamentable error was, that the troops from the Baltic, the only thoroughly disciplined part of his force, were brought into action after the first defeat, and exposed by single battalions to bear the brunt of every conflict ; and thus they were sacrificed in detail, giving melancholy proof, by the devoted courage with which they stood their ground, of what they could have effected, if, as a body, they had been brought into some fair field of battle.

*Dispersion
 of Blake's
 army at
 Reynosa.*

Blake attempted with the remains of his army to make a stand at Reynosa ; his principal magazine and his park of artillery were there ; it is one of the strongest positions in that strong country, and had it been occupied in time, the event of the campaign might have been different. But the forlorn hope of collecting his scattered forces there was soon defeated. Victor was pursuing him closely from Espinosa ; Lefebvre from the side of Villarcayo. And from the side of Burgos, where a fatal blow had now been struck, Marshal Soult, Duke of Dalmatia, marched upon Reynosa. No alternative was left him but to retreat toward S. Andero, and the dispersion was so complete, that there no longer remained any force on this side to oppose the enemy. Yet in justice to this ill-fated army it should be said, that no men ever behaved more gallantly, nor with more devoted patriotism.

Without cavalry, half clothed, almost without food, they fought battle after battle against troops always superior in number, and whose losses were always filled up with reinforcements. Nor did any circumstance of disgrace attend their defeat; there was no capitulation, no surrender of large bodies, or of strong places; the ground on which they fought was won by the French, and that was all, as long as any body of the Spaniards remained together. The magazines at Reynosa now fell into their hands, and they entered S. Andero. The Bishop saved himself in an English ship, and General Riquelme expired as his men were lifting him on board. They had borne him thither from Espinosa; for, routed as they were, they would not leave him to die in the hands of the enemy. Here, and in some of the smaller ports, the French found a considerable booty of English goods.

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XIV.
1808.
November.

Nov. 16.

When Buonaparte arrived in Spain he was not pleased at finding that Lefebvre had opened the campaign; his hope had been to march a strong force in the rear of Blake's army, and thus place it in a situation where it must either have been destroyed or have laid down its arms. In crossing the mountains near Mondragon he had nearly lost one of his favourite Generals, Marshal Lasnes, Duke of Montebello; the ground was covered with frozen snow, his horse fell with him, and in attempting to rise fell on him. He was carried to Vitoria in a state of great danger, his body covered with those discolorations which show that the small vessels of the skin are ruptured, the abdomen swoln, the extremities cold, suffering acute pain, and with all the symptoms of inflammation in the intestines, from the shock and the pressure. M. Larrey, who attended Buonaparte in all his campaigns, had learnt a remedy from the savages of Newfoundland, applied by them to some sailors whose boat had been broken to pieces and themselves dashed by the waves upon their

*Buonaparte
arrives in
Spain.*

CHAP.
XIV.

1808.
November.

*Larrey,
Campagnes
et Mémories
t. iii. 243—
246.*

*Defeat of
the Extre-
maduran
army at
Burgos.*

Nov. 10.

coast. A large sheep having been first stunned by a blow on the neck, was immediately flayed, the reeking skin was sown round the Marshal's body, while his limbs were wrapped in warm flannels, and some cups of weak tea were given him. He felt immediate relief, complaining only of a painful sense of formication, and of the manner in which the skin seemed to attract every part wherewith it was in contact. In the course of ten minutes he was asleep. When he awoke, after two hours, the body was streaming with perspiration, the dangerous symptoms were relieved, and on the fifth day he was able to mount on horseback and follow the army.

Buonaparte reached the head-quarters at Vitoria on the 8th, and immediately pushed forward a corps under Soult against the Extremaduran army in his front. Bessiéres commanded the cavalry, which had before proved so fatal to the Spaniards at Rio Seco, and which had now been greatly reinforced. This army, under the Conde de Belveder, had been intended to support Blake, and keep up a communication between his army and that of Castaños. It consisted of about 13,000 men; and their Commander, a young man, although aware that a superior force was advancing against him, waited for the attack in an open position at Gamonal. He had with him some of the Walloon and Spanish guards, and a few regiments of the line; the rest were new levies, and among them a corps of students, volunteers from Salamanca and Leon. These youths, the pride and the hope of many a generous family, were in the advanced guard. They displayed that courage which might be looked for in men of their condition, and at that time of life: twice they repulsed the French infantry, and when Bessieres with the horse came upon their flank, fell almost to a man where they had been stationed. The loss in killed was estimated at 3000, nearly a fourth of this brave army; the victorious cavalry entered Burgos with the

fugitives, and the city, which was entirely forsaken by its inhabitants, was given up to be plundered. Bessieres pursued Count Belveder, while Soult turned aside toward Reynosa, to complete the destruction of Blake's army. One corps of the French marched upon Palencia, another upon Lerma; from the latter place the Count retreated to Aranda; there also Bessieres pursued, and the wreck of the army collected at Segovia; the piquets of the French were now upon the Douro, and their cavalry covered the plains of Castille.

CHAP.
XIV.
1808.
November.

On the second day after the defeat of the Extremaduran army Buonaparte established his head-quarters at Burgos, and issued a proclamation, granting, in the Intruder's name, a pardon to all Spaniards who, within one month after his arrival at Madrid, should lay down their arms, and renounce all connexion with England. Neither the members of the Juntas nor the general officers were excepted: but wishing, he said, to mark those, who, after having sworn fidelity to Joseph Buonaparte, had violated that oath; and who, instead of employing their influence to enlighten the people, had only used it to mislead them: wishing also that the punishment of great offenders might serve as an example in future times to all those, who, being placed at the head of nations, instead of directing them with wisdom and prudence, should mislead them into disorders and popular tumults, and precipitate them into misfortunes and war: for these reasons he excepted from this amnesty the Dukes of Infantado, Híjar, Medina Celi, and Ossuna, the Marques de Santa Cruz, Counts Fernan Nunez and Altamira, the ex-Minister of State Cevallos, and the Bishop of S. Andero; declaring them traitors to the two crowns of France and Spain, and decreeing that they should be seized, brought before a military commission, and shot. Those persons who had sworn homage to the Intruder, compulsory as that homage was, had unquestionably exposed

Proclamation excluding certain Spaniards from pardon.

CHAP. themselves to its possible consequences: they had been forced
 XIV. into a situation in which the only alternative was to become
 1808. traitors to him, or traitors to their country: but by what law or
 November. what logic were they traitors to France, a country to which they
 owed no allegiance, and with which they had contracted no
 obligation?

*Movements
 against
 Castaños.*

From Burgos Marshals Ney and Victor were dispatched with their divisions to act on the rear of Castaños, and cut off his retreat, while Lasnes, with 30,000 men, should attack him in front. This last remaining army of the Spaniards is represented by the French as consisting of 80,000 men, of whom three-fourths were armed. But the nominal force of the conjoined armies under Castaños and Palafox was only 65,000, and the effective soldiers hardly more than half that amount. Many of the Andalusian troops had returned to their homes after the first success, and many more had remained at Madrid, so that though some thousands (mostly from Valencia) had joined Castaños, his force was little more numerous than it had been at Baylen. His own opinion was decidedly against risking an action in which there could be no reasonable hope of advantage; but the commissioner, D. Francisco Palafox, to whom the power of overruling the General had been madly entrusted by the Central Junta, determined that a battle should be fought, and Castaños therefore was compelled to fight, lest he should be stigmatized as a traitor, and murdered by his own men, or torn to pieces by a mob. Already the Conde de Montijo, who left the army at this time, was every where accusing him of treachery, because he had warmly opposed a determination, the fatal consequences of which he certainly foresaw.

*Battle of
 Tudela.*

The plan of the French against this army was the same as that which they had practised against Blake's; they meant to rout it by a powerful attack in front, and to destroy the fugitives

by intercepting them with a second force in their flight. Their destruction was considered to be as certain as their defeat, but Ney was less expeditious in his movements than had been calculated; and Castaños hearing on the 21st that this corps was advancing upon Soria, while Lasnes and Moncey approached from the side of Logroño and Lodosa, abandoned Calahorra and fell back upon Tudela. On the 22d Lasnes entered Calahorra and Alfaro, and at daybreak on the following morning he found the Spaniards drawn up in seven divisions, with their right before Tudela, and their left extending along a line of from four to five miles upon a range of easy heights. The Aragonese, who had joined only a few hours before by forced marches, were on the right, the Valencians and the troops of New Castille in the centre, the Andalusians on the left. Their line was covered by forty pieces of artillery. Situations were chosen by the enemy for planting sixty pieces against them; but upon seeing their own relative strength, and the confusion which was observable among the Spaniards, they preferred a more summary mode of attack. General Maurice Mathieu, with a division of infantry, forced the Spanish centre; and General Lefebvre, with the cavalry, passing through, wheeled to the left, and coming in the rear of the Aragonese, at a time when that wing, having withstood an attack, supposed itself victorious, the fate of the battle was decided. At the same time Lagrange, with his division, attacked the left; a brave, and in some part a successful resistance was opposed; and the action, which began in the morning, was prolonged on this side till darkness enabled Lapeña's division to fall back from Cascante to Tarazona, where the first and third divisions were stationed, and had not been engaged. There too the second division arrived, which had been ordered to support Lapeña; but though it received these orders at noon, and the distance which it had to march was only two leagues, either from

CHAP.
XIV.
1808.
November.

CHAP. incapacity in the leaders, or want of order, it did not arrive till
XIV. night, after the action was decided.

1808. According to the French 4000 Spaniards fell in this battle,
November. 8000 men, 800 officers, and thirty pieces of cannon were taken,
Retreat of the defeated army. their own loss not amounting to 500. The right wing, dispersing and escaping how it could, assembled again at Zaragoza, with some of the central division also, there to prove that their failure in the field had not been for want of courage. As soon as the wreck of the left had collected at Tarazona, Castaños ordered them to begin their march by way of Borja to Calatayud. It was midnight, and at the moment when they were setting forward a chapel, which served as a magazine, blew up. Many shells went off after the explosion; this occasioned an opinion that an enemy's battery might be playing upon them, and the Royal Carabineers, in the midst of the confusion, fancying that the chapel was occupied by the French, presented themselves sword in hand to charge it. Presently a cry of treason was set up; it spread rapidly; misfortune in such times is always deemed a proof of treachery; those troops who had not been engaged could not understand wherefore they were ordered to retreat, and at such an hour; a general distrust prevailed; some corps dispersed, and they who remained together were in a fearful state of insubordination. They retreated however through Borja and Ricla, without stopping in either place, and on the night of the 25th reached Calatayud.

Their deplorable condition at Calatayud.

On that same day Maurice Mathieu entered Borja in pursuit, . . too late to make any prisoners. Ney arrived on the day following. He had been ordered to reach Agreda on the 23d, which, if he had done, the wreck of this army must have been destroyed; but he found a pretext for delay in the fatigue of his men, and a cause in the pillage of Soria. The people of that city, unmindful of the example which the Numantines had set

them upon that very ground, opened their gates to the enemy. This did not save them from being plundered. Their church, and their rich wool-factors, afforded good spoil to the French; and for the sake of this booty, and that he might extort all he could from the inhabitants, Ney remained there three days, not because his men had been over-marched. But this delay enabled Castaños to reach Calatayud. He had thus escaped the danger of immediate pursuit, and men and officers had leisure now to feel the whole wretchedness of their situation. There were neither magazines nor stores here; the system of supplying the troops, which before had been miserably incomplete, was at an end, and the military chest, containing two million *reales*, had been conveyed to Zaragoza. Desperate with hunger, the men broke through all restraint, and the inhabitants fled from their houses, hardly less dismayed at the temper of their own soldiers than at the vicinity of the French. The muleteers attached to the baggage and artillery could obtain no payment, nor food either for their animals or themselves; such as could find opportunity threw away the baggage, mounted their beasts, and rode away; others abandoned them altogether, cursing their ill fortune, and yet glad to escape with their lives. The soldiers, having nothing else to stay the cravings of hunger, devoured cabbage leaves, or whatever crude vegetables they could find, and many literally dropped for want.

Here Palafox and the Aragonese army expected that Castaños would have rallied, have made a stand, and, acting on the offensive as circumstances permitted, have saved Zaragoza from a second siege, or at least have delayed its evil day. They who formed this expectation did not reckon upon the activity of the enemy, and imputed to their own government a promptitude and power which it was far from possessing. Had the defeat of the central army been apprehended in time, and measures taken

CHAP.
XIV.
1808.
November.

*They are
ordered to
approach
Madrid.*

CHAP. for supporting it, one of the first objects would have been to
XIV. have strengthened this point. There had been no such foresight.

1808. The French were in pursuit, and orders arrived from Morla,
November. who was one of the council of war, requiring Castaños to hasten with his army to the defence of the capital. He consulted accordingly with the chiefs of division, and they resolved to march by way of Siguenza; from whence they might either repair to Somosierra, if that strong position should still be retained, or to Madrid, if such a movement should be more advisable. In that direction, therefore, they recommenced their retreat, after one day's rest.

*Measures
of the Cen-
tral Junta.*

The Central Junta, mean while, was occupying itself with measures ill adapted to such times. While Blake's army was fighting, day after day, without clothing, without food, and without reinforcements to recruit its ranks, they passed a decree for the establishment of a special tribunal, to try all persons accused of treason; its object being not more to bring such as were guilty to deserved punishment, than to rescue from suspicion and danger those who were unjustly suspected; for, under the existing circumstances of Spain, they said, the people, having suffered so much from treachery, would naturally suspect all those whose conduct it did not fully comprehend. The tribunal, which was composed of members from each of the great councils of state, was to have a jurisdiction over persons of all ranks: but not to carry into execution any sentence of death, confiscation, or dismissal from office, till they laid the whole case before the Supreme Junta. A certain number of its members might carry on the ordinary business, but a writ for the arrest of any person, or the sequestration of his goods, must be issued by the whole. Especial provisions were made to prevent secret arrest, or long confinement; and the papers of the accused were not to be detained, as soon as it was ascertained that they con-

tained no relation to the matter with which he was charged. No proceedings were to take place upon anonymous information, nor was any informer to be admitted, who would not consent to let his name be known. The humanity of these provisions is in such direct opposition to the practice of the holy office, that it seems to have been the intention of the framers of this tribunal to render their state inquisition as unlike as possible to that curse and disgrace of their country. The tribunal was particularly charged to inquire into the conduct of those persons who had gone as deputies to Bayonne, or who had submitted to the Intruder at Madrid ; endeavouring carefully to distinguish between what was compulsory and what was their own act and deed ; and proceeding with the caution and prudence required, where, on the one hand, the public safety was at stake, and, on the other, the reputation of many good and honourable citizens. And when their investigations had established the innocence of any one, they were to consult with the Supreme Junta upon the means of restoring to him all the credit and respectability which he had formerly enjoyed.

By another decree, dated on the day when Castaños was defeated at Tudela, they resolved that honorary militias should be formed in all towns which were not in the scene of war, in order to prevent disorders, and to arrest robbers, deserters, and ill-disposed persons. A more remarkable measure related to the Ex-Jesuits : their banishment was repealed, and they were permitted to return to any part of Spain, and there enjoy their pensions. The reason assigned was, that it was a miserable thing for them to be expatriated, to live far from their friends and kin, and be abandoned to the mercy of strangers ; that it was now become difficult to furnish them with the pensions assigned to them by the crown ; and that the sums thus allotted were so much withdrawn from the circulating specie of the king.

CHAP.
XIV.
1808.
November.

CHAP. dom, to increase that of foreign and even of hostile countries:
 XIV. This late act of humanity to the poor survivors of an injured
 1808. community, is not at any time to be censured; but it is ex-
November. traordinary that at such a time it should have occupied the
 attention of the Junta.

Of these measures, all would have been unexceptionable, and even praise-worthy, had they been well timed; but the Central Junta still pursued the fatal system of deceiving the people as to the extent and imminence of their danger. They addressed a proclamation to the inhabitants of Madrid, saying, that they had taken all the measures in their power for defeating the enemy, who, continuing his attacks, had advanced to the neighbourhood of Somosierra; and that the number of the French there hardly amounted to 8000 men. The enthusiasm with which the soldiers were preparing to beat the enemies of their country, they said, and their confidence in their valour, was not to be expressed; and the English were ready to march from the Escorial, to reinforce the position chosen by the able general whom the Junta had appointed, and to support the operations of the van, who, by that time, were already engaged with the slaves of the tyrant.

Nov. 21.

With such representations did the government endeavour to deceive the people of Madrid, and lull them into a feeling of security, when its duty was, to have told them the whole extent of their danger, and manfully roused them to those exertions which the emergency required. But they themselves still in some degree partook the delusion which they inspired. Their confidence in the Spanish character was too well founded ever to be shaken; and they relied, with little reflection, upon the natural strength of the country. Their present hope was upon the pass of the Somosierra. D. Benito San Juan, a judicious and able officer, of high reputation, was stationed there with the remains of the Extremaduran army, which had with great prompti-

tude been reinforced. The Junta did not call to mind with how little difficulty Vedel had forced the stronger passes of the Sierra Morena.

CHAP.
XIV.

1808.

November.

*Pass of the
Somosierra
forced.*

Buonaparte continued at Aranda till the 29th, when his head-quarters were removed to Bocaguillas, a village upon the skirts of the Somosierra. There he learnt that about 6000 men were entrenched upon the heights of Sepulveda, and that a stronger body occupied the pass. The advanced guard was attacked without the success which the French expected; but the Spaniards, instead of being encouraged by this advantage, forsook their entrenchments and dispersed. On the following morning the enemy, under M. Victor, attempted the pass. Sixteen pieces of cannon had been well placed to flank the ascent, and some attempts had been made to break up the road; but this easy means of defence had been so imperfectly performed, that the pass was won by a charge of Polish lancers. They were favoured in their approach by a thick fog; but the Spaniards must have strangely neglected the advantage of the ground, when they suffered a strong mountain defile to be taken by a charge of light horse. The men, fancying themselves betrayed, betrayed themselves by their own fears; they threw away their arms, and dispersed among the hills, leaving all the artillery and baggage to the enemy. And now the way to Madrid was open.

Nov. 30.

During the series of disasters which thus rapidly succeeded each other, there had been no time for the Junta to think of removing their residence to the capital, still less for them to take into consideration, on the appointed day, the plan for forming a Regency; and convoking the Cortes. They began now to feel themselves insecure at Aranjuez; . . already advanced parties of the French had approached the Tagus; wherever they went there was no armed force to oppose them; they had appeared at Villarejo on the 28th, on the 30th at Mostoles; and if at this time

*The Central
Junta retire
from Aran-
juez.*

CHAP.
XIV.

1808. Junta, and by depriving Spain of its government, have inflicted upon it a more dangerous injury than all which it had hitherto suffered in the field. This opportunity was overlooked by Buonaparte; and the Junta, sensible of their danger when the consequences of the defeat at Tudela and the rout at Somosierra were known, deliberated whither to retire. Florida-Blanca, who was sinking under the burthen of years and the anxieties of his situation, was for removing at once to Cadiz, and a few others agreed with him. Jovellanos, who added to his other virtues that of perfect calmness and intrepidity under any danger, represented that this would be sacrificing too much for safety; and that the honour of the government, as well as the public service, required that it should establish itself as near as possible to the theatre of war. Toledo was named, and rejected, as having nothing but its situation to defend it. Cordoba and Seville were proposed, but liable to the same objection; and Badajoz, which was the place that Jovellanos advised, was chosen: the provinces every where were open to the enemy, but Badajoz was a strong place, from whence the Junta might correspond with the British army, and with that which Romana was now re-forming in the northern provinces from the dispersed troops of Blake and the Conde de Belveder. There they could take measures for raising new armies in Extremadura and Andalusia; and if the French should overrun those provinces, which there was now nothing to prevent them from doing, they might thence pass through Portugal to those northern parts where the founders of the Spanish monarchy had found an asylum from the Moors; and where its restorers, animated with the same spirit, might, in like manner, Jovellanos thought, maintain the independence of their country. They were to halt at Toledo

November.

Jovellanos's
Memorial,
p. ii. § 44.

on the way, and there take such measures as circumstances might require.

Two days before the passage of the Somosierra orders had been given to arm and embody the people of Madrid. The people were ready and willing, but this measure had been too long delayed; nevertheless a permanent Junta was formed, to maintain order, and provide for the defence of the capital; and the latter object was especially entrusted to Morla and to the Marques de Castelar. Now indeed was the time for that city to have emulated Zaragoza, and the spirit was not wanting in the inhabitants, had there been one commanding mind to have directed them. Priests and regulars came forward to bear arms, and old men, and women, and boys offered themselves for the service of their country; . . . for this purpose leaving their houses open, and their property to take its chance, they employed themselves in opening trenches, erecting batteries, and barricading the streets. The pavements were torn up, and women and children carried the stones to the tops of the houses, to be used from thence against the enemy. Parapets were made on the houses, and the doors stopped with mattresses. Whatever arms were in the possession of individuals were brought forth, and about 8000 muskets were distributed. The troops who were in the city, and the armed inhabitants, were now assembled in the Prado, that they might be distributed to their appointed stations; the first step for establishing that order without which all efforts in defence of the city would be ineffectual. Great confusion prevailed; and when the people called out for cartridges, Morla coolly replied, that there were none. Happy had it been for Morla, if the indignation which this proof of negligence excited had been directed against himself; had he then perished under the hands of the mob, the treachery which he was preparing would never have been

CHAP.
XIV.

1808.
December.

State of
Madrid.

CHAP. known on earth, and he would have escaped perpetual infamy:

XIV.

1808.

December.

*Marques de
Perales
murdered
by the po-
pulace.*

But his character stood so high, that no suspicion pointed towards him. It happened that among those cartridges which had been delivered in the morning some were found containing sand instead of gunpowder; they had probably been made by some dishonest workman, or mischievous lad; but in such a time of feverish irritation and imminent danger, the fact was of course imputed to a deep-laid scheme of treason, and the Marques de Perales was the person upon whom the crime was laid. The Duque del Infantado was informed that a mob was hastening toward the house of this unfortunate nobleman, and that he and his family were in the greatest peril. Infantado himself seems to have thought there was guilt somewhere; he repaired instantly to the spot, meaning to deliver over the suspected persons to a proper tribunal, by which they might be tried; but before he arrived Perales* had been pierced with wounds, and his dead body dragged upon a mat through the streets, the rabble accompanying it, and exulting in what they believed his deserved punishment.

*The Duque
del Infan-
tado sent to
the central
army.*

The permanent Junta, who held their sittings at the post-office, as the most central point, taking into consideration the proximity of their danger, thought that more reliance was to be placed upon succour from without, than on any exertions of the inhabitants. These persons were in truth unequal to the arduous situation in which they were placed; even the example of Zaragoza had not taught them what wonders might be effected in a civic defence; and they did not consider, that as the first insurrection, and the consequent massacre at Madrid, had roused all

* M. Nellerto (Llorente) kills him twice. Once on the flight of the Intruder from Madrid, preliminarily, (t. i. p. 143); and secondly and definitively on this occasion. T. i. p. 159.

Spain to arms, a greater impulse would now be given if the capital opposed a determined resistance. They agreed therefore to content themselves with such efforts as might prevent the enemy from instantly forcing the town, and induce him to grant terms of capitulation. If by this means time could be gained for a diversion to be effected, or a successful attempt made in their favour, it would be well; but if not, their minds were subdued to this. They counted upon succour from San Juan's troops, many of whom were now arriving, and they dispatched Infantado to meet the remains of the central army, and bring it with all speed to the relief of Madrid. On the 2d of December, therefore, early in the morning, the Duke set out on this forlorn commission, accompanied by the Duque de Albuquerque and a small escort.

CHAP.
XIV.
1808.
December.

*Manifiesto
del Duque
del Infantado,
i. 10.*

Only an hour or two after their departure, Bessieres, with the French cavalry, came within sight of Madrid, and took possession of the heights. Buonaparte arrived at noon on the same day, being the anniversary of his coronation. There were not more than 6000 troops in the city, but there were ten times as many men ready to lay down their lives in its defence; and the sight of the enemy excited indignation, not dismay. It was apparent that there was a total want of order among the people, but that they were in a state of feeling which might render them truly formidable: the bells of all the churches and convents were sounding, and from time to time the shouts of the multitude were heard, and the beat of drums. Preparations had been made which evinced at once the zeal and the ignorance of those by whom they were directed; the batteries were so low, that it was easy for the French to plant their guns where they could completely command them; and they were so near the wall, that there was scarcely room to work them, and the men would suffer more by the broken stones than the direct effect of the enemy's shot.

*Madrid
summoned
to surrender.*

*Infantado,
p. 4.*

CHAP. Buonaparte thought it easier to force the city than he would
 XIV. have found it ; but though insensible to any humane considera-
 1808. tions, policy made him desirous of avoiding that extremity.
December. Such a catastrophe might inflame the continent as well as Spain,
 by proclaiming to all Europe how utterly the Spaniards abhorred
 the yoke under which he had undertaken to subject them. An
 aide-de-camp of Marshal Bessieres was therefore sent to sum-
 mon the town in form ; he was seized by the people, and would
 have been torn to pieces if the soldiers had not protected him.
 No communication could be opened that day with those who
 wished to deliver up the capital. In the evening the French
 infantry came up ; arrangements for an attack in the morning
 were made by moonlight ; and at midnight a Spanish Colonel,
 who had been taken at Somosierra, was sent with a letter from
 M. Berthier, Prince of Neufchatel, to the Marques de Castelar,
 exhorting him not to expose Madrid to the horrors of an assault.
 Castelar replied, that he must consult the constituted authorities,
 and ascertain also how the people were affected by their present
 circumstances before he could give an answer ; and he requested
 a suspension of arms for the ensuing day.

*Morla
 treats for
 a capitula-
 tion.*

This reply was sent on the morning of the 3rd. Before it
 arrived an attack had been commenced upon the Buen Retiro,
 the favourite palace of Philip IV. which had been fortified with
 some care, as a point from whence the city might be commanded.
 Thirty pieces of cannon soon made a breach in the walls, and
 the place was carried, after a thousand Spaniards had fallen in
 defending it. The other outlets which had been fortified were
 won also, but the French were repulsed from the gates of Fuen-
 carral and Segovia. Some shells were thrown, in the hope of
 intimidating the inhabitants. In the forenoon of the ensuing
 day Berthier sent in a second summons. "Immense batteries,"
 said he, "are mounted, mines are prepared to blow up your

principal buildings, columns of troops are at the entrances of the town, of which some companies of sharp-shooters have made themselves masters. But the Emperor, always generous in the course of his victories, suspends the attack till two o'clock. To defend Madrid is contrary to the principles of war, and inhuman towards the inhabitants. The town ought to seek protection for its peaceable inhabitants, and oblivion for the past." The firing ceased, and at five in the afternoon Morla and D. Bernardo Yriarte came out to Berthier's tent. They assured him that Madrid was without resources, and that it would be the height of madness to continue its defence, but that the populace and the volunteers from the country were determined to persevere in defending it. They themselves were convinced that this was hopeless, and requested a pause of a few hours, that they might make the people understand their real situation. . . Hopeless, and without resources, when threescore thousand men were ready to defend their streets, and doors, and chambers! This would not have been said if Palafox had been in Madrid.

These unworthy deputies were introduced to Buonaparte, and one of those theatrical displays ensued in which he delighted to exhibit himself. "You use the name of the people to no purpose," said he; "if you cannot appease them, and restore tranquillity, it is because you have inflamed them, and led them astray by propagating falsehoods. Call together the clergy, the heads of convents, the Alcaldes, the men of property and influence, and let the city capitulate before six in the morning, or it shall cease to exist. I will not withdraw my troops, nor ought I to withdraw them. You have murdered the unfortunate French prisoners who fell into your hands; and only a few days ago you suffered two persons in the suite of the Russian Ambassador to be dragged through the streets, and killed, because they were Frenchmen. The incapacity and the cowardice of a

CHAP.
XIV.
1808.
December.

*Speech of
Buonaparte
to the de-
puties.*

CHAP. General put into your power troops who capitulated on the field
XIV. of battle, and that capitulation has been violated. You, M.

1808. Morla, what sort of an epistle did you write to that General?

December.

Perhaps it becomes you, Sir, to talk of pillage; you, who, when you entered Roussillon, carried off all the women, and distributed them as booty among your soldiers. Besides, what right had you to use such language? the capitulation precluded you from it. See what has been the conduct of the English, who are yet far from piquing themselves on being strict observers of the law of nations. They cried out against the convention of Portugal, but they have fulfilled it. To violate military treaties is to renounce all civilization; it is placing generals on a footing with the Bedouins of the desert. How dare you then presume to solicit a capitulation, you who violated that of Baylen? See how injustice and ill faith always recoil upon the guilty! I had a fleet at Cadiz, it was in alliance with Spain, and yet you directed against it the mortars of the city where you commanded. I had a Spanish army in my ranks; and rather than disarm it, I would have seen it embark on board the English ships, and be forced to precipitate it afterwards down the rocks at Espinosa. I would rather have seven thousand more enemies to fight than be wanting in honour and good faith. Return to Madrid. I give you till six o'clock in the morning; come back at that hour, if you have to announce the submission of the people; otherwise you and your troops shall be all put to the sword." Had there been a Spaniard present to have replied as became him in behalf of his country, Buonaparte would have trembled at the reply, like Felix before the Apostle.

*Surrender
of Madrid.*

The enemy had now been three days before Madrid, and the ardour of the people was deadened by delay and distrust. Deserted and betrayed as they were, they knew not in whom to confide, and therefore began to feel that it behoved every one

to provide for his own safety. During the night the strangers who had come to assist in the defence of the capital, and such of the inhabitants as had been most zealous in the national cause, left a scene where they were not allowed to exert themselves ; and at ten o'clock on the morning of the 5th the French General Belliard took the command of the city. Morla's first stipulation was, that the catholic apostolic Roman religion should be preserved, and no other legally tolerated. No person was to be molested for his political opinions, or writings, nor for what he had done in obedience to the former government, nor the people, for the efforts which they had made in their defence. It was as easy for the tyrant to grant this, as to break it whenever he might think proper. The fifth article required that no contributions should be exacted beyond the ordinary ones. This was granted till the realm should definitely be organized ; and, with the same qualifying reserve, it was agreed, that the laws, customs, and courts of justice should be preserved. Another article required, that the French officers and troops should not be quartered in private houses nor in convents. This was granted with a proviso, that the troops should have quarters and tents furnished conformably to military regulations, .. regulations which placed houses and convents at their mercy. The Spanish troops were to march out with the honours of war, but without their arms and cannon : the armed peasantry to leave their weapons, and return to their abodes. They who had enlisted among the troops of the line within the last four months were discharged from their engagements, and might return home ; the rest should be prisoners of war till an exchange took place, which, it was added, should immediately commence between equal numbers, rank for rank. It was asked that the public debts and engagements should be faithfully discharged ; but this, it was replied, being a political object, belonged to the cognizance of the

CHAP.
XIV.
1808.
December.

CHAP. XIV. assembly of the realm, and depended on the general administration. The last article stipulated, that those generals who might wish to continue in Madrid should preserve their rank, and such as were desirous of quitting it, should be at liberty so to do. This was granted; but their pay was only to continue till the kingdom received its ultimate organization.

*Decrees
issued by
Buonaparte*

Notwithstanding the formality with which the soldiers were included in this capitulation, very few of them remained to be subject to its conditions. Castelar and all the military officers of rank refused to enter into any terms, and, with the main body of the troops and sixteen guns, marched out of the city on the night of the 4th, and effected their retreat. The Council of Castile, which had already suffered the just reproaches of their country, had now to endure the censure of the tyrant whom they had supported while his power was predominant, and disowned when the tide turned against him. He issued a decree, whereby, considering that that Council had shown, in the exercise of its functions, as much falsehood as weakness, and that, after having published the renunciation of the Bourbons, and acknowledged the right of Joseph Buonaparte to the throne, it had had the baseness to declare that it had signed those documents with secret reservations, he displaced them, as cowards, unworthy to be the magistrates of a brave and generous nation. Care, however, was taken to except those who had been cautious enough not to sign the recantation. At the same time another decree was passed, abolishing the Inquisition, as incompatible with the sovereign power, and with the civil authority. Its property was to be united to the domains of Spain, as a guarantee for the public debt. A third decree reduced the number of existing convents to one-third. This was to be effected by uniting the members of several convents in one; and no novice was to be admitted or professed till the number of religioners of

either sex should be reduced to one-third of their present amount. All novices were ordered to quit their respective convents within a fortnight; and those who, having professed, wished to change their mode of life, and to live as secular ecclesiastics, were permitted so to do, and a pension secured to them, to be regulated by their age, but neither exceeding 4000 reales, nor falling short of 3000. From the possessions of the suppressed convents, a sum was to be set apart sufficient for increasing the proportion of the parish priests, so that the lowest salary should amount to 2400 reales; the surplus of this property should be united to the national domains; half of it appropriated to guarantee the public debt, the other to reimburse the provinces and cities the expenses occasioned by supplying the armies, and to indemnify the losses caused by the war. Provincial custom-houses were abolished, and all seignorial courts of justice; no other jurisdiction being permitted to exist than the royal courts; and another decree, premising that one of the greatest abuses in the finances of Spain arose from the alienation of different branches of the imposts, which were, in their nature, unalienable, enacted, that every individual in possession, either by grant, sale, or any other means, of any portion of the civil or ecclesiastical imposts, should cease to receive them.

CHAP.
XIV.
1808.
December.

Buonaparte now addressed a proclamation to the Spaniards. What possible result, he asked them, could attend even the success of some campaigns? Nothing but an endless war upon their own soil. It had cost him only a few marches to defeat their armies, and he would soon drive the English from the peninsula. Thus, to the rights which had been ceded him by the princes of the last dynasty, he had added the right of conquest: that, however, should not make any alteration in his intentions. His wish was to be their regenerator. All that obstructed their prosperity and their greatness, he had destroyed;

Proclamation to the Spaniards.

CHAP. he had broken the chains which bore the people down ; and, in-
 XIV. stead of an absolute monarchy, had given them a limited one,
 1808. with a free constitution. The conclusion of this proclamation
December. was in a spirit of blasphemy, hitherto confined to the barbarous
 countries of Africa or the East. “ Should all my efforts,” said
 he, “ prove fruitless, and should you not merit my confidence,
 nothing will remain for me but to treat you as conquered pro-
 vinces, and to place my brother upon another throne. I shall
 then set the crown of Spain upon my own head, and cause it to
 be respected by the guilty ; *for God has given me power and in-
 clination to surmount all obstacles.*”

*Change in
 Buona-
 parte's views
 concerning
 Spain.*

*De Pradt,
 180.*

*Roeca, 24.
 55.*

But though Buonaparte had thus easily dispersed the Spanish
 armies, and made himself master of Madrid, his triumph was not
 without alloy. He now perceived with what utter ignorance of
 the national character he had formed the scheme of this usurpa-
 tion, and he complained of having been deceived, when, in
 reality, he had turned a deaf ear to all who would have dissuaded
 him from his purpose. Till he arrived at Madrid, the people, as
 well as the armies, had disappeared before him ; the towns and
 cities were abandoned as his troops approached. Twelve months
 before there was no other country wherein his exploits were re-
 garded with such unmingled admiration ; they had a character
 of exaggerated greatness which suited the Spanish mind, and as
 he had always been the ally of Spain, no feeling of hostility or
 humiliation existed to abate this sentiment : now, it was not to
 be disguised from himself that he was universally detested there
 as a perfidious tyrant. But policy, as well as pride, withheld him
 from receding ; unless he went through with what he had begun,
 he must confess himself fallible, and let the world see that his
 power was not equal to his will ; and then the talisman of his
 fortune would have been broken. He had committed the crime
 and incurred the odium ; wherefore then should he not reap the

benefit, and secure the prize, not for a brother, whom he began to regard with contempt as the mere puppet of his pleasure, but for himself? This was a feeling which he did not conceal from those who possessed his confidence; and Joseph, and the unworthy ministers who had abased themselves to serve him, were made to perceive it, by the manner in which Napoleon, regardless even of appearances, issued edicts in his own name, as in a kingdom of his own. The obstinacy of the Spaniards in refusing to acknowledge his brother, he thought, would give him ere long a pretext for treating the country as his own by right of conquest. Meantime no interval was to be allowed them for collecting the wreck of their forces to make another stand.

CHAP.
XIV.

1808.

December.

De Pradt,
222. 225.

Three days before the battle of Somosierra, Castaños, with his broken army, recommenced their retreat from Calatayud. Some ten miles west of that city, near the village of Buvierca, the high road to Madrid passes through a narrow gorge, where the river Xalon has forced or found its way between two great mountain ridges. When D. Francisco Xavier Venegas, with the rear-guard, consisting of 5000 men, reached this place, he found instructions from the Commander-in-chief, requesting him to suspend his march, and take measures for defending the pass, on which, he said, the safety of the other divisions depended; and he desired him to place the troops whom he selected for this purpose under such officers as would volunteer their services, promising to reward them in proportion to the importance and danger of the duty. Venegas was too well aware of its importance to trust the command to any but himself, and he replied, that he would halt there till the rest of the army was beyond the reach of pursuit. Early on the 29th the French came up, 8000 in number, under Mathieu. They commenced an attack at eight o'clock, which continued for eight hours: the Spaniards suffered severely; but they maintained the pass, and they ef-

*Retreat of
the central
army.*

CHAP. fectually disabled this part of the French army from pursuing.

XIV.

1808.

December.

*Lapeña
succeeds to
the com-
mand.*

On the evening of the following day the army reached Siguenza with all the artillery which they took with them from Tarazona, notwithstanding the bad state of the roads and the fatigue of the men, who had been allowed no rest upon this last march. Here Castaños received a summons from the Central Junta, and resigned the command to Don Manuel de Lapeña.

The situation to which this general succeeded was deplorable. The artillery had indeed been saved, and the pass of Buvierca most gallantly maintained; nevertheless the army had suffered during its retreat from all the accumulated evils of disorder, insubordination, nakedness, and cold, and hunger, and fatigue. Sometimes when the rear-guard had been on the point of taking food, the enemy came in sight, and the ready meal was abandoned to the pursuers; this, though it was the effect as much of panic in the soldiers as of any want of conduct in their commanders, gave new cause for dissatisfaction and distrust. The men themselves were ready to fly at sight of the French, because they suspected their leaders, yet they accused their leaders of treachery for not always turning and making head against the enemy, . . . not reflecting, that the officers in like manner, though from a different motive, could place no confidence in their men. Many dropped on the way, over-marched, or foundered for want of shoes; others turned aside because they considered the army as entirely broken up: they were ready to die for their country, but it was folly, they thought, to squander their lives, and, under the present circumstances, their duty was to preserve themselves, and recover strength for future service. The loss at Buvierca, too, had been considerable. Before they reached Siguenza the four divisions had thus been wasted down to 8000 men.

*They arrive
at Guada-
lazara.*

It was on the evening of the last day of November that they

reached this point. Here message after message arrived, requiring them to hasten with all possible speed to Somosierra. They set forward again the following day, the infantry by Atienza and Jadraque, the horse and artillery by Guadalajara, in order to avoid the bad roads, leaving the river Henares on their right. This plan was soon changed; advices reached them in the middle of the night at Jadraque, that the pass of Somosierra had been lost. It was now determined that the whole army should march for Guadalajara, for the defence of Madrid; information of this movement was dispatched to the Marques de Castelar, in that city; and persons were sent, some to ascertain the position of the enemy, others to learn whither San-Juan had retreated, in order that some operations might be concerted with him. The next day, when the foremost troops entered Guadalajara, they found some detached parties of the enemy in the town, whom they drove out: the first and fourth divisions, the horse and the artillery, arrived there that night; here the news was, that Madrid was attacked, and the continual firing which was heard confirmed it. Poor as the numbers were which they could carry to the capital, they were eager to be there; and if Madrid had been protected, as it might have been, by a British army, or defended as the inhabitants, had it not been for treachery, would have defended it, 8000 men, who stood by their colours under so many hopeless circumstances, would have brought an important succour. The inhabitants relied with great confidence upon this reinforcement;...they expected hourly that these brave men would appear, and take post beside them at their gates, and in their streets; and one of the most successful artifices by which the traitors who made the capitulation depressed their zeal, was by reporting that a second battle had been fought, in which the army of the centre had been entirely defeated by Marshal Ney, so that no possible succour could be

CHAP.
XIV.

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December.

Dec. 2.

CHAP. expected from it. At the very time when this falsehood was
 XIV. reported, a part of this brave army was only nine leagues from
 1808. Madrid, impatient to proceed to its assistance. They were,
 December. however, compelled to remain inactive the whole of the next
 day, waiting for the second and third divisions and the van,
 which did not come up till the day following.

*The Duque
 del Infantado joins
 them.*

On that day the Duque del Infantado joined them, having passed safely through the advanced posts of the French by favour of a thick fog. A council of war was held; the urgent danger of the capital was represented by the Duke, and low as his hopes had fallen when he saw the deplorable state to which the remains of the army were reduced by fatigue and hunger, it was nevertheless determined that an effort should be made, not to attack the besiegers, for this would have been madness, but to collect as large a convoy of provisions as they could, and endeavour to enter with it under cover of the night by the Atocha gate. The Duke, however, knew but too well the situation of the metropolis; and at his suggestion a letter was sent to the French General who commanded before the walls, reminding him that a great number of French were in the hands of the Spaniards, and would be held responsible with their lives for any ill treatment which might be offered to the inhabitants of Madrid. Both the officer and the trumpet were detained prisoners by Buonaparte's orders.

*Condition
 of the
 troops.
 Dec. 4.*

The troops were now mustered, and it was then perceived what they had lost in number, and how severely they had suffered during this fearful retreat. From 6000 to 7000 infantry, and about 1500 cavalry, were all that could be brought together; men and horses alike exhausted by fatigue and hunger; many indeed had fallen and perished by the way. Here for the first time they found something like relief, great numbers not having tasted bread for eight days: they had now sufficient food, and

there was cloth enough in the manufactory there to supply every man with a *poncho*, the rude garment of the Indians about Buenos Ayres, which the Spaniards have adopted for its simplicity and convenience. Meantime the French were collecting in their neighbourhood; they occupied Alcala and the adjoining villages, and some skirmishes took place at Meca. Buonaparte had been informed of their movements, and as soon as Madrid capitulated, Bessieres was dispatched to Guadalaxara with a considerable force of horse, and Victor followed with infantry. The first business of Lapeña was to disencumber himself of his superfluous artillery, for they had brought off no fewer than sixty pieces of cannon. Forty of these, to preserve them from the enemy, were sent across the Tagus at Sacedon, and these were safely forwarded to Carthagená. The van, under Venegas, which had saved the army at Buvierca, arrived on the night of the 4th. Its losses had been replaced by drafts; the post of honour and of danger had been assigned it during the whole of this retreat, and it continued to cover the movements of the other divisions. Two of them were leaving Guadalaxara when it arrived, the second and third followed the next noon, in two columns, proceeding by two roads to Santorcaz: this division began to follow them, but before it was out of one gate, the advanced guard of the enemy entered at another.

Venegas perceived the importance of a position to the south of the city, lying directly between the two roads to Santorcaz, and he immediately occupied it. The battalions (*tercios*) of Ledesma and Salamanca, which formed the rear of the third division, perceived his intention, and turned back and joined him; their commanding officers, D. Luis de Lacy and D. Alexandre de Hore, being ambitious of bearing part in the action which they expected. The French were in great force opposite on the right bank of the Henares; some of their detachments

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1808.
December.

*They retire
towards the
Tagus.*

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December.

forded both on the right and left of the Spaniards' position ; but light troops had been stationed on both the flanks, who skirmished with them, and repelled them till night. The position was judged too formidable in front to be attacked, and the main body of the French halted during the whole evening, not choosing to cross the river. Having thus obtained time for the army to perform its march, which was all he hoped or wanted, Venegas broke up three hours after the darkness had closed, and continued his retreat in good order without the loss of a single man. The Commander now took up a position at Santorcaz, a little village about two leagues east of Alcala, between the rivers Henares and Tajuna. There he learnt the fate of Madrid. The French now evacuated Alcala, and extended themselves along the heights at the back of Meca, and along the banks of the Jarama, pushing their advanced parties to Arganda, Morata, and other places in that neighbourhood. The plan of Lapeña and his officers under these circumstances was, to cross the Tagus at Aranjuez, and take shelter, if necessary, among the mountains of Toledo. With this intent they marched to Villarejo de Salvanes. A few poor soldiers, who dropped behind at Nuevo-Bastan, were sabred by the French with that cruelty which at this time so frequently characterised and disgraced their armies.

*Passage of
the Tagus.*

On the 6th, when they were about to proceed to Aranjuez, tidings came that the French were in possession of that place, and this was confirmed by an express from General Llamas, who had vainly attempted to resist the enemy there with a few armed peasantry, and a few soldiers who had escaped from Madrid. New difficulties now presented themselves to the remnant of this harassed army. To look towards Toledo was become hopeless; it was equally hopeless to make for Andalusia, for the French General, Ruffin, as soon as he had obtained possession of Aranjuez, crossed the Tagus, and, pushing on as far as Ocaña, cut

off their retreat in that direction. Nothing remained but to cross the Tagus by boats at Villamanrique, Fuenteduenas, Estramera, and other places where there were ferries, and make for the Sierras of Cuenca. There it was hoped they might be able to rest, rally the stragglers, and again unite in numbers sufficient to take vengeance for all their sufferings. Hazardous as it was to cross the river in this manner, with an enemy so near at hand, it was effected with rare good fortune; the French had not foreseen the attempt, and not a man nor a gun was lost. Having gained the left bank of the river, they hastened on their retreat, and head-quarters were established on the 7th at Belinchon. The second division, under General Grimanest, which crossed at Villamanrique, was the only one which was endangered. This having effected the passage, took up a position at Santa Cruz, between Aranjuez and Ucles, where it was attacked on the night of the 8th by a corps of Bessieres' division, under General Montbrun. Finding themselves unable to maintain the position against a force which was superior to their own, they abandoned it before they sustained any loss.

The first and fourth divisions mutinied on their march to Yedra, where they were to be stationed. This was ascribed to the intrigues of some traitorous agents, as well as to the unprincipled ambition of a few officers, desirous, in these times of insubordination, to exalt themselves by flattering the soldiers and slandering their commanders. It was easy to inflame the men, who imputed all their misfortunes to treason, and were already in a state of great insubordination. They insisted upon marching to Madrid, that they might attack the enemy there; an artillery officer was at their head; and the guns were planted to prevent the troops from proceeding in the direction where they had been ordered. A difference of opinion among themselves prevented the execution of this mad purpose; some were for

CHAP.
XIV.
1808.
December.

*Some of the
troops mu-
tiny.*

CHAP. hastening to Despeñaperros, to take their post in the passes of
 XIV. the Sierra Morena, for the defence of Andalusia. This afforded
 1808. opportunity for the General to reason with them, and pacify
 December. them for a while. In consequence of this circumstance, the difficulty which daily increased of subsisting the troops, their increasing wants, and the rapid desertions which were naturally occasioned by privations, want of hope, and total relaxation of discipline, Lapeña assembled his general officers at Alcazar de Huete. The Duque del Infantado, and Llamas, who had joined them at Villarejo, were present at this council, and it was determined, on Lapeña's proposal, that the Duque should take the command. One reason for appointing him was, that he was president of the Council of Castille, and in that character was entitled to require provisions and all things necessary from the people, . . such being the respect paid to the old authorities and established forms, even at a time when necessity might have superseded all laws, as paramount to all.

*Infantado
 chosen commander.
 Dec. 9.*

*They retire
 to Cuenca.*

No command was ever accepted under more painful and disheartening circumstances. The troops were in a state of mutiny; the enemy within three leagues, preparing to complete their destruction; they had neither stores, supplies, nor treasure, nor other means of obtaining any than by the obedience which the people might pay to his authority; and upon any panic which might seize the soldiers, or any suspicion that should arise among them, the General would be the first victim; it had too fatally been proved, that no character, however unimpeached, no services, however eminent, afforded any protection against the ferocity of a deluded multitude. With a full sense of these dangers, the Duke accepted a command which it might have been even more dangerous to refuse. His rank, his affable manners, the part which he had taken against the Prince of the Peace, and the share which he was supposed to have had in

bringing about the downfall of that worthless minion, had made him one of the most popular persons in Spain ; and though he had lost something by accompanying Ferdinand on his miserable journey to Bayonne, still he stood high in the opinion of the nation. The new appointment was announced to the army in a short proclamation ; and the Central Junta ratified it afterwards, approving Lapeña's resignation, and dispensing with an informality, which the dangerous and peculiar state of things rendered prudent. The immediate good which had been expected from this measure was produced ; for the soldiers confided in their untried General, and order was re-established among them. On the 10th they entered Cuenca, there concluding a retreat of nearly four hundred and fifty miles. The position of that city enabled them to receive supplies from La Mancha, Valencia, and Murcia ; there they rested for a while, discipline was restored, and three persons, who had been most active in the mutiny, were brought to trial and executed. The troops were clothed, funds were raised for paying and supporting them, and hospitals established. The stragglers having recovered that strength, for want of which they had fallen behind, rejoined their corps ; new levies were raised ; and it was manifest that, notwithstanding all their disasters, notwithstanding the mighty power of the enemy, the treachery of some leaders, and the misconduct of others, which had been hardly less injurious, the spirit of patriotism was still unimpaired, and the people, by whom alone a country is to be saved, had not abated one jot of heart or hope.

Five days after their arrival they were joined by a corps which it was supposed had been cut off among the mountains of Rioja. The history of its escape is equally honourable to the men and to the Cónde de Alache D. Miguel Lili, who conducted them. They formed originally a part of the army of Old Cas-

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*Arrival of
the Cónde
de Alache's
corps.*

CHAP. tille, under the Conde de Cartaojal, which had been broken up
XIV. after the position of Logroño was lost. At the end of October,
1808. Castaños stationed it along the skirts of the Sierra de Cameros,
extending from in front of Logroño to Lodosa; the last division
of this force, which formed the left flank of the army, was
posted at Nalda under Lili. During the first three weeks of
November, this division sustained repeated and almost daily
attacks; varying its position as circumstances required, and
having, like Blake's army, to endure the severest privations;
nevertheless it carried off fourteen pieces of artillery, from
Nalda to Ausejo and Calahorra, in sight of the French, and by
roads which had been thought impracticable. On the night of
the 21st, Lili received intelligence that a considerable force of
the enemy had moved from Logroño towards Ausejo; the next
day he learnt that the Spaniards, who were stationed there and
at Tudelilla, had fallen back upon their right, and that 5000
French infantry and 1000 horse had moved from Najara, giving
out that they were going for Calahorra. He was thus in im-
minent danger of being surrounded. Immediately he left the
banks of the Iregua, and fell back to Venta de Codes, four
leagues in the rear of Nalda, where, in the course of the night,
a messenger from Cartaojal reached him with instructions written
at Tudelilla, on the 21st, saying, that the French were in great
force at Ausejo, and that Castaños ordered him to retreat by the
Sierra to Agreda, whither Cartaojal himself was going with all
his troops to oppose the French on the side of Almazan.

Nov. 23.

For Agreda, therefore, Lili began his march at daybreak.
By two in the afternoon he had reached Villar del Rio, five
leagues from the place which he had left, eight from that to
which he was bound; but here he met intelligence of fresh dis-
asters and new dangers. Agreda, it was said, had already been
abandoned by the Spaniards; 1200 French cavalry, with a small

body of foot, were on their way to that town from Soria, which had opened its gates to the enemy; other columns from Soria and from Almazan were to follow in the same direction. Fugitives now arrived every hour, with tidings that the enemy were sacking one place, or approaching another, all their parties tending to the one point of Agreda. Lili perceived, that if Cartaojal had not already retired from that town, he inevitably must, and that for himself, if he continued his march, it would be to run into the midst of his enemies. He did not hesitate, therefore, to disobey orders which would have involved him in certain destruction; and, acting upon his own judgement, he marched the next morning in a contrary direction, to Lumbreras, and the day afterwards to Montenegro, thinking that a more defensible point, and for the sake of receiving certain intelligence from the side of Agreda. The report that that town had been evacuated on the 23d was premature; and Lili received a letter from Cartaojal, written from thence on the 24th, and regretting that he had fallen back to Lumbreras upon erroneous information; to have joined him at Agreda, he said, was the proper movement, and almost the only means of safety; but it was no time to consider what might have been done, and, as things were, he must now follow his own discretion, with that zeal which it was not doubted he possessed. Whatever regret Lili might have felt at receiving this reproof, was effectually counteracted by the report of the messenger who brought it; for at the very moment when Cartaojal dispatched him, news arrived that the enemy were beginning to attack the town. In fact, he was compelled speedily to abandon it, and, marching by way of Borja to Calatayud, joined the wreck of the army of the centre, and accompanied them in their retreat.

Perilous as Lili's situation now was, he had yet to receive intelligence of events which rendered it more desperate. On the

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CHAP. 27th he learned at Salas de los Infantes, by some stragglers
XIV. who had escaped from the action at Burgos, that that capital was
1808. now in the hands of the French. His spies brought him informa-
December. tion, that the Intruder was with a great force at Aranda; that
the enemy occupied all the bridges and fords of the Duero; and
that the Somosierra was threatened: finally, to crown the distress-
ing news of the day, a full account reached him of the battle of
Tudela. On every side he was surrounded; to move in any di-
rection seemed equally perilous, and he was utterly ignorant
what course had been taken by the relics of the army which he
wished to join. In these difficulties his first measure was to
march to Canales, four leagues from Salas, where, in the very
centre of the mountains, he might hope to remain concealed
from the enemy, or resist them to the best advantage if he were
attacked. There, amid those difficult and inclement heights,
from whence the Arlanza flows toward Lerma, the Duero toward
the plains of Castille, the Tiron, the Najerilla, and the Iregua
toward Rioja, he remained six days. During this time he ob-
tained sufficient intelligence of the movements of the French to
direct his own, and then proceeded towards New Castille, in
search of Castaños's broken army. On the 5th he reached Quin-
tanar de la Sierra, on the 6th San Leonardo. His men travelled
the whole of the following day and night, and crossed the Duero
at Berlanja. On the 9th they entered Atienza, and here the
information which they found served only to occasion new per-
plexity; for here Lili learned that the central army had passed
through, and been pursued by the French; that they had after-
wards abandoned Guadalaxara and the heights of Santorcaz: of
their farther movements nothing was known. Lili, however,
considering all circumstances, was convinced that they must
have retreated upon Cuenca, and he directed his march towards
the same point. On the 11th, at daybreak, he crossed the great

road from Zaragoza to Madrid, at an opportune and happy hour, passing between the last division of the French and their rear-guard, then on the way from Calatayud; and on the day that the Duke del Infantado reached Cuenca, he arrived at Villar de Domingo Garcia, from whence, on the 16th, he passed to the head-quarters of the Commander. During this whole retreat, which was over a tract of nearly four hundred miles, through the most difficult and untravelled ways, this corps had constantly been surrounded by the enemy, who were seldom more than ten or twelve miles distant from them. Food they had none, but what they could procure upon the way; most of the men were barefoot, many of them nearly naked, but their spirits never failed.

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If ever during the contest there was a time when Spain might have been irretrievably subjected, it was now, if a dissolution of the government had taken place. The Central Junta had been slow in perceiving the danger, but when it came upon them they acted with promptitude and wisdom. Before they left Aranjuez a commission of six members was appointed to transact business during their journey, and official intelligence of their removal was communicated to the foreign ministers. Their escort was so insufficient, that a small body of cavalry might have surprised them; they travelled in parties, but assembled at Talavera; three members were left there to collect and re-organize the soldiers who were coming in great numbers to that point. From thence proceeding to Truxillo, there they again met, dispatched orders to the provinces, and sent some of their own members to those places where they might be most useful. That city afforded an opportunity of reconsidering where they should fix their abode, whether at Badajoz, as had been determined, or at Cordoba, the road to either place being open: Seville was preferred to either, and they assembled there on the 17th of De-

*Retreat of
the Central
Junta from
Aranjuez.*

CHAP. cember. Before this removal it had been concerted by Jovel-
 XIV. lanos, with some members of the Royal Council and of the
 1808. Council of the Indies, that eleven members of the former and
December. nine of the latter, including their presidents, should follow the
 Central Junta, and with two members from each of the other
 tribunals, form a *Consejo reunido*, or united Council. The other
 members were commanded to leave Madrid, and retire either
 to their own places of abode in the provinces, or whither they
 would, there to receive their salaries, assist the government with
 their advice and services when called upon, and promote by all
 means in their power the national cause. Too many of these
 persons were found wanting in the hour of trial, some in weak-
 ness submitting to the Intruder rather than endure the ills of
 honourable poverty, others taking an active and infamous part
 in his service. The proposed Council was formed of those who
 repaired to Seville; and those who, from whatever cause, ar-
 rived at a later time, found from the Junta an indulgence which
 would not have been granted them by the people, less charitable,
 and perhaps less just; they were received with respect, and their
 salaries continued to them.

*Their ad-
 dress to the
 people of
 Madrid.*

The agents of the Intruder knowing how desirable for their
 views it would be to bring the national government into dis-
 repute, reported that the Junta had sanctioned and approved
 the capitulation of the capital. This the Junta contradicted in
 a manly proclamation, and they exhorted the inhabitants of
 Madrid to bear in mind that the temporary occupation of their
 buildings by the enemy was of little moment, while he was not
 master of their hearts. "Continue to resist him," said they,
 "in the very bosom of your families; place no confidence in the
 promises of the French; remember that they have promised hap-
 piness to every people, and have made every people miserable.
 Keep alive your hope, retain your fortitude, and your deliverance

will be glorious in proportion to the greatness of the danger which you have encountered." They made no attempt to conceal the extent of their disasters; but they attributed them to the inexperience of their troops, and denied that the monarchy was comprehended within the narrow precincts of the metropolis. "Were you to believe the enemy," said they, "our armies have vanished like the smoke of the battle, and Spain has neither forces wherewith to oppose her invaders, nor authority to regulate her councils, nor resources to save her from destruction. All this is false. The government which has been chosen by the people never attracted more respect, never felt more strongly the strong principle of union, and never found more ardour in the public cause. The provinces have redoubled their exertions at its voice, and new enlistments, new contributions, and new sacrifices have already filled the void occasioned by our losses." A splendid instance of patriotism in one of the nobles was at this time made public; the Duke of Medina Sidonia, whose property had just been confiscated in Madrid by the intrusive government, had from the commencement of the struggle made a free gift every month of 2500 dollars, in addition to his share of the public burthens, and to various donations of necessaries for the army.

While the Junta was making exertions which were well seconded by the zeal of the people, the whole of those extensive plains, which form the centre or table-land of Spain, lay at the mercy of the invaders. On the 11th of December Victor had his detachments in Aranjuez and in Ocaña; on the 19th he occupied Toledo. The surrender of this ancient and famous city, after its professions of determined patriotism, was one of those circumstances for which the Spaniards were reproached, by those who had depreciated their exertions, and despaired of their cause. Yet if the Toledans did not signalize themselves by

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*The French
enter To-
ledo.*

CHAP. heroic sacrifices, like the Zaragozans, there was no want of a
XIII. right spirit, nor had they been deficient in their duty. In the
1808. spring of the preceding year Dupont and Vedel entered that
December. city with their divisions, and raised a most oppressive contribution. But no sooner had they proceeded on their way to Andalusia, than a Junta was formed, consisting of the most respectable citizens : they could not raise forces themselves, being surrounded by the enemy, and having no military means ; but they ordered as many of the districts in that kingdom as could exert themselves to act under the instructions of the Junta of Badajoz ; they contributed large sums of money ; and they refused obedience to four successive orders which enjoined them to proclaim the Intruder, though it was announced, that, if they continued in their disobedience, 5000 French would come, and perform the ceremony sword in hand. The evacuation of Madrid relieved them from this danger. And when the victorious army of Castaños was on its way to the capital, Toledo supported 10,000 men of that army for three weeks, made a donation of 300,000 reales to them on their departure, equipped many of their officers, and clothed a great proportion of the men. This was not all. In two months it raised and equipped two regiments of infantry, and a corps of 700 horse ; for which funds were raised by a subscription, all persons, from the archbishop to the poorest peasant, contributing according to their means. The university also raised a corps of students ; and after the siege of Zaragoza the pectoral of the archbishop, valued at 150,000 reales, was converted into money to relieve the inhabitants of that heroic city. After the defeat at Burgos, the Toledans applied to government for arms to defend their walls. This was the mode of warfare to which the Junta, if they had rightly understood the nature of their own strength, should have resorted ; and this system of defence was advised by the English

ambassador, Mr. Frere, than whom no man judged more generously, nor more wisely, of the Spanish character and the Spanish cause. But this essential precaution had been neglected; and when the Toledans applied for artillery and ammunition, disaster followed so close upon disaster, that there was no leisure for attending to their request, urgent as it was. What then could be done? They sent off their moveable property to Seville; 12,000 swords also were dispatched to the same place, from that fabric which for so many centuries has been famous, and which probably owes its original celebrity to workmen from Damascus. The Junta, the legitimate authorities, and all the most distinguished inhabitants, left the city; neither the threats nor promises of the Intruder could induce them to return: they retired to the free part of the peninsula, submitting to poverty with that dignified composure which resulted from the consciousness of having discharged their duty. This was the fate of the parents, while their sons, in the corps of students, fought and bled for the independence of Spain. It is plain, therefore, that though the gates of Toledo were opened to the enemy, that same spirit still existed within its walls which, during the war of the Commons of Castille, rendered it the last hold of Spanish liberty.

From Toledo, from Aranjuez, and from Ocaña, parties of French cavalry overran the open and defenceless plains of Lower La Mancha, foraging and plundering the towns and villages with impunity as far as Manzanares. The La Manchans, relying, like the government, too confidently upon the resistance which regular armies and the modes of regular warfare could oppose to such a military power as that of France, had made no preparations for defending themselves: some places were deserted by the inhabitants; all left open to the enemy, who scoured the country at their pleasure. The little townlet of Villacañas afforded a single and honourable exception. A party

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*Defence of
Villacañas.*

CHAP. of 60 horse entered it on the night of the 20th of December, being
XIV. a detachment from a much larger force which had quartered
1808. itself in Tembleque. The people caught up such arms as they
December. could find, and drove the invaders out; they began immediately
to dig trenches and throw up barricadoes, . . the adjoining peasantry came to their assistance, . . a few persons of high quality fled; but, with these few exceptions, the utmost zeal and alacrity were displayed by all ranks, and ready obedience was paid to some old soldiers, who took upon themselves the command. During five successive days the French renewed their attacks, and were constantly repulsed; their plundering parties had no artillery with them, and the means of defence, therefore, as long as the Spaniards took care not to expose themselves to a charge of horse in the open country, were equal to those of attack. Weary at length of repeated failures, and unwilling to incur farther loss in an object of no other value than what the plunder of the place might be worth, the French desisted from any farther attempts, and Villacañas remained safe and uninjured, while all the country round was ransacked. The example was deservedly thought of such importance, that the whole details of this little siege were published by the government in an extraordinary gazette. Whatever contributions were due to the state by the inhabitants of this townlet were remitted to them, and those persons who had taken the lead were rewarded by other privileges. "This," said the government, "is the kind of war which our perfidious enemy feareth most, and which is the most advantageous for ourselves. Let the people of every village arm themselves, entrench themselves in their very houses, break up the roads, lay ambushes upon every height and pass, intercept his provisions, cut off his communications, and make him perceive that at every step he will find the most obstinate resistance. Thus we shall waste his forces; thus we shall show to the world

that a great and generous nation is not to be insulted with impunity, not to be conquered when it fights for its king, for its liberty, and for its religion."

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1808.

December.

*Prepara-
tions for
defending
the Sierra
Morena.*

Meantime the Juntas of Ciudad Real, (the capital of Upper La Mancha,) and of the four kingdoms of Jaen, Granada, Cordoba, and Seville, which compose the province of Andalusia, formed a Central Assembly in La Carolina, where two deputies from each province met to consult upon speedy measures for fortifying the gorge of Despeñaperros, this pass of the Sierra Morena being considered as the Thermopylæ, where the progress of this new barbarian might be withstood. Here an army was necessary, and there was none: the Marques de Palacio was sent by the Supreme Junta to form one under his command. The Juntas of Andalusia and La Mancha raised new levies; and officers and men who had deserted from the central army, many of them scattering alarm and sedition where they fled, re-entered into this new establishment. The marine battalions and brigades of artillery were ordered hither from Cadiz, leaving only 300 men in that city, besides the volunteers. Fourteen pieces of cannon had been fortunately stopped at Manzanares, on their way to Madrid. These were now mounted upon the works which were thrown up to defend this important position. Another road also, by which the enemy might have passed the Sierra, was occupied by a detachment of 500 men. Before the middle of December, 6000 foot and 300 horse had assembled at La Carolina, and their number increased daily. But it was not towards the Sierra Morena that Buonaparte was looking; his attention was chiefly fixed upon the English army, and the road by which he thought to reach Andalusia was through Extremadura, hoping to overtake the Supreme Junta in their flight; having reached them at Truxillo, his armies might divide,

CHAP. one marching to take possession of Lisbon, the other to take
XIV. vengeance for Dupont at Seville and Cadiz.

1808. There was no force in Extremadura which could oppose any
December. obstacle to this plan. When the pass of Somosierra was lost,
Murder of San Juan at Talavera. San Juan, who commanded there, cut his way sword in hand through a squadron of Poles, and by by-roads reached Segovia, where he found the troops who had retired from Sepulveda. From thence he marched to Guadarrama, united with the Extremaduran troops under General Heredia, and descended to the Escorial, because he was without provisions in the pass. There they received orders to hasten to Madrid, and enter that city by the gate of Segovia. On the way exaggerated reports were spread of the strength of the enemy; suspicion increased the insubordination of the soldiers; the artillery and baggage-men forsook their charge and fled, and several corps broke up. The whole of Heredia's van-guard dispersed in this manner, in spite of all San Juan's efforts to detain them; they would rally, they said, at Talavera: this word went through the army, and served as a pretext for every one who chose to fly. The two generals had only a handful of men with them when they approached Madrid, and then they discovered that the city had been betrayed. No other course remained for them than to repair to Talavera, in the hope of rallying what would still form a considerable force. The rabble of the army, sufficiently faithful to their appointment, bent their way to that city, plundering as they went along; and there San Juan met them, unhappily for himself. The wretches who had been foremost in subverting discipline, and instigating the troops to break up, began to apprehend punishment if the army should again assume a regular form; and this was likely to be the case immediately, for many thousands (many having escaped from Madrid) were now col-

lected there, and the government had already begun to take measures for re-equipping them. It was easy for these villains to raise a cry against San Juan: all men knew the importance of the position at Somosierra; but there were few who knew with what insufficient means the general had been supplied. Mobs never reason, least of all when they are under the influence of fear; and the Spanish troops had suffered so much from incapacity, that when any person was denounced as a traitor, it seemed like a relief to themselves, and an act of justice to their country, to vent their vengeance upon him. The cry against San Juan became general: a friar went at the head of a party to the convent of the Augustines, where he had taken up his quarters, and they cried out that they were come to put Benito San Juan to death. San Juan attempted to expostulate, but in vain. He drew his sword to defend himself; and immediately he was pierced with their bullets. The rabble dragged the body to a gibbet, and hung it there; next they sought for Heredia, that they might kill him also; but he eluded their search. As soon as their fury was allayed, the instigators of these excesses secured themselves by flight; and the troops, who had been misled, perceived the consequences of their lawless conduct. If San Juan had indeed been a traitor, they felt that they ought to have delivered him up to the proper tribunal; . . . by taking vengeance into their own hands they had made themselves obnoxious to the laws. Whom too could they trust, whom were they to obey? Instead, therefore, of forming a new army, as they had designed, at Talavera, they dispersed again, not having now any rallying place appointed, but each man going whither he thought best. Some took the road to Andalusia, some to Avila: the Extremadurans, who were the most numerous, went to their homes.

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December.

Dec. 7.

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1808.

*December.**Edict
against
deserters.*

The dispersion of the soldiers called forth a severe edict. It began by stating, that the martial laws of Spain had affixed no punishment for officers who deserted their colours or stations, it never having been supposed that men of such rank could possibly be guilty of such a crime. But now it had unhappily been seen that many officers, forgetful of all honour and duty, had fled; scattering disorder and terror wherever they went, and pretending treason in their generals as an excuse for their own conduct; whereas they themselves had been the worst enemies of their country, by abandoning their generals in the most critical moments. The Junta, therefore, pronounced sentence of death against every officer who absented himself from his colours without permission, and confiscation of his property for the relief of the widows and orphans of soldiers in his parish. Soldiers were made liable to the like penalty; any person who harboured a deserter was to be punished by confiscation of his property, and the same penalty was denounced against all magistrates who suffered deserters to remain within their jurisdiction. But all who, within fifteen days, should present themselves to the nearest authority in order to rejoin the army, were exempted from the pains in this decree.

A few English stragglers butchered by the French cavalry.

Four days after the murder of San Juan, and the dispersion of his army, two divisions of French cavalry, under Milhaud and Lasalle, entered Talavera. They found the body of the Spanish General still on the gibbet, and this murder furnished Buonaparte with a new subject of invective against the Spaniards; though this, and the thousand deaths, and all the untold crimes, and all the unutterable miseries with which the peninsula was filled, were the consequences of his own single conduct, the fruits of his individual wickedness. Lasalle fell in with sixteen Englishmen upon the road, stragglers from General Hope's

detachment, and it was related in the bulletins * of Buonaparte, as an exploit worthy of remembrance and commendation, that a division of French cavalry, falling in with sixteen Englishmen who had lost their way, put them to the sword. This was but a small part of the force which was destined to proceed in this direction. As soon as Madrid had been delivered up, Lefebvre was ordered to advance from Valladolid towards Lisbon. First he advanced to Segovia, which he entered unresisted. The people were dispirited by the panic and flight of their armies; but it should not be forgotten for their exculpation, that the more generous and heroic spirits, having flocked to their country's standard among the foremost levies, had already received their crown of martyrdom, or were clinging to the wreck of the two great armies of the north and the centre, or were consummating the sacrifice of duty in Zaragoza. In one place only between Valladolid and the capital did this part of the French army experience any opposition. The pass of Guadarrama was open to them: General Hope had been stationed

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December.

* This part of the bulletin was officially transmitted by Lord Castlereagh to Sir John Moore, with the following instructions:—"His Majesty cannot overlook this account, descriptive, according to the obvious sense of it, of the murder of some unresisting stragglers of his army, although his Majesty is disposed to disbelieve a transaction, however sufficiently recorded, which is so utterly repugnant to the usual laws of war, and to every principle of humanity. His Majesty therefore desires that you will take the earliest means of ascertaining the truth of the fact so recorded, and the circumstances under which it was perpetrated, if perpetrated at all. If it shall upon investigation appear to be founded, I am to desire you will cause a protest to be made by you to the nearest head-quarters of the French army, and that you will take such measures as shall appear to you most expedient for the protection of the troops under your orders against conduct so barbarous and so disgraceful."—No such measures were taken, in consequence of Sir John Moore's retreat. This instruction, however, exculpates the British government from any charge of indifference upon the subject.

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XIV.

1808.

*December.**The French
take possession of the
Escorial.*

there, but was recalled by Sir John Moore, and there were no native troops to supply his place. But when the enemy descended upon the Escorial, and proceeded to take possession of that palace, the magnificent monument of a victory which Spain had achieved over France in open, honourable war, and in a fair field, they found the peasantry assembled to defend the seat and sepulchres of their kings. Undisciplined as they were, ill-armed, and with none to direct their efforts, they stood their ground till they were overpowered by practised troops, superior in numbers as well as in arms; and the French, after the slaughter of these brave peasants before the gates, took up their quarters in the palace of the Philips. He who founded that stately pile, could he then have beheld from his grave what was passing around him, would have seen the consequences of that despotic system which he and his father established upon the ruins of the old free constitution of Spain.

It was a noble feeling which led these peasants to sacrifice themselves in defence of the Escorial, and the action did not pass unnoticed by those able and enlightened Spaniards whose patriotic writings at this time did honour to themselves and to their country. "Nothing," said Don Isidro de Antillon, "is more worthy of public interest, and nothing will more excite the admiration of posterity, than a deed like this. If indeed we had only armies to oppose to Buonaparte, infallibly we should become his slaves; the victory would be the usurper's beyond all resource. But it is the collective strength of our inhabited places, the defence of our walls, the obstinate and repeated resistance of the people in the streets and gateways, along the roads and upon the heights, wherever they can cut off or annoy the detachments of the enemy, . . . the universal spirit of insurrection, now become as it were the very element of our existence; this it is which disconcerts his plans, which renders his victories

useless, and after a thousand vicissitudes and disasters, will finally establish the independence and the glory of Spain."

Lefebvre entered Madrid on the 8th of December. Buona-
parte reviewed his division in the Prado, and dispatched it to
Toledo, while Sebastiani with another division marched for
Talavera. In that city, by the 19th, about 25,000 French were
assembled, including 5,000 cavalry. The wiser inhabitants fled
before their arrival, preferring the miseries of emigration to
the insults and atrocities which they must otherwise have en-
dured: for the exaction of heavy contributions, which reduced
half the people to beggary, was the least evil those towns
endured that fell under the yoke of the French. Every where
the soldiers were permitted to plunder; no asylum could secure
the women from their unrestrained brutality; churches and
convents were profaned with as little compunction as dwelling-
houses were broken open; and in many instances, the victims
were exposed naked in the streets. The Spanish government
exclaimed loudly against these enormities. "In other times,"
they said, "war was carried on between army and army, soldier
and soldier; their fury spent itself upon the field of battle;
and when courage, combined with fortune, had decided the
victory, the conquerors behaved to the conquered like men of
honour, and the defenceless people were respected. The progress
of civilization had tempered the evils of hostility, till a nation
which so lately boasted that it was the most polished in the
world, renewed, in the 19th century, the cruelty of the worst
savages, and all the horrors which make us tremble in perusing
the history of the irruptions of the barbarians of old. Like
tygers, these enemies make no distinction in their carnage, . .
the aged, the infants, the women, . . all are alike to them, where-
ever they can find blood to shed."

This appeal could be of no avail against a tyrant who, in the

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*Excesses of
the French.*

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very origin of the war, had shown himself dead to all sense of justice, humanity, and even of honour, which sometimes supplies their place; nor against generals and officers who could serve him in such a cause. Such men could be taught humanity only by the severest retaliation. The language which the government addressed to their own subjects might be more effectual. "What resource have you," said they, "in submission and in cowardice? If by this abasement you could purchase a miserable existence, that perhaps with base minds might exculpate you. But you fly to your houses to perish in them, or to be idle spectators of the horrors which these ruffian soldiers are preparing for you! Yes! wait for them there, and they will not tarry long ere they come and shed before your eyes the blood of the innocent victims whom you will not defend. Old fathers, wretched mothers, prepare to receive your daughters released from the arms of an hundred barbarians only when they are in the act of death! or if they recover life, to curse it in the bitterness of unextinguishable shame; tell them to reproach those cowardly husbands, those base lovers, who are content to live, and see them plunged in this abominable infamy. But they will not be suffered to live: hand-cuffed and haltered, they will be dragged out of their country; they will be made soldiers by force, though they would not become so from honour and a sense of duty; there they will be exposed in the foremost ranks to the fire of the enemy; there they will not be able to fly; . . . the toil, the danger, and death will be theirs; the glory and the spoil will be their conquerors', and the crowns which they win will be for the tyrant, the cause of all this misery."

Galluzo collects the fugitives in Extremadura.

It had been happy for Spain if the government had always acted as energetically as it wrote; but it should be remembered in justice to the Spaniards, that the dispersion of the troops was in many instances an act of self-preservation, so utterly were

they left without supplies of food or clothing, by the inexperience and incompetence of every military department. Even against the testimony and the reproaches of its own government, the Spanish nation stands acquitted. Never did men suffer more patiently, or fight more bravely, than Blake's army. There was no want of courage at Tudela; and of the remains of the army which fought there, a large proportion was at this very time defending Zaragoza with a heroism unexampled in modern times, upon any other soil. Wherever, indeed, a new army was to be collected, soldiers were not wanting. After San-Juan's death, Galluzo was appointed to the command; he took his post at the bridge of Almaraz to defend the left bank of the Tagus; and in a few days had collected about 8000 soldiers, . . many of them were without arms, . . most of them bare-footed, and now unhappily accustomed to flight and desertion. Nevertheless they assembled; for every man felt individually brave, and it was only the want of discipline, which, by preventing them from feeling confidence collectively, made panic contagious in the moment of danger. The province of Extremadura immediately provided money for these troops; this province, though the least populous in the peninsula, had particularly distinguished itself by its exertions; it had raised and equipped, wholly at its own expense, 24,000 men, and had supplied ammunition and arms of every kind from Badajoz to the other provinces.

There are four bridges between Talavera and the confluence of the Tietar with the Tagus; the Puente del Arzobispo, or the Archbishops, the Puente del Conde, or the Counts, the bridge of Almaraz, and the Puente del Cardinal, or the Cardinals. With his present feeble and inefficient force Galluzo had no other means of protecting Extremadura than by breaking down, or defending these bridges; if he could effect this, the province would be secure from an attack on the side of Talavera. Almaraz

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*He prepares
for the de-
fence of the
Tagus.*

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was the most important of these points ; here he planted ten pieces of cannon and two mortars, and stationed 5000 men. The more surely to prevent the enemy from winning the passage he mined the bridge ; but so firmly had this noble pile been built, that when the mine was fired, the explosion only served to injure it without rendering it impassable. Don Francisco Trias was sent with 850 men to the Puente del Arzobispo ; on his way he met the engineer, who had previously been dispatched to break it down, but who had been prevented from attempting it by the enemy, so that this bridge was already in their power. Trias, therefore, took his position with the view of checking the incursions of the French on this side, and ordered Don Antonio Puig, with such assistants as he could procure from the magistrates of Talavera la Vieja, to destroy the Puente del Conde, and provide for the defence of that point, and of three fords upon the same part of the river. When this officer arrived he had neither a single soldier under his command, nor arms for the peasantry ; the latter want was soon supplied ; the peasantry were zealous, and some of the stragglers joined him.

The bridge of the Cardinal was assigned to the keeping of a battalion of Walloon Guards and a squadron of the volunteers of Extremadura, under Brigadier Don Francisco Durasmiel. Galluzo also stationed his reserve at Jaraicejo, under Brigadier Don Josef Vlazquez Somosa, and sent another field officer to Truxillo to collect and organize the stragglers who might either voluntarily join him, or be detained by the patrols. While the General was making these dispositions for the defence of the province, the Junta of Badajoz made the greatest exertions to supply the wants of this new army, and its efforts were well seconded by the Extremaduran people. Half a million of reales was raised in loans and free gifts within a week ; all the cloth of Torremocha and of other clothing towns was applied to the use of the army, . . no

other work was carried on in the monastery of Guadalupe than that of making earthen vessels for their cookery; and commissaries were sent to the sixteen villages nearest the bridge of Almaraz to see that rations of bread for 5000 men were daily delivered there. These measures were so effectual, that the troops were soon comfortably clothed, and after the first day they had no want of any thing.

It was, however, scarcely to be hoped that so small and ill-compacted a force could maintain its ground, in a country which offered them no advantages for defence against such an army as the French had assembled in Talavera. After some skirmishes with the advanced guard at Almaraz, and some slight attacks upon the Puente del Conde, which were designed chiefly to keep the Spaniards on the alarm, and divert their attention from the side where the real attack was intended, Sebastiani crossed the Puente del Arzobispo on the 24th of December, and attacked Trias in front and on his right flank with superior numbers. The Spaniards did not yield till after a vigorous resistance; and then retreated by the Sierra to Castanar de Ibor. On the same day, about two hours after noon, the Puente del Conde was attacked, and the fords. The bridge was bravely defended by Don Pablo Murillo, whose distinguished talents were now first displayed. Puig guarded the fords, and they repelled the enemy every where till night; when, being informed of the defeat of Trias, and that Sebastiani had proceeded by Peralera de Garbin and Bohonal towards Almaraz, Puig perceiving that he must be taken in the rear if he continued in his present position, retreated to Peralera de Garbin behind the French, and from thence to Castana de Ibor.

The news of these disasters reached Galluzo at night. Immediately he apprehended that the object of the enemy, who were marching by Valdecasa, Valdecañas, and other points, to Ro-

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December

*The French
cross the
river.*

*Galluzo
retreats to
Jaraicejo.*

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mangordo and Miravete, was to cut off the retreat of his whole division. To prevent this he ordered all the artillery, except four pieces, which formed a battery on the left of the bridge, to retire with the main force to Jaraicejo, for which place he himself set off at midnight with his Aide-de-camps and the cavalry, leaving three companies in charge of the remaining battery under Captain Don Xavier de Hore. This officer was attacked on the following morning by the French; the battery was ill-placed, and Hore perceived that the ammunition-carts were within reach of the enemy's fire. He ordered them to be removed behind a bank which would shelter them; . . the muleteers were no sooner out of his sight, than they cut the traces, and fled with their beasts, imitating the conduct of some infantry who took to flight. The enemy soon made themselves masters of the bridge and the battery, and secured some prisoners, . . though but few; for before the French could lay planks over the broken bridge, and pass in sufficient number, most of the Spaniards effected their escape, and afterwards rejoined the General at Miajadas.

*Dispersion
of his army.*

Galluzo's first thought was to make a stand at Jaraicejo, and with this intent he dispatched orders to General Henestrosa to join him from Truxillo with all the troops which he had collected, and requested the Junta to supply him with as large a force of armed peasantry as possible. But no sooner did he learn that the bridge of Almaraz had been forced, than he gave up this purpose, and resolved to fall back upon Truxillo, apprehending that the enemy might intercept his retreat. His apprehension degenerated into panic, when false intelligence was brought him that the French had entered Deleitosa, a village something less than eight miles to the south-east. This intelligence was followed by other reports equally false and more alarming, which the knavish and the traitorous invented, and the fearful and the suspicious

easily believed. The retreat had been begun in perfect order, but the army before it reached Truxillo was in a state of total disorganization. Galluzo, confounded at the first approach of danger, (for if he had deliberately resolved to attempt resistance, the pass of Miravete would have been the place which he would have chosen, after the bridge was forced,) called a council of war; it was agreed that the defence of Extremadura was no longer possible, and that he should retreat into Andalusia. A chapel, which had been converted into a powder magazine, was now blown up, that it might not fall into the hands of the enemy. The explosion, and the preparations which were made for further flight, excited the utmost terror in the inhabitants of Truxillo, and their lamentations increased the confusion and alarm of the soldiers. It now became a rout; . . . most of the troops deserted, plundering the towns and villages through which they passed. Those who still followed the General were no longer under any restraint; they went through Miajadas, Medellin, and Quintania, and in four days reached Zalamea, above an hundred miles from Jaraicejo. Here it had been appointed to halt, and here Galluzo found himself with not more than a thousand men. Nothing could be worse than the conduct of the men during their flight; . . . some sold their muskets, . . . some threw them away, . . . houses were broken open, and upon one individual a piece of church plate was found, . . . a species of robbery which excites peculiar horror in Spain. The officers, instead of endeavouring to restrain these excesses, were some of them active themselves in pillage; it is probable, indeed, that had they done their duty, the men would have discharged theirs; for those officers to whom the more difficult task of bringing off the artillery had been entrusted, and who were therefore picked men, effected their object: though without an escort, they lost only two pieces of cannon, and carried seventeen to Miajadas, . . . from whence part

CHAP.
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CHAP. were sent to Badajoz, the rest followed Galluzo to Zalamea.
 XIV. Trias also effected a far more dangerous retreat than his com-
 1808. mander in good order. He set forward from Castanar for Fres-
December. nedoso, and when within a mile of the place, learnt that the
 French were there, having won the bridge of Almaraz. He had
 now to tread back his steps, and endeavour to reach Jaraicejo.
 After a day's march he found that the French were there also,
 and making for Truxillo, again discovered the enemy in pos-
 session of the place to which he was bound. Nevertheless he
 preserved discipline in his little troop, and that preserved con-
 fidence; instead of losing his men by desertion, he collected
 stragglers as he went, and arrived at Zalamea with a larger force
 than Galluzo himself had brought there.

*Galluzo is
 superseded
 by Cuesta.*

Before the incapacity of Galluzo was thus decidedly mani-
 fested, it had been in agitation to remove him from the command,
 and appoint Cuesta in his place. This General, as an arrested
 person, followed the Junta on their retreat from Aranjuez. It
 so happened, that while he was at Merida, some soldiers belong-
 ing to the scattered army of Extremadura gathered together in
 that city, and the owner of the house in which Cuesta lodged
 persuaded them to demand him for their leader, as it were by
 acclamation. The Junta of Merida upon this sent up a repre-
 sentation to the Central Junta, requesting that Cuesta might be
 appointed to the command. It was replied, that this ought not
 to be done without the approbation of the Junta of Badajoz,
 which had made such signal exertions in the patriotic cause, and
 was not willing to supersede Galluzo, whom it had appointed.
 But now, after this disorderly flight, he was immediately de-
 prived of the command, and put under arrest, and Cuesta was
 nominated to succeed him. Cuesta's errors were overlooked,
 because no doubt of his motives was entertained; and at a time
 when the cry of treachery once raised against a commander was

sufficient to break up an army, it was an object of considerable importance to find a leader in whom the men would confide. At this moment the whole of Extremadura to the very walls of Badajoz was open to the enemy, and the Junta trembled for Seville. Brigadier Don Josef Serrano Valdenebro was sent with as many men as he could collect to guard Santa Olaya and El Ronquillo, in the western passes of the Sierra Morena, and co-operate with Cuesta in covering Andalusia on that side. These means of defence would have been as ineffectual as they were feeble, if Buonaparte had not thought it of more importance at this time to drive the English out of Spain, than to pursue his victories in the south.

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CHAPTER XV.

CAMPAIGN OF THE BRITISH ARMY UNDER SIR JOHN MOORE.

1808.

*Buonaparte
reproaches
and insults
the English.*

*14th Bul-
letin.*

*Gazeta de
Madrid,
Dec. 18.*

Do. Dec. 24.

*4th Bul-
letin.*

*12th Bul-
letin.*

*14th Bul-
letin.*

IN all the bulletins and proclamations of Buonaparte the English were held up to the Spaniards for indignation and contempt; they were a people, he said, who fomented war every where, and distributed arms like poison, but who shed their own blood only for their own direct interest. At this time it is probable that he sincerely despised the English as a military nation. Can any thing be more ridiculous, it was asked, than that England should pretend to struggle with her land forces against France? she will realize the fable of the frog swelling itself to rival the ox, till it burst. "The day," said Buonaparte, "wherein we succeed in seeing these English will be a day of jubilee for the French army. Oh, that they may dye with their blood this continent, which they have desolated with their intrigues, their monopolies, and their frightful selfishness! Oh, that they might be met with to the number of 80,000 or 100,000 men instead of 20,000! that English mothers might feel the evils of war, and the English government cease to sport with the lives and blood of the continental nations. All the evils, all the plagues, which can afflict the human race, come from London." He represented the Spaniards as complaining that the English had given them arms, powder, and clothing, but had sent troops only to excite them, lead them astray, and forsake them in the hour of danger,

when 40,000 British at Espinosa or Tudela might have balanced the fortune of the war. . . That number of British troops would at either place have turned it.

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1808.

Great Britain possessed at that time men, means, and generals equal to any service ; but the nation did not yet understand its own strength, nor had the government yet learnt either to direct it wisely, or to make exertions commensurate to the end whereat they aimed. The lessons which books and history might teach had been neglected, and experience therefore was to be purchased at a heavy price.

As soon as the campaign in Portugal was ended, Sir Hew Dalrymple began to prepare for entering Spain : on the 6th of October Sir John Moore received his appointment to the command ; the preparations meantime had not been relaxed, and in eight days afterward part of the troops were in motion. Difficulties and doubts had occurred at the very outset. The infantry were to go either by sea or land at the Commander's discretion ; the voyage at that season was thought too precarious ; and the Junta represented, that if they went by sea, half the army would be unable to leave the coast for want of necessaries, there being scarcely means at Coruña for forwarding 10,000 men who were to land there under Sir David Baird, and join the Commander wherever he should appoint. The land-journey therefore having been chosen, the Spanish Commissary General was consulted concerning the means of subsisting the army on the great road by Elvas ; but the quantity of meat which was required astonished him ; and he computed that in three months all the oxen in the country would be consumed, and very few hogs left. There was no want of food in the north of Portugal, but it was said that artillery could not be transported across the mountains. British officers were sent to examine the roads, and they confirmed this assertion of the natives. It was ascertained when too late, that bad as the ways were, they were practicable for cannon ;

*The British
army from
Portugal
enters Spain*

CHAP. but in consequence of this error, it was deemed necessary to
 XV. divide the army, and this led to serious evils. General Hope,
 1808. with the artillery, cavalry, and four regiments of foot, was to go
 by the Madrid road; General Paget, with two brigades, by
 Elvas and Alcantara. The rest of the army moved through
 Almeida; two brigades, under General Beresford, by way of
 Coimbra; three, under General Fraser, by Abrantes, crossing
 the Tagus there, and recrossing at Villa Velha, . . a point which,
 in former wars, has been considered the key to Lisbon. These
 were to unite at Salamanca, and General Hope and Sir David
 Baird to join them either there or at Valladolid.

*Former
 services of
 Sir John
 Moore.*

If the people of England had been required to name the general who should be employed on this important occasion, Sir John Moore would certainly have been their choice, so generally was he respected as an officer and as a man. He was born at Glasgow in 1760. From the eighteenth to the twenty-third year of his age he was on the continent with his father, (a physician and a distinguished man of letters, then travelling with the young Duke of Hamilton,) and soon afterwards rose to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel in the army. He served with distinction in Corsica, the West Indies, the Helder expedition, and in Egypt; had often been wounded, and given proofs of professional skill as well as of personal gallantry, for he was fond of his profession, and had studied it well. But the constitution of his mind led him to look at the dark rather than the hopeful aspect of things; and it was his farther misfortune to have imbibed that exaggerated opinion of the French as a military people, the ability of their Generals, and the consummate wisdom of their Emperor, which the enemies of government in England were always labouring to produce, for the purpose of humbling the spirit of their country.

*His care to
 maintain
 discipline.*

Before the troops began their march Sir John Moore warned them in his general orders that the Spaniards were a grave,

orderly people, extremely sober, but generous, and easily offended by any insult or disrespect; he exhorted them to accommodate themselves to these manners, to meet with equal kindness the cordiality wherewith they would be received, and not shock by their intemperance a people worthy of their attachment, whose efforts they were come to support in the most glorious cause. His resolution to maintain order and proper discipline was farther evinced by punishing a marauder upon the march with death: the offender was one whose character gave no hope of amendment, and the General took that opportunity of declaring his determination to show no mercy to plunderers or marauders, in other words, to thieves and villains. Farther to gratify the Spaniards, the army, upon entering Spain, were ordered to wear the red cockade in addition to their own.

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On Nov. 13 Sir John arrived with his advanced guard at Salamanca. Before he entered the city, he learnt the defeat of the Extremaduran army at Burgos, and on the second night after his arrival, was awakened by an express, with news that the French had possession of Valladolid, . . . twenty leagues distant. He had only three brigades of infantry with him, and not a single gun. His first thought was to fall back upon Ciudad Rodrigo; but he soon learnt that the French had retired to Palencia, and that none of their infantry had advanced beyond Burgos: he therefore sent orders to Generals Baird and Hope, to concentrate their divisions, and join him with all speed. Every day now brought with it intelligence of new disasters. Blake's army was dispersed, and Buonaparte might either turn his force against Castaños, or march against the English, to prevent their junction. He, meantime, placed nearly in the centre, between two divisions of his army, which were approaching from different points, was compelled to remain inactive: Perceiving what he thought the supineness of the Spanish government, and indignant

*Ill prospect
of affairs
when he ar-
rives at Sa-
lamanc*

CHAP. at discovering the weakness of the Spaniards, he began to despair
 XV. of their cause. He saw nothing around him but an inactivity,
 1808. which he mistook for torpor and indifference. They had not,
 he said, shown themselves a wise or a provident people; their
 wisdom was not a wisdom of action. Yet still he felt that they
 were a fine people; that they had a character of their own, quite
 distinct from that of any other nation; and much, he thought,
 might have been done with them. He erred in thinking that
 they would not do much for themselves.

*Sir David
 Baird ar-
 rives at
 Astorga.*

Sir David Baird had formed a like opinion. The expedition
 under his command reached Coruña on the 13th of October;
 and such were the idle forms and the negligence of the Spanish
 authorities, that the troops were kept on ship-board till an order
 for their landing could be received from the Central Junta. This
 General had been accustomed to an Indian army, with its train
 of slaves and sutlers, elephants and palanquins; . . he had now to
 march through a country where it is not without difficulty that a
 party of travellers can obtain food, and which had already been
 drained by its own troops; and his commissaries were not only
 inexperienced in the business of their department, but ignorant
 of the language of the people. Dividing his army into small
 detachments, which followed each other at considerable distance,
 he arrived at Astorga, Nov. 19th, and there learning the defeat
 of Blake's army, and anticipating that of Castaños's, he consulted
 with his general officers, and informed Sir John Moore of their
 unanimous opinion, that he ought not to advance till his whole
 force was assembled there, which would not be before the 4th. of
 December. Sir John Moore's opinion of the hopelessness of
 affairs was thus confirmed by Sir David Baird. "I see my
 situation," he said in his journal, "as clearly as any one, that
 nothing can be worse; yet I am determined to form the junction
 of the army, and to try our fortune. We have no business here

as things are ; but, being here, it would never do to abandon the Spaniards without a struggle.”

It was not long before intelligence arrived that Castaños was defeated, and his army dispersed. This event the British Commander had expected ; it had always been his opinion that the south of Spain ought to have been the scene of action ; that Cadiz, not Coruña, should have been chosen for the disembarkation of the English army, and Seville or Cordoba the place of their junction. He now determined to retreat upon Portugal. . .

“ Thus,” he said, in a letter to the English ambassador, Mr. Frere, “ he should fall back upon his resources, cover a country where there was a British interest, act as a diversion in favour of Spain, if the French detached a force against him, and be ready to return to the assistance of the Spaniards, should circumstances again render it eligible. That such circumstances would occur he had no expectation. The French, he thought, would have little more to do to subdue the country than to march over it, though, after the conquest, they might have troublesome subjects.” And, in his letter to Sir David Baird, ordering him to fall back upon Coruña, and sail from thence for the Tagus, he directed him to write immediately to England, and order that transports might be sent to Lisbon ; “ they will be wanted,” said he ; “ for when the French have Spain, Portugal cannot be defended.” He had written a few days before this to Lord Castlereagh, saying, that he had ordered a depôt of provisions, for a short consumption, to be formed at Almeida, and perhaps the same should be done at Elvas : in that case, the progress of the enemy might be checked, while the stores were embarking at Lisbon, and arrangements made for taking off the army. Beyond this, the defence of Lisbon or of Portugal should not be thought of. In communicating his resolution of retiring to the British government, he wrote in the same spirit of utter despondency.

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Sir John Moore resolves to retreat upon Portugal, and embark from Lisbon.
Nov. 28.

CHAP. "If the French," said he, "succeed in Spain, it will be vain to
 XV. attempt to resist them in Portugal. Portugal could not be de-
 1808. fended against a superior enemy: the Spaniards, however, might
 rally in the south, and the English might still be of use, if they
 were landed at Cadiz. But it was impossible to be very sanguine
 on this subject, after what had been seen."

*He asks the
 opinion of
 the British
 Ambassa-
 dor.*

When this intention of retreating was made known to the army at Salamanca, murmurs against it were heard in every quarter, and from men of all ranks. Even the staff officers lamented the resolution of their Commander. In his letter to Mr. Frere, written before the defeat of Castaños was known, Sir John Moore had proposed as a question, what the British army should do, in case of that event; whether he should retreat upon Portugal, or march upon Madrid, and throw himself into the heart of Spain, thus to run all risks, and share the fortunes of the Spanish nation? "This movement," he said, "would be one of great hazard, as his retreat to Cadiz or Gibraltar must be very uncertain, and he should be entirely in the power of the Spaniards; but perhaps it was worthy of risk, if the government and people of Spain were thought to have still sufficient energy, and the means to recover from their defeats. The question," said Sir John Moore to Mr. Frere, "is not purely a military one. It belongs at least as much to you as to me to decide upon it. Your communications with the Spanish government, and the opportunities you have had of judging of the general state of the country, enable you to form as just an estimate of the resistance that is likely to be offered. You are perhaps better acquainted with the views of the British cabinet; and the question is, what would that cabinet direct, were they upon the spot to determine? It is of much importance that this should be thoroughly considered; it is comparatively of very little, on whom shall rest the greatest share of responsibility. I

am willing to take the whole, or a part ; but I am very anxious to know your opinion." Mr. Frere knew that what the Spanish government most deprecated was, a retreat of the English upon Lisbon. It would sink the hearts of the whole country, and would make them believe that England, after an ineffectual effort, had relapsed into the old limited system of protecting Portugal. If, therefore, a retreat were determined upon, as absolutely necessary, he thought the army should fall back upon Galicia, and the strong country about Astorga. But he said, in his reply to the General, that Leon and the two Castilles (with the exception of La Mancha and the city of Madrid) were the provinces least distinguished for a military, patriotic, or provincial spirit in all Spain : the people had been passive during the late events, and had seen their country successively occupied by the strongest party. It was difficult to blame them : living in open villages, in vast plains, without arms and without horses, they had neither the means of defence or escape. That country must necessarily belong to the party which was superior in cavalry ; . . yet even there there was no want of a right feeling ; the towns were abandoned at the approach of the enemy ; not a single magistrate had been brought over to take the oath of allegiance to the Intruder, nor had the French been able to enlist a single soldier. The other provinces were possessed by the most ardent and determined spirit. There was no doubt of the people. The government was new, and had hitherto been too numerous to be very active ; but there was hope that that inconvenience would soon be remedied. " They are resolute," said Mr. Frere, " and I believe every man of them determined to perish with the country. They will not at least set the example, which the ruling powers and higher orders of other countries have exhibited, of weakness and timidity." .

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*Mr. Frere
wishes him
to advance
for the de-
fence of
Madrid.*

Great advantages, the ambassador thought, would result from advancing speedily to cover Madrid. It was a point of great moment for effect in Spain, and still more in France, and in the west of Europe. The people of the town were full of resolution, and determined to defend it, in spite of its situation; and nothing could be more unfavourable to the claim of the Intruder than a siege of the capital. The first object of the English, therefore, he thought, should be to march there, and collect a force capable of resisting the French, before farther reinforcements arrived from France. There were reports that the resistance to the conscription had been much more obstinate than usual, and a pastoral letter of the Bishop of Carcassone seemed to prove that these reports were not wholly without foundation. An advantage obtained over the French now would be doubly valuable, inasmuch as it would render a conscription, for a third attempt upon Spain, infinitely difficult, if not impracticable. But if, with their present forces, they were allowed to retain their present advantages, and to wait the completion of the conscription, they would pour in forces, which would give them immediate possession of the capital and central provinces, and the war would then be reduced to an absolute competition between the two countries, which could stand out longest against the waste of population.

If, however, Mr. Frere said, this view of the subject should not appear sufficiently clear or conclusive to the Commander-in-chief, to induce him to take this step, which he, the Ambassador, was well convinced would meet with the approbation of his Majesty's government, he would venture to recommend retaining the position of Astorga. A retreat from thence to Coruña (as far, said he, as an unmilitary man may be allowed to judge of a country which he has travelled over) would be less difficult than

through Portugal to Lisbon; and we ought in that position to wait for the reinforcements of cavalry from England: the army would thus be enabled to act in the flat country, which opens immediately from that point, and extends through the whole of Leon and Old Castille . . . Before this letter arrived, the General's resolution had been taken, in consequence of the news of Castanos's defeat. It was not shaken by the reasoning of the Ambassador, whose opinion he had asked, and he waited only for the junction of General Hope, to commence his retreat on Portugal.

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The Junta had wished it had been possible for Sir John Moore to have conferred personally with them at Aranjuez, or with the military council at Madrid, and he himself had formed the same wish, believing that unless prompt and efficacious measures were taken, the defeat of the Spanish armies and the ruin of their cause were inevitable. But as this could not be, the Captain-General of Granada, with another officer, selected for his reputation and military experience, were deputed to consult with him at Salamanca. These Generals, in representing the resources of the Spaniards, enumerated the force under San Juan, and relied upon the pass of Somosierra; but Colonel Graham had just arrived before them with news that the pass had been won; and Sir John considered them personally as weak old men, and officially as having no information upon which any plan could be concerted. Mistaking, as he did, the spirit of the nation, and undervaluing its strength, he gave no ear to their urgent desire that he would form a junction with Romana, and thereby draw off the enemy from Madrid, nor to their declaration that his retreat, if he persisted in that intention, would immediately occasion the destruction of Spain.

Two Spanish Generals sent to confer with Sir John Moore.

On the 5th of December, a dispatch arrived from Castelfranco and Morla, informing him that about 25,000 men, of the

Morla and the Military Junta urge him to advance.

CHAP. central army, were falling back on Madrid ; that 10,000 from
XV. Somosierra were coming thither ; and that nearly 40,000 would
1808. join them. With that number of troops, the French army,
December. which had presented itself, was not to be feared. But the Junta,
apprehending an increase of the hostile forces, hoped he would
be able to unite with their army, or fall on the rear of the enemy ;
and they did not doubt that the rapidity of his movements would
be such as the interests of both countries required. This letter
was written on the second, and the men who signed it had then
determined to betray their country, . . but though they might
have wished and designed to draw on the British army to its
destruction, the proposal that it should advance came not from
them alone, but from the civil and military Junta also, and was
such as true Spaniards would have given. While Sir John was
considering this letter, Colonel Charmilly, a French emigrant in
the British service, and denized in England, arrived, with
dispatches from Mr. Frere. Colonel Charmilly was in Madrid
on the night of the first, when the inhabitants were working by
torch-light at the trenches, breaking up the streets, and barri-
cading the houses. He had seen the Duque del Infantado, who
told him there were provisions and ammunition in Madrid ; that
more than 30,000 men had that day enlisted themselves as volun-
teers ; and that it was of material importance to the common
cause that the British commander should make a diversion,
which would compel the French to divide their forces, and thus
afford some relief to Madrid. This he requested Charmilly to
communicate to Sir John Moore, as he himself had been an eye-
witness of the spirit of the people, and the preparations which
they were making for resistance. By another Grandee he was
requested to say to Sir John Moore, that he must make use of
this moment to save Spain, by making conditions with the Junta
for a better government ; but especially that he should require

the Spanish army to be put under the orders of the British Commander-in-chief for the time being, as it had been under Lord Peterborough.

When Charmilly reached Talavera, on his way, he found that Mr. Frere had just arrived there, following the Central Junta, who were retiring from Aranjuez to Badajoz. To him he communicated what had passed with the Duque del Infantado; and the Ambassador requested him, as a colonel in the British service, to take charge of a letter to Sir John Moore, urging him to suspend his retreat, as a measure which would have the worst effect upon the Spanish cause, and be of the greatest injury both to Spain and England. But thinking that, having begun the retreat, Sir John might suppose himself engaged to go on with it, Mr. Frere entrusted Colonel Charmilly with a second letter, to be delivered in case the General persisted in his determination. The purport of this letter was to request that the bearer might be examined before a council of war; and the reason for this measure was, that the decision of a council of war would exonerate the Commander-in-chief from the responsibility by which he might otherwise feel himself fettered. Charmilly reached Salamanca while Sir John was deliberating upon the dispatch from Morla and Castelfranco. He delivered the Ambassador's first letter. The state of Madrid, Mr. Frere said, so much exceeded every thing which he had ventured to say of the spirit and resolution of the people, that he could not forbear representing to the General, in the strongest manner, the propriety, not to say the necessity, of supporting the Spanish people by all the means which had been entrusted to him for that purpose. "I have no hesitation," he added, "in taking upon myself any degree of responsibility which may attach itself to this advice, as I consider the fate of Spain as depending absolutely, for the present, upon the decision which you may adopt. I say, for the present; for

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Col. Charmilly sent to Sir John Moore by the Duque del Infantado and Mr. Frere.

CHAP. such is the spirit and character of the country, that, even if
 XV. abandoned by the British, I should by no means despair of their
 1808. ultimate success." Having read this letter, and heard Charmilly's
December. communication, Sir John Moore gave him no reason to suppose
 that the intention of retreating would be given up. He retired,
 however, to reflect upon what he had heard. His instructions
 directed him to receive the representations both of the Spanish
 government and the British Ambassador with the utmost defer-
 ence and attention: . . . both deprecated his retreat. Charmilly
 had been an eye-witness of the preparations which were making
 in Madrid, and accounts confirming his report came from various
 quarters. He was persuaded that a great improvement in the
 public affairs had taken place, and that it was not becoming
 him to fly at such a time; and he wrote, that night, to Sir David
 Baird, telling him to suspend his retrograde march till he heard
 again, and to make arrangements for returning to Astorga,
 should it be necessary.

*Sir John
 Moore re-
 solves to ad-
 vance.*

Still the rooted feeling of his heart was despondency. In this
 very letter he expressed his fear that the spirit of resistance had
 arisen too late, and that the French were now too strong to be
 resisted in that manner. All this, he said, appeared to him very
 strange and unsteady; yet if the spirit of enthusiasm did arise,
 and the people would be martyrs, there was no saying, in that
 case, what a British force might do. In the morning he wrote a
 second letter, ordering Sir David to return to Astorga. "We
 must be at hand," said he, "to aid and take advantage of what-
 ever happens. The wishes of our country and our duty demand
 this of us, with whatever risk it may be attended." But he added,
 "I mean to proceed bridle in hand; for if the bubble bursts, and
 Madrid falls, we shall have a run for it." These were ominous
 words. It was apparent that he had no confidence in the pa-
 triotism of the Spaniards, nor in his own means of resisting the

French, however strong the country; it was apparent also, that, while these impressions weighed upon him, he looked on with apprehension to the opinion of the English public, and that in deference to that opinion he was sacrificing his own.

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While Sir John was dispatching these instructions, it was not known at Salamanca that he had changed his intention of re-treating: officers and men alike were delivering their opinions loudly, and speaking of another investigation. Charmilly hearing this, and being equally ignorant of the determination which had been formed, supposed that his second letter was necessary, and accordingly delivered it. The General, not perceiving the intent for which it was written, and feeling like a high-spirited officer who thought himself injured, tore the letter in pieces, and gave vent to his indignation in violent language. Part of his anger fell upon Charmilly, and, on the following day, he ordered him to quit Salamanca. Charmilly respectfully represented that he had not deserved such treatment. The General replied that he did not mean to give him the smallest offence; but he repeated the order, and it was obeyed. Sir John Moore, in his resentment for what he conceived the improper interference of the Ambassador, soon, however, recollected what was due to him as the King's minister. He told Mr. Frere, therefore, that he should abstain from any remarks on the two letters delivered by Colonel Charmilly, or on the message which accompanied them. "I certainly," said he, "did feel and express much indignation at a person like him being made the channel of a communication of that sort from you to me. Those feelings are at an end, and I dare say they never will be excited towards you again. If M. Charmilly is your friend, it was, perhaps, natural for you to employ him; but I have prejudices against all that class, and it is impossible for me to put any trust in him." He informed the Minister that every thing should be done, for the assistance of

CHAP. Madrid and the Spanish cause, that could be expected from such
 XV. an army as he commanded, . . . but he could not make a direct
 1808. movement on Madrid, because the passes of Guadarrama and
 December. Somosierra were in the hands of the French, and, besides, he was
 much too weak, until joined by Sir David Baird.

*News of the
 surrender of
 Madrid.
 Dec. 7.*

On the following day, Sir John received a letter from the Junta of Toledo, telling him they intended to re-unite the dispersed armies there, and defend the city to the last. He replied, that if the Spaniards acted up to such sentiments, there could be no doubt of their ultimate success, whatever temporary advantages the French might gain; and he sent a British officer to reside at Toledo, and concert measures for its defence. On the 8th, he informed Sir David Baird that he should move a corps on the 10th to Zamora and Toro, and ordered him to push on his troops, by brigades, to Benevente. But, on the 9th, Colonel Graham, whom he had dispatched to Morla and Castelfranco, returned from Talavera, with tidings that these men had surrendered Madrid. The number of the French there was computed at between 20,000 and 30,000 men, and it was said that they remained at the Retiro, not having taken possession of the city, in consequence of the temper of the inhabitants. Another part of the French army was engaged in besieging Zaragoza. From Toledo the news was equally discouraging: Victor no sooner approached than it was surrendered to him. These circumstances did not induce the British General to alter his plan: his object was to threaten the French communications, draw their attention from Madrid and Zaragoza, and thus favour any movements which might be projected by the armies forming on the south of the Tagus. If no advantage was taken of it, and no efforts made, he saw that the French might turn against him what portion of their force they pleased. That they would be able to do this he expected; and he believed that nothing which

his army could effect would be attended with any other advantage than the character which might be won for the British arms. He looked, therefore, to a retreat, as an event which would soon be unavoidable; in his dispatches home, dissuaded the government from sending out reinforcements, and desired that transports might be ready, at Lisbon and at Vigo, to receive the troops; being fully persuaded that the efforts of England could be of no avail, and that it would be necessary to evacuate the peninsula.

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Having determined, in this inauspicious state of mind, upon advancing, he wrote to Romana, who was then at Leon, collecting and refitting the remains of Blake's army. Sir John complained to him that he had been put in no communication with any of the Spanish armies, had been kept perfectly in the dark with respect to their movements, the plans of their generals and their government, and that while his army was on the march to assemble and unite itself, he had been left exposed, without the least support. Therefore, though his wish had always been to co-operate with the Spaniards, it became necessary for him, finding that he was left to himself, to think of himself alone. Under that feeling he had ordered the corps at Astorga to fall back on Coruña, and meant himself to retire upon Portugal, there to be ready for the assistance of Spain whenever their affairs were better managed, and an opportunity offered for doing them any good. Perhaps this opportunity had now occurred; and as his retreat had been reluctant, so he had stopped it the moment a chance of acting to advantage presented itself. His wish now was to unite with the Marques, for whose character he had the highest respect, and who would always find him ready to undertake whatever was practicable for the service of the Spanish nation. The account which Romana gave of his army in reply was far from encouraging. He had 20,000 men under arms, but they were almost all without haversacks, cartridge boxes, and

*Correspondence
with Romana.*

CHAP. shoes, and at least two-thirds were without clothing, from head
 XV. to foot. Their spirits however were good, and if they were well
 1808. fed they would do their duty. Their dispersion in Biscay had been
December. wholly owing to the want of subsistence. He should not doubt of
 uniting with Sir John, and concerting a decisive attack upon the
 troops which surrounded Madrid, were it not for a division of
 8000 or 10,000 men, extending from Sahagun to Almanza, whose
 apparent object was to check his army. As long as they re-
 mained in that position, he could not abandon his, because it
 would leave them a free way into Asturias; they would take pos-
 session of the country from whence he drew large supplies, and
 they would threaten the passage into Galicia. A combined
 movement with Sir David Baird might oblige them to fall back
 upon Reynosa, and then it would not be difficult to form a
 junction.

*First skir-
 mish at
 Rueda.*

From the beginning Sir John Moore had thought so poorly
 of the Spaniards, that this account of the force with which he was
 to co-operate could make no alteration in his views. It was per-
 fectly understood by him that he must stand, or fall, by his own
 means. He left Salamanca on the 12th. On the same day,
 Lord Paget, with the principal part of the cavalry, marched from
 Toro to Tordesillas; and General Stuart surprised and cut off a
 party of French who were posted at Rueda. This was the first
 encounter between the British and French in Spain; and the
 prisoners declared it was universally believed that the English
 army had retreated. On the 14th, when Sir John was at Alaejos,
 a packet of letters, from the head-quarters of the French army,
 was brought to him. Some peasantry had killed the officer who
 had them in charge. Among them was a letter from Berthier to
 Marshal Soult, directing him to take possession of Leon, drive
 the enemy into Galicia, and make himself master of Benevente
 and Zamora. He would have no English in front, it was said;

for every thing evinced that they were in full retreat. A movement had been made to Talavera, on the road to Badajoz, which must compel them to hasten to Lisbon, if they were not already gone; and when they had retired, the Emperor thought Soult could do whatever he pleased. It appeared, from this letter, that Soult had two divisions with him at Saldaña; that Junot was collecting another at Burgos; and that another, under Mortier (Duke of Treviso), had been ordered to march against Zaragoza.

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Sir John had intended to march to Valladolid, but seeing that Soult was stronger than had been represented, he thought it better to move to Toro, and unite his army there, Sir David Baird doing the same at Benevente, from whence the two corps might be joined, either by a forward or flank movement, and strike a blow against Soult, before that General should be reinforced. While the head-quarters were at Toro, a member of the Junta arrived there with Mr. Stuart. After the manner in which Colonel Charmilly had been dismissed, Mr. Frere had little reason to hope that any thing would induce Sir John Moore to alter his determination of retiring from the country in despair. The Spanish Government had, however, pressed him to make one effort more: if that determination were persisted in, they said, it would bring on the most dreadful consequences. The measures which alone could save Portugal and Spain would be completely disconcerted, and England would have afforded them succour only to make them rely on an effective aid, and then to withdraw it at the critical moment when it was most needed. In reality, the enemy at this moment exposed himself to ruin by dividing his army to cover such an extended line. Romana would join Sir John Moore with 14,000 men, and the Junta had taken such measures that within a month 30,000 would be raised in Leon, Galicia, and Asturias. Mr. Frere inclosed this note to

*Head-
quarters re-
moved to
Toro.*

*The com-
mand of the
Spanish
armies
offered to Sir
J. Moore.*

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the British Commander, and reminding him of the immense responsibility with which he charged himself in adopting a measure which must be followed by immediate if not final ruin to our ally, and by indelible disgrace to the country with whose resources he was entrusted, expressed a hope that Mr. Stuart, who was personally esteemed by the General, would by that advantage be enabled to urge this argument with the warmth of regard. "I am unwilling," he pursued, "to enlarge upon a subject in which my feelings must be stifled, or expressed at the risk of offence; which, with such an interest at stake, I should feel unwilling to excite. But this much I must say, that if the British army had been sent abroad for the express purpose of doing the utmost possible mischief to the Spanish cause, with the single exception of not firing a shot against their troops, they would, according to the measures now announced as about to be pursued, have completely fulfilled their purpose. . . That the defence of Galicia should be abandoned, must appear incredible." . . This letter arrived too late to have any influence upon Sir John's movements; he had advanced, but it was with a heavy heart: and when the Deputy from the Junta, D. Francisco Xavier Caro, at this time offered him the command in chief of the Spanish armies, he refused it. He would not have done this if he had had any hope of acting with success against the enemy, or any intention of making a stand against them: for at this time he learnt that Romana was beginning to retire on Galicia, and felt how inconvenient it was that the army which was to co-operate with him should be independent of him. He therefore wrote to the Marques, saying, he had looked for the assistance of such part of his corps as was fit to move; and had expected also that the road to Coruña would have been left open for the British army, as that by which it must receive its supplies, and the only one by which it must retreat, if compelled so to do.

Romana replied, that he should have had no thought of retreating had it not been for the intelligence which he received from Sir D. Baird; that he was ready to act with Sir John; and that this was the moment, not for retreating, but for trying what could be done against the enemy, and drawing him from the capital.

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The junction with Sir D. Baird was formed at Mayorga on the 20th; the united force amounting to something more than 28,000 men, of whom 2450 were cavalry, with 50 pieces of artillery. The cavalry under Lord Paget were pushed forward, and having learned that some of the enemy's cavalry were posted at Sahagun, Lord Paget endeavoured to cut them off. The alarm was given, and they had time to form in a favourable position; but they were out-manœuvred, charged, overthrown in a moment, and dispersed in every direction, with the loss of many killed, and 157 prisoners, including two Lieutenant-Colonels. In this affair about 400 of the 15th Hussars encountered nearly 700 French; and the British felt and proved their own exceeding great superiority. Head-quarters were advanced to Sahagun on the 21st. The weather was severe; the roads bad, and covered with snow; and as the troops had suffered from forced marches, they halted there for a day, and there a co-operation with Romana was finally concerted, the Marques engaging to move with from 9000* to 10,000 men, being that part of his force which was sufficiently clothed and armed to take the field. Pitiable as their condition appeared when they were compared to troops so admirably equipped as the English, it was, nevertheless, evident, even to a desponding observer, that they might be brought into

*Junction
with Sir D.
Baird
formed.*

* The French historian of Marshal Soult's Campaigns in 1808-9, affirms that Sir John Moore had 37,000 effective men, and Romana had from 25,000 to 30,000; their united force amounting thus to more than 60,000!

CHAP. action as auxiliaries, to occupy part of the enemy's force, and to
 XV. complete his destruction in case of victory.

1808. According to the information which Romana could obtain,
 December. Soult's corps consisted of about 9000 infantry and 1000 horse ;
 They ad- but that General, apprehending that some attempt would be
 vance against M. made against him, had applied for reinforcements, and without
 Soult. waiting for them, called to his assistance the nearest troops ;
 he had thus brought together about 18,000 men, who were
 posted behind the river Carrion. Every arrangement was made
 for attacking him, and orders were issued accordingly, . . never
 more welcome to a British army. The convents in Sahagun
 were prepared for the reception of the wounded ; and the soldiers
 confidently anticipated a glorious victory. Their general was
 less sanguine. " The movement I am making," he said to Mr.
 Frere, " is of the most dangerous kind. I not only risk to be sur-
 rounded every moment by superior forces, but to have my com-
 munication with Galicia intercepted. I wish it to be apparent
 to the whole world, as it is to every individual of the army, that
 we have done every thing in our power in support of the Spanish
 cause, and that we do not abandon it until long after the Spa-
 niards had abandoned us." The truth is, that nothing had been
 done ; but he was disgusted with the Spanish Government, and
 he had no faith in the people : his own judgement would have
 led him to fall back from Salamanca ; and he only advanced
 because he knew what would be the feelings of the English
 nation, if its army had retired without attempting any thing.
 Offended with Mr. Frere, for having given his opinion, when he
 himself had asked it, he did not deem the suggestion of that
 Minister, as to making a stand at Astorga, worthy of considera-
 tion. It was at once rejected, as futile ; and he advanced against
 this detachment of the French, " bridle in hand," as he himself

said, and expecting to "have a run for it," . . not thinking that any possible benefit could result from a victory, but seeking a reason which might appear valid to the people of England for abandoning the peninsula, and for leaving Spain and Portugal to their fate. . . "It was necessary to risk this army," he said, "to convince the people of England, as well as the rest of Europe, that the Spaniards had neither the power nor the inclination to make any efforts for themselves. With respect to the cause, it will probably have no effect. Even if I beat Marshal Soult, it will be attended with no other effect than the character it will attach to the British arms."

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At the hour appointed, the whole force was under arms ; the right column had begun its march, and the rest were in high spirits, expecting the word of command : . . just at this time came a letter from Romana, with intelligence that the French were advancing from Madrid, either to Valladolid or Salamanca ; and information to the same purport was received by other messengers, and also, that considerable reinforcements had arrived at Carrion from Palencia. Orders were immediately issued that the troops should go back to their quarters, and by daybreak next morning be again under arms. "In my life," says one who was present, "I never witnessed such an instantaneously-withering effect upon any body of living creatures ! A few murmurs only were heard, but every countenance was changed, and they who, the minute before, were full of that confidence which ensures victory, were at once deprived of all heart and hope." The next morning General Hope fell back to Mayorga, on the road to Benevente, with his own division and with General Fraser's. Sir David Baird was ordered to pass the river Ezla at Valencia de San Juan : on Christmas-day the Commander-in-chief followed General Hope, with the reserve and the light brigades ; and the cavalry, under Lord Paget, followed the reserve .

*The French
endeavour
to surround
the British
army.
Dec. 23.*

*Sir J. Moore
begins his
retreat.*

CHAP. on the 26th. When Sir John Moore apprized Romana that he
XV. should fall back, he told him that if he were pursued he should
1808. stop and offer battle: and in a second communication from
December. Sahagun he said, that if he were pressed after crossing the
Ezla, he should have no objection to try an action. But he
had made up his mind to lose some of his baggage, and not
to fight, if he could avoid it. Astorga was to be his rallying
point: there he informed Romana he should stand, as his retreat
from thence, if necessary, would be secure, and he should be in
the way to receive the supplies and the reinforcements which
he expected from England. At the worst, he could defend
himself, and, with Romana's aid, defend Galicia. "You may
rest assured," he added, "that I shall not retreat a foot beyond
what is necessary to secure my supplies from being inter-
cepted.. You will find no inclination in me to abandon the
Spanish cause." But his dispatches from Benevente, on the
28th, show that this intention, if it had ever been seriously
entertained, was soon abandoned; and as for the reinforce-
ments, he had already countermanded them in his feeling of
despair. His force, he said, when he reached Astorga, would be
about 27,000; Romana could not have above 8000. The troops
moving against him he estimated at not less than 50,000; and
it was said that Buonaparte himself was coming, with 10,000 of
his guards. His real purpose was not to stop longer at Astorga
than to secure the stores, and then retreat to Villa Franca, where
he had been told there was a position. Romana had intimated
to him, some time ago, his intention of retiring into Galicia
by this route, but Sir John begged it might be left open to the
English, being the only communication they had for their retreat
or supplies.

From the 22d to the 24th, Soult received such reinforcements
as made his army superior to the British. Junot, with the army

which had been transported from Portugal to France, had advanced to Palencia, and threatened their right flank. Buona-
 parte was hastening from Madrid, with his imperial cavalry, and all the disposable force in that quarter. The force under Lefebvre was counter-ordered from the road to Badajoz, and directed toward Salamanca. The retreat of the British upon Portugal was thus cut off. Of the numbers advancing against him Sir John Moore was not informed; and so little idea was there of flying when he began his retreat, that it was determined to carry off the prisoners; and they were accordingly stowed in covered waggons. A thaw came on the day when they first fell back; on the following it rained without intermission: the soil in that part of the country is a heavy loam, and the roads were above a foot deep in clay. The proclamations of the French travelled faster than the British army: these were, as usual, full of promises which would not be fulfilled, and menaces which would. They were come, they said, to deliver Spain; to emancipate the people from the yoke of a tyrannical nobility and a fanatic priesthood. All persons who remained quiet in their houses, or who, having forsaken them, speedily returned, should receive no injury; but otherwise, whatsoever belonged to them should be confiscated. Unhappily, the conduct of our people now began to give effect to these hand-bills. The soldiers were indignant with the Spaniards for their apparent supineness; they were exasperated by the conduct of some poor wretches, whose carts had been pressed to carry the sick and wounded, and who, as many of them as could, had taken their mules, and run away in the night, because the movements of a retreating army exposed themselves to imminent danger, and their beasts to certain destruction. Weary and disheartened, in want of rest and food, disappointed in their confident hopes of victory, and indignant at turning their backs upon an enemy

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December.*the conduct
of the troops.*

CHAP. whom they would so eagerly have met in the field, it was a
XV. relief for them to vent these feelings, in the shape of anger,
1808. upon the only objects within their reach. In this temper they
December. began to plunder and commit havoc wherever they went; and
the officers, many of whom already murmured at the rapidity of
the retreat, and were discontented with the total silence which
the Commander-in-chief maintained respecting his future mea-
sures, did not exert themselves as they ought to have done, to
prevent these excesses.

*Passage of
the Ezla.*

Dec. 26.

Sir David Baird, who took the shorter line to Astorga, by way of Valencia de S. Juan, effected his march without molestation. The sick and wounded, following the same track, halted at the latter place, to pass the night. Hardly had they been provided with the necessary food, and laid to rest, before the alarm was sounded, and they were again hurried into the waggons. The night was cold, misty, and exceeding dark, and the Ezla was to be crossed some little distance from the town. They were not provided with pontoons. The ford is dangerous, because of the rapidity of the stream, occasioned by two narrow banks of shingles, which form an angle in the middle; and at this time the river was fast rising, from the melting of the snow upon the mountains. A serjeant's guard had been left by Sir David on the opposite bank, to assist the waggons in passing, and skuttle two ferry-boats, when they had effected their passage. They kindled a fire with grass and rushes, for the sake of its light, but the materials were wet, and the wind soon extinguished it. A Spanish muleteer attempted to guide them over the ford: his mule tripped in the mid stream, he was thrown, and saved by a soldier, when just in the act of sinking. Perilous, however, as the ford was, the passage was accomplished, without other loss than that of some baggage-waggons, which broke down.

Sir John Moore, meantime, with the other division of the army, reached Benevente, and there found it necessary to issue general orders, which reflected severely upon the conduct both of his men and officers. "The misbehaviour of the column which had marched by Valderas exceeded," he said, "what he could have believed of British soldiers. He could feel no mercy towards officers who neglected, in times like these, essential duties, nor towards soldiers who disgraced their country, by acts of villany towards the people whom they were sent to protect." Alluding then to the discontent which was manifested at the hurry of the retreat, and the mystery which was thrown over their proceedings, he said "it was impossible for the General to explain to his army the motives of the movements which he directed; he could, however, assure them, that he had made none since he left Salamanca which he did not foresee, and was not prepared for; and, as far as he was a judge, they had answered the purposes for which they were intended. When it was proper to fight a battle he would do it, and he would choose the time and place which he thought most fit. In the meantime, he begged the officers and men to attend diligently to discharge *their* parts, and leave to *him*, with the general officers, the decision of measures which belonged to them alone." Strong as this language was, it had no effect, and the havoc which had been committed at Valderas was renewed at Benevente. The castle there is one of the finest monuments of the age of chivalry; we have nothing in England which approaches to its grandeur: Berkeley, Raby, even Warwick and Windsor are poor fabrics in comparison. With Gothic grandeur, it has the richness of Moorish decoration; open galleries, where Saracenic arches are supported by pillars of porphyry and granite; cloisters, with fountains playing in their courts; jasper columns and tessellated floors, niches, alcoves, and seats in the walls, over-arched in various forms, and enriched with every grotesque adornment of

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General orders issued at Benevente.

Dec. 27.

CHAP. gold and silver, and colours which are hardly less gorgeous.
 XV. It belonged to the Duke of Ossuna; and the splendor of old
 1808. times was still continued there. The extent of this magnificent
December. structure may be estimated from this circumstance, that two re-
 giments, besides artillery, were quartered within its walls. They
 proved the most destructive enemies that had ever entered them:
 their indignant feelings broke out again, in acts of wanton mis-
 chief; and the officers, who felt and admired the beauties of this
 venerable pile, attempted in vain to save it from devastation.
 Every thing combustible was seized, fires were lighted against
 the fine walls, and pictures of unknown value, the works, per-
 haps, of the greatest Spanish masters, and of those other great
 painters who left so many of their finest productions in Spain,
 were heaped together as fuel. The archives of the family for-
 tunately escaped.

*Affair of
 cavalry on
 the Ezla.
 Dec. 28.*

The soldiers had, however, here an opportunity of displaying
 a spirit more becoming them as Englishmen. Soon after the
 rear of the army had marched into the town, an alarm was given
 that the enemy were on the opposite heights. In an instant all
 was on the alert; every man hastened to his place of rendezvous;
 the cavalry poured out of the gates: . . the plain in the opposite
 direction was covered with fugitives, and the streets were filled
 with women bewailing their fate, and calling upon the Saints
 and the Virgin for protection. The French, seeing with what
 alacrity they would be encountered, looked at our men from the
 heights, and retired. It was towards evening, and as the enemy
 were so near, orders were given to destroy the bridge. This was
 effected about daybreak the following morning; and it was sup-
 posed that their progress was for a while impeded. The troops
 again continued their retreat, and the whole of the infantry and
 heavy artillery had departed, when intelligence arrived that the
 French were again appearing, and that their cavalry were in the
 act of passing the Ezla: . . they had found a ford about three

Dec. 29.

hundred yards below the bridge. Lord Paget and General Stewart were still in the town. The picquets of the night, under Lieutenant-Colonel Otway and Major Bagwell, were sent down; the cavalry were ordered to repair to their alarm posts; and many volunteers came forward. Lord Paget hastened to the spot: he found four squadrons of imperial guards already formed, and skirmishing with the picquets; other cavalry were in the act of passing. The 10th Hussars were sent for: as soon as they arrived, General Stewart placed himself at the head of the picquets, and charged the enemy. The French gave way, and repassed the ford more expeditiously than they had crossed it. They formed again on the other side, and threatened a second attempt; but three pieces of horse artillery, which now came up, were stationed near the bridge, and opened a fire upon them, that did considerable execution. About seventy prisoners were taken: among them General Lefebvre Desnouettes, Commander of the imperial guard of cavalry. The loss of the enemy could not be ascertained: it was variously guessed, from 60 to 200. Ours was about 50 in killed and wounded. It was reported that Buonaparte was on the heights during this action.

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The ardour of the French was manifestly damped by this fresh proof of British valour; and they continued their pursuit at such respectful distance, that the rear of the army, which had been engaged with them, reached Bañeza that night unmolested. The next day the Commander-in-chief reached Astorga. This was the rallying point, and here they found about 5000 men of Romana's army. That army was literally half naked and half starved; a malignant typhus fever was raging among them, and sixty or seventy were sent daily to the hospitals. About this number, however, were fit for service. Romana arrived there the same day. The first intimation that the French were advancing to interpose between Portugal and

Sir John
Moore
reaches
Astorga.

Dec. 30.

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*Honourable
conduct of
Romana
and his
army.*

the British army had been received from him ; but it was his opinion that that information ought to have produced no change in Sir John Moore's intentions. The intended attack, he thought, ought still to have been made ; Soult might have been beaten in time to fall upon the corps which was coming to reinforce him, and by the success which prompt and vigorous measures would have ensured, they should have become masters of Leon and Castille. To his utter astonishment he now found that there was no intention of making a stand at Astorga, part of the British army being already on the way to Villafranca, and a regiment of cavalry all that was left on the side of Bañeza. He went therefore to the British Commander, and represented to him the propriety of facing the enemy where they were, a point from whence they had always a secure retreat by the passes of Manzanal and Foncebadon, . . passes so strong that a small force might maintain them against any numbers. He represented to him also, that the park of artillery was at Ponferrada, where also the hospitals were established, and there were magazines of corn ; that in Villafranca there were more than 2000 sick, with hospital stores and depôts of arms, and therefore it was of the utmost consequence to defend the Bierzo. But Sir John Moore replied, that he had determined upon retiring into Galicia, because his troops required rest. He desired that the high road of Manzanal might be left to him, saying, he would defend that and the principal entrance to Galicia by Villafranca ; and that Romana might take the Foncebadon pass, and enter by way of the Val de Orras and Puebla de Sanabria. And here a proof of Spanish magnanimity was given by these half armed, half naked, and half famished men, for such they literally were. A malignant fever was raging among them, and long fatigue, privations, and disease, made them appear more like an ambulatory hospital than an army. Under such circumstances it might have been supposed they would have sought

to secure their retreat under protection of the British to Coruña and Ferrol. But Romana and his forlorn band were too high-minded to attach themselves as a burden upon those allies with whom they had so lately expected to co-operate in honourable and hopeful enterprise; and they assented without hesitation to the British General's desire. Romana only requested that the British troops might no longer be permitted to commit disorders which even in an enemy's country ought never to be allowed; it must have been painful indeed for Sir John Moore to have heard of such excesses, and still more painful to feel, that in a retreat so hasty as this was intended to be, it was impossible to prevent them.

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The troops had been assured, at Benevente, that they were not falling back upon Coruña, but that their march was only to secure a more favourable position: . . . no affirmations could make the soldiery believe this; and when Sir John Moore reached Astorga, and issued his orders, it was too manifest that they were not retreating, but flying, before the enemy. Ammunition wag-gons were burnt here, and an entire depôt of entrenching tools abandoned, so that the army was thus deprived of a most important means of impeding the enemy's progress. The position at Villa Franca, which the Commander-in-chief had formerly mentioned in his dispatches, was no longer thought of. Two brigades, under General Craufurd, were detached, by way of Orense, to Vigo, to which port Sir John had ordered empty transports to be sent for him, supposing it to be the best point of embarkation. This detachment preceded Romana in the line which he expected was to have been left for him; and when he and his forlorn band, after halting only one night, took their way toward Orense, they found the country stripped of the means of subsistence upon which they had reckoned. General Fraser and his division were immediately sent forward, with orders to

*Sir John
Moore pur-
sues his re-
treat.*

CHAP. proceed to Lugo; he was followed by General Hope and Sir
 XV. David Baird, and their instructions were to make forced marches
 1808. to the coast. "With respect to me and the British troops," said
December. the Commander, in his official letter, "it has come to that point
 which I have long foreseen. . . From a desire to do what I could,
 I made the movement against Soult: as a diversion, it has
 answered completely; but as there is nothing to take advantage
 of it, I have risked the loss of the army for no purpose. I have
 no option now but to fall down to the coast as fast as I am able.
 . . We must all make forced marches, from the scarcity of pro-
 visions, and to be before the enemy, who, by roads upon our
 flanks, may otherwise intercept us."

The Bierzo. It appears evident, from these expressions, that Sir John
 Moore was not well informed of the nature of the country through
 which he was about to retreat. Westward of Astorga, two great
 ranges of mountains trend from north to south: Puerto del Ra-
 banal, Cruz de Ferro, and Foncebadon, are those of the eastern
 branch; those of the western are the Puerto del Cebrero, Puerto
 del Courel, and Puerto del Aguiar; they meet, on the south,
 with the Sierra de Sanabria, the Sierra de Cabrera, and the
 Montes Aquilianos. The tract which these mountains inclose is
 called the Bierzo: from summit to summit it is about sixteen
 leagues from north to south, and about fourteen from east to
 west. The whole waters of this amphitheatre have but one
 opening; they are collected into the river Sil, and pass, through
 a narrow gorge, into the Val de Orras, in Galicia. . . The centre
 is a plain of about four square leagues. There is scarcely in
 Europe a more lovely tract of country, certainly no where a more
 defensible one. The main road, one of the finest in Europe, is
 that of Manzanal; that of Foncebadon also leads into the Bierzo;
 there is no third ingress, and from Villa Franca toward Coruña
 the only way is that of the Puerto Cebrero; both the former

passes lead along defiles, where, as Romana observed three months before this miserable retreat, a thousand men might stop the march of twenty times their number: and beyond Villa Franca there is no lateral road. Sir David Baird's army had travelled this road; they supposed that it could not possibly be intended to fall back beyond that point. But the Commander saw no security till he should reach the coast; there he hoped to find transports ready, or to take up some defensible position till they arrived. The same difficulties which affected him must affect his pursuers. It was not probable that all the numbers which were now marching against him would follow him the whole way; and once on the coast, it was his determination not to be molested by any thing like an equal force: . . . "it is only while retreating," said he, "that we are vulnerable." His sole object now was to bring off the army, . . . to effect this he had already destroyed great part of the ammunition and military stores, and now left behind many of the sick.

The mountain-tops were covered with heavy clouds, and the roads knee-deep in snow. Provisions, in a country where the natives are not rich enough at any time to lay by a store, can never be abundant, and what there were, had already been exhausted by the repeated march of troops, English and Spaniards. The little order with which such food as could be found was issued out, occasioned waste, and thereby increased the evil. The men, half famished, half frozen, and altogether desperate, were no longer in any subordination. They forced their way into the houses where their rations should have been served, seized it by force, frequently spilling the wine, and destroying more than they could carry away. This was not all: . . . pillage could not be prevented. Houses and villages were burning in all directions; but when they thus acted as enemies, they were

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*Disorders
committed
by the
troops.*

CHAP. treated as such ; and many of them were put to death by the
 XV. peasantry, in revenge, or in self-defence.

1808. Buonaparte pursued in person no farther than Astorga : he
 December. left Marshal Ney with 18,000 men to keep that part of the
 Buonaparte stops at Astorga. country in subjection ; and assigned to Marshal Soult, with
 23,000, what he called the “ glorious mission of destroying the
 English army, . . pursuing them to their point of embarkation,
 and driving them into the sea.” Marshal Soult’s was an easy
 task : he had only to follow the English just close enough to
 keep them at the pace at which they set out, and not come near
 enough to make them turn and stand at bay : fatigue would do
 his work more surely than the sword. From Astorga to Villa
 Franca del Bierzo is fifteen leagues, about sixty English miles ;
 the road for the first four leagues is up the mountain, but through
 an open country. Having reached the summit of Foncebadon,
 you enter into some of the strongest passes in Europe. It would
 scarcely be possible for an invading army to force their way
 here ; against a body of determined men. These passes continue
 between two and three leagues, nearly to the village of Torre ;
 from thence, through Benvibre and Ponferrada, nothing can be
 finer than the country, and the circle of mountains which binds
 it in. But never, in the most melancholy ages of Spanish history,
 had a more miserable scene been represented, than was now to
 be witnessed here. The horses of the retreating army began to
 fail, and this, in great measure, for want of shoes and shoe-nails.
 There was no want of iron to hammer new ones : there are iron-
 works near Villa Franca, and enough might have been procured,
 had there been time allowed. As soon as these noble animals
 foundered, they were shot, lest the enemy should profit by them.
 The rain continued pouring, . . the baggage was to be dragged,
 and the soldiers were to wade through half-melted snows, . . the feet

of the men as well as of the beasts began to fail, . . more waggons were left behind, . . more ammunition destroyed along the way ; and when the troops reached Villa Franca, they were in such a state, that several experienced officers predicted, if this march against time were persevered in, a fourth of the army would be left in the ditches, before it was accomplished. More magazines and carriages were here destroyed. Some of the men abandoning themselves now, as knowing that if they proceeded they must die of cold, hunger, and weariness ; they got into the wine cellars, and, giving way to desperate excess, were found dead when the French entered the town. When the General marched with the reserve from Benvibre, he left a detachment to cover the town, while parties were sent to warn the stragglers of their danger, and drive them out of the houses, . . for the place was filled with them, near a thousand men of the preceding divisions having remained there, all abandoned to despair, and most of them to drunkenness. A few were prevailed upon to move on ; the greater number were deaf to threats, and insensible to danger, till the rear-guard was compelled to march. A small detachment of cavalry still covered them, and did not quit the town till the enemy approached, and then the road was filled with stragglers, armed and unarmed, mules, carts, women, and children. . . Four or five squadrons of French cavalry compelled the detachment in the rear to retire, and pursued them closely for several miles, till General Paget, with the reserve, repulsed the pursuers. As the French dragoons galloped through the long line of these wretched stragglers, they slashed them with their swords to the right and left, . . the men being so insensible with liquor that they neither attempted to resist nor get out of the road. Some of these men having found their way to the army, mangled as they were, were paraded through the ranks, to show their comrades the miserable consequence of drunkenness at such a time.

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*January.**Jan. 2.*

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*January.**Skirmish at
Cacabelos.**Jan. 3.**Retreat
continued
from Villa
Franca.*

The Spaniards at Villa Franca would not believe that the French were advancing; through so strong a country, and in so severe a season, they thought it was impossible. Sir John Moore, however, well knew that he was pursued, and he was afraid of halting, lest the enemy should get in his rear, and intercept him at Lugo; an apprehension which could not have been entertained, had he been acquainted with the country. The troops, therefore, were hurried on: the artillery and head-quarters went foremost; General Baird's column, and the cavalry, under Lord Paget, covered the rear. The advanced guard of the enemy, under General Colbert, were close at their heels: Merle's division joined them on the 3d; and on the afternoon of that day they ventured to attack the rear-guard at Cacabelos. They were repulsed by the dragoons and riflemen. General Colbert received a ball in his forehead, and fell; he was an officer of great promise, and of so fine a person, that Canova is said to have called him the modern Antinous. Having thus once more shown the enemy what they could do in battle, the rear of the army, reluctantly and almost broken-hearted, continued their retreat.

From Villa Franca to Castro is one continued ascent up Monte del Cebrero for about fifteen miles, through one of the wildest, most delightful, and most defensible countries in the world. The road is a royal one, cut with great labour and expense in the side of the mountain, and following all its windings; . . . for some part of the way it overhangs the river Valcarce, a rapid mountain stream, which falls into the Burbia near the town, and afterwards joins the Sil, to pass through the single outlet in the gorge of the Bierzo. Oaks, alders, poplars, hazels, and chestnuts grow in the bottom, and far up the side of the hills: the apple, pear, cherry, and mulberry are wild in this country; the wild olive, also, is found here; and here are the first vineyards

which the traveller sees on his way from Coruña into the heart of Spain. The mountains are cultivated in some parts even to their summits, and trenches are cut along their sides, for the purpose of irrigating them. Even those writers whose journals were written during the horrors of such a flight noticed this scenery with admiration. It was now covered with snow: . . . there was neither provision to sustain nature, nor shelter from the rain and snow, nor fuel for fire, to keep the vital heat from total extinction, nor place where the weary and foot-sore could rest for a single hour in safety. All that had hitherto been suffered was but the prelude to this consummate scene of horrors. It was still attempted to carry on some of the sick and wounded: the beasts which drew them failed at every step; and they were left in their waggons, to perish amid the snow. "I looked round," says an officer, "when we had hardly gained the highest point of those slippery precipices, and saw the rear of the army winding along the narrow road . . . I saw their way marked by the wretched people who lay on all sides expiring, from fatigue and the severity of the cold: . . . their bodies reddened in spots the white surface of the ground." The men were now desperate: excessive fatigue, and the feeling of the disgrace there was in thus flying before the enemy, excited in them a spirit which was almost mutinous: . . . a few hours' pause was what they desired, an opportunity of facing the French, the chance of an honourable and speedy death, the certainty of sweetening their sufferings by taking vengeance upon their pursuers. A Portuguese bullock-driver, who had faithfully served the English from the first day of their march, was seen on his knees amid the snow, with his hands clasped, dying in the attitude and act of prayer. He had at least the comfort of religion in his passing hour. The soldiers who threw themselves down to perish by the way-side gave utterance to far different feelings with their dying breath: shame

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CHAP. and strong anger were their last sentiments ; and their groans
 XV. were mingled with imprecations upon the Spaniards, by whom
 1808. they fancied themselves betrayed, and upon the generals, who
January. chose rather to let them die like beasts than take their chance
 in the field of battle. That no horror might be wanting, women
 and children accompanied this wretched army : . . some were
 frozen to death in the baggage-waggon, which were broken
 down, or left upon the road for want of cattle ; some died of
 fatigue and cold, while their infants were pulling at the ex-
 hausted breast : . . one woman was taken in labour upon the
 mountain ; she lay down at the turning of an angle rather more
 sheltered than the rest of the way from the icy sleet which drifted
 along ; . . there she was found dead, and two babes, which she
 had brought forth, struggling in the snow : . . a blanket was thrown
 over her, to cover her from sight, . . the only burial which could
 be afforded, . . and the infants were given in charge to a woman
 who came up in one of the bullock-carts, . . to take their chance
 for surviving through such a journey.

*Treasure
 abandoned.*

While the reserve were on this part of the road, they met
 between thirty and forty waggon filled with arms, ammunition,
 shoes, and clothing, from England, for Romana's army. There
 was no means of carrying them back : . . such things as could be
 made use of were distributed to the soldiers as they passed,
 and the rest were destroyed. Indeed, the baggage which was
 with the army could not be carried on : nearly an hundred
 waggon, laden with shoes and clothes, were abandoned upon
 this ascent. The dollars, too, could no longer be dragged along :
 had the resolution of sacrificing them been determined upon in
 time, they might have been distributed among the men : in this
 manner, great part might have been saved from the enemy, and
 they who escaped would have had some little compensation for the
 hardships which they had undergone : . . they were now cast over

the side of the precipice, in hopes that the snow might conceal them from the French : . . many men are supposed to have been lost, in consequence of having dropped behind, for the hope of recovering some of this money. Dreadful as this march appeared to those who beheld the wreck of the army strewing its line of road, it was perhaps still more so for them who performed it in a night stormy and dark, wading through sludge and snow, stumbling over the bodies of beasts and men, and hearing, whenever the wind abated, the groans of those whose sufferings were not yet terminated by death.

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From the summit of this mountain to Lugo is nearly twelve leagues. There are several bridges upon the way, over glens and gills, which might have impeded the pursuit, had they been destroyed. One, in particular, between Nogales and Marillas, is the most remarkable work of art between Coruña and Madrid. This bridge, which is called Puente del Corzul, crosses a deep ravine : from its exceeding height, the narrowness of its lofty arches, and its form, which, as usual with the Spanish bridges, is straight, it might at little distance be mistaken for an aqueduct. Several of those officers who knew the road relied much upon the strength of the ravine, and the impossibility that the French could bring their guns over, if the bridge were destroyed. Grievous as it was to think of destroying so grand a work, its destruction was attempted ; but, as in most other instances, to no purpose ; whether the pioneers performed their office too hastily, or because their implements had been abandoned upon the way.

The different divisions had been ordered to halt and collect at Lugo. Sir John Moore was now sensible of the impossibility of reaching Vigo, . the distance was double that to Coruña, the road was said to be impracticable for artillery, and the place itself offered no advantages for embarking in the face of an enemy. The brigades, however, of Generals Craufurd and Alton

*The army
collects at
Lugo.*

CHAP. had marched for that port; and General Fraser, with his division,
 XV. had been ordered to follow and join them. A dispatch was sent
 1809. to stop him: the dragoon who was entrusted with it got drunk on
January. the way, and lost the letter; and these troops, in consequence,
 had proceeded a full day's journey, on their way towards Vigo,
 before the counter-order reached them, and they were marched
 back. Thus, instead of having two days' rest at Lugo, as had
 been designed, they returned to that place excessively harassed,
 and with some diminution of number, occasioned by fatigue.
 When the horses entered Lugo, many of them fell dead in the
 streets, others were mercifully shot; . . above four hundred car-
 casses were lying in the streets and market-places; . . there were
 none of the army who had strength to bury them; the towns-
 people were under too painful a suspense to think of performing
 work which it seemed hopeless to begin while the frequent
 musquet-shot indicated so many fresh slaughters; there therefore
 the bodies lay, swelling with the rain, bursting, putrifying, and
 poisoning the atmosphere, faster than the glutted dogs and
 carrion birds could do their office. Here the retreating army
 might have rested, had the destruction of the bridges been
 effected; but this attempt had been so imperfectly executed, that
 the French came in sight on the 5th, and, collecting in consider-
 able strength, took up a good position opposite our rear guard,
 a valley dividing them.

*Sir John
 offers battle
 at Lugo.
 Jan. 6.*

On the following day they attacked the outposts, opening
 upon them with two Spanish pieces of ordnance, which they had
 taken on their march. The attack was made with great spirit;
 but it was received, says an officer, "with a steadiness which
 excited even our own wonder;" . . for at the sight of the enemy,
 and the sound of battle, the English recovered heart, and de-
 rived from their characteristic and invincible courage a strength
 which soon made them victorious. On the 7th another attack

Jan. 7.

was made, and in like manner repelled. The prisoners reported that Marshal Soult was come up with three divisions. Sir John Moore, therefore, expecting a more formidable attempt; drew up his whole force on the morning of the 8th. It was his wish now to bring the enemy to action: he had perfect confidence in the valour of the troops, and perceived, also, that, unless he crippled his pursuers, there was no hope of embarking unmo-
 lested. Order and discipline were instantaneously restored by this resolution to fight, and the men seemed at once to have recovered from their sufferings. The French were not equally eager for battle; the trial which they had made of their enemies on the two preceding days was not such as to encourage them; and Soult was waiting for more troops to come up. The country was intersected with inclosures, and his position was thought too strong to be attacked by an inferior force. But, in reality, the French at this time were less numerous than the English. Another reason assigned for not attacking the enemy was, that the commissariat had only provisions for two days: delay, therefore, was judged as disadvantageous as retreat. It was afterwards known, that the French expected to be attacked, that they had no confidence in the strength of their position, and that their ablest officers apprehended their advanced guard would have been cut off. They frequently spoke of this to those English who were left in their power at Lugo, and exulted that Sir John Moore had contented himself with offering battle, instead of forcing them to an engagement. After waiting till the afternoon, during a day of snow and storms, Sir John ordered large fires to be lighted along the line, for the purpose of deceiving the enemy, and continued his retreat during the night.

Before the reserve left Lugo, the General once more endeavoured to repress the irregularity of the march. He warned the soldiers that their safety depended entirely upon their keeping their divisions, and marching with their regiments; and that

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*Retreat to
Coruña.*

CHAP. those who stopped in villages, or straggled in the way, would
 XV. inevitably be cut off by the French cavalry, . . . "who have
 1809. hitherto," said he, "shown little mercy even to the feeble and
January. infirm who have fallen into their hands. The army has still
 eleven leagues to march ; the soldiers must make an exertion to
 accomplish this : the rear guard cannot stop ; and they who
 fall behind must take their fate." These representations were
 ineffectual : . . it was, indeed, impossible to obey them : many of
 the men were exhausted and foot-sore, and could not keep their
 ranks ; . . others, who had totally broken through all discipline,
 left them for the love of wine, or for worse motives. So irresistible
 was the temptation of liquor to men in their state, that it was
 deemed better to expose them to the cold and rain of a severe
 night, than to the wine-houses of Betanzos, the next town upon
 their march. When the Royals reached that place, they only
 mustered, with the colours, nine officers, three serjeants, and
 three privates : the rest had dropped on the road ; and many of
 those who joined did not come up for three days. There was a
 memorable instance, in this part of the retreat, of what might
 have been accomplished by discipline and presence of mind.
 A party of invalids, between Lugo and Betanzos, were closely
 pressed by two squadrons of the enemy's cavalry. Serjeant
 Newman, of the 2d battalion 43d, was among them : he made
 an effort to pass three or four hundred of these poor men, then
 halted, rallied round him such as were capable of making any
 resistance, and directed the others to proceed as they could.
 This party he formed regularly into divisions, and commenced
 firing and retiring in an orderly manner, till he effectually covered
 the retreat of his disabled comrades, and made the cavalry give
 up the pursuit.

*Sir John
 is advised to
 propose
 terms.*

The partial actions at Lugo, and the risk to which he had
 been exposed of a general one, checked Soult in his pursuit ;
 and he was too sensible of the danger which he had escaped, to

trust himself again so near the British, without a superior force. The British army, therefore, gained twelve hours' march upon him, and reached Coruña with little farther molestation; they obtained implements from Coruña for destroying the bridge over the Mero, and thus impeded the enemy's progress. At Coruña, if the General had not represented the cause of Spain as hopeless, they might have found reinforcements from England, which would have enabled them to turn upon their pursuers, and take ample vengeance for the sufferings and the shame which they had endured. But, instead of reinforcements, he had directed that empty transports should be sent; and, for want of due knowledge of the country, had ordered them to Vigo, instead of Coruña. That order had been countermanded as soon as the error was discovered; but contrary winds detained the ships, . . happily for the honour of their country, for otherwise the troops would have quitted Spain as fugitives. It was apparent now that they could not escape unless they gained a battle. Coruña was a bad position. Had they been numerous enough to have occupied a range of hills about four miles from the town, they could have defended themselves against very superior numbers, . . but these heights required a larger force than the English army, of which not less than a fourth part had been foundered by the way. Both flanks would have been liable to be turned: it was therefore necessary to relinquish them to the enemy, and be content with occupying a second and lower range. Such, however, were the disadvantages of this situation, that some of our general officers advised the Commander to propose terms to Soult, for permitting the army to embark unmolested. In communicating this to the Government, Sir John said he was averse to make any such proposal, and exceedingly doubtful if it would be attended with any good effect, . . but whatever he might resolve upon this head, the Ministers might rest assured that he would accept no terms which were in the least dishonourable to the army or to

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CHAP. the country. Happily for his own memory, upon farther con-
 XV. sideration, he rejected the advice. It is sufficiently disgraceful
 1809. that such advice should have been given; and deeply is England
 indebted to Sir John Moore for saving the army from this last
 and utter ignominy, and giving it an opportunity of displaying
 to the world that courage which had never forsaken it, and
 retrieving the honour which, had this counsel been followed,
 would irretrievably have been lost.

*Prepara-
 tion for
 battle.*

Arrangements, therefore, were made to give the enemy battle. One division, under General Hope, occupied a hill on the left, commanding the road to Betanzos: the height decreased gradually to the village of Elvina, taking a curved direction. At this village General Baird's division commenced, and bent to the right: the whole formed nearly a semicircle. On the right of Sir David Baird, the rifle corps formed a chain across a valley, and communicated with General Fraser's division, which was drawn up about half a mile from Coruña, near the road to Vigo. The reserve, under General Paget, occupied a village on the Betanzos road, about half a mile in the rear of General Hope. On the outside of the British posts was a magazine, containing 4000 barrels of gunpowder, which had been brought from England, and left there, while the Spanish armies were without ammunition! It was now necessary to blow it up: . . the explosion shook the town like an earthquake; and a village near the magazine was totally destroyed.

*Theartil-
 lery em-
 barked.*

The French made their appearance on the morning of the 12th, moving in force on the opposite side of the river Mero. They took up a position near the village of Perillo, on the left flank, and occupied the houses along the river. Their force was continually increasing. On the 14th they commenced a cannonade, which was returned with such effect, that they at last drew off their guns. In the evening of this day the transports from Vigo hove in sight. Some slight skirmishes took place the following

morning. Preparations meantime were making for the embarkation. Sir John finding that, from the nature of the ground, much artillery could not be employed, placed seven six-pounders and one howitzer along the line, and kept four Spanish guns as a reserve, to be advanced to any point where they might be wanted: the rest of the artillery was embarked. The sick and the dismounted cavalry were sent on board with all possible expedition. A few horses also were embarked, . . but there was little time for this: most of them were completely disabled; another slaughter, therefore, was made of them: and the beach was covered with their bodies. Some of these animals, seeing their fellows fall, were sensible of the fate intended for them: they became wild with terror, and a few broke loose.

The preparations for embarking were completed on the morning of the 16th, and the General gave notice, that he intended, if the French did not move, to begin embarking the reserve at four in the afternoon. This was about mid-day. He mounted his horse, and set off to visit the out-posts: before he had proceeded far, a messenger came to tell him that the enemy's line were getting under arms; and a deserter arriving at the same moment, confirmed the intelligence. He spurred forward. Their light troops were pouring rapidly down the hill on the right wing of the British, and the advanced picquets were already beginning to fire. Lord William Bentinck's brigade, consisting of the 4th, 42d, and 50th regiments, maintained this post. It was a bad position, and yet, if the troops gave way on that point, the ruin of the army was inevitable. The guards were in their rear. General Paget was ordered to advance with the reserve, and support Lord William. The enemy opened a cannonade from eleven heavy guns, advantageously planted on the hills. Two strong columns, one advancing from a wood, the other skirting its edge, directed their march towards the right

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*Battle of
Gorritia.*

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wing. A third column approached the centre: a fourth advanced slowly upon the left: a fifth remained half way down the hill, in the same direction. Both in number and weight of guns they had a decided superiority; and they fired with such effect from the commanding situation which they had chosen, that the balls in their bounding reached the British reserve, and occasioned some loss there.

Sir David Baird had his arm shattered with a grape-shot as he was leading on his division. The two lines of infantry advanced against each other: they were separated by stone walls and hedges which intersected the ground: but as they closed, it was perceived that the French line extended beyond the right flank of the British, and a body of the enemy was observed moving up the valley to turn it. Marshal Soult's intention was to force the right of the British, and thus to interpose between Coruña and the army, and cut it off from the place of embarkation. Failing in this attempt, he was now endeavouring to out-flank it. Half of the 4th regiment was therefore ordered to fall back, forming an obtuse angle with the other half. This manœuvre was excellently performed, and they commenced a heavy flanking fire: Sir John Moore called out to them, that this was exactly what he wanted to be done, and rode on to the 50th, commanded by Majors Napier and Stanhope. They got over an inclosure in their front, charged the enemy most gallantly, and drove them out of the village of Elvina; but Major Napier, advancing too far in the pursuit, received several wounds, and was made prisoner, and Major Stanhope was * killed.

* He was shot through the heart, and died so instantaneously, that the smile with which he was regarding the conduct of his men was fixed upon his cheek. They buried him at the entrance of the bivouac which he had occupied the preceding night;

The General now proceeded to the 42d. "Highlanders," said he, "remember Egypt!" . . they rushed on, and drove the French before them, till they were stopped by a wall : Sir John accompanied them in this charge. He now sent Captain Hardinge to order up a battalion of guards to the left flank of the 42d. The officer commanding the light infantry conceived, at this, that they were to be relieved by the guards, because their ammunition was nearly expended, and he began to fall back. The General, discovering the mistake, said to them, "My brave 42d, join your comrades : ammunition is coming, and you have your bayonets!" Upon this, they instantly moved forward. Captain Hardinge returned, and pointed out to the General where the guards were advancing. The enemy kept up a hot fire, and their artillery played incessantly on the spot where they were standing. A cannon-shot struck Sir John, and carried away his left shoulder, and part of the collar-bone, leaving the arm hanging by the flesh. He fell from his horse on his back, his countenance did not change, neither did he betray the least sensation of pain. Captain Hardinge, who dismounted, and took him by the hand, observed him anxiously watching the 42d, which was warmly engaged, and told him they were advancing ; and upon that intelligence his countenance brightened. Colonel Graham, who now came up to assist him, seeing the composure of his features, began to hope that he was not wounded, till he perceived the dreadful laceration. From the size of the wound, it was in vain to make any attempt at stopping the blood ; and Sir John consented to be removed in a blanket to the rear. In raising him up, his sword, hanging

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and as his brother leant forward to look upon the body for the last time, a rifle-shot passed through his cloak, and struck his side ; its force was broken by the folds of the cloak, otherwise the blow must have been fatal, and he would have fallen into the grave upon his brother's corpse.

CHAP. on the wounded side, touched his arm, and became entangled
XV. between his legs: Captain Hardinge began to unbuckle it; but
1809. the General said, in his usual tone and manner, and in a distinct
January. voice, "It is as well as it is; I had rather it should go out of the
field with me." Six soldiers of the 42d and the guards bore him.
Hardinge, observing his composure, began to hope that the
wound might not be mortal, and said to him, he trusted he
might be spared to the army, and recover. Moore turned his
head, and looking steadfastly at the wound for a few seconds,
replied, "No, Hardinge, I feel that to be impossible."

As the soldiers were carrying him slowly along, he made
them frequently turn round, that he might see the field of battle,
and listen to the firing; and he was well pleased when the sound
grew fainter. A spring-waggon came up, bearing Colonel
Wynch, who was wounded: the Colonel asked who was in the
blanket, and being told it was Sir John Moore, wished him to
be placed in the waggon. Sir John asked one of the Highlanders
whether he thought the waggon or the blanket was best? and the
man said the blanket would not shake him so much, as he and
the other soldiers would keep the step, and carry him easy. So
they proceeded with him to his quarters at Coruña, weeping as
they went.

General Paget, meantime, hastened with the reserve to sup-
port the right wing. Colonel Beckwith dashed on with the rifle
corps, repelled the enemy, and advanced so far as nearly to carry
off one of their cannon; but a corps greatly superior moved up
the valley, and forced him to retire. Paget, however, attacked
this body of the enemy, repulsed it, and pressed on, dispersing
every thing before him, till the enemy, perceiving their left wing
was now quite exposed, drew it entirely back. The French then
advanced upon Generals Manningham and Leith, in the centre,
and there they were more easily repelled, the ground being more

elevated, and favourable for artillery. The position on the left was strong, and their effort there was unavailing: but a body of them took possession of a village on the road to Betanzos, and continued to fire from it, till Lieutenant-Colonel Nicholls attacked it, and beat them out. Night was now closing in, and the French had fallen back in all parts of the field. The firing, however, was not discontinued till it was dark.

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Never was any battle gained under heavier disadvantages. The French force exceeded 20,000 men, the British were not 15,000. The superiority in artillery was equally great: . . the enemy had met English guns on the way, sent off, thus late, to the patriotic armies, and these they had turned back, and employed against the English. Our artillery was embarked; and the Shrapnell shells, which contributed so materially to the success at Vimeiro, were not used in this more perilous engagement. If the moral and physical state of the two armies be considered, the disadvantages under which our soldiers laboured were still greater: . . the French, equipped in the stores which they had overtaken upon the road, elated with a pursuit wherein no man had been forced beyond his strength, and hourly receiving reinforcements to their already superior numbers; . . the English, in a state of misery, to which no army, perhaps, had ever before been reduced till after a total defeat; having lost their military chest, their stores, their baggage, their horses, their women and children, their sick, their wounded, their stragglers, every thing but their innate, excellent, unconquerable courage. From 6000 to 7000 men had sunk under the fatigues of their precipitate retreat. The loss in the battle did not amount to 800; that of the * French is believed to have exceeded 2000. If such a victory

* The historian of Marshal Soult's campaigns in 1809 states the loss of the French at 150 killed and 500 wounded. They were successful on all points, he says; the victory

CHAP. was gained by the British army under such circumstances, what
 XV. might not have been achieved by that army when unbroken, with
 1809. all its means at hand, in health and strength, in its pride, and
January. in its height of hope!

The General lived to hear that the battle was won. "Are the French beaten?" was the question which he repeated to every one who came into his apartment; and he expressed how great a satisfaction it was to him to know that they were defeated. "I hope," he said, "the people of England will be satisfied! I hope my country will do me justice." Then, addressing Colonel Anderson, who had been his friend and companion in arms for one-and-twenty years, he said to him, "Anderson, you know that I have always wished to die this way... You will see my friends as soon as you can: . . . tell them every thing. . . Say to my mother"—But here his voice failed, he became excessively agitated, and did not again venture to name her. Sometimes he asked to be placed in an easier posture. "I feel myself so strong," he said, "I fear I shall be long dying. It is great uneasiness... it is great pain." But, after a while, he pressed Anderson's hand close to his body, and, in a few minutes, died without a struggle. He fell, as it had ever been his wish to do; in battle and in victory. No man was more beloved in private life, nor was there any general in the British army so universally respected. All men had thought him worthy of the chief com-

was decided, and if the action had begun earlier, and if the ground had permitted the cavalry to charge, *c'en était fait de cette armée Anglaise*. These are modest mis-statements in an author who asserts that, in the hope of impeding the French in their pursuit, the English conceived the horrible intention of blowing up the town of Betanzos, where the inhabitants had received them as allies; and that for this purpose they deposited six thousand weight of powder on the ground floor of the town-house, and set fire to the four quarters of the town!!

mand. Had he been less circumspect, had he looked more ardently forward, and less anxiously around him, and on all sides, and behind, . . . had he been more confident in himself and in his army, and impressed with less respect for the French Generals, he would have been more equal to the difficulties of his situation. Despondency was the radical weakness of his mind. Personally he was as brave a man as ever met death in the field ; but he wanted faith in British courage, and it is faith by which miracles are wrought in war as well as in religion. But let it ever be remembered with gratitude, that, when some of his general officers advised him to conclude the retreat by a capitulation, Sir John Moore preserved the honour of England.

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He had often said that, if he were killed in battle, he wished to be buried where he fell. The body was removed at midnight to the citadel of Coruña. A grave was dug for him on the rampart there, by a party of the 9th regiment, the aides-du-camp attending by turns. No coffin could be procured ; and the officers of his staff wrapped the body, dressed as it was, in a military cloak and blankets. The interment was hastened ; for, about eight in the morning, some firing was heard, and they feared that, if a serious attack were made, they should be ordered away, and not suffered to pay him their last duty. The officers of his family bore him to the grave ; the funeral service was read by the chaplain ; and the corpse was covered with earth.

Meantime, General Hope, on whom the command devolved, passed the night in embarking the troops. At ten o'clock he ordered them to march from the field by brigades, leaving strong picquets to guard the ground, and give notice if the enemy approached. Major-General Beresford, with a rear-guard of about 2000 men, to cover the embarkation, occupied the lines in front of Coruña. Major-General Hill, with a corps of reserve, was

CHAP. XV. stationed on a promontory behind the town. Nearly the whole
1809. army was embarked during the night: the picquets were with-
January. drawn and embarked also before day, little remaining ashore
Jan. 17. at daylight except the rear-guard and the reserve. The French,
seeing this, pushed on their light troops to the heights of St.
Lucia, which command the harbour, got up some cannon to a
rising ground, and fired at the transports. Several of the masters
of these vessels were frightened, and cut their cables: four of
them ran a-ground. The men were put on board other ships,
and these were burnt. During the night of the 17th, and the
following morning, Beresford sent off all the sick and wounded
who were in a condition to bear removal: and, lastly, the rear-
guard got into the boats, no attempt being made to interrupt them.
Thus terminated our first campaign in Spain.

END OF VOL. I.

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